
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES



Volume IX

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY FROM 350 TO 600 A.D.

KARL H. POTTER

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VOLUME IX

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KARL H. POTTER

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PREFACE

In the Preface to Volume VIII, the previous volume of this Encyclopedia dealing with Buddhist philosophy, certain disclaimers were made by this Editor. These remarks, concerning the limitations on our knowledge of the Buddhist authors and works and the shortcomings of the Editor's understanding of the material there surveyed, apply likewise to material in the present Volume, whose Editor is unfortunately the same person. I can only hope that someone more conversant with the language and literature of Buddhist philosophy can be found to write the Introductions to the future Volumes.

This Volume, like its predecessors, has been made possible in part by grants from various agencies: the American Institute of Indian Studies, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Smithsonian Institute, as well as the University of Washington. Many thanks to all. I should like particularly to thank Prof. Eli Franco for his needed last-minutue corrections to the Introduction, some of which came unfortunately, though no fault of his, too late to incorporate into the final version published here. And Dr. Christine Mullikin Keyt has, as before, provided invaluable aid in resolving many of the problems that have arisen during the preparation of the manuscript on my present computer and its predecessors.

January 2003 Karl H. Potter

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

ADV	:	*Abhidharmadīpa-Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* (ed. P.S. Jaini). Patna 1959
AKB	:	Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa,* ed. P. Pradhan. Patna 1967
AS	:	*Abhidharmasamuccaya*
ASBh	:	Sthiramati, *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*
Asl	:	Buddhaghosa, *Dhammasaṅgaṇī-Aṭṭhakathā*
ASV	:	*Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*
Bagchi	:	Prabodh Chandra Bagchi, *Le canon bouddhique en Chine, les traducteurs et les traductions.* Paris 1927
ca.	:	around (the year ...)
CSL	:	Paramārtha, Chuan Shih lun
EnBud	:	*Encyclopedia of Buddhism*
Feer	:	Leon Feer, *Fragments extraits du Kandjour.* AMG 5, 1883
GT	:	Giuseppe Tucci, *Opera Minore* (Roma 1971-72)
K	:	*A Comparative Analytical Catalogue of the Kanjur Division of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka,* cp. Bunkyo Sakurabe. Kyoto 1930-32
Lancaster	:	Lewis R. Lancaster, *The Korean Buddhism Canon: a Descriptive Catalogue.* Berkeley 1979
Kosa	:	Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa*
Law	:	Bimala Churn Law, *Buddhaghosa.* BBRAS Monograph 1 (Bombay 1946)
Ligeti	:	Lajor Ligeti, *Catalogue du kanjur mongol imprimé, par Rinchen.* New Delhi 1964
LVPAK	:	Louis de la Vallée Poussin (tr.), *Abhidharmakośa*
MMK	:	Nāgārjuna, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*
MPPS	:	*Mahāprajñāramitopadeśa*
MRP	:	Bhavya, *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*
MSA	:	*Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra*
MV	:	Asaṅga, *Madhyāntavibhāga*
MVB	:	Vasubandhu, *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya*
N(anjio)	:	Nanjio, *A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka* (Oxford 1883)
NCat	:	New Catalogues Catalogorum
op.cit	:	referred to above

P(eking)	:	*The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition.* Tokyo 1962
Pati	:	*Paṭisambhidāmagga*
PHK	:	Nāgārjuna, *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikā*
PSAVDh	:	*Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅgadharmaparyāya*
PSK	:	Ullangha, *Pratītyasamutpādaśāstra*
Ratna	:	Sāramati, *Ratnagotravibhāga*
SAKV	:	Yaśomitra, *Sphuṭārtha-Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (ed. U. Wogihara). Tokyo 1932-36
T	:	*Canon de Taisho* (Tokyo 1924-35)
TJ	:	Bhavya, *Madhyamakahṛdaya-Tarkajvālā*
Toh(oku)	:	*Catalogue of the Tibetan Works in the Tohoku University Collection.* Sendai 1953
Vism	:	Buddhaghosa, *Visuddhimagga*

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

This Volume attempts to cover the development of Buddhist philosophical notions from approximately the time of Vasubandhu and his acrimonious critic .Saṁghabhadra--that is from about the mid-fourth century, to the end of the sixth century A.D. It is a glorious period in Indian history generally, the time of the Gupta kings and relative peace throughout the subcontinent, though perhaps the same cannot be said of Laṅkā (until recently called Ceylon) to the south. However, even there, whatever political difficulties there may have been, this age saw in Laṅkā the two large treatises of Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta, two scholars whose works constitute the most thorough reviews we have of Theravāda Buddhism.

In India visits of Chinese travellers continued and increased. Perhaps most notable was Fa-hsien, who between 399 and 412 travelled through Inner Asia to Samarkand, crossed from Kashgar to Kashmir and Gandhara, visited Mathura, Varanasi, Nalanda and Kalinga, and exited by way of Anuradhapura in Sri Lanka, returning to China by way of Sumatra and the Pacific. Other Chinese translator-travellers to India in this period include Seng-chien (388-408), Chih-yen (427), Pao-Yün (427, who travelled to India with Fa-hsien), Hsiang Kung (420-479), Chü-ch'ü Ching-sheng (455), Kong Tö-che (=Guṇasatya?), who travelled to China between 454 and 465), T'an Yao (472), and Ki Kia Ya (472).

There were also a large number of Indians traveling to China who translated Buddhist works in this period. Among Indian translators of philosophical works dealt with in the present Volume, besides Buddhayaśas and Kumārajīva, many of whose translations were of works dealt with in our Volume Eight, we may note, in what is said to be relative chronological order: Buddhabhadra, born in Kashmir, who was in China at the beginning of the fifth century and who died in 429; Dharmakṣema from Central India, who got as far as Cutch, modern Qizil in Chinese Turkestan and translated a large number of works, dying in 433; Guṇabhadra, also from Central India, who went to China by way of Ceylon and died in Canton in 468; Mandrasena, who came from Funan to Leang and was translating in 503; Dharmaruci, translating in 504; Saṁghabhara, born in 460, translated between 506-523, and died in 524; Gautama Prajñāruci, a Brahmin from Varanasi who was in China between 516 and 538; Bodhiruci, who was in China between 508 and 536;

Buddhaśānta, who flourished in China between 520 and 539; Vimokṣasena, in China around 541; Upaśūnya, in China 538-565; Narendrayaśas (there are perhaps two persons of that name); Jinayaśas from Magadha; Dharmagupta of royal lineage from South India who travelled through Kashgar, Tashkent, Cutch and Turfan to China, arriving there in 590; as well as Paramārtha, for whose life and travels see the introduction to #173 below.

As for the authors of the works summarized in this Volume, we know of the whereabouts and lives of only a few of them. From north India we can count Skandhila/Sugandhara, Śamathadeva, Buddhasena and Vimalamitra, while from the south came Buddhaghosa, Buddhadatta, Buddhapālita, Dignāga, Kambala, Guṇamati and Cāttanār. Bhavya and Paramārtha came from Central India, while the Theravāda monks Mahānāma and Upasena appear to have come from, or at least spent their lives in, Laṅkā.

The meager traditions about the dates and location of these authors provide little insight into the history of our period. We are entirely at a loss concerning the earlier part, the 4th-5th centuries. Concerning the 6th century there is more information available, largely centering on the two great Universities at Nālandā and Valabhī, the inceptions of which must be supposed to date from around 500 or perhaps a bit before.

In Volume Eight of this *Encyclopedia* we reviewed André Bareau's accont of the Buddhist schools that appear to have been active during the second to the fourth centuries and in many cases before that time. Many of these persisted and appear to have thrived during our present period.

However, Heinz Bechert points out that "(T)here is, unfortunately, still much confusion on the nature of Buddhist 'sects' or 'schools' in spite of the enormous amount of writing that has been done on Budddhist sects. This confusion is caused by confounding different types of sects. ...(A) *nikāya* or sect can be described as a group or community of monks that mutually acknowledge the validity of their *upasampadā* or higher ordination and therefore can join together in the performance of *vinayakarma*s, i.e., legal acts prescribed by Vinaya or Buddhist ecclesiastical law...(T)he controversies leading to the formation of these sects did not completely stop after the final codification of the various 'sectarian' recensions of the *vinaya* scriptures, but turned to minor matters not clearly regulated in the texts and to disputes on the interpretation of the texts. The *nikāya*s formed in this way should be termed 'sub-sects', and the three *nikāya*s in mediaeval Ceylonese Buddhism are 'sub-sects' of

Theravāda in this sense."

"...(O)nly a few of the sects mentioned in the context of the early doctrinal controversies succeeded in developing a consistent system of philosophy which had its impact on the progress of philosophical thought in India. Later sources usually list four schools of Buddhist thought, viz., Sarvāstivādin (or Vaibhāṣika), Sautrāntika, Śūnyavādin (or Mādhyamika) and Vijñānavādin (or Yogācāra)..."

"There should be no confusion of these philosophical schools with the earlier doctrinal and the early *vinaya* sects. A Sarvāstivādin, in the sense of the follower of the Sarvāstivāda philosophy, could well be a member of a rather different *vinaya* sect, particularly of a sect which had no philosophical tradition of its own. There is a well-known *vinaya* sect which adopted not only the philosophy but also the name of the Sarvāstivāda, viz. the Mūlasarvāstivādin. This sect was not a sub-sect of the Sarvāstivādin but it had a *vinaya* tradition of its own."

"...The formation of Mahāyāna Buddhism was an innovation of a new kind, quite dissimilar from the formation of Buddhist sects. It was an event taking place not on the basis of the understanding of monastic discipline nor of doctrinal controversies of the traditional kind, but on a different level, viz. by a new definition of the goal of the religious life. Instead of attaining to personal liberation as a follower of the advice given by the Buddha, a Mahāyānist has decided to go along the path of a Bodhisattva, but a *bhikṣu* of Mahāyāna Buddhism did not at all cease to be a member of one of the *nikāyas*, because nobody could become a *bhikṣu* except by an *upasampadā* based on the *vinaya* tradition of one of the *nikāyas*. When Mahāyāna developed, there originated two factions in most of the ancient Buddhist *nikāyas* or sects: a mahāyānistic and a hīnayānistic faction."[1]

A lot of what is standardly written and supposed about the "Hīnayāna" and "Mahāyāna" contrast stems from likely confusions of the sort indicated by Bechert. In this Volume we have not attempted to wield a strong editorial pen over references to Buddhist "schools" and especially over references to these two supposed great traditions within Buddhism. In this Introduction, at any rate, we shall try to avoid making those distinctions determinative except where we are actually reporting textual references.

The question of "schools" also has implications concerning the proper way to relate the positions of those whose works are covered in the present Volume. The "traditional" story views these works as

representing differing accounts of reality that, it is implied, stood against each other as starkly alternative interpretations of the Buddha's words. This is the basis for the view, exemplified in Bechert's passage just quoted, that there are essentially four philosophical schools of Buddhism, viz., Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, and that they constitute the main alternative interpretations. This "traditional" story appears to have perhaps been inherited from the theories of Tibetan interpreters of Buddhism, and it certainly received its most influential authority in recent times from Th. Stcherbatsky's account, which was disseminated in English in the early 20th century before more thorough readings of the many texts relating to the question were available.

The position that will be taken in the present Volume is that there are not just four schools of Buddhism, and indeed that the views associated with these four schools are not necessarily to be viewed as rival alternatives. The relation between Buddhist philosophers' ideas is more complex than that. While it is true that one finds occasional explicit attacks by one Buddhist philosopher against things said by other Buddhist philosophers, such passages are rather infrequent before the time of Bhavya in the latter part of the sixth century. Not that Buddhism is entirely free from intraBuddhistic squabbling. In particular it is clear that later Buddhists, who arrived at the ideal of the Bodhisattva as an even loftier aim than the mere natural final demise of an *arhat*, did not avoid using the terms that characterize the older understanding--terms such as "Hīnayāna" or "*pratyekabuddha*". The contrast between the two ideals--of Buddha vs. Bodhisattva--is, however, a separable question from that of properly understanding Buddhist philosophical theses. After all, a Bodhisattva will eventually be a Buddha, and the aim of gaining enlightenment and eventual release from rebirths remains a common and undisputed feature for all Indian Buddhism.

A broad overview of the period this Volume covers may well pick out several themes of special importance. One is, as said above, the development of further comprehensive surveys of Ābhidharmika notions, not only by Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta in the fifth century, but also notably by Vimalamitra and Yaśomitra toward the end of the sixth. A second development, of overreaching import for the subsequent centuries of Buddhist thought in India, is to be found especially in the work of Dignāga, who for the first time and almost single-handedly provided Buddhism with a thorough, detailed, and analytic epistemology, logical theory and theory of language. A third noteworthy development must

surely be the installation of the great Universities of Nālandā and Valabhī, where most of the figures whose writings make up Buddhist philosophical literature in the latter part of the sixth century taught, and several of whom occupied administrative positions there. A fourth aspect of the period here under review comprises the interpretations of Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika methods provided by Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka (or, as we shall refer to him for brevity's sake, Bhavya). Some would say that another theme must be found in the development of Yogācāra thought, though in the period under study here only the commentaries of Sthiramati on Vasubandhu's Yogācāra works constitute clear contributions to Yogācāra literature. Whether Dignāga's or Bhavya's works are to be counted as Yogācāra is a debatable matter. We shall refer to Dignāga's position simply as that of the "Buddhist Logicians". And if one looks to eventual developments in Buddhism outside of India one will have to count the tradition stemming from the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and its commentaries as still a sixth feature of importance in the period here covered.

From another, less "academic" point of view, the most important contribution of our period is the vastly increased emphasis on the notion of a Bodhisattva. As a conception of what one should aim to be in life, it increasingly appears that this Bodhisattva ideal comes to supplement that of the liberated Buddha as a state which is capable of being realized in a thinkable amount of time, and which can appeal to the humanitarian sentiments of the populace rather than the austere, otherworldly aim of complete release from the cycle of rebirths.

Among the themes or topics listed in the last two paragraphs, five concern specific aspects of Buddhist philosophical thought and will be dealt with later in separate sections in this Introduction. Concerning the rise of the Universities, however, it seems best to turn to that now. Fortunately, there is a monograph, originally an M. A. thesis, by H. D. Sankalia which reviews in detail what is said about Nālandā (and some stray information about Valabhī) published in book form in 1934 and reprinted in 1972.[2] While the account Sankalia gives is somewhat dated now, since there seems to be little else to go on we shall follow his lead.

Nālandā, in Magadha, was very early associated with Buddhism, and is indeed referred to in canonical tales about the Buddha's lifetime. He is said to have visited there many times with Ānanda, and Tāranātha says it was the birthplace of the monk Śāriputta, and that King Aśoka erected "a great Buddhist temple" there.[3] Tāranātha also claims that Nāgārjuna

and Āryadeva (see Volume Seven of this Encyclopedia) "took interest in the educational institutions of the place".[4] Fa-hsien mentions Nālandā (though not by name: Sankalia argues he did not visit it), and Hsüan-tsang later on confirms that it was located seven miles from Rājagṛha, not far from modern Patna in Bihar state. Both I-tsing and Hsuan-tsang agree that a temple there was built by a "Śakrāditya" who, Sakalia argues, was in fact Kumāragupta I, the Gupta king coins and other evidence of whom are to be found still in the region. Kumāragupta flourished in 415-455, and was followed by the subsequent Gupta monarchs in supporting the building of classrooms and living places for the monks/students, culminating in Harṣavardhana of Kanauj at the close of the sixth century, who built a brass *vihāra* there. Sankalia concludes "that there were at least six (or possibly seven) colleges at Nālandā", each with a *vihāra* built by one or another of the Gupta emperors down to Harṣa.[5] It also had "a grand library".[6] At Nālandā the study of the Vedas and Upaniṣads, along with Sāṁkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist works was carried on, though perhaps only by advanced students.[7]

If the dates Sankalia argues for are right, then, Nālandā was an active center of instruction and learning at least by the middle of the fifth century. Although the dating of Buddhist authors is a chancy (and much argued) business, there are traditions associating Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, as well as Dignāga, with Nālandā. Several other authors of works summarized in this Volume appear to have been teachers at, and in several cases the Presidents of, the University. They include Guṇamati, Paramārtha, and Sthiramati. Sthiramati is known to have eventually abandoned Nālandā in favor of Valabhī.

CHAPTER TWO: ABHIDHARMA

The process leading to enlightenment and *nirvāṇa* receives extensive treatment by many of the authors surveyed in the following pages. The overall process, however, remains essentially unchanged from its formulation in earlier Buddhist literature, e.g., in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, a work which may have been composed only a little before the period surveyed in this Volume. After committing himself to the life of a seeker, a person appeals to a teacher, a "good friend", (*kalyāṇamitra*), for help in initiating meditation designed to eliminate the hindrances (sensual desire, ill-will, sloth and torpor, restlessness and worry, and doubt). By adopting vows to follow a moral way of living, by showing disinterest in attractive objects and neutrality toward unattractive ones, by developing mindfulness and discernment in the deportment of his life, he prepares himself for the practice of meditation.

Following again his teacher's advice, the seeker at this point begins practicing entering meditation either with the aim of suppressing the five hindrances fully one by one (the gradual path, or path of serenity (*śuddhi*) or by reflecting analytically on the causes and conditions of those hindrances and thus developing insight and calm (the path known as *vipassanā* in Pāli).

Although the requisites for enlightenment can thus briefly be described as abandonment of the five hindrances, what Abhidharma path-philosophy is largely concerned with is the advancement through several stages (basically four) of meditative concentration, each of which can be understood as the abandoning of certain factors blocking one's way together with the attainment of other factors constituting that stage's attainment. (It has to be kept in mind, in reading these texts, that the context of these discussions, and their terminology, is technical in the sense of referring to quite private experiences whose precise nature can only be understood by attaining the requisite state of meditation. Translation of technical terminology, although in many cases standard, is thus nonetheless not necessarily particularly helpful to the nonpractitioner in understanding the stage's nature, at least in the sense of the mental state experienced therein.)

In descriptions of beginning meditation we are first confronted with

technical terminology referring to the kinds of contents that can be chosen to be concentrated on. The general term for these is *kasiṇa*, a word we have elected not to try to translate throughout the Volume: as the Index indicates, qualities such as colors present appropriate neutral choices for meditation, since one should avoid choosing as such contents any kind of thing which will breed passions such as desire or dislike. Our fledgling meditator chooses, then, a color, say, and proceeds to try to visualize it as clearly with his eyes closed as he can with his eyes open. Being able to do that, the color, referred to as the "counterpart sign" (P. *paṭibhāganimitta)* becomes his "learning sign" (P. *uggahanimitta*), lacking the aspects of its former "physical" status, aspects such as extension and shape. The meditator's mind is thus fully absorbed in the sign.

At this first level (*dhyāna*, Pāli *jhāna*), while the meditator needs to understand the entire panoply of psychic states that are visited on him, we are told that five such factors are especially relevant: they are those here rendered as initial thought (*vitarka*), sustained thought (*vicāra*), joy (*prīti*), satisfaction (*sukha*), and one-pointedness (*ekāgratā*). The first two of these are explained as involving conceptual categories of thought, the difference between them lying in the intensity, range and fixity of one's concentration. Joy and satisfaction indicate respectively the emotional effect of that *kasiṇa* (its desirability) and the subjective feeling that arises in the meditator. Since the meditator has separated out the content of his concentration, his mental state is appropriately described as one-pointed.

Saying that one concentrates on the sign does not mean he is not also aware of the context in which that sign appears. Although the concentration is single, it actually focuses on the sign in the context of a large number of mental concomitants which are present as "background". These are the myriad psychological factors known to us from such lists as are found in the *Abhidharmakośa* listed as "associated mental factors" (*caitasika* or *caitta*). At this level, while a single color, say, is the content of concentration, that color is still thought of in a context of its relations to the meditator's feelings, wants, other sensory presentations, the capacities of the object to cause other mental features to arise--thus, the entire sprectrum of associations present to this particular meditator, with the incipient possibility of discursive analysis thus still present which could and would, if it were attended to, arise from linguistic expression of what is happening to the meditator.

The language of meditation needs to be carefully distinguished from the more general language in which one may describe the moments in

any cognitive process. The technical terminology of this language of meditation and its analysis is found fully in Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga*. Since the texts covered in this Volume use this language it had better be clarified here.

According to Sarvāstivāda any awareness (*citta*) lasts for a very short time, only a fraction of a second, but even within that time it undergoes four stages of arising, duration, decay and destruction. We are unable to discern these momentary stages; our experience is of a process or "stream of consciousness" theoretically composed of these momentary elements. More precisely, two kinds of series of momentary consciousnesses comprise our experience. One kind is known as *bhavaṅga* (a term left untranslated here), which refers to the series of contentless awarenesses that ensures one's personal continuity from the first moment in one's mother's womb until the moment of death.[8] The other kind is the consciousness-process (*cittaviṭhi*) which arises replacing the first when something--a sensory or mental datum--impinges on one's consciousness. Let us suppose that this new series occurs in a person involved in meditation.

This second, consciousness-process series begins with a vibration (*calana*) of the *bhavaṅga* marking the inception of a definite intention to act. This is followed by the replacement of the *bhavaṅga* series by the moments of the consciousness-process. Just after this the mind of the meditator, now focused on the sign he has chosen to meditate on, is said to "advert" to the object or sign through the "mind-door" (*manodvāra*)--the process we commonly refer to as attending to the object. After this a series of "impulsions" (*javana*) occur, a first impulsion which prepares one for the first meditative level described above, the second impulsion known as "access" (*upacāra*) meditation since it brings one to be aware of his entry into meditation. A third moment called "adaptation" or "inclination" (*anuloma*) adapts the meditator's awareness-stream to the meditative process, while a fourth, called "change of lineage" (*gotrabhū*), in this context stands for one's transfer from ordinary sensory awareness to the meditative level. These four are referred to collectively as "access concentration" (*upacārasamādhi*), since they provide access to meditation itself.

After this preparation the moment of meditative concentration arises. At the initial stages of training there will occur just one moment (comprising three sections of arising, duration and ending), after which the consciousness-process (in this special sense) ends and one lapses back

into *bhavaṅga.* Training and practice in meditation will eventually allow one to extend this single moment to two, three or more moments. That section of the process, whichever number of moments it comprises, is known as "absorption concentration" (P. *appanāsamādhi*).[9]

The above account is intended to introduce the reader to the first of four levels of meditation and to a description of the process of meditation itself. Each of the five factors that delineate the first level--initial and applied thought, joy, satisfaction and one-pointedness--must be present in the moment(s) of first-level meditation for the exercise to be useful; each of the five has a specific function in fending off one or another of the five hindrances. We are told that perfecting this first level involves not only the enlarging of the sign in his contemplation but more relevantly five kinds of mastery (P. *vasī*)--mastery in adverting, being the ability to attend to the factors meditated on in a previous meditation; mastery in attaining concentration quickly; mastery in remaining in the meditation for exactly the period of time planned; mastery in emerging quickly and easily from trance; and mastery in reviewing immediately after what one has just attended to. When one has attained these abilities, one is ready for the second meditative level.

Much the same structure is used in analyzing the second and third meditative levels as for the first, but with certain crucial differences. Where the first level concerned itself mainly with the five factors of initial and applied thought, joy, satisfaction and one-pointedness, this second level eventuates in graduation beyond thinking of either the initial or applied sorts. However, this does not occur immediately. The analysis of the meditative process through the completion of access concentration is as before, the difference being the arising of the first moment of full absorption (*appanāsamādhi*). In this second stage, the factors of initial and applied thought disappear. It is said that at this level the disappearance of the two kinds of thought coincides with the confidence (*samprasādana*) gained by such mastery, a confidence which is analyzed as involving faith and tranquility. Moreover, the joy and satisfaction found in this second stage is a function of that very faith and tranquility, and they are not undermined by features of the discursive thought which has been left behind. This second level or stage is referred to as "material" (*rūpa*), but there is nothing in it particularly to do with matter or for that matter color (either of which "*rūpa*" can mean ordinarily).

Likewise, attaining the "immaterial" (*arūpa*) level, the third, involves intensifying the features of the second, once the introductory aspects of

the process are gotten through. That is to say, the joy indicative of second-level meditative attainment is discarded as potentially backward-leading, involving concerns undermining the confidence, faith and tranquility gained by entering the third level. The features of this third-level meditation are confined to satisfaction and one-pointedness: one is said to dwell in equanimity, mindfulness and discernment.

Eventually even the satisfaction inherent in the third level is found to be a weakness, and one proceeds to a final fourth level where neither satisfaction nor dissatisfaction obtain but only mindfulness and discernment: the virtue of equanimity prevails, a neutrality in which all attachment is abandoned. But even here one is still aware of factors; it is one's attitude towards them that differs.

From this point one may continue in three directions. First, one can meditate on four topics termed *ārūpya*: meditation on boundless space, on boundless consciousness, on nothingness, or on neither-perception-nor-nonperception. The realization of these must be in that order, but progress through the four involves no further diminution of hindrances, though it does feature greater refinement of equanimity and one-pointedness.

Secondly, and subsequent to the four meditations just mentioned, besides practising meditation in a variety of ways on eight different *kasiṇa*s, one can develop various kinds of higher faculties (*abhijñā*). These remarkable abilities are essentially those featured in the Pāli canon and identified in the Introductions to previous Volumes of this Encyclopedia.

The third direction in which one may proceed after mastering the fourth meditative state is to develop wisdom by following what is termed the "noble path". We shall shortly turn to summarize what the texts say about this path.

One may at this point ask about the amount of time it takes to complete the mastery of these various levels of meditative advancement, and since a life eventually ends, how the kind of being one is, and in due course becomes, conditions or affects both the kind of rebirth he gets and his capacity for continuing advancement. Does he, e.g., revert to square one (pre-first level experiencing) if he dies after having achieved a higher level of meditation? No. The level at which he finds himself in the next life has to do with those karmic traces from previous lives that are activated at the beginning of the new one. As is generally held throughout Indian thought, one's next life is governed by various sorts of karma earned in previous lives, with the added notion that the karmic traces of

extremely good or bad deeds take precedence over the others in governing one's next rebirth, with proximity to the time of death constituing another factor in calculating which stored karma is likely to be activated the next time around. The notion is clearly that the workings of these principles will ensure that one's next birth will provide the appropriate conditions for one to continue his spiritual development with only minor interruption.

Specifically there are three stages (or planes, *bhūmi*, also rendered as "spheres") of beings: sensuous (*kāmāvacāra*), material (without desires) (*rūpāvacāra*) and immaterial (*arūpāvacāra*). These are related causally and linguistically to the "levels" we were just speaking of, but are not identical with them. The first, sensory, stage comprises eleven kinds of existence. The first four of these eleven comprise life in hell, as an animal, as a ghost or as a demon (*asura*). A life in these forms is caused by bad karma finding its way at the time of death to the head of the line among the various stored-up factors that may influence one's next life. On the other hand, if a good trace predominates at the time of death/rebirth one can be reborn either as a human being, or as one or another of six kinds of gods. If one has died having attained one or another of the four meditative levels detailed previously, and provided death occurs in the course of meditation, one will be reborn in successive states of advancement corresponding to their accomplishment. Thus one dying while meditating at the first level is said to be reborn in the world of Brahmā, at the second level to be reborn in luster (*ābhā*), at the third level to be reborn in clear (*śubha*) states--each of the three levels being distinguished into lower, middle and higher levels of accomplishment. Those who die having attained the fourth level are reborn in one or another of some seven states depending on their accomplishments beyond the fourth level. On the other hand, if one has attained meditations of one of the four sorts mentioned previously as boundless space, boundless consciousness, nothingness and neither-perception-nor-nonperception, one will be reborn into the appropriate immaterial realm. In this way one who has achieved meditative mastery at each level maintains his status through death and subsequent rebirth.

Of course, if subsequently one loses his concentration at a given level, his next rebirth will be determined by whatever karma becomes determinative at that point. This is because meditation on any of the four mundane levels only suppresses defilements (*kleśa*) but does not uproot them. Thus if one wishes to press on toward liberation one needs to

follow the noble path, as mentioned earlier, that path in which he may finally eradicate all the defilements one is subject to in worldly (*laukika*) existence, a term which covers all the eleven kinds of existence so far mentioned: he takes up the higherworldly or supramundane (*lokottara*) path.

The *Visuddhimagga* details the path to deliverance in terms of morality, concentration and wisdom as well as by an account of seven stages of purification (*viśuddhi*). Running through purification by virtue (*śīla*), of awareness (*citta*), of view (*dṛṣṭi*), by overcoming doubts (*saṁśaya*), by knowledge (*jñāna*) and vision (*darśana*) of the right and wrong paths, by knowledge and vision of the way, and by knowledge and vision, this set of seven provides still another way of understanding the progress of the seeker through the paths of peace and insight. Whichever of these various descriptions summarized above is used, the seeker eventually gets to a point where he has mastered meditative techniques and has inculcated the truths concerning the momentariness, frustratingness and selflessness of things, and after once again reflecting thus a series of three special moments ensues--moments of concentration (P. *parikamma*), access (*upacāra*) and adaptation (or more usually, "conformity") (*anuloma)*, referring to the last moment of insight knowledge before the supramundane path begins--one arrives at what is called "change-of-lineage knowledge" (*gotrabhūjñāna*).

In earlier Volumes on Buddhist thought (Volumes Seven and Eight of this Encyclopedia) the "higher-worldly" progress through the four stages of stream-entry, once-returner, nonreturner and *arhat* have been indicated. Suffice it to say that the practice of meditation continues, and as briefly described in Volume Seven, p. 70, at each successive stage of advancement certain of the defilements are gotten rid of permanently. The language used to describe the meditative techniques involved resembles that employed before, with certain important differences. E.g., whereas worldly meditation produces karma and leads to rebirth, supramundane meditation brings about complete destruction of (karmic) defilements and breeds no rebirths in itself. Also, the factors of which one is aware in worldly meditation at, say, the first or desire-level, which, as we saw, were numerous, are still numerous for the first supramundane meditation but there are significant differences--compassion and sympathetic joy are absent from the list since these can only occur in ordinary sentient beings.

As for the mundane path, there are for the supramundane path certain special states that can be gained along the way for those on one

or another of its levels. One such state is the "attainment of fruition" (*phalasamāpatti*). On the mundane levels the experience constituting attainment of a particular level is brief--a moment or two, followed by immediate reversion to the *bhavaṅga*. When a noble person gains the supramundane level, say, of once-returner he is able to replicate the experience for as long as he desires, thus in a way experiencing the bliss of liberation prior to its ultimate achievement.

Another such special supramundane state is what is briefly called the "attainment of cessation" (*nirodhasamāpatti*). Available only to nonreturners and *arhat*s, this is a state (the "cessation of identification and feeling", *saṁjñāvedayitānirodhasamāpatti*) in which the meditator intentionally stops being conscious after having previously planned the appropriate time to come out of his meditative trance. This special ability, which is found referred to in various Buddhist texts of Abhidharma and other schools, has been the subject of an intensive study by Paul Griffiths, who reviews references to it in various systems and points out the problems it poses in relation to the question of how the state of nonconsciousness differs from death and thus what the ramifications are, e.g., for the question of how it differs from liberation itself.[10]

The conception of the *arhat*, while clearly central to the thinking of the Buddha as conveyed to us through the Pāli canon and Sarvāstivāda analogues, seems to have lost its sway by our period, being replaced by the ideal of a Bodhisattva. Edwina Pio has traced this change,[11] estimating that there were no *arhat*s recognized after the third century A.D.[12]. She attributes this change in Buddhist ways of thinking to a natural function of the changing times, given the increasingly high standards of meditative advancement that are to be discerned in what we have outlined above. She also suggests that the "influences of the Greeks, Persians, Śakas, Parthians and Kushans" contributed to the inroads on the *arhat* ideal, as well as the familiarity with the Buddha image resulting from the depiction of the Buddha in paintings and stone.[13] Whether these factors entirely explain the change, and indeed how complete this change--the adoption of the new ideal of Bodhisattva--actually was can still be argued: certainly the literary remnants of the fourth to sixth centuries as found in the texts summarized in this Volume may suggest that the ideal of Buddhahood still commands attention among the monks, whether or not they thought there were actually any Buddhas in times not far earlier than their own.

On the other hand, Nathan Katz[14] argues "that the Mahāyāna

criticisms of the arahant do not refer to the arahant of the Pāli canon"[15], that the apparent differences in the use of the term in such criticisms "is not referential talk" and that what is needed, which he tries to provide, is a contextual study of the various situations in which, and the purposes for which, the terminology is used. A cursory glance at the summaries of the texts dealt with in the present volume seems to confirm this reading. In the references to Bodhisattvas that are not merely to those we here are calling "seekers", who are often enough also referred to as Bodhisattvas, the "highest" Bodhisattva or *arhat* is characterized as one who is physically reborn but not in the usual way, one who chooses his own rebirths, understands the highest truth, has few wishes, not even for enlightenment, is "established in pure consciousness" (*pratisaṁvid*), and has thirty-two marks that clearly distinguish him from those who are still ridden by the proclivities. It is doubtful that the Mahāyāna criticisms Katz has in mind are putting down such a being: the Buddha, after all, was the most prominent example.

Similarly, Shanta Ratnayaka, analyzing the Theravāda view of the *arhat* in comparison with the Mahāyāna ideal of the Bodhisattva, raises a central question about the Bodhisattva's presumed vow not to be liberated until all others have been liberated. "If everyone waits till everyone attains nirvāṇa, no one will attain nirvāṇa. So, this principle of bodhisattvahood is unpracticable. If it is practiced totally, all beings will remain in saṁsāra."[16] Thus the Buddha was not selfish when after many eons of Bodhisattvahood as told in the Jātaka stories he allowed himself to become entirely liberated. However, *arhat*s have also been Bodhisattvas in previous lives.

This charge of selfishness in the Buddha has also been the subject of what Arthur Danto thinks of as the "Bodhisattva paradox", which is another way of pointing to the alleged selfishness of the Buddha in leaving the rest of us in the lurch, as it were. Roy Perrett has pointed out that it is precisely this "paradox" that the Mahāyāna doctrine of the three bodies of the Buddha is presumably directed toward: though the physical body of the Buddha is no longer available to us after his *nirvāṇa* his other two bodies, his *sambhoga-* and *nirmāṇa-kāya*s, remain to assist those remaining in *saṁsāra*.[17]

CHAPTER THREE: EPISTEMOLOGY, LOGIC AND LANGUAGE

To a reader who comes to Buddhist thought having been previously exposed to the history of modern Western philosophy from Descartes through Hume, it is almost unavoidable to note the apparently close parallels that exist between the various stages in both histories of thought, although the relative chronological relationships do not seem to be the same. Thus it is tempting to align Descartes' realism with Abhidharma ontology and epistemology, Locke's representational realism with that of the Buddhist Logic of Dignāga, the Yogācāra of Vasubandhu with Berkeley's subjective idealism, and Hume's skepticism with Nāgārjuna's phenomenalism, if we may call it that. Irresistible as that comparison may be, it is instructive to consider the differences as well. The most evident difference is chronological. Whereas Hume's skepticism must figure as the culmination of the process found in Western thought, and thus is unsurprisingly developed after and with due awareness of the three other positions (of Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley) that preceded him, in Buddhism Nāgārjuna antedates Vasubandhu by two centuries or more, and Vasubandhu probably lived a century before Dignāga. A second difference is that whereas the development in Western thought seems to have coincided with a move from rationalistic assumptions of the persistent external things of "naive realism" to Locke's halfway house which carefully distinguished persistent substances from fleeting qualities, and from there to the subjectivism of Berkeley where all entities are mind-dependent, to the fleetingness of all experiences found in Hume, in Indian Buddhism most of the schools by this time share the assumption of momentariness, so that the realism of Western rationalism is precluded for them from the start. Furthermore, though Abhidharma constructs "external reals" out of material factors, which are viewed as mind-independent, the move to the eventual Yogācāra view that even material things are ultimately consciousness-only is preceded by Nāgārjuna's skepticism and only afterward followed by Dignāga's studied neutrality on the point.

The preceding paragraph summarizes matters which we wish to make clearer in the remainder of this Chapter. Before that, it is pertinent here to note that the constant comparison with Western epistemological views may inadvertently suggest another, possibly quite mistaken, assumption, which is that these several schools saw themselves as rivals

for the "crown" of the true or "highest" Buddhist position on these points. While that may have been the case, the texts are conspicuously (to the Western eye) lacking in evidence that any of our philosophers (excepting Bhavya and Dharmapāla) saw other Buddhists as guilty of mistaken theories that needed correction. If most of the Yogācāras and Buddhist Logicians of our period saw Mādhyamika as the enemy they certainly kept it to themselves! Rather, what is suggested here is that exponents of the three "Mahāyāna" schools excluding Abhidharma may have seen their relations as positions on a sliding epistemic and ontological scale each well-suited to a certain level of advancement on the part of the student but none of them the Absolute Truth--for the simple reason that they all shared still another widespread assumption, viz., that if there is any Absolute Truth it is unspeakable, that language, which requires acceptance of the negation of the proposition that is denied, is utterly incapable of depicting a situation in which the *catuṣkoṭi* holds sway, where a proposition is neither true, nor false, nor both nor neither.

What was just suggested may, of course, be an accidental outcome of the period of time this Volume covers. In point of fact, there are few published texts of this period which are not commentaries, and most of those few are logical works by Dignāga. It remains to be seen, as we move to the next phase of Buddhist thinking starting with Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti, to what extent the point made in the previous paragraph remains true there. It is also likely that the remarks above may lose some of their importance once we recognize that "Yogācāra" stands for not a single viewpoint but several, of which only the position of e.g. Vasubandhu's *Viṁśatikā* argues a strongly idealistic position. The standpoints of the *Madhyāntavibhāga* and of the *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa* when properly understood, it can be argued, veer more closely toward Nāgārjuna's position (or nonposition), since these texts insist that no one of the three natures (constructed, dependent and perfected) is itself independently real, so that all the three natures, including the perfected, are to be seen as aspects of the conditionally dependent and thus none of them "higher"!

These remarks, hopefully, set the stage for a review of the specific theses and arguments of philosophers of our period here. Given the subtlety of the positions we shall leave off trying to characterize them in terms of Western analogues, although on some of the issues Western scholarship, couched in Western terms, remains the most profound and sophisticated we have and thus may occasion reintroduction of such

scholarship, couched in Western terms, remains the most profound and sophisticated we have and thus may occasion reintroduction of such parallels with respect to more specific matters. And naturally the Western secondary literature as well picks out those topics which have relation to matters found of concern to Western epistemology generally.

1.DIGNĀGA ON PERCEPTION

A good deal of the secondary literature concerns Dignāga, so we shall begin there in this Chapter. And we may as well at the outset try to assess more carefully what Dignāga's position on fundamental matters actually is. (By "fundamental matters" is meant the kind of concerns discussed in the foregoing paragraphs; it is not suggested that these are necessarily the things foremost in Dignāga's own mind.) And for this we begin by looking closely at his *Ālambanaparīkṣā*.

So important is the position of this work that we next provide a resumé of its contents (provided by Georges Dreyfus). "Dignāga...proposes the following argument against realism concerning external objects...Metaphysical realism is based on the intuition that our perception of external objects is accurate. External objects would exist then according to the way we perceive them; that is, as having extension and unity. This is not possible, however, since the individual particles, which compose the objects, cannot create individually the impression of extension. Since no individual atom has such an aspect, there is nothing in reality that corresponds to our impression of extension. One might object that, although particles cannot produce individually perceptions of extended objects, they can collectively create the impression of extension. Against this, Dignāga proposes two possibilities: Either atoms form a mere collection (*saṁghāta*), like a forest or an army, or they are aggregates (*saṁcita*), possessing their own collective structure. The collection cannot be, however, the external support of perception since it is not real. Like a forest, which is a mere name given to a bunch of trees without overall unity, it is a mere conceptual overlay on the individual atoms and, as such, does not exist substantially (*dravya-sat*). Since it is unreal, it cannot cause a consciousness to perceive extension. Similarly, the aggregate, the second alternative, cannot be the external support, for it is attributable to the cognition, not to the object. No collective structure in the object itself exists over and above its individual parts. Otherwise,

we would have Nyāya wholes existing over and above their parts."[18]

The argument seemingly denying external objects is central to the issue concerning the Buddhist school to which Dignāga belonged. On this Richard Hayes reports a complex scholarly disagreement about the final message of the *Ālambanaparīkṣā*: "The majority of scholars have held a view (favoring) the thesis of the sole existence of consciousness. Wayman...emphatically denies that the text argues that only consciousness exists: 'the vulgar interpretation--that this denies external objects--is nonsense'. Warder agrees that it is nonsense to interpret the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* as denying external objects, and he takes this as a sign that Diṅnāga was not a Yogācāra at all but rather a Sautrāntika. Others...argue against Wayman that the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* does deny external objects, agree with Warder that Diṅnāga was a Sautrāntika and conclude against tradition that Diṅnāga did not in fact write the *Ālambanaparīkṣā*."[19]

Since Hayes' summary was published, an even more complex solution to the problem has been suggested by Georges Dreyfus.[20] His argument, which directly concerns Dharmakīrti but extends to Dignāga as well, is that these writers develop "an ascending scale of analysis". "Dignāga and Dharmakīrti...are ontologists only inasmuch as their epistemology requires them to be. They even seem to feel free to alternate between several conflicting metaphysical standpoints. For example, in most parts of their works, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti adopt a so-called Sautrāntika standpoint, presupposing the existence of external objects. In other parts of their works, however, they shift their ontological framework and move to a Yogācāra rejection of external objects... (C)ommonsensical levels are introduced for the sake of convenience and withdrawn to be replaced by higher but more counterintuitive schemes."[21]

The range of views summarized in the foregoing paragaphs also relates centrally to the proper interpretation of Dignāga's newly-introduced category of pure particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*). Once again scholars diverge on the readiness they exhibit to credit Dignāga with a metaphysical thesis identifying the pure particular as ultimately real. A similar range of possibilities on this score is possible, and indeed is found defended in the literature by various writers, depending on whether they read Dignāga as a realist, an idealist, a phenomenalist or in Dreyfus' fashion as proposing an ascending scale of analysis.

But care needs to be taken here. Though the pure particular is identified by Dignāga as the object of perception, perception is also

defined there as free from conceptual construction (*kalpanāpoḍha*; the more common term used later is *nirvikalpaka*), that is, as beyond (or perhaps better, prior to) the association with the categories of language and conceptual thought. Thus, while the pure particular may be the object (*ālambana*) of perception, it is not the content (*viṣaya*) of perception, since it has in itself no features which could be grasped by us. As we saw before, "there is nothing in reality that corresponds to our impression of extension." So whatever it is that is grasped by us in perception it is not the pure particular. What is it then?

Dignāga's answer to this question is that what is grasped is an aspect (*ākāra*). The pure particular itself is not blue, but the content of our cognition is (or has) a blue aspect, though at the initial moment of perceptual awareness we do not cognize it as blue. What, then, is an aspect--i.e., how is it related to the object, the pure particular? Well, if we could not be aware of a thing's blue aspect we couldn't tell a blue content from a yellow one--but that doesn't answer the question of its relation to the *svalakṣaṇa*. What we want to know is whether the pure particular, of which this blue is an aspect, is physical, mind-independent, or mental, mind-dependent.

Georges Dreyfus, whose account is being followed here but who is in fact more concerned with Dharmakīrti than with Dignāga, suggests that at this point "Dharmakīrti shifts to a Yogācāra framework, following Dignāga's example and his strategy of ascending scales of analysis."[22] He adds, however, that the idealism or phenomenalism of Yogācāra is counterintuitive, one that Dharmakīrti refers to rarely, preferring to continue on under the Sautrāntika assumption that mind-independent objects exist. Whether we can safely ascribe the same "ascending scales of analysis" view to Dignāga remains a moot point. But at least we can agree that Dignāga does invoke the concept of "aspect" (*ākāra*) in the relevant sense in his *Upādāyaprajñapti*, and that he also fails to tell us much if anything about the relation between the pure particular and its aspects.

He does try to tell us, however, what kinds of aspects of pure particulars there are. Besides sense-data (as we may term aspects such as blue) he identifies two other kinds of aspects of particulars. Remember that pure particulars themselves are precisely data which are or have aspects involving no construction, thus are "given" in the sense used by, e.g., phenomenalists of recent times in the West. One of the two other kinds of (aspects of) particulars is the kind experienced by the meditator

when he achieves ultimate one-pointedness and "sees the object as it really is". This is an experience allusions to which are well known to us not only from accounts of Buddhist yoga but from Patañjali's Yoga as well.

The other kind of aspect of a pure particular is the awareness itself. That is, when one is perceptually aware of a color, as we say, one is at the same time aware that one is aware of it. The idea is not new; Buddhists have from the beginning talked about the grasper-grasped nature of consciousness. And it is important to emphasize that there are not two awarenesses--one of the object and the other of one's awareness--but that these are two aspects of the same awareness. Thus the standard account of Dignāga's view, which states that Dignāga postulated four kinds of perception, is mistaken. There are, rather, three kinds of perception, namely perception of a datum, mental perception of that datum, and perception by a yogi, and each of them has as content the two aspects or contents, viz., the datum (say, the blue) and one's awareness of that datum.[1] That is to say, when we are aware of something we are also, and always, aware of our awareness of that something.[2]

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[1]See Eli Franco, "Did Dignāga accept four types of perception?", Journal of Indian Philosophy 21, 1993, 295-299. Franco notes that the four-types view, defended by Alex Wayman who is the target of Franco's piece, is also suggested by Masaaki Hattori's English translation of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* I.1.6ab as well as by the explicit readings of some but not all later commentators. He connects his analysis with the parallel passage k. 7cd-8ab, where the word "*sataimiram*" has caused a problem for translators; Franco likewise takes Wayman to task for a misleading reading of that passage as well in "Once again on Dharmakīrti's deviation from Dignāga's *pratyakṣābhāsa*", Journal of Indian Philosophy 14, 1986, 79-97. We discuss this matter below.

[2]This thesis is called the "self-intimation" thesis by Jonardon Ganeri, "Self-intimation, memory and personal identity", Journal of Indian Philosophy 27, 1999, 469-483. Ganeri provides an elegant analysis of the argument and contends that in the final analysis a weaker version of the thesis succeeds, viz., every thought at some higher order is self-aware, but that the stronger thesis, Dignāga's, falls afoul of infinite regress.

The reason for this "double aspect theory", as it is regularly called in the literature, is that when we perceive the blue, since perception is constructionfree (*nirvikalpaka*), we are not aware that we are perceiving blue. Thus by the time that we realize--at a subsequent moment, perhaps the next one--that it is a blue we perceive it is too late to realize as well that we have perceived that blue unless we indeed perceived both that blue and our perception of it at the very same first moment.

Any awareness is "mental", and thus our awareness of the pure particular at the first moment--along with our awareness of our awareness--is of course mental. But Dignāga also seems to have referred in particular to the perceptual awareness at the next moment after the first one as "mental perception", and it is this reference that has (perhaps) misled some to speak of four kinds of perceptual awareness rather than three. But in fact when Dignāga refers to mental perception--and Hattori's translation shows clearly his appreciation of this point--he is not referring to another, fourth, kind of awareness but rather to a second momentary awareness directly following the initial one, a moment which likewise has a double aspect, only differing from the first temporally. It would appear that Dignāga is led to postulate this second moment in order to account for the fact that when we think and speak, and in so doing apply concepts and words to the data of our sense-experience, the initial perceptual moment has elapsed, and in order for us to apply, e.g., the concept "blueness" or "being blue" to what was given in perception at that first moment we need to have the blue that was an aspect of the first awareness around long enough (or better, back again) for us to make the application. (And by the same token, we need our perception of the blue at the first moment to be replicated in order to account for our constructionfilled awareness of that blue's being what it is.) Thus Dignāga postulates a second moment of awareness of the blue, an awareness which is constructionfree but which coincides temporally with the first constructionfilled moment of awareness, i.e., the first moment when we are inclined to think or speak "blue" in application to this datum. This latter constructionfilled moment is, of course, not perceptual at all but "inferential" according to Dignāga's two-fold distinction. In this way the application of concepts to percepts, to use Kantian jargon, is accomplished.[23]

In addition to mental perception of a sense-datum Dignāga also classes within mental perception what he terms the "self-awareness" (*svasaṁvedana*, often also *svasaṁvitti*) of qualities of ourselves--the

examples he gives are desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure and pain. While some, as noted above, try to make this a fourth kind of perception, Dignāga's commentary makes it quite clear that he has in mind here merely the perceptions of the "subjective" counterparts (desire, etc.) of the "objectively" perceived data of "external" sense. Indeed, anything, when grasped in the relevant way that the blue is grasped according to the foregoing account, can be a pure particular: Dignāga illustrates this by pointing out that even the first awareness of conceptual construction is pure perception.

Why does Dignāga argue so vehemently for this theory of perception? Franco argues that it is because he was explicitly denying the possibility that our organs of immediate awareness are capable of being mistaken. Dignāga insists on this because he has in mind Nāgārjuna's attack on perception and the other instruments of knowledge. Wishing to substantiate our capability of grasping reality, and mindful of Nāgārjuna's critique of the instruments of knowledge in, e.g., *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, Dignāga secures perception as a genuine instrument of knowledge by defining perception in such a way that, being free from conceptual construction, it cannot possibly be subject to error, since error requires a classification of something as something and perception by (his) definition allows for no classification, being defined as free from conceptual construction. (We shall see that Dharmakīrti finds himself forced to modify this position by introducing the term "nonillusory" into the definition of perception, thus possibly blurring the thrust of Dignāga's position if not abandoning it altogether--but that is a matter for the next Buddhism Volume of our Encyclopedia, which will cover Dharmakīrti's views.)

If, as Dignāga asserts, perception is constructionfree how is it that we speak of erroneous perceptions, or for that matter of our perceptions of an aspect called "blue"? Verse 7cd-8ab of Chapter One of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* addresses this problem, but the text as we have it poses another problem for Franco's interpretation. This verse purports to identify types of awareness which are commonly called perceptual but are actually not, given Dignāga's analysis. What is called "erroneous perception", e.g., a mirage, is not a perception in Dignāga's technical sense, since we conceptually construct the water for which the sand is mistaken. What is regularly thought of as true empirical awareness of ordinary objects ("this is a chair") is not perception in this technical sense since language and thought are responsible for our choosing the idea of

word "chair" and thus indicate clearly that we are in the realm of the "lower truth" (*saṁvṛtisat*) where language and thought hold sway. Inference, memory and desires--if anyone were inclined to call them perceptions--are clearly ruled out by the same reasoning.

Unfortunately, perhaps, the text as it comes to us adds one more word at the end--*satimiram*. Just what this word means is not clear. Literally, *satimira* means "with" or "involving *timira*", and *timira* at least sometimes is used in Buddhist literature to designate some kind of eye-disease, perhaps the one which gives us double vision so that we see two moons instead of one. The term appears here in apposition to a word which means "what is only apparently but not really perception", and the question is: why would Dignāga mention *timira* at all, since the several examples of things thought to be but which are not perceptions seem to need no repetition? Some, including Dharmakīrti, have thought that Dignāga actually added this term to identify still another type of error; Alex Wayman argues that it simply refers to an awareness caused by a defective sense organ. Hatttori, supported by Franco, thinks not. The category of "erroneous perception" can easily be construed so as to cover the double moon. If the foregoing account is accurate, through constructionfree perception we become aware of pure particulars and cannot possibly be mistaken, since no aspects are seen and nothing is attributed to these particulars in that kind of awareness. However, in daily life, and arguably also in beginning to develop our yogic abilities, as we cognize things that we normally suppose constitute the world in which we live, we form for ourselves and others judgments expressed in language and framed in concepts. To Dignāga's way of thinking this is the realm of "inference" (*anumāna*). And there is no third way of cognizing other than perception and inference.

II. DIGNĀGA ON INFERENCE

It follows, then, that not only clearly inferential judgments but also judgments we ordinarily call "perceptual"--e.g., "this is blue"--are in Dignāga's theory inferential. This clearly broadens the scope of the word "inference" in a way other schools, e.g., the Naiyāyikas, do not accept. And furthermore it carries the clear implication that all propositional judgments are "false" in at least one sense, namely that they attribute to reality properties that reality in itself lacks. It is important, though, to

realize immediately that this is only one sense of "false". Commonsensically for us a propositional judgment about the cat being on the mat, though "false" in this special sense, is either true or false (in the ordinary sense) depending on whether the cat is on the mat or not. The implications of this are not lost on writers after Dignāga, where we understandably find a distinction made between "true (*tathya*)" and "false (*mithyā*)" within the conventional level, a distinction accepted in that sense not only by Madhyamakas like Bhavya (who may have coined the expressions) but also by other sorts of later Buddhists. We shall turn to this when we take up Bhavya and his ilk.

For the moment, though, let us consider what Dignāga himself has to say about inference. In an interesting article Eli Franco has suggested that the history of the language of the threefold mark (*trairūpya*), language which Dignāga uses in setting forth his account of inference, actually had nothing to do at the outset with inference; the natural home of that language is in the theory of debate (*vāda*). Franco studies in particular the evidence to be gleaned from what is left of Vasubandhu's *Vādavidhāna* and *Vādavidhi* and is able to trace the development of the terms in pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist texts. He suggests that originally the theory of debate and the theory of inference were dissociated,[1] that they "have arisen within different sets of questions and were meant to solve different problems." It was Vasubandhu, he argues, who "was the first to have established an intimate relation between proof and inference."[24]

Franco goes on to suggest that Vasubandhu himself dropped the "threefold mark" analysis altogether, "probably because he saw that it was not adequate for inference."[25] Dignāga revived and, Franco argues, reinstated the threefold mark, as well as construing the problem as one of proof rather than of inferring.

To assess this reasoning we need now to explain what this theory of the "threefold mark" is. Dignāga holds that to establish a properly-formed argument as valid three requirements or "marks" must obtain: (1) the *pakṣa* must actually instantiate the *hetu* property, (2) the *sapakṣa* must be an instance of the *hetu* (and the *sādhya*) properties, and (3) the *vipakṣa*

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[1]Eli Franco, "Valid reason, true sign", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 34, 1990, pp. 201-202, pointing out that in the *Nyāyasūtra*s, for instance, "the *avayava*s and the *pramāṇa*s (which include inference) form different categories (*padārtha*)".

must not be an instance of either *hetu* or the *sādhya* properties. The proper relation is found in the stock case of a valid inference "this mountain has fire because it has smoke, like a kitchen and unlike a lake": if the particular mountain in question (the *pakṣa*) actually has smoke (the *hetu*) on it, some kitchen (the *sapakṣa*) is smoke-possessing (and fire-possessing), and no lake (the *vipakṣa*) is either smoking or on fire, the argument is valid.

Franco thinks Vasubandhu probably dropped the threefold mark analysis because he saw what Franco ably argues for, viz., that no empirical statement (i.e., no properly-formed proposition about matters of fact) can ultimately succeed in attaining certainty, since (in effect) success would require knowledge that all future instances will conform to past ones, knowledge which we cannot in principle have since we cannot now experience future instances. In other words, we are dealing here with inductive, not deductive reasoning; we are in the realm of probabilities, not of certainty. However, while Vasubandhu may have dropped the analysis, Dignāga champions it.

This leads Franco to ask "Was Dignāga aware of the fact that a valid inferential sign defined in terms of the three characteristics can never be known?", and he answers "I think that the problem probably did not occur to him. And this is understandable if we are right in our assumption that he was the first to introduce the theory of *trairūpya* into the context of inference. For as long as the *trairūpya* was used in debate the problem could not arise, and it was probably not immediately realized that what was good enough for debate was not good enough for inference."[26]

Specifically, "the problematic part of the *trairūpya* was the third criterion. How is the absence in dissimilar cases to be determined? Is it by non-perception of the (*hetu*) in these cases? But what is non-perception? It is obviously not perception, but what is it? Is it inference? If so, we need an inference before we make an inference, and thus fall infinite regress. But...what else could it be?"[27] Franco goes on to review Īśvarasena's addition of a third instrument of knowledge--nonperception (*anupalabdhi*)--to Dignāga's two, and points out that the threefold mark "ended its career with Dharmakīrti...since the problem is insoluble, and inferences are indeed either uncertain or tautological."[28]

Recently Shoryu Katsura[29] has identified a passage in the fifth Chapter of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccayabhāṣya* in which Dignāga clearly anticipates Īśvarasena's suggestion that through nonperception one may be able to justifiably claim the truth of the pervasion that is

implicitly the basis for the inference.[1] Īśvarasena, however, proposed nonperception as a third instrument of knowledge, unlike Dignāga, and Katsura remarks that when Dharmakīrti criticizes the theory of nonperception he "criticizes Dignāga's whole system of logic" without realizing that it was his "great predecessor" Dignāga that he was criticizing.[30]

A rather better-known problem about Dignāga's threefold mark concerns the question "why three marks rather than two?". Bimal Matilal[31] formulates the three-fold mark (he calls it the indicator-reason) requirement as follows:

"1. It (the mark=*hetu*) must be present in a location where the property characterizing the locus would be also present,

2. It must also be present in a similar location,

3. It must not be present in any dissimilar location."

He goes on: "The problem with this theory is that it seems that not all the three are jointly necessary....it seems clear that (1) and (3) together would be sufficient to make the indicator-reason adequate to generate a sound inference....What...did Diṅnāga have in mind when he insisted upon the second condition as being necessary?"

Matilal's answer is as follows. "(Consider), for example,

P1: Sound has impermanence, for it has audibility.

If the...possiblity of something being a sound and not impermanent has been excluded by the information available from previous knowledge (that is, by the available information), why can't we decide that sound (all cases of sound) is impermanent? Here we reach the crux of the matter.

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[1]The passage is *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* on V. 34. Katsura's translation (ibid., p. 226) of the relevant section goes as follows: "A linguistic item (*śabda*) expresses its object (*artha*) in two ways, viz. *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. And they are defined as 'application to the similar' (*tulye vṛttiḥ*) and 'non-application to the dissimilar' (*atulye 'vṛttiḥ*). Of them, regarding the similar, it is not necessary to mention the application (or *anvaya*) to all instances, for they are in some cases infinite in number and (it is) impossible to mention every object. Regarding the dissimilar, however, although infinite, it is possible to mention the non-application (or *vyatireka*) on the basis of mere non-perception (*adarśanamātreṇa*)." This passage is apparently not summarized in the summary of this section, below.

We have to remember that all cases of sound are not (at least, in principle) part of the available information. They lie outside the domain that is constituted by available information. We are only certain of one more thing: sounds are sounds, have audibility...This is an *a priori* certainty. But this does not guarantee that instances of sound are the kind of things of which impermanence or permanence is predicable. It could be that sounds are neither. Such a guarantee is available only if we could cite a case, independently of the present situation, where both the indicator-reason and the inferrable object exist together, and show that the present case is similar to such a case. This is, therefore, part of the justification for Diṅnāga not being totally satisfied with the exclusion of contrary possibilities (*vipakṣāsattva*), and thereby insisting upon citation of a similar case...(*sapakṣasattva....*). P1 is, accordingly, declared as inconclusive or uncertain."

"...(T)he above justification assumes that lack of togetherness of A with non-B does not necessarily imply togetherness of A with B. As Richard Hayes[32] has rightly stated, while 'every A is B' may presuppose (as it does in the interpretation of the Aristotelian syllogistic) that there are As, 'no A is non-B' may not, under this theory, presuppose that there is at least one A which is B also. For...all As may be such things with regard to which the question of their being B or non-B does not arise. Hence, 'an A is neither B nor non-B' is a further possibility that is not eliminated by the exclusion of the contrary possibilities. And since such a further possibility is not eliminated, the required certainty that the case under consideration is B is not reached. Citation of a 'positive' example with A and B together eliminates the said third possibility, and thereby leads us to the required certainty." On this reading, not nonB is not always equivalent to B, and B and nonB are not contradictories but contraries in that they both may fail to apply to some cases.

What Matilal is suggesting is "that in Diṅnāga's system...only universal affirmative propositions carry existential presupposition...If we view matters in this way, we can find an explanation why Diṅnāga insisted that both a positive and a negative example are needed to confirm the required inference: sound is perishable because it is a product. It seems to explain also why in the above example, P1, it is claimed that because of the lack of a positive example to confirm that each audible fact is perishable, the inference (certainty of the conclusion) is not decidable..."

Matilal is, in introducing this problem, reporting a feature which has

been the subject of quite a lot of literature, culminating in the reports of Shoryu Katsura on his research concerning the status of the positive and negative examples in Dignāga. His findings (in his latest paper) confirm that the need for two kinds of example is implicitly rejected already in Dignāga, albeit in only one passage, which we have inserted in our summary of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Katsura himself interprets Dignāga's handling of the threefold mark in the following way:

"The second and third formulae (i.e., presence of *sp* in *h* and *s* and absence of *vp* from *h* and *s*) constitute the inductive method or process by which we can determine what is a valid inferential mark or reason...(But) as a result of the insertion of *eva* the (positive or) *anvaya* formula no more represents the inductive process; it expresses the relation between the domain of *liṅga* (i.e., *hetu*) and that of the property to be proven (*sādhyadharma*), namely, the former is restricted by the latter; in other words, the former is pervaded (*vyāpta*) by the latter. As far as I can see, Dignāga insisted on inserting the particle *eva* in order to express the relation of pervasion (*vyāpti*) between *liṅga* and *sādhyadharma* which he considered to be the foundation of any valid inference or reasoning."[33]

Dignāga is also responsible for a unique way of classifying fallacies, one that is echoed in Śaṁkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśa* and in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* but apparently was abandoned by Dharmakīrti in his later writings and by all subsequent Buddhist logicians. Dignāga classifies fallacies into three main varieties--fallacies of the thesis, of the reason, and of the examples. This provides a neat way of cataloguing the vast majority of all the kinds of mistakes possible in reasoning following the Buddhist (or for that matter, pan-Indian) procedures.[34] Why Dharmakīrti abandoned it is a story to be told later.

III. DIGNĀGA ON LANGUAGE

A remarkable feature of Dignāga's work lies in his addressing, almost without precedent in Buddhist thought, problems in the philosophy of language, notably over how language works. We have seen the peculiarities of Dignāga's views on perception and inference: what is sensed (the pure particular) cannot be thought or spoken of, and what is spoken or thought of doesn't really exist. Then how is it that we manage to use language to deal with the particular things that we take to constitute the world we live in?

The problem might not seem so serious but for an additional point. Dignāga flatly denies there are any such things as universal properties. Other "logicians", e.g., Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, could answer the problem by merely proposing that we deal with particular things by noticing their actual universal properties. This answer is not available to Dignāga, since for him there are no actual universal properties. And if so, how then can we learn that a presentation of sense is of a particular kind?

Dignāga's answer is regularly known as his theory of *apoha*. Rather than trying to explain what that word means, it will be more informative to sketch the theory itself. It is perhaps pertinent to remark that Dignāga seems to show from the outset a keen appreciation of grammatical analysis. What may be his earliest work, titled *Traikālyaparīkṣā*, is in fact merely a presentation of a portion of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*, the basic treatise on Grammarian philosophy. A lost work, *Sāmānyaparīkṣā*, perhaps constituted Dignāga's most thorough treatment of linguistic meaning, on the evidence of a few passages quoted elsewhere from it. The chapter on *apoha* in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, probably his last work, displays thorough competence in the field of grammatical thought.

Dignāga had to explain how we can speak of types of things, since the particular things themselves (the pure particulars) are not available to our awarenesses and thus cannot be classified or described by us. What Dignāga proposes is that, though we cannot speak of types of e.g., pure particulars directly, we can understand and speak of them by excluding their complements. "Dignāga therefore suggests that one can establish a connection with reference to the mere fact that the word 'tree' is not observed to apply to what is not a tree. The mere non-observation (*adarśanamātra*) of the word's application to things that are dissimilar to the things through which its meaning is realized can be generalized so as to hold for everything dissimilar to the object to which the word 'tree' is applied. The meaning of a term is thus equivalent to an inference based upon the exclusion from its scope of what it does not denote (*vyavacchedānumāna*)."[35]

The obvious objection to Dignāga's proposal points out that, if the suggestion is that we somehow gain something by speaking of non-nontrees rather than trees, the proposal is worthless, since the denial of a denial is just the affirmation of the original--not to be nontree is just to be a tree. But there is more to Dignāga's proposal than this. To see what it is we here provide a lengthy and complex but elegant explanation by Mark Siderits.

"The doctrine of *apoha* claims that the meaning of 'cow' is given by the expression 'not non-cow'. Thus to say of a particular that it is a cow is to say that it does not belong to the class of things that are appropriately called non-cows. This strategy obviously avoids positing any shared nature or resemblance among the individual cows; all they have in common, apart from the absence of being non-cows (which, as a mere absence, is not ultimately real), is the name 'cow'. But one wonders whether this does not rely on there being some discernible nature common to all the non-cows. For if there is not, then it would seem I can tell what a non-cow is only by knowing what cows are, and we will have come full circle. This circularity is problematic, given that linguistically mediated cognition is efficacious. If there is not some nature the presence of which makes an individual a cow and the absence of which makes it a non-cow, why when I ask my assistant to fetch a cow do I obtain a cow--something that gives milk--and not an ox or a lawn tractor? It is no help to be told that my assistant knows oxen and lawn tractors are non-cows. How can she know this unless she first knows what a cow is? The Apohavādin hastens to agree that cows do have a common nature, cowness, but holds that this shared nature is a linguistically induced fiction and is ultimately unreal. This does not seem to help. For only what is ultimately real can, in the final analysis, explain efficacy. If each *svalakṣaṇa* is indeed genuinely unique (and thus strictly ineffable), then it is difficult to see why those *svalakṣaṇa*s making up what are termed lawn tractors should be excluded from the extension of 'cow', while those making up the milk-givers are included."

"A crucial component of the Apohavādin response to this difficulty is the distinction between two kinds of negation: *paryudāsa* and *prasajya-pratiṣedha*. The grammarians explicated *paryudāsa* as primarily positive in force, and negative only by implication, whereas *prasajya-pratiṣedha* was said to be negative in force, with no commitment to any positive characterization. (B. K.) Matilal (in *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 156-157) introduced the terms 'nominally bound negation' for *paryudāsa* and 'verbally bound negation' for *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, thereby bringing out the grammarians' point that where a sentence contains a negation, the former type tends to be associated with the noun (or adjective), the latter with the verb. Thus we may think of two distinct ways to negate a sentence, 'That is polite', namely: 'that is impolite' (nominally bound negation) and 'That is not polite' (verbally bound negation). And notice

that in the former case the negation serves as a positive characterization of the action in question, whereas in the latter case the emphasis appears to be on simply denying attribution of the predicate 'polite' to the action in question. But now notice as well that when the two types of negation are conjoined, as in 'That is not impolite', the result is not what one would expect given the classical rule of double negation; this sentence is not equivalent to 'That is polite'. This is because in this case the nominally bound negation or *paryudāsa* behaves not classically (like exclusion negation) but like choice negation: besides those things that are said to be polite, and those things that are said to be impolite, there are also those things that may be said to be neither polite nor impolite (namely those actions where questions of politeness simply do not arise). Verbally bound negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*), on the other hand, always behaves like the classical exclusion negation, never occasioning bivalence failure."

"With this distinction in hand, we are now prepared to investigate the Apohavādin resolution of the difficulty (that was) mentioned (at the outset, viz.,) the nominalist's standard difficulty--explaining how our use of kind terms might be rule-governed. Their answer begins by considering how we might represent the uniqueness of the *svalakṣaṇa*, which may be thought of as the fact that each *svalakṣaṇa* is wholly distinct in nature from every other. For a given *svalakṣaṇa* s_n we may then say that every other *svalakṣaṇa* is non-s_n in nature, employing nominally bound negation (*paryudāsa*) on the particular (hereafter to be symbolized as '-s_n'). Now if we were to perform verbally bound negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*) on this expression, saying of something that it is not non-s_n (not -s_n), what we said would be true precisely of s_n and nothing else, so this gets us no closer to the semantics of kind terms, which must be predicable of many particulars. However, perceptual contact with a *svalakṣaṇa* causes the occurrence of a mental image (considered a representation by Sautrāntika, a cognitive form by Yogācāra). This mental image is itself a particular, and thus its apprehension in perception will not yield the basis for any generality. But given the right training, we can learn to employ a mental image p_n generated by *svalakṣaṇa* s_n in a somewhat different way. We can learn to form the nominally bound negation of p_n in such a way that not all other mental images are excluded by this negation. Thus the nominally bound negation -p_n may function like choice negation. As we saw above, the choice negation of the predicate 'polite' yields a complement class of those things that are impolite, but at the same time

it leaves open the possibility of a non-empty set consisting of those things that are neither polite nor impolite. By the same token, we can learn to treat $-p_n$ in such a way that mental images p_{n+1}, p_{n+2}, etc., while distinct from p_n, are not in the exclusion class formed by $-p_n$. In this case, the expression 'not $-p_n$' will be true of p_n, p_{n+1}, p_{n+2}, etc. That is, "not $-p_n$' functions as the name of a mentally constructed pseudo-universal. We have learned to form p_n in such a way as to overlook the differences among p_n, p_{n+1}, p_{n+2}, etc., so that each may be said not to be other than the rest."

"Suppose, counterfactually, that cows were *svalakṣaṇa*s. (The supposition is counterfactual because the cow, as an aggregate substance, could not be ultimately real.) And suppose that s_n, s_{n+1} and s_{n+2} were particular instances. Now the representation p_n when apprehended perceptually is absolutely distinct from all other representations, including p_{n+1} and p_{n+2}. To learn to use 'cow', however, is to learn to treat some such representation as p_n in such a way that it does not exclude such other mental images as p_{n+1} and p_{n+2}. To have learnt to use the word is to have acquired the disposition to form this paradigm image upon hearing the word. I am then able to determine that the novel instance s_{n+3} is a cow by noting that the mental image p_{n+3} is not excluded by, is not incompatible with, p_n. I am likewise able to correctly say that s_m is not a cow (it is in fact a lawn tractor) by noting that the mental image p_m generated by it is excluded by or incompatible with p_n."

"Now one might admire the elegance of this solution and yet still wonder whether anything really has been achieved through its use of all this logical and psychological machinery. How am I able to learn to form p_n in such a way as to ensure that precisely such mental images as p_{n+1} and p_{n+2} are not thereby excluded, given that s_n, s_{n+1} and s_{n+2} share neither a class character nor any real resemblances? We are told that this learning proceeds in accordance with a set of verbal conventions. This is no doubt true, but it seems unhelpful. These conventions can be employed only if there is some objective basis for intersubjective agreement concerning the formation of p_n. And what might this be if s_n, s_{n+1} and s_{n+2} share neither a class character nor any real resemblances? The answer is that s_n, s_{n+1} and s_{n+2} do share something, namely, the capacity to give milk. But this is a misleading way of putting the point. Instead we should say that each of these particulars serves as cause of milk, i.e., has the capacity to satisfy a desire for milk. If we are tempted to suppose that this amounts to a real resemblance among them, we

should consider the plants *guḍūcī, dhātṛ, abhaya,* etc., each of which has the power to abate fever. These are distinct kinds of plants, so there can be no temptation to suppose they resemble one another in any way save in their antipyretic virtue. And we should refrain from judging that they have a real resemblance in this respect, since our interest in fever abatement would clearly be behind such a judgment. Just as with 'chariot' and 'forest', our interest make it the case that it would be lighter--less prolix, more parsimonious--to employ the term 'antipyretic' rather than having distinct names for the power of each. And so, again just as with 'chariot' and 'forest', we end up projecting onto the world something that is not really there--a real resemblance or class character. There is an objective basis to the formation of p_n in such a way as to ensure that mental images p_{n+1} and p_{n+2} are not excluded: each of s_n, s_{n+1} and s_{n+2} are able to satisfy our interest in obtaining milk. Our use of 'cow' expresses this interest. But such use also leads us to see particular cows as similar and sharing in a common class character, when they are in fact utterly distinct and incommensurable."[36]

It is worth mentioning that the category of mental images, invoked by Siderits as a kind of particular in the foregoing passage, is what is accounted for by the category of mental perception included in Dignāga's list (see above). It is clearly crucial for the theory as we now see it developed that what was referred to there as "mental perception" indeed be perceptual and not inferential, for otherwise, since inference involves universals, Dignāga's *apoha* theory would not be necessary, since we could get to the use of descriptive language directly from mental perception--our "mental perception" of the universal cowness would be precisely what we base use of the term "cow" on, not *apoha*. More pertinently, if mental perception were not by definition a kind of awareness of a pure particular it would not be the case that perception grasps only particulars and the Buddhist would be in effect assenting to the Nyāya view that not all perception is constructionfree, that there is also constructionfilled, and thus possibly false, perception. But it is precisely that Nyāya view that Dignāga wants to avoid in his hard-and-fast distinction between perception and inference.

IV. BHAVYA ON INFERENCE

The next issue we turn to concerns the proper view concerning the function of reasoning in Mādhyamika philosophy. We have remarked previously on the relative lack of commentarial literature focusing on Nāgārjuna's groundbreaking work, despite its clearly influential stature for Buddhists in the period following Nāgārjuna's lifetime. With the apparent exception of the commentary ascribed to *Piṅgala called *Akutobhayā*, reported on by C. W. Huntington Jr. in Volume VIII of this *Encyclopedia*, we have no commentaries on Nāgārjuna's works prior to Buddhapālita's which probably dates from around 480. The *Akutobhayā* is only preserved in Chinese, and in Huntington's summary of it one gets the decided impression that it hews quite closely to Nāgārjuna's text. Despite this apparent lack of attention in the form of commentaries, there are several texts ascribed to Nāgārjuna that invoke Nāgārjuna's method of reasoning, and Buddhapālita's brings this select literature up to the end of the fifth century.

As Willliam Ames' summary of the work below indicates, Buddhapālita does not seem to have argued for any novel interpretations of the master's reasoning, taking it for granted that Nāgārjuna's methods proceed through a systematic critique of all possible points of view about any thesis. These arguments are sometimes put in the form of the quadrilemma (*catuṣkoṭi*), but as often as not merely laid out systematically in their own terms, and Ames' summary reports this straightforwardly.

Buddhapālita slightly antedates Dignāga, and as we have seen it was Dignāga who seems to have been the major figure in the redirection of Buddhist interests toward an analysis of inferential reasoning. Dignāga combined an innovative epistemology and an acute critical ability with an analysis of inference which implied its availability as a powerful tool for the drawing of linguistically expressible conclusions. One cannot but conclude that by emphasizing these things Dignāga's work gave renewed hope to one who maintains a supportive attitude toward the power of positive thinking, as it were. In this sense, then, the implications of Dignāga's work in Buddhist logic was seen by some as a support for the use of Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika methods, and as a consequence makes Mādhyamika look less like the undermining of all positive philosophy and more like a philosophical school in its own right.

Also having implications for this issue were the several varieties of

"idealism" that, as we have seen, are commonly collected under the "Yogācāra" rubric. While Madhyamaka notoriously insists on only two levels of truth, the highest or ultimate level (*paramārtha*), sometimes called "the absolute", and the lower or relative level (*saṁvṛti*), at least one of the "Yogācāra" models distinguishes three natures--constructed (*parikalpita*), dependent (*paratantra*) and perfected (*pariniṣpanna*). It seems likely that the latter model was introduced in order to distinguish on the one hand the world(s) that are linguistically expressible (the constructed and dependent) from that which is not (the perfected), and on the other to distinguish what is "true" in the sense of reflecting the Buddha's insights (the linguistically inexpressible perfected nature and the expressible dependent nature) from ordinary, commonsensical constructed nature, termed "false" because nothing of the constructed sort actually exists. Although Vasubandhu seems to insist that all three of the three natures are "real", there is nevertheless a hierarchy implicit in the analysis that downgrades nonauthoritative categories in the light of authoritative ones, and downgrades all linguistic categories in the light of the inexpressible one. The relation of the two-truths model to the three natures model became a problem for Buddhist philosophers, and the controversy between Bhavya and others like Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti can be seen as one between two ways of solving that problem. We turn to this in the next section.

The connection between the issues spoken of two paragraphs back and the issues spoken of in the preceding paragraph can be seen as connected, and this in the following way. Nāgārjuna's method of negative dialectic, which undermines all positive use of inference to establish conclusions, can seem to imply the rejection of all cognitive attempts to understand anything, even the practical importance of the difference between what works and what does not, or the difference between what stands to reason and what does not. Although Mādhyamikas claim that Nāgārjuna's reasoning is logically impeccable, he gives no independent reason why it is important that it should be--all that would seem to matter is that ultimately the addressee should accept his medicine, become silent and stop thinking that way. There is no independent analysis possible of positive right reasoning: at least none is offered by Nāgārjuna. (He does, of course, offer the analyses of others, but only to refute them.) Indeed, some of the arguments used by Nāgārjuna present problems of logical analysis, though these may be claimed merely to signal our inability to plumb the depths of his thought. In short, language is important even if

the Mādhyamika's rejection of it is also important. And reasoning, carried out through language and conceptual thought, is also important, just because it is important that the seeker come to appreciate the difference between good and bad reasoning--construed by Mādhyamika as the difference between reasoning and no reasoning at all.

In the light of this, the Mādhyamika viewpoint comes to appear as only one of several possible viewpoints, all of them true. Perhaps the perfected nature is the realm of reality and of purification. But that's not all that we are interested in, and indeed not even what we are perforce most interested in right now. Right now, as reflective human beings, we need to know what is said and reasoned correctly to be able to distinguish it from what is misleading or unreasonable. That's why we need logic--not to tell perfection from what is not perfected, but to tell what is true--the dependent nature--from what is false--the constructed nature. Each is "true" in contrast to its relevant alternative. The constructed nature is true in contrast to dreams, illusions, etc. The dependent nature is true in contrast to the constructed nature, and the perfected nature is true in contrast to the other two natures. So they are all true! And yet from the Mādhyamika viewpoint they are all false: even the perfected nature, like the other two natures, is false when misunderstood as having an essential or intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*).

It is not surprising, therefore, that Bhavya and some other Mādhyamika thinkers found it appropriate to distinguish between a "higher" or correct (*tathya*) and a "lower" of incorrect (*mithyā*) type of each of the two levels. The distinction is needed on the conventional level to distinguish between what we normally consider to be true judgments, defensible through sound reasoning (e.g. about the cat's being on the mat when it is) and false judgments (e.g. about bent sticks in water). And it is needed at the highest, perfected level to distinguish between Nāgārjuna's ultimate "truth", which is unspeakable, and the ultimate truth indicated linguistically if only by the negative use of language. In this way the distinction between the two truths is mapped onto the three levels while preserving the final "topper" which is that ultimately there are no truths and no levels at all, that all is empty since the truths and levels only appear to exist due to our propensity to think and speak discursively.

In this way Bhavya is able to rescue good reasoning, sound inference, from the all-encroaching fire of Nāgārjuna's methods. Bhavya defends logic since he perceives it to be needed to salvage the ultimate import of the Buddha's message. "The purpose of logic is to support and

substantiate *āgama* (the Buddhist scripture) by vindicating it by means of *sādhana* (positive reasoning) and *dūṣaṇa* (negative reasoning) against the attacks of disbelieving and poor logicians (*kuvādaka, kutārkika*)...According to Bhavya a Madhyamaka should not merely confine himself to point(ing) out the absurd consequences (*prasaṅgavākya*) in the opponent's position (*pūrvapakṣa*) because in this way he gives his opponent an opportunity to shirk the issue by putting forward an alternative counter thesis (*sāvakāśavākya*). In order to silence the opponent for good we should instead not only prove our own position by means of a logical reason and an example but also refute alleged mistakes (in the opponent's arguments)."[37]

However, one must be careful not to misrepresent Bhavya as a renegade from Mādhyamika. "The method to deny every proposition of the opponents while giving no proposition themselves, and to clarify (the) unpropertiedness of every word and every theory, is the unmovable tradition of the Mādhyamikas since Nāgārjuna has established it...Bhāvaviveka too, quoting Devaśarman, declares that the Mādhyamikas only negate the arguments of others and do not establish their own theories. But what makes Bhāvaviveka differ from the other Mādhyamikas consists in (the) certainty or logicality of the negation...Bhāvaviveka's intention is that the Mādhyamikas should clarify, with certainty, how (the) logic of the practical world confesses its nonsense under the light of the absolute reality, and (that) accordingly (one) should modify the traditional method of the Mādhyamika (which is) a false application of *reductio ad absurdum (prasaṅgavākya)* by logicians. He devoted himself to establishing the new logical methodology of the Mādhyamika demonstration, which Nāgārjuna and the Prāsaṅgikas did not care for. His conviction that the *paramārtha* can be manifested in a logical form and that only this kind of logic as founded in the abolute reality can be called true logic (*tathyasaṁvṛtijñāna*) leads him to the invention of a special kind of syllogism."

"We can summarize the...characteristics of Bhāvaviveka's syllogism (under) the following four items:

(1) A peculiar qualification "from the transcendental point of view (*pāramārthatas*)" is added in every conclusion (*pakṣa*).

(2) He negates the *prasaṅga-vākya*, which is the unique method of the Prāsaṅgikas.

(3) (The) reason (in) his syllogism lacks "non-existence of (the) reason in the counter example" or "negative concomitance" (*vipakṣa*

nāstitā), one of (the) three conditions of (the) reason.

(4) The conclusion of every syllogism is a negative proposition and yet the negation is qualified as an absolute negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*) and is not a relative negation (*paryudāsapratiṣedha*)."[38]

Several points alluded to in Kajiyama's passage just quoted are to be noted. One is that those who defended the "traditional method of the Mādhyamika" and preserved what Kajiyama describes from Bhavya's point of view as "a false application of *reductio ad absurdum* (*prasaṅgavākya*)" became later called by Tibetans "Prāsaṅgika". This "traditionalism constitutes a position defended enthusiastically by Candrakīrti, who lived soon afrer Bhavya and who clearly considered himself as defending Nāgārjuna's true position from Bhavya's blasphemic misinterpretation. The position taken by Bhavya itself becomes known in Tibet as "Svātantrika", since according to it "the *paramārtha* can be manifested in logical form", i.e., independently (*svatantra*), albeit with the qualifications indicated by the four provisos enumerated in the preceding paragraph.

A second point worthy of note is that characteristic (3) of Bhavya's "syllogism" in the summary of it that Kajiyama gives amounts to the jettisoning of the third "mark", the one having to do with the *vipakṣa*. As was remarked above, this revision is clear in Dharmakīrti's later works, and if Kajiyama is right we can now see its earlier occurrence in Bhavya. (It may be remarked that, as usual, not all of the author's (or authors' alleged) works agree on points like this. In the *Karatalaratna* one finds the role of the *vipakṣa* still utilized, which can suggest any one of several conclusions: either *Karatalaratna* is not by Bhavya, or it is by another Bhavya, or this Bhavya changed his mind on the matter. Depending on one's feeling on related topics--e.g., concerning the existence of a second, later Bhavya who authored a number of the works traditionally attributed to a single author--one may feel more or less inclined to accept one or another of these explanations.)

A feature of Bhavya's philosophy, unremarked upon as yet here, is the rather unusual amount of attention he gives to the views of other schools, both other Buddhist schools as well as philosophical systems outside the Buddhist fold. As Malcolm Eckel remarks, "Bhāvaviveka...created a realm of experience in which he could concentrate on the subjects of the conventional world that caught his interest, without having to worry at every moment about applying Nāgārjuna's critique. That part of the Mādhyamika method belonged to

the realm of ultimate truth and could be postponed indefinitely while one considered problems in the mundane realm. Bhāvaviveka's fascination with this realm had important consequences for historians of Indian philosophy; his diligence in collecting the details of other philosophical systems provided important evidence for the development of some of the Indian schools."[39] Something of this diligence can be seen previously in Dignāga's work as well, but Bhavya far outdistanced Dignāga in the number of systems and the depth of the treatment applied to them.

V. MAPPING THE THREE NATURES ONTO THE TWO LEVELS

By now we have separated out several traditional ways of speaking about positions each of which has its source in the earlier literature of Buddhism but not all of which seem to pull in the same direction. First, there is the standard distinction, associated most clearly with Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka version of Buddhist thought, between what are frequently called the two truths, in Sanskrit termed conventional (*saṃvṛti*) vs. highest (*paramārtha*) truth (*satya*). Secondly, there is the threefold distinction, coming into Buddhism apparently first from the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* and championed in various of Asaṅga's works; between the constructed (*parikalpita*), dependent (*paratantra*) and perfected (*parniṣpanna*) natures (*svabhāva*). Thirdly, there is the distinction between those who think that consciousness has "aspects" (*ākāra*), thus called "*sākāravādins*", and those who don't, called "*nirākāravādins*". Fourthly, there are the distinctions among those who think that everything language can speak of positively is nonexistent and those who pick out certain kinds of things--atoms, pure particulars, persons, consciousness--as ultimately knowable and existent. And fifthly, there is the terminology of emptiness (*śūnyatā*), terminology whose universal application has the authority of the Buddha behind it, though seemingly differently applied by different Buddhist philosophers.

It is over the implications of these various distinctions that the arguments among Buddhist philosophers largely turn, beginning in our present period and continuing until the end of Buddhism in India. It is not at all obvious that all our philosophers use the various terms mentioned above in the same sense. Nevertheless, it may be possible, and appears likely to be instructive, to arrange a number of our philosophers in an order that reflects all or most of these distinctions. If such an

ordering can be maintained, it will also be helpful in dealing with later philosophers and positions to be treated in subsequent Volumes on Buddhist thought.

The five philosophers dealt with in this Volume who appear to have distinctive views on these methodological positions include Buddhapālita, Bhavya, Kambala, Dharmapāla, and Dignāga. The case could be made for including others, especially Sthiramati, in this list, but given that Sthiramati's available works are limited to commentaries on Vasubandhu and Asaṅga we may simplify, perhaps too hastily, by counting him as hewing to positions championed by those two. And indeed it is with the positions championed by those two, and in particular Vasubandhu, that we must start, since in Vasubandhu's several works we can already see a variety of methodological positions. (I say "methodological" positions because I don't want to prejudge whether the issues at stake are logical, epistemological, metaphysical or something else--classifications of that sort had better come after, rather than before, examination of the positions themselves as they are taken.)

Let us begin by trying to say what all five agree on. They of course agree that everything is "momentary", fleeting. They all agree that all factors (if there are any) are causally conditioned, possibly excepting space and liberation itself. None of them explicitly take Nāgārjuna to task for undue negativism, though one might read many of the views they develop as implying a tension, at least, with the implications of Nāgārjuna's arguments. But they don't themselves say so. Indeed, one might read the positions that the five develop as conceding implicitly the conclusions of Nāgārjuna's arguments, so that their own contributions need to be understood not as alternatives to those conclusions, but rather as attempts to show how to speak of ultimate things when no such speech is literally possible given those same conclusions. Not that our five ever say so in so many words. Thus the last of our five topics, emptiness, is at least verbally agreed on by all parties.

Of our five philosophers, whose positions form (I suggest) a spectrum, one end of the spectrum will be occupied by Buddhapālita. It is tempting to say that this is because Buddhapālita's position is precisely Nāgārjuna's, but this would be to prejudge who is right in the most famous controversy within Madhyamaka Buddhism, that between Bhavya and Candrakīrti (since Candrakīrti is avowedly defending the position of his predecessor Buddhapālita). Instead, let us merely list the standpoint taken by Buddhapālita on several of our issues.

On Buddhapālita's reading, the *paramārthasatya* or highest "truth" is found in the highest of the three natures, the perfected (*pariniṣpanna*). It is ineffable, so the question of which things occupy that level is without meaning. Everything that is thinkable, speakable, belongs on the conventional level. Thus "reality" (the "highest truth") is formless (*nirākāra*), literally nothing can be said about it, nothing attributed to it. The other questions in our list, about entities, persons, etc. can only sensibly be asked and answered on the conventional level, and there Buddhapālita is quite willing to speak, since in effect whatever he says, his hearer cannot, or at least should not if he has been listening, suppose that what is said is a description of how things really are. That is why the Buddha said that everything is empty. It is this position that is defended by Candrakīrti; Buddhapālita himself is uninterested in debating it if even he is aware of issues needing to be debated.

Though the full sweep of the differences between Candrakīrti and the next of our philosophers, Bhavya, must be delayed to the next Volume, we must next assess the position Bhavya takes, which is quite innovative. He agrees with Buddhapālita that reality is ineffable, but does not conclude that it is necessarily the perfected nature. No doubt reality (the highest truth, *paramārtha*) is formless, but Bhavya distinguishes two kinds of *paramārtha*. Explaining this, Yuichi Kajiyama writes:

"The essential difference of the two truths were by Bhāvaviveka changed into the negative and contradictory relation upon which his logic of *paramārtha* was establised. But for that purpose the *saṁvṛti* cannot be false in itself and the *paramārtha* cannot be merely transcendental. In the *Tarkajvālā* (Chap. III)...Bhāvaviveka defines, "the *saṁvṛti* is so-called in the meaning of investigating (*pravicaya*?) all (*samanta*) things like colour etc., it is true activity of the world. This very action is nothing but truth (*satya*), because of its being a means which leads to establishment of things. The *saṁvṛtyasatya* is here given the character of a means of true knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Although logic is itself of the relative world, it is at the same time a means by which we know the absolute. Therefore the logic of *paramārtha* exists in a place where the *saṁvṛti* is in contact with the *paramārtha*. The *saṁvṛti* is, in the stage of the *tathya-saṁvṛtya-satya*, admitted as the *paramārtha* and the *paramārtha* is, in the stage of the *paryāya-paramārtha-satya*, the *saṁvṛti*."[40]

"(T)he *paramārtha* is of two kinds. That is, the one is the *paramārtha* which is without volition and fruition, supermundane, devoid of mental impurity and is beyond conceptual differentiation, and the other

is the *paramārtha* which is with volition and fruition endowed with correct worldly knowledge conformable to moral and intellectual accumulation and conceptual; the former being the inconvertible absolute (*aparyāya-paramārtha*) and the latter the convertible absolute (*paryāyaparamārtha*). And he continues to say that the qualification 'from the transcendental standpoint' in his syllogism means in the standpoint of the convertible absolute, and that it has the efficiency of valid argument. Even if mental phenomena are considered from the transcendental standpoint, that is, in the convertible absolute, they can be conceptually expressed and can have logical or conceptual existence, if not real existence..."

"Just as the *paramārtha* is of two kinds, so is the *saṁvṛti*, which is divided into the faultless phenomenal knowledge (*tathya-saṁvṛti-jñāna*) where only conceptual existence is approved and the faulty phenomenal knowledge (*mithyājñāna*) in which realistic view is by mistake taken; and mental phenomena belong to the faultless phenomenal knowledge which is actually nothing but the convertible absolute knowledge...[41]

The result of this interpretation of Madhyamaka is that positive inferences, which were avoided by Nāgārjuna himself on the grounds that language always and only speaks of unreality, are given a content. Put another way, Bhavya's position made it feasible to have a debate on philosophical issues, since Bhavya has found a way to satisfy the requirement that both the proponent and the opponent in an argument must be talking about the same entities.

Is Bhavya, then, a Yogācāra masquerading as a Mādhyamika? Not intentionally or verbally, for he nowhere actually champions the traditional Yogācāra three-levels approach. Specifically, he argues consistently against the notion of a dependent (*paratantra*) nature. But if Kajiyama is right (see the very last remark in the passage just quoted) that the faultless phenomenal knowledge is nothing but the convertible absolute knowledge, he apparently champions a tripartite model which at least formally resembles the very account he is apparently criticizing. So what is at issue beteween Bhavya and Buddhapālita?

The issue would appear to be that, where Buddhapālita views all positive linguistic descriptions of reality as ultimately false, Bhavya finds a "level" where judgments can at least tentatively be proposed as true, thus making it possible to reason about them so as to discover that in the end they are all ultimately false. If we couldn't at least formulate arguments about things, arguments which operate on the assumption that

the things are real, we would be unable to even start to subject views to criticism, since we couldn't even formulate them as relatively true, given that the two-level analysis finds views collectively and even relatively false. Note that in proposing this interpretation Bhavya does not in the least question Nāgārjuna's basic Mādhyamika contention that everything is empty, nor does he bring into question the implications of Vasubandhu's Yogācāra as presented in the *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa,* viz., that the three natures all apply to any and every thing we can conceive of. Indeed, he carefully avoids calling the level he proposes "dependent", presumably just to avoid confusions of the sort that could easily result, and to reaffirm his status as a Mādhyamika.

From a slightly different angle, what Bhavya is doing is reminding Buddhists overimpressed with Nāgārjuna's way with arguments that in order for those arguments to even be broached there has to be a level at which the arguments are meaningful, can be formulated as tentatively or putatively true, and further that by the same token it must be possible to distinguish between good and bad arguments even if ultimately what they say and are about is in every case empty.

It follows, then, that Bhavya's way with our other distinctions is the same as Nāgārjuna's and Buddhapālita's--that no actual entities, no persons, no abode-consciousness, indeed no consciousness at all have essential natures, that all of these are empty. It is on these points that, as we are about to see, the positions of the other three of our group of five differ.

The next in order of our group is Kambala. (I reserve to the end of this discussion a thorough analysis of what the "order" represents, and a final rehearsal of the reasons for arranging the five in the order I have chosen.) The work of this author was for long unknown to us: it is Christian Lindtner who has unearthed it, brought it to light and translated it, so I turn to his account.

"The important practical question...arises: How does one attain mental purification, or liberation? The standard Yogācāra answer--and the core of (Kambala's) *Ālokamālā*--is: by means of meditation on the three natures (*svabhāvatrayabhāvanā*). With a clear allusion to Nāgārjuna Kambala makes it clear that the Madhyamaka answer: by means of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) will not do. Kambala surely agrees that liberation consists in realizing emptiness (*śūnyatā*) but Nāgārjuna's idea that all concepts and things are empty of 'own-being' because they 'arise' in mutual dependence--thus being neither existent nor

non-existent, etc.--certainly needs further qualifications to prove fruitful. Emptiness must be emptiness of something somewhere, not just a universal lack of independent existence. Hence any 'object' of cognition (*jñeya*) must have three characters or 'natures': an imaginary, a dependent and an absolute. Emptiness, then, is the emptiness of the unreal imaginary nature in the real dependent nature. Hence the dependent is necessarily the basis or 'possibility' of the purification of the unreal. Without the real the unreal would not be unreal. But once the unreal is gone so is the real. This is the fully accomplished nature of the object of cognition--actually, as we now realize, no object after all, but pure mind without an object. So in the ultimate analysis there is no object, much less three natures of such an object. The doctrine of the three natures (*svabhāvatraya*) then is merely a meditational device presupposing the ontological doctrine of consciousness-only (*cittamātra*). The important thing, as Kambala stresses again and again, is of course meditation (*bhāvanā*): the process of habituating ourselves to the fact that everything--as scripture (*āgama*) and reasoning (*yukti*) shows--is only mind. Like other Yogācāras Kambala does not hesitate to adopt the Madhyamaka theory of the two truths (*satyadvaya*) to express his view: *saṁvṛti* is the state where mind falsely appears as subject versus object, *paramārtha* the state where mind is one without a second and pure."[42]

Lindtner classifies Kambala's position as "reformed Nirākāravāda, rather than Sākāravāda".[43] "Like Nāgārjuna Kambala makes a distinction between the two truths (*satyadvayavibhāga)*, but on the basis of Yogācāra ontology."[44] The position closely resembles Bhavya's, but is expressed in Yogācāra rather than Madhyamaka terminology. And if Lindtner is right in classifying Kambala as a *nirākāravādin* he represents the only Yogācārin in our period espousing such a viewpoint. Moreover, the *Ālokamālā*, at any rate, shows no interest in logic and argument: its approach, Lindtner suggests, is more like that of Advaita Vedānta: "...Ignorance *(avidyā*), in Kambala, has a double function; it projects the unreal (viz. constructed nature, *parikalpitasvabhāva*), and conceals the real (viz. dependent nature, *paratantrasvabhāva*). The stuff that ignorance is made of is traces (*vāsanā)*, karmic energy-matter. This trace (*vāsanā)*...is made of awareness (*cittastha*)...The seed of a trace (*vāsanābīja*) is stocked in the storehouse consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*). The appearance (*khyāti*) of the entire world is a manifestation, *vibhūti*, an error (*bhrānti*), mere mental confusion (*cittavibhramamātraka*), an *upanirgama*, an emanation of *citta*. Ignorance, traces (*vāsanā*) and

awareness (*citta*) can be compared to a disease, and to poison. There is only one way to recover, not by understanding e.g. the Four Noble Truths, not by seeing dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpādadarśana*), but only by seeing the three natures (*svabhāvatrayadarśana*). Kambala also retains the distinction of the two truths (*satyadvayavibhāga*), which, after all, is canonical, but not Nāgārjuna's interpretation...In the ultimate sense awareness (*citta*) is without distinctions (*a(vi)bhāga*); in a relative sense it admits of distinctions (*vibhāga*)."[45]

Fourth in line among our five is Dharmapāla. A contemporary of Bhavya's, his is the position that Bhavya attacks in the fifth Chapter of the *Madhyamakahṛdaya* and its *Tarkajvālā,* and Dharmapāla himself (if we accept John P. Keenan's account) addresses Bhavya in Dharmapāla's commentary on Āryadeva's *Śataśāstra*. Dharmapāla, unlike Buddhapālita, Bhavya and Kambala, is standardly classed as a Yogācāra philosopher, though Tillemans, whose study we draw on here, finds the point somewhat moot. Here is what Tilleman says:

"..(T)he essential point of the debate concerns the interpretation of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*'s pronouncements that dharmas are without natures (*niḥsvabhāva*), do not arise (*anutpāda*) or cease, have always been tranquil and by nature in nirvāṇa; Dharmapāla took the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*'s statements as being of 'interpretative meaning' (*neyārtha*) and opted for the *Saṁdhinirmocanastra*'s explanation in terms of the three-nature (*trisvabhāva*) doctrine, while Bhāvaviveka took the statements about 'non-arisal', etc. as definitive (*nītārtha*). For Yogācāra, the causally dependent phenomenon, i.e. *paratantra*, does really exist and does arise: it is the *parikalpitasvabhāva*, the misconceived or thoroughly imagined natures of *paratantra*, which have never existed nor arisen and which are without nature."[46]

"There is no doubt that for him (Dharmapāla) *paratantra* and *pariniṣpanna* exist really and ultimately (*paramārthatas*) and have natures (*svabhāva*)...A common move in such Yogācāra commentaries may well have been to interpret the Madhyamaka's refutations of various entities as merely negating their *parikalpitasvabhāva*--certainly this tactic is very clear in the case of Dharmapāla. In other words, for Dharmapāla's Yogācāra the conclusion of a Nāgārjunian or Āryadevan argument is, in effect, that no entity exists different from the mind which apprehends it: there are no external objects (*bāhyārtha*). Naturally the conclusion of virtually every Madhyamaka argument is phrased in terms of entities being void (*śūnya*) of nature (*svabhāva*), but the Yogācāra can turn this

to his advantage by arguing that the ultimate nature of dharmas, their *parinispannasvabhāva* or thusness (*tathatā*), is 'voidness' (*śūnyatā*) because these dharmas are void of all characters (*lakṣaṇa*), the latter all being *parikalpitasvabhāva* and without nature (*niḥsvabhāva*). So long as the Yogācāra stresses exclusively the fact that *parinispanna* is voidness and that all *lakṣaṇa* are purely imagined, he can make sense of most Madhyamaka argumentation. Indeed if one reads Dharmapāla's first seven chapters without reading the eighth, where he explains his standpoint on the three natures, his commentary on Āryadeva will, with a few exceptions, look like a Madhyamaka treatise. It is only when one arrives at the end that one fully realizes that one has to reinterpret all that came before in a Yogācāra light."[47]

"In most expositions of Yogācāra their position is described as 'idealism'. A problem arises in connection with, e.g., Dharmapāla, since his position seems to operate on two levels: a) his Madhyamaka-style critique is directed against misconceived notions of existence, inexistence, identity, difference, real consciousness and even voidness; b) his Yogācāra philosophy affirms the existence of consciousness and ultimate truth, what remains after misconceptions and errors are stripped away."[48] "So", Tillemans asks, "in what sense is Dharmapāla an idealist given that...he..resists the tendency to reify mind?...(W)e would have to say that Dharmapāla and other Yogācāras are idealists to the degree that they do make the mind more fundamentally real than external objects. But curiously enough, while we see that Dharmapāla does accept the reality of mind *qua paratantra*, this is a very slim ontological commitment, for he is prepared to use Madhyamaka-style arguments to dismiss all its characters as mere *parikalpita*, and with these *parikalpitasvabhāva* goes not just the mind we conceive or talk about, but even our ordinary categories of existence and inexistence. The margin of difference between Dharmapāla's idealism and Candrakīrti's acceptance of external objects is thus fine indeed and turns on the acceptance or rejection of the mind *qua paratantra*, a mind which we cannot conceive of or say what it is, and whose mode of being we fundamentally do not understand. For Yogācāras the core of their position is that this inexpressible mind *qua paratantra* is a necessary condition for cognition, illusion and spiritual progress."[49] Thus, "a Buddhist idealist does not just accept mind-dependence or a reduction of existence to mind, but also that mind has a preferred ontological status and is more real than external objects. (But) the structure of his system guarantees that any attempt to

conceptualize or formulate what that mind is like or how it exists is impossible."[50]

The last of our five philosophers is Dignāga, who seems almost entirely preoccupied with the theory of inference. Nevertheless he too has views on the relations between the two truths and the three natures, and a position on aspects. Take the latter first. He is, like Dharmapāla and unlike the other three, a *sākāravādin*. "There really is no such thing as subject, object and self-cognition. It is only by way of metaphor (*upacāra*)...that we can speak of such things. There is only cognition which appears to know 'something', its 'fruit'; that something is nothing but itself as 'object'. The 'object' is its own product, or result (*phala*). This 'object' is therefore just its odd way of being aware of itself. The three are not different. All cognition is self-cognition. Cognition is basically one, consciousness-only (*vijñaptimātra*), but unfortunately, by a mistake (*bhrānti, upaplava, viplava,* etc.), it seems to be split up into subject and object. The power responsible for this mistake, it goes without saying, is traces (*vāsanā*)."

"This, then, is Sākāravāda in a nutshell. Cognition contains the object, its own product, in itself; the object is therefore just as real, or unreal for that matter, as the subject that seems to cognize the 'object'...(C)ognition does not grasp or reflect anything, it illuminates and projects; it is only affected by its own projections."[51]

Lindtner's description of Dignāga's position as a *sākāravādin*, however, is not altogether consistent with Tillemans' depiction of idealism which we have just reported, since it decribes Dignāga's position as treating subject and object on a par, whereas the idealism we've just attributed to Dharmapāla, following Tillemans, gives mind a preferred status in relation to objects. Indeed, it is (remember!) Nāgārjuna who treats subject (grasper) and object (grasped) on a par inasmuch as both are equally unreal constructions. So why isn't Dignāga to be classed as a Mādhyamika rather than as a Yogācāra? Or perhaps he shouldn't be counted in either camp; perhaps Dignāga is a throwback to the earliest "school" of all, Abhidharma of perhaps the Sautrāntika variety?

What we appear to need to solve this problem of interpretation is an account of Dignāga's views on the three natures. He doesn't have much to say about them. But he does make much of the distinction between the objects cognized respectively in perception and in inference: the former are pure particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*), the latter things cognized in terms of their general or universal characters (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). Perception proper

can only grasp the former; inference proper can only grasp the latter. This is because perception is defined by Dignāga as constructionfree (*nirvikalpaka*), whereas "inference" is the sole provenance of the constructionfilled notions conveyed in language and thought. Lindtner suggests the following: "To cut a long story short: perceptual awareness (*pratyakṣajñāna*) has to do with the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*); and inferential awareness (*anumānajñāna*) has to do with the constructed nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*). By reviewing Yogācāra philosophy in an epistemological perspective Dignāga is able to reduce the constructed and dependent natures to two different modes of cognition in a mind that is not really split up into subject and object, and the fundamental nature of which is self-illumination."[52]

This may be so, but Dignāga doesn't himself explicitly equate perception with the dependent nature and inference with the constructed nature. Furthermore, Lindtner's account doesn't say what Dignāga does with the perfected nature, although he briefly suggests that "the fundamental nature of (cognition) is self-illumination", and goes on to explore Dignāga's attitude toward meditation, which he views as yogic perception (*yogipratyakṣa*) which when perfected (though Lindtner does not use that term) is both clear and vivid and supported by scripture and proper reasoning. Given that view, then, it is indeed understandable why Dignāga spent the rest of his *magnum opus* on the analysis of proper argumentation.

It is important to realize that the model of the three-natures found in, e.g., *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa*, does seem to resist the temptation simply to upgrade the perfected at the expense of the other two, and indeed to upgrade the dependent and thus downgrade the constructed. While gradation may have been the orientation of the earlier texts which developed the three-natures terminology (e.g, in the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*) it is manifestly not the position taken by Vasubandhu in the *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa*. The temptation to order the three natures in a single overriding fashion must have been strong, and indeed, looking back at our five Buddhist philosophers discussed in this section, some of them may well be guilty of succumbing to the temptation. What is crucial is to keep in mind that just because the perfected is "perfect" that doesn't mean that the others are imperfect; or that perfected and dependent things are not constructed, etc. The implications of this point are somewhat mind-boggling, but it would not do justice to the profundity of the thought of this work to forget or misconstrue them.

To sum up the foregoing analysis, then: for Buddhapālita only the perfected nature is real; it is single and entirely unthinkable and unspeakable. It has no aspects, and there are no actual entities--no persons, no atoms, no consciousness, not even emptiness. For Bhavya only the perfected nature is real, but it has a higher and a lower sort, the lower sort perhaps equivalent to the dependent nature as well as the higher kind of constructed nature. While the higher perfected nature is single and entirely unthinkable and unspeakable, the lower sort, being a higher constructed nature, is thinkable and speakable, indeed it is the subject-matter of proper inferential reasoning. Though the higher perfected nature is no doubt formless, thus without aspects, there are aspects that can stand the test of reasoning, notably consciousness itself, atoms, emptiness, and such, so perhaps decribable as "real" within the limits of the constructed level. For Kambala both perfected and dependent natures are real, though neither are available through positive language; thus there are no aspects (all aspects belong to the constructed nature) but consciousness is real (though not to be confused with its grasping aspect). For Dharmapāla both the perfected and dependent natures are real, and the latter has aspects; the dependent and constructed natures are expressible linguistically, unlike the perfected, which is directly perceived and indescribable. There are no external objects, but consciousness really exists on the dependent level, unlike emptiness, atoms and such which are confined to the constructed nature. Finally, Dignāga identifies the dependent nature with the data of nonlinguistic perception and the constructed nature with the things dealt with in linguistically-expressible inference; only consciousness exists on the perfected level.

The literature on these five Buddhist thinkers and their respective theories is full of references to e.g. Svātantrikas, Prāsaṅgikas, Yogācāra-Sautrāntika-Madhyamakas, Yogācāra-Sautrāntikas, Sautrāntika-Svātantrikas, Ālīkākāras, and Satyākāras. These are all terms invented by Tibetans to distinguish not only the five theories above but also some more views proponents of which are yet to come in subsequent centuries of Indian Buddhism. While it is handy to have such terms, the possibility remains that their applications may turn on Tibetan interpretations which in turn may or may not represent the thinking of the Indian philosophers themselves whose views are being characterized. For the record, the Tibetans characterize Buddhapālita as a Prāsaṅgika, Bhavya as a Sautrāntika-Svātantrika (both being branches of Mādhyamika), and they assign the rubrics Ālīkākāra to Kambala, Madhyamaka-Yogācāra to

Dharmapāla and Nyāya-Yogācāra to Dignāga (in contrast to Āgamic-Yogācāra, meaning the position(s) of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu). Since Stcherbatsky these have been the classifications by which our philosophers were known, and one needs to understand the references to properly understand the critical literature of Buddhist philosophy.

PART TWO

SUMMARIES OF WORKS
(Arranged Chronologically)

1.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Sarvadharmapravṛttinirdeśa* (351)
Translated by Kumārajīva in 401.[1]

2.NĀGĀRJUNA, *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśasūtra* (ca. 354)

This is a commentary on the *Pañcaviṁśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitāsūtra*, #54 of our Volume VIII. We refer to this commentary in what follows as "*Upadeśa*". The *Upadeśa* was translated by Kumārajīva around 404, and constitutes Taisho 1509. Its Chinese title is *Ta tche tou louen*. It is ascribed to Nāgārjuna as early as 597 in *Li tai san pao ki*, the catalogue of the *Tripiṭaka* compiled in 597 by Fei tch'ang fang. As we have noted before many works are ascribed to Nāgārjuna, and we have tried to guess the approximate age of them (see Volume VIII under the various Nāgārjunas for more details on such works). That this is not a work of Ur-Nāgārjuna, the author of *Madhyamakakārikā*, is suggested by several points summarized by Lewis Lancaster.[53]

Étienne Lamotte has translated the first part of the *Upadeśa*, which consists of fifty-two chapters and constitutes an integral Indian text. The second part, in eighty-nine chapters, is not summarized here. One chapter of the second part is translated into French at the end of Lamotte's translation (cf. Volume 5, pp. 2374-2445). Von Rospatt, *The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness* (Stuttgart 1995) translates a number of passasges; cf. p. 281 for the list.

Kumārajīva was born in 343-344 in Cutch (Northwest India); he went to China in 401-402 at age 58 and remained there until his death, and is renowned as a great teacher of famous Chinese scholars such as Seng-chao, Tao-sthena, and Seng-jui; he was a friend of the famous Buddhist scholar Hui-yüan. He translated many Buddhist *sūtras* such as the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, Vajracchedikā, Aṣṭasāhasrikā* and *Sūraṅgamasamādhi*, and also translated some philosophical texts, for example, Harivarman's *Tattvasiddhi*.

Part One of the *Upadeśa* is translated into French by Lamotte in five volumes published between 1949 and 1980.[54] We indicate this French

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[1]Kumārajiva translated this work in 401 in the "3d year of Hung Shih, Later Ch'in dynasty (A.D.401) in Hsiao-yao Garden, Ch'ang-an" (Lancaster, p. 72). K. 168 = T.1650 = N. 164 = Bagchi's #30 on p. 192. On Kumārajīva's remarakable life cf. Bagchi, pp. 178-185.

volumes published between 1949 and 1980.[54] We indicate this French translation in the following summary by "F". K. Venkata Ramanan in 1966 published an English translation of selected passages rearranged topically. We have indicated these passages by "E". Venkataramanan's work also includes translations of a number of passages from the second part of the *Upadeśa*. When the text refers to itself we use the abbreviation "MPPS" for such self-reference. Numbering corresponds to that in use in F.

I (F4-55) Question: Why did the Buddha preach the MPPS?

Answer: 1.The Buddha in the *Tripiṭaka* preached the law of the Ājīvakas, but only in the MPPS does he speak to the Bodhisattva.

2 Besides, he enunciates the MPPS specifically for those cultivating the practice of concentration on the memory of the Buddha (*buddhānusmṛtisamādhi*).

3 provides a biography of the Buddha's life.

4-8 The MPPS is directed toward those who deny that the Buddha is omniscient; explain the Buddha's teachings to those able to understand it; refutes nay-sayers; and gives solace to those who accept his *dharma*; and is for the delight of his hearers, for whom it refutes heretics.

9 The Buddha is the doctor who cures the heretic's malady.

10 The MPPS shows the Buddha's (superhuman) body as inconceivable, immense.

11 summarizes the life of the Buddha again.

12 Some who desire to be saved seek pleasure or practise asceticism and lose the way to *nirvāṇa*, for which the MPPS is a remedy.

13-15 The MPPS explains the difference in retribution between worship of the body of birth and of the body of the law; shows that the Bodhisattva does not regress; honors the *prajñāpāramitā*; and explains the triple vehicle.

16 Explanation of the highest teaching (*pāramārthika siddhānta*) from four points of view of (a) the ordinary person, (b) each individual, (c) providing antidotes; (d) the ultimate point of view.

(a) (E137-138) Real factors provide causes and conditions for existing things. A man consists of five aggregates, reborn according to karmic retribution. Good actions lead to rebirth as god or man; bad actions lead to the three lower destinies. The ordinary person is attached to the self. which exists only from the mundane point of view, not as absolute truth.

Objection: Only the absolute point of view should be taken as true,

no other.

Answer: Not precisely. The four points of view taken separately, being true Thusness, *dharmatā*, ultimate reality, do not exist from the mundane point of view but do as absolute truth. Likewise the person exists as a collection of aggregates, but not actually.

(b) (E139) In order to preach the *dharma* one must take an individual to be a seat of awareness, so that he may understand or fail to understand the *dharma*.

(c) (E139-140) Factors exist as antidotes, though not absolutely. Examples to show that a thing is a remedy or not depending on situation; e.g., the twelve causes and conditions.

Objection: The Buddha said that the twelve causes and conditions were profound, difficult to understand. Then how can a confused (*mūḍha*) person be counselled to study them?

Answer: A confused person has faulty views, but is capable of arriving at correct ones through consideration of the right teachings, such as dependent origination. Likewise, momentariness is a remedy for one who believes in continuity, but not as absolute truth. Why? Because conditioned factors cannot really have the three marks of birth, maintenance and destruction. If they did, they would all three have to be present at once, which is absurd. Furthermore, if momentariness were really true there could be no retribution for acts.

(d) (E72-73, 140-141) From the ultimate point of view all factors, all the subjects of discourse can neither be correctly maintained nor denied. This is recognized in the three stances reviewed in the *Arthavargīyasūtra*: the wise man neither adheres to any belief nor intervenes in any scholarly quarrel; he does not espouse or deny any view, but examines it; he doubts anyone who claims to have found the truth.

Question: But if all views are false, how can there be absolute truth?

Answer: It is the path that transcends all linguistic expression, that terminates thinking; without support, it is both the denial and the true character of factors, without beginning or end, indestructibility, unalterability.

17 The Buddha preaches the MPPS so that great masters (whose names are provided) will have faith in the Buddhist law.

18-19 The Buddha preaches the law in two ways, one to fit the assumptions of his listeners, the other to convert them; or again, as topics of dispute and as undisputed. Of course, there are no actual topics of dispute, since factors are absolutely empty.

20 In other *sūtra*s the Buddha speaks of good, bad and neutral factors. Here he shows that factors are none of these. Elsewhere he addresses the foundations of mindfulness in terms of the understanding of the seeker, but here he teaches the pefection of wisdom.

II (F56-79) (E83, 103-104, 131-133, 195-197, 200) Word by word explanation of the first *sūtra* of the *Pañcaviṁśati*.

III (F80-114) Explanation of the sense of the first part of that *sūtra*.

IV (F115-161) (E147-148, 150) Names of the Buddha.

V (F162-197) On the city called Rājagṛha.

VI (F198-231) The great assembly of monks there, with recounting of who was in attendance, and explanation of names such as "*saṅgha*", "*arhat*", and that Ānanda is not an *arhat* because of his vow.

VII (F232-234) The Buddha is accompanied at the assembly by 500 nuns, 500 laymen and 500 laywomen.. Their status explained.

VIII (F235-308) (E297-298, 312) Bodhisattvas explained. The distinction between those Bodhisattvas who are subject to regression and those that are not. How the Bodhisattva is viewed in the Abhidharma (viz., in the *Vibhāṣā*) and in the Mahāyāna. The 32 marks of a Bodhisattva explained.

IX (F309-317) Explanation of the term "*mahāsattva*": it refers to Bodhisattvas who have taken a great vow and arrived at high status.

X (F316-356) (E238, 246-247) Eighteen qualities of a Bodhisattva reviewed.

XI (F357-390) (E93-96, 98-99, 100, 112, 179, 183-184, 205) Ten analogies to help understand how things said by the Buddha not to exist can nevertheless appear to us to exist: a magical creation, a mirage, the reflection of the moon in water, empty space, an echo, the city of the Gandharvas, a dream, a shadow, a reflection in a mirror, a magically appearing thing.

XII (F391-402) Explanation of the ascription of "untrammelled awareness", "extreme patience" and "excelling in saving" to a Bodhisattva.

XIII (F403-430) The various activities of Bodhisattvas. A list of twenty-two principal Bodhisattvas.

XIV (F431-528) Further description of the variety of ways in which the Buddha assists beings toward liberation.

XV (F529-616) (E201, 313) The ten Bodhisattvas. Why should there be more than one? In fact there are an infinite number inhabiting an infinite number of heavens, but they are all apparitions of the one

Buddha. Doubting arguments refuted.

XVI (F621-649) (EE169) The story of Śāriputra at the Giryagrasamāja festival. His conversion to Buddhism along with that of Maudgalyāyana. Review of all the aspects contemplated by the wise man, and all the factors which constitute the contents of their meditations: those objects which are sense-contents, the four truths, classified into groups of two, three, four, five and six.

XVII (F650-657) (E128, 140, 169) "Prajñāpāramitā" explained.

XVIII (F658-661) Eulogy of the virtues of giving.

XIX (F662-691) Classification of kinds of gifts and how given.

XX (F692-769) (E79-84, 219-224, 227-228, 230, 349) The virtue of giving and of propounding the *dharma*. The thing given does not exist, since there are no external objects.

Refutation of the realist belief that external things exist. The realist argues that things really exist because they have names and because they have effects and are caused. The response is that we have names for both real and unreal things, so the fact of being named doesn't necessitate an actual thing named. Secondly, there are three kinds of things: relative existents, nominal existents, and real entities. Examples:

Long and short are relative terms; things are not intrinsically long or short, but only in comparison with other things. Milk is a complex of four factors--color, smell, taste and touch: thus milk is not real in the way that the composing factors are real. Even color, smell, taste and touch are merely names for what are ultimately composites of atoms; though they are "real" in contrast to other things, they are not so in contrast to atoms.

Atomist: But the atoms at least exist! They are not composite; they are ultimately small; they have no parts.

Refutation of the atomist: The "ultimately small" doesn't exist, being merely a way of speaking. "Large" and "small" being relative notions, nothing is intrinsically large or small. If there could be an atom, it would have to have spatial divisions; otherwise it couldn't be a component of a larger thing.

Moreover, for those who believe in emptiness matter is a function of awareness (*cittānuparivartin*). Thus one can meditatively view a thing as earth, water, fire or air, as blue or yellow or absolutely empty, just as one can see the same woman as attractive or repulsive depending on how she is analyzed, or see her as empty. And since these things are known as empty they are seen as nonexistent

The giver too is nonexistent, being a complex of causes and

conditions. All distinctions are nominal only. This includes the self.

But the believer in a self argues that a self must exist, since otherwise (1) we wouldn't have the idea of me and you as different; (2) we wouldn't find things differing in color, etc.; and (3) there would be no difference between me and you with respect to our karmic residues and so frustration could not occur and liberation is irrelevant. Answers to (1) include the following: (a) if I only know myself as different from you, how do I know you without already knowing myself? Your reasoning is circular. (b) If the person is a composite of the five aggregates, since those five are born from causes and conditions and so empty, the person is empty too, and only supposed to exist by the influence of karmic traces. Answer to (2): it is the visual consciousness that grasps the difference between the colors of things, so the self is unnecessary.

Answers to (3). (1) The self plays no necessary role in the causal account of karmic bondage and of liberation from it. (2) It is the psychophysical complex that is referred to in ordinary language when a "person" *(pudgala)* is spoken of, so the self has nominal existence only and is not ultimately real.

The six perfections related to giving.

XXI (F770-781) (E106) Morality defined and analyzed.

XXII (F782-852) Part One deals with the five precepts against killing, stealing, sexual perversion, lying and drinking. Part Two concerns the moral behavior of laymen and laywomen, seekers and monks.

XXIII (F853-864) Moral virtue.

XXIV (F865-901) (E280) Patience defined and analyzed.

XXV (F902-926) (E90-91, 93, 107-108, 145, 211, 215-216) Dharmic patience (*dharmakṣānti*) occurs in the face of extreme provocations such as adulation, flattery, violence and luxury.

XXVI (F927-945) Energy defined and analyzed.

XXVII (F946-984) Energy's virtues

XXVIII (F985-1057) Meditation is necessary for the Buddhist aspirant. Explanation of the procedures to be followed in learning to meditate properly: elimination of sensual desires; overcoming various obstacles.

XXIX (F1058-1065) (E286-287) Wisdom's virtues.

XXX (F1066-1113) (E73, 142, 144-146, 212-213, 287) The knowledge appropriate to seekers, adepts and those who are neither, to self-enlightened ones, to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, and to heretics. The literature of Buddhism is divided into three: *Piṭaka*, that is, the Buddha's

teachings themselves; the Abhidharma; and the teaching of the emptiness of persons and of factors. A Bodhisattva knows how factors are identical and how they differ.

XXXI (F1121-1207) The thirty-seven allies of enlightenment are reviewed and analyzed from the points of view of Abhidharma and Mahāyāna.

Question: Since the allies of enlightenment belong to the path of seekers and self-enlightened, why are they discussed here under the path of the Bodhisattva?

Answer: The Bodhisattva must follow all the paths. In fact it isn't anywhere said that the allies of enlightenment are for seeker and self-enlightened alone.

Objection: But since the thirty-seven allies are only present for the Bodhisattva at the penultimate stage of his path, after which counselling him to accomplish the perfections and great compassion has no point, one can readily infer that the allies of enlightenment are not meant for Bodhisattvas.

Answer: Since the Bodhisattva spends a long time in *saṁsāra* it is necessary for him to understand the true way and the false way, the world and liberation. Taking a great vow, he promises to practice the perfections. It is because he has not yet practiced them that he is not immediately liberated. In the Abhidharma it is (wrongly) taught that *saṁsāra* and *nirvāṇa* are different, but in the Mahāyāna it is (rightly) understood that they are the same, namely emptiness (*Madhyamakakārikā* XXV. 19-20 is quoted).

The roots of the thirty-seven allies of enlightenment are ten: faith, morality, thought, energy, memory/mindfulness, concentration, wisdom, tranquility, joy, equanimity.

The seven groups comprising the thirty-seven allies of enlightenment are analyzed successively. These seven are: four establishments of mindfulness, four right efforts, four supernatural powers, five faculties, five powers, seven aspects of enlightenment, eight members of the path.

XXXII (F1209-1238; E190, 233, 294) Three concentrations on emptiness, signlessness, aimlessness are analyzed from the standpoint of Abhidharma and Mahāyāna. The four meditative levels are classified in Abhidharma into two basic sorts: those of worldly purity and those of transcendent purity.

Question: In the MPPS you speak of factors as only empty of character, so how can the Bodhisattva meditate on empty factors?

Answer: The Bodhisattva knows that all factors stem from causes and conditions, have no self-nature and are empty. So it is easy for him to reject them. But ordinary folk, who find pleasure in things wrongly supposed to exist, think meditation is profound and marvellous.

XXXIII (F1239-1279) Four boundless states of loving kindness, compassion, joy and equanimity. The four immaterial states of infinite space, infinite consciousness, nothingness and neither-identification-nor-nonidentification.

XXXIV (F1281-1309) Eight liberations (*vimokṣa*): seeing both external and internal things; seeing interior but not exterior things; pure liberation from the body; the four immaterial states just discussed; the cessation of identification and feeling.

Eight masteries: knowing the number, beauty, exteriority of visible things as well as knowing internal things; knowing those things plus knowing that the internal is dominant; knowing those aspects of external things but not internal things; knowing only exterior things as blue, yellow, round and white.

The ten organs of entirety (*kṛtsnāyatana*).

The nine successive liberations.

XXXV (F1311-1328) Nine foul states according to Abhidharma and Mahāyāna.

XXXVI (F1329-1430) Eight memorable things (*anusmṛti*): the Buddha; the *dharma*, the order, morality, renunciation (*tyāga*), gods, breath, death.

XXXVII (F1431-1463) Ten identifications: transitoriness, frustration, no self, the first three as one, dislike (*pratikūla*) towards food, displeasingness of the whole world, death, foul things, abandoning, disenchantment, cessation.

XXXVIII (F1365-1503; T289-290) Eleven knowledges of the Mahāyāna:

Three concentrations. Three faculties: knowing what was unknown, knowing that one knows, perfect knowledge.

XXXIX (F1505-1566; T77) Ten powers.

XL (F1567-1624; Four convictions of the Buddha: that I am completely enlightened, that I am free of all impurities, that I have renounced all hindering factors, that my noble path yields liberation. Four discriminations: of objects, factors, grammar and perspicuity.

XLI (F1625-1703; T134, 136, 197-199) Eighteen attributes peculiar to the Buddha (*āveṇikadharma*). Refutation of the Sarvāstivāda theory on

this score. Review of the list of eighteen found in the *Abhidharmavibhaṅga*.

XLII (F1705-1717) The great benevolence and compassion of the Buddha.

XLIII (F1809-1879) (E105-106, 148-149, 302) The six higher faculties. Knowledge of other's thoughts.

Objection: A thought, which you claim can be known by another, is either gone (*gata*) or not gone (*agata*). If it is gone it doesn't exist, like the thought of a dead man. And if it is not gone, then how can it be known by another?

Answer: It is neither gone nor not gone; the notion that a thought occurs at a fixed time is wrong.

Question: Can the Buddha or Bodhisattva know all the thoughts of others? If so, beings are of a finite number.

Answer: No, there are an infinite number of beings, and the Buddha's omniscience can comprise such an infinite group, being limitless. Anyway, the Buddha declined to answer such questions.

What the seeker, the self-enlightened one, and the Bodhisattva can know distinguished.

Spells, i.e., preparatory exercises to help the aspirant retain what he has heard, which he approaches as either words (*ghoṣa*) or syllables (*akṣara*).

Concentration as described in Abhidharma and in Mahāyāna reviewed.

XLIV (1180-1890) Sympathetic joy (*anumodanā*) discussed. The Bodhisattva's action in helping others surpasses those of the seeker and self-enlightened ones in this connection.

XLV (F1891-1930) (E70-72) Practice of the six perfections. The connections between wisdom and giving. The marks of a Bodhisattva, and the nature of his family.

XLVI (F1931-1974) The good roots and the six perfections.

XLVII (F1975-1994) More on the marks of a Bodhisattva.

XLVIII (F1995-2151) (E76-77, 215-216, 298-299) Eighteen emptinesses: emptiness of factors internal, external, and both; emptiness of emptiness; the great emptiness of ten regions; emptiness of the highest, i.e., of liberation; emptiness of the conditioned and the unconditioned factors; absolute emptiness; emptiness of factors that have not come into being; emptiness of factors that have already occurred; emptiness of supposedly ultimately real things, such as *prakṛti*, emptiness of all factors,

emptiness as nonperception; the emptiness of absences, of self-nature, and of both together.

XLIX (F2163-2230) (E91, 184, 190-194, 254-255, 261-264) The four conditions: causal, directly antecedent, supporting and dominant. The five causes: connected, simultaneous, homogeneous, pervasive, retributory. Explanations of terms *tathatā, dharmadhātu* and *bhūtakoṭi*. The four great elements.

L (F2231-2277) (E263) Arrival at the other bank, of conditioned and unconditioned factors.

Question: How can a Bodhisattva, who has not yet destroyed his contaminants, yet find himself among the noble persons?

Answer: He has had a glimpse of enlightenment, and his merits and understanding is great, greater than those of seekers and self-enlightened people.

The three positively meritorious actions (*puṇyakriyāvastu*) are giving, morality and meditation. They are explained.

The five eyes: the fleshly eye, the divine eye, the eye of wisdom, the eye of *dharma*, and the Buddha's eye. They are used by the ascetic in visualizing the past, present and future states of the Buddha.

LI (F2279-2342) (E263) The Bodhisattva finds perfection of wisdom through hearing, reciting, memorizing and retaining the teaching of the Buddha having twelve members, namely (1) text (*sūtra*), 2) chants (*geya*), 3) predictions (*vyākaraṇa*). 4) metric passages (*gāthā*), 5) exclamations (*udāna*), 6) conditions (*nidāna*), 7) short recitations (*avadāna*), tales ("thus have we heard", *ityuktaka*), 9) birth-stories (*jātaka*) and 10) large texts (*vaipulya*), 11) marvels (*adhibhūta*) and 12) explanations (*upadeśa*).

LII (F2343-2372)(E281) Examination of the three bad roots or poisons: attachment, hatred and delusion.

Question: If the Buddha, who is the Lord of *dharma*, can disappear why doesn't the *dharma* likewise disappear?

Answer: Because it is retained in memory by the Bodhisattva even without being realized. In fact the nature (*dharmatā*) of the Buddha's *dharma* is nonarisen, undestroyed, uninterrupted, impermanent, neither one nor many, neither come nor gone, unattached, unsupported, nonexistent, it is *nirvāṇa*.

Question: So it is indestructible?

Answer: Indeed, the true character of the *dharma* is indestructible. By hearing the innumerable names of the Buddha one attains illumination (*abhisambodhi*).

3.AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
Tathāgataguṇajñānacintyaviṣayāvatāranirdeśasūtra (ca. 355)

The title is rendered by Nanjio as "Sūtra on crossing the wisdom, light, and adornment of the place of all Buddhas."[55] It was translated anonymously by someone in the period 350-431. T.302 = N.85.

4.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Anantadhāraṇīdharmaparyāyasūtra* (ca. 355)

K. 334 = N. 374 = T. 1342. Lancaster tells us that the translation was made by "Sheng-chien during the years of T'ai Ch'u, Western Ch'in dynasty (A.D.388-407)."

5.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Bhadraśerīsūtra* (ca. 355)

K. 469 = T. 570 = N. 510, translated by Sheng-chien around the same time as the previous entry. Nanjio renders the title as "Sūtra spoken by Buddha on (the request of) Bhadraśerī (a queen of Bimbisāra)".

6.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Sūtra* on Ānanda's thinking (ca. 355)

Translated by Fa-chien (or Fa-hsien) around 400. Fa-chien travelled from China to India between 399 and 414, and prepared a record of his travels (T.2085 = N. 1496 = K.1073).[1]

7.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Śrīkaṇṭhasūtra* (ca. 355)

K.374 =T.744 = N. 398, translated by Fa-Hsien.

8.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Ākāśagarbhasūtra* (363)

K. 62 = T.405 = N. 68, translated by Buddhayaśas in 408-413. Chapter 11 is translated by Bendall and Rouse (London 1922; Delhi

[1]The Chinese name of the text is *A nan fen pieh ching*; it is T. 495 = N. 637). It comprises 7 leaves. Cf. Sudha Sengupta, *Buddhism in the Classical Age* (Delhi 1985), pp. 64-71 for further details about the visit to India of the Chinese translator Fa-hsien and his translations.

1971, 1981), pp. 61-70. Buddhayaśas was in China at the same time as Kumārajīva. Cf. P.C.Bagchi, *Le Canon Bouddhique en Chine* (Paris 1927), pp. 200-204 for more information on his life and travels. Acording to Sudha Sengupta, *Buddhism in the Classical Age* (op. cit.), p. 56, the work "describes five root sins which are to be avoided by princes and eight sins which the young novices are liable to commit; and the way to get rid of them is prescribed as the worship of the Bodhisattva Ākāśagarbha."

9.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Kṣudrakasūtra* (365)

Goes under several other titles, e.g., *Saṁyuktapiṭakasūtra*. K.767 = T 745 = N 676. Comprises 1 chapter in 11 leaves. Lancaster tells us that this text was translated by Fa-hsien in Tao-ch'ang monastery, Yang-tu in 405.

10.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Anantamukhasādhakadhāraṇīsūtra* (ca. 369)

K. 325 = T. 1012 = N 356, translated in 419 by Buddhabhadra (cf. Nanjio, pp. 341-346), a person born in Kapilavastu of royal blood who is supposed to have bested Kumārajīva in some sort of controversy and eventually become his advisor. Nanjio says: "He met Kumārajīva in China, and whenever the latter found any doubts, the former was always asked for an explanation." Bagchi describes him as man of elegant and courteous manner and profound erudition. He died in China in 429. Some of his translations were done in collaboration with Fa-hsien (see above).

11.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Buddhadhyānasamādhisāgarasūtra* (ca. 369)

A good-sized work of 12 chapters, translated by Buddhabhadra. K. 401 = N. 430 = T.643.

12.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Buddhadharmācintyanirdeśasūtra* (369)

This text comprises a portion of the *(Buddha)Avataṁśakasūtra*, constituting K. 79 = T. 278 = N. 87, translated by Buddhabhadra between 418 and 422.

13.AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
Devarājasaṁtuṣṭabhagavanmaṅgalagāthāsūtra (369)

Yet another porton of the *Avataṁśakasūtra*. Besides the locations cited in the previous entry, see also Bagchi, p. 344, (1), where we are told that the translation was finishèd in "320-321", presumably a misprint.

14.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka* (369)

This text is reported by Isshi Yamada as available from six Sanskrit manuscripts held in various collections around the world (London, Cambridge, Paris, Calcutta, Tokyo and Kyoto), in two Tibetan translations, and in two Chinese translations. The Chinese version that appears to be the earliest, K. 126 = T157 = N. 142, is a translation by Dharmakṣema made some time between 414 and 421. On Dharmakṣema see Bagchi, pp. 212-221 and Sudha Sengupta, op. cit., pp. 56-57: he was from Central India, went to Kashmir to study Mahāyāna, and travelled to China in 414 and remained there till his death in 433. "E" refers here to the Sanskrit text as presented by Isshi Yamada in *Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka. The White Lotus of Compassion.* Volume II (New Delhi 1989). Pages 63-120 of Volume I of Yamada's publication provide an English summary on which our present summary is based.

CHAPTER ONE: Turning the Wheel of Dharma

(E1-13) Śākyamuni, the Buddha, is staying on Mt. Gṛdhrakūṭa in Rājagṛha, attended by many thousands of Bodhisattvas and other followers. This Chapter provides a description of the Padmā Buddha land in the southeastern direction, and of the miracles performed there by the Buddha.

CHAPTER TWO: The Source of Spells

(E14-50) History of the Buddha Land. How Gaganamudra became Padmottara and helped millions of Buddhas attain the patience constituting the *dharma* of nonarising by following ten Dravidian spells (*dhāraṇī*). This is confirmed by Maitreya, who traces the sources of these spells. Śākyamuni explains five additional spells, and notes that they are hard to practice, and that Buddhas only rarely appear on earth. He turns into a huge tongue (*abhūtajihvatā*) as testimony the truth of his instruction.

CHAPTER THREE: Bestowal of a Gift

(E51-104) Śāntimati asks how Śākyamuni, despite living in the fivefold world of defilements (of short life, of a bad age, of bad people, of wrong views and of desires), managed to attain enlightenment without resorting to a pure Buddha land where the defilements are lacking. The Buddha answers that he inhabits such a fivefold world because of his great compassion for others. To explain this he tells the story of King Araṇemin, who is to become Amitābha, and his minister Samudrareṇu, who will become Śākyamuni, each through their particular vows.

CHAPTER FOUR: Classification of Bodhisattvas

(E105-326) Display of the Bodhisattvas in various places by name, capped by Samudrareṇu, who hearing this takes five hundred vows that cover the entire legendary biography of the Buddha.

CHAPTER FIVE: The Gift

(E327-387) A collection of six Jātaka stories about former lives of the Buddha.

CHAPTER SIX: Epilogue

(E388-420) Praise to the Buddha. His ten names.

15.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Mahāmeghasūtra* (ca. 370)

K. 164 = T.387 = N.244, translated by Dharmakṣema (see under the previous entry (#4). According to Paul Demiéville[56] this work is also known as "Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra" and "Alakṣaṇa- or Asaṁjñā-sūtra". Demieville provides a summary in French. He says it is a different work from Nanjio 187-188 and 970, rendered into English by Cecil Bendall in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 12.2, pp. 288-311, which according to Demiéville is a "purely Tantric" work.

16.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Ratnaketudhāraṇīsūtra* (ca. 370)

Nalinaksha Dutt provides details about this *sūtra* in *Gilgit Manuscripts* Volume IV (Calcutta 1959), pp. i-iii, and a summary in the succeeding pages iii-xiv, from which we have drawn in preparing the summary given below. The text is known from a single mansucript discovered at Gilgit and which Dutt estimates as having been written in

the 5th or 6th century. There is a Tibetan translation by Śīlendrabodhi and a Tibetan Lotsava. It was, however, first translated by Dharmakṣema between 414 and 421, K.56 (9) =T. 397 (9) = N.61 (9)[57].

Summary by Nalinaksha Dutt

CHAPTER ONE: *Mārajimhīkaraṇa*

"The first chapter...begins with the story of the conversion of Śāriputra and Mahāmaudgalyāyana. Śāriputra met Aśvajit and was greatly impressed by his saintly appearance and on enquiry found out that he was a disciple of Buddha. On hearing (a certain) stanza Śāriputra developed an insight into the Truth and communicated the same to his friend Maudgalyāyana according to their mutual understanding. Maudgalyāyana also penetrated into the teaching (*dharma*) and attained the first stage of sanctification (*srotāpanna*). Both of them decided to join the Buddhist order of Śākyamuni, who was then in Rājagṛha, and before doing so, they apprised their students of the intention to become Buddhist monks. Their 500 students also followed them and became disciples of Śākyamuni. Māra, the lord of Kāmadhātu, was very much agitated at the change of mind of Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana and apprehended that his realm would be gradually denuded of persons with secular leanings on account of Buddha's teachings. He then took the form of Aśvajit and approached the two leaders telling them that whatever he had communicated to them heretobefore was all wrong and that there was in fact neither cause nor its effect, there were neither fruits of deeds nor rebirth. He was, however, found out by the two leaders, who advised their students to take ordination in order to escape from old age and death. Failing to deceive them, Māra put up obstructions on their way to Śākyamuni by creating miraculously a waterfall, a mountain and roaring lions but all these were counteracted by Śākyamuni's superior supernatural powers. Unaware of Māra's obstructive activities, the two leaders with their 500 students proceeded to Śākyamuni, who ordained them then and there without any formal ceremony. Māra then appeared before Buddha in the form of gods Maheśvara and Brahmā to dissuade him from his mission but received a sharp retort from the Teacher. He was very much disappointed and went back to his palace and entered into his chamber of grief...He was cheered by the Apsarases with the words that he must not fight shy of anybody as there was none who could go beyond the ocean of desires. Māra replied that there was one who had realised the evanescence of worldly

objects and collected around him disciples who lived in forests practising meditations for removing the mental impurity of hatred. This man would bring about havoc in his realm. Hearing these words of Māra about Śākyamuni's sanctity and greatness the Apsarases felt a reverence for Śākyamuni and approached him to ascertain how a female could become a male and ultimately a Buddha. They rebuked Māra for his evil designs and advised him to show due regard to Buddha. They then left the service of Māra and became devotees of Buddha. Māra felt sore at the changed attitude of his female attendants. He then called his sons and asked them to make the maximum war preparations to conquer his enemy. In reply to his sons' enquiry about the strength of his enemy, Māra said that his enemy was Śākyamuni, who was mean and deceitful and had been beguiling all good men of his realm including his female attendants by his wrong teachings. Māra's army then advanced against Śākyamuni and hurled all their deadly weapons upon him, who, however, then entered into...meditation...which changed all the missiles into flowers and jewels and their war-cries into the sounds of *buddha, dharma, saṁgha, pāramitā* and so forth. Witnessing the supernatural feats of the great Buddha all beings of the universe from the lowest to the highest developed faith in him and started eulogizing him in beautiful verses in which they said that Buddha's mind, although as free as space, was however permeated with love and compassion because he wanted to rescue all beings from the fleeting worldly existence.

Observing the wonderful powers of Buddha, the daughters of Māra showered on him *muktā* flowers, all of which through his miraculous power turned into canopies hovering in the air over the heads of countless Buddhas, who were all of the same form, colour and appearance. There were however differences in the shape and size of their thrones, number of their followers and nature of their Buddha-*kṣetra*s. Māra's sons returned to their father at night and acknowledged their discomfiture and inability to move even a hair of Buddha's body. Many of them again approached the Teacher and listened to his teachings. Hearing this news, Māra became very much dejected and applied his mind to devise other means to conquer Buddha.

CHAPTER II

The second chapter is entitled "*Pūrvayoga*" (associated with past existences). It opens with the solicitation of Māra's sons and daughters to Buddha to explain what is the best course for attaining perfect

sanctification and for acquiring knowledge, supernatural powers, compassion, means of expediency and power of correct intonation. In reply, Bhagavān gave them the following instructions: One should (a) not develop any attachment for the *pāramitā* practices nor form any conception about them; (b) eradiçate from one's mind the notion of the existence of a being or soul; (c) remain dissociated from sound, smell and other sense-objects and (d) not entertain any notion about the elements constituting the three planes of existence as also about their origin and continuity on account of certain causes and conditions.

In order to develop the above mental attitude, one must realise that the so-called practices prescribed for Bodhisattvas are without any real basis and that all objects are in fact non-existent and without origin and decay, are devoid of a permanent substance and individual characteristics. The only means to attain omniscience is to get rid of the notion of duality, viz., that there are practices of attaining omniscience and that one is exerting to perfect oneself in the practices to attain omniscience, and so forth. Then a few Bodhisattvas, who were spiritually advanced, gave out their individual experiences, and the steps taken by them for the realisation of the Truth, and the nature of their actual realisations. Bhagavān Buddha endorsed fully the views of Kautūhalika Bodhisattva, who said that there was neither any teaching nor any teacher nor any words or sentences conveying the teaching, nor were there the taught who studied the teaching or exerted according to the same. By comprehending that everything was inexpressible one could realise sameness (*tathatā*) of the Reality of omniscience (*sarvajñajñāna*) or the Truth that everything was without origin and decay. After these expositions of the truth given by the Bodhisattvas, Māra's sons and daughters developed the faith that all objects were without origin...They then showered flowers on Śākyamuni as an expression of their gratitude....

CHAPTER III *Māradamana*

The Third chapter...opens with the statement that when the *Ratnaketudhāraṇī* was recited by Śākyamuni while recounting his past existence, there was not only an earthquake but also a flash of bright light flooding all corners of the universe. On enquiry made by the countless Māras about the source of the light, Māra the lord of Kāmadhātu told them that a deceitful magician had been born in the family of Śākya. For six years he had exerted alone in a solitary place to acquire the magical powers. Māra's army could not move a single hair of his body and was

routed by his signless magic and over and above this the female attendants of Māra deserted him to become devotees of the magician. Māra therefore sought the help and co-operation of other Māras to subdue the wicked and deceitful magician. On hearing this, the other Māras had a look at Bhagavān and were dismayed at the sombre voice of his preaching. Each of them, one by one, uttered one or two verses dwelling on the excellence of the great man and of his teaching and advised their friend not to court peril by showing anger and enmity towards the great Being. Māra of Kāmadhātu gave to each of them suitable replies in choice verses with a view to incite their wrath. The verses of other Māras presented the best features of Buddha's teachings as those of Kāmeśvara. Māra did the same under the garb of pointing out the utility and importance of worldly life....

At last, however, the other Māras agreed to give him military aid and they all came with their army fully armoured and hovered in the air on the border of Aṅga and Magadha. They also got the aid of other non-human beings who had no faith in Buddha. Māra of Kāmadhātu, in the meantime, came across in the Himalayas a hermit-saint called Jyotirasa, who was a devotee of Maheśvara and proficient in eighteen branches of learning. He persuaded him to meet Buddha with a view to see him triumph over the Teacher in knowledge and magical feats. While his friends were getting ready with their weapons of war, Māra advised his attendants to make friends with Buddha's four great disciples, viz., Śārīputra, Maudgalyāyana, Pūrṇa Maitrāyaṇīputra and Subhūti while they would come out on their begging rounds, and to dance and sing with them. The attendants did so but they were told by the four great disciples in verse that the constituents of a being and worldly enjoyments were their enemies which must be destroyed, and uttered a *mantrapada*, which changed the minds of the attendants and made them devotees of the disciples. The verses uttered by Subhūti were replete with Mahāyānic teaching of *śūnyatā*.

Śākyamuni Buddha then wrought a miracle by which the four disciples found them seated in a wide crossing of streets, one facing the other, and on that spot appeared countless lotuses, from the leaves of which issued forth thoughtful verses. Seeing this miracle, Māra of Kāmadhātu became extremely disappointed while the other Māras reproached him for misguiding them to fight against a divine saint. They congregated at Rājagṛha and after taking forms of different celestial beings, they worshipped the Teacher with folded hands. Māra of

Kāmadhātu, being thus deserted by his friends, became almost mad with grief and fear, and while shedding tears he attempted to destroy the lotuses, but he failed to do anything as he could neither see nor touch them. He was dumbfounded and could not let out a shriek or throw out his hands. He wanted to return to his house, but that also he could not do and found himself bound down as if by five fetters. He was advised by another Māra to take refuge in Buddha. In order to get release from his fetters, he offered salutation to Buddha and found himself unfettered then and there. As he wanted to get away from Buddha, he was fettered again as before. At last he submitted to Buddha wholeheartedly

CHAPTER IV: *Ṛṣi Jyotirasaprasāda*

The title means "conversion of ascetic Jyotirasa". The opening account reverts to the four Mahāśrāvakas, who were compelled by the attendants of Māra to sing and dance with them, but whose utterances relating to Nirvāṇa made the earth quake. The temporary discomfiture encountered by the great disciples made the gods nervous about the future well-being of the teaching and so they solicited the Teacher to see that the discipline of the monks was properly maintained. Bhagavān assured them that no one could do any harm to his teachings and that he would now go to convert to his faith the Māras, who had assembled at Rājagṛha. He was however warned in verses uttered by the gods dwelling at Rājagṛha not to risk his life by going to teach the Māras, but the Śuddhāvāsakāyika gods told the other gods that they were confident that he could not be harmed by any Māra. Bhagavān then consoled them all by recounting in verses his virtuous and meritorious acquisitions and his consequent invincibility.

All beings felt greatly relieved at the words of Bhagavān and were convinced that they would be rescued by him from the ocean of existence to the state of fearlessness. They expressed their devotion by offering flowers to the Buddha.

Buddha then entered into *śūraṅgamasamādhi* and while meditating he moved about among men and gods and other beings, all of whom regarded him as a fellow-being of theirs. At that time he met Jyotirasa who was persuaded by Māra to challenge him. But Jyotirasa on seeing him became not only a changed man but an ardent devotee of Buddha, eulogizing him in glorious terms. He offered flowers to him in deep reverence. Buddha then rose from his *śūraṅgamasamādhi* and made the prophecy that Jyotirasa would ultimately become a Buddha.

CHAPTER V: *Lakṣaṇa*

The title refers to characteristics of worldly objects. It is fragmentary and the available portion opens with the remark that Bhagavān had a look round the whole universe. He imparted instructions to Māra and said that the appearance of Buddha and his teachings were extremely rare in this world. He explained the Mahāyānic principles of Buddhism and established that there were neither worldly objects nor their characteristics nor their originator.

As the main topic of the chapter is a dissertation on the nonexistence of phenomenal objects and their characteristics, it has been called the *Lakṣaṇaparivarta*.

CHAPTER VI: *Dhāraṇī*

This chapter...opens with the account of a congregation of countless Buddhas (*mahāsannipāta*) in the (Sahā)Lokadhātu of Śākyamuni Tathāgata. At the sight of the Buddhas, the three impurities of attachment, hatred and delusion, etc. of all beings subsided and their minds became calm and serene. Śākyamuni Tathāgata then addressed the assembled Buddhas that in consequence of his past resolutions he had attained enlightenment with a view to rescue beings from the evil states in which they had fallen. He said that the fallen beings had given up their noble resolutions, were plunged in darkness of ignorance, and had become bereft of roots of all merit. In order to fulfill his purpose, he was moving about on foot, eating uneatable articles of food, wearing rough robes and dwelling in forests and cemeteries. He was imparting to the kings, traders, brāhmaṇas and workers, instructions suited to their tastes and inclinations. He was being abused and ill-treated to the extreme by his hearers while his disciples were being misguided by the wicked beings, and his doctrines were being trampled down by the Māras, but in spite of all these he was labouring hard to preach his doctrines in order to enlighten the beings. It is with the object of making this struggle of his against odds known to all Buddhas that he had in this dark age invited an assembly of Buddhas. He wanted their support and help so that all beings might get rid of their worldly woes, enjoy abundance of food and clothes, and above all develop the *bodhicitta*. He would futher request them to utter the *dhāraṇī* known as "Vajradharma-samatā-pratītya-dharma-hṛdaya-samuccaya-vidhvaṁsaṇī-dhāraṇī-mudrāpada-prabheda-praveśa-vyākaraṇa-dharma-paryāya". In response to this request all Buddhas then recited the *dhāraṇī*. They were then praised by all beings who were highly impressed

by the very large congregation of Buddhas, Bodhisattvas and Mahāśrāvakas.

Bodhisattva Candraprabha Kumārabhūta then uttered with folded hands a few laudatory verses praising the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas and declared that the *dhāraṇī (mudrāpada)* would increase the merits of Bodhisattvas and lead them to Bodhi. The laudation of Candraprabha was endorsed with one voice by the other Bodhisattvas who added that if any monk or nun, or a male or female lay-devotee cleanly dressed and standing on a throne, should utter this *mantrapada*, he or she would not suffer from any mental or physical pain nor suffer from any disease. The hearers of the *mantrapada* would also enjoy the same benefit. Candraprabha then uttered a formula for giving one's approval to the *mantrapada*. Then the Bodhisattvas, Mahāśrāvakas and gods acknowledged the excellence of the *mantrapada*.

At that time Bhūteśvara Mahābrahmā, seated in a well-decorated female form in front of Amitāyus Tathāgata, announced that he would give protection to the reciter and hearer of the *mantrapada* from any injury caused by an evil Māra of spirit.

The neatly adorned Śikhīndhra Śakra was seated near Amitāyus Tathāgata. He mistook Bhūteśvara Mahābrahmā as a female goddess and said that it was improper for her to sit just in front of Amitāyus Tathāgata. He then explained in a few words the real meaning of *tathatā*. Amitāyus Tathāgata pointed out the error of Śikhīndra Śakra and said that Bhūteśvara Mahābrahmā was not a female but a highly advanced Bodhisattva who could take any form at will. The god Indra craved forgivenness for his error. Then Bhūteśvara Mahābrahmā announced in a loud voice to all Brahmā gods to give protection to the reciters of the *mantrapāda* from any injury or suffering and uttered a few curses which would befall those who would do any harm to the faithful.

The next three chapters are missing.

CHAPTER X: *Ārakṣa*

The beginning of this Chapter is also missing. Its title means "giving protection (to the treatise, its reciters and hearers)".

The large congregation of Buddhas informed the gods, men and other beings of the (Sahā)Lokādhātu that it should be their responsibility to preserve and propagate the *Mahāsannipāta-dharmaparyāya*. This treatise, they said, would keep up the religion and help all beings to achieve

perfection. They added that the monks and nuns, male and female lay-devotees, who would propagate this treatise by teaching or copying it, deserved worship of the people. Then they enumerated the manifold merits that would accrue to the preservers and propagators of the treatise.

On hearing these words of the Buddhas, the Bodhisattvas with Maitreya as their leader promised to protect the treatise. The gods also made smilar promises and they were all complimented for this noble resolution of theirs by the assembled Buddhas.

CHAPTER XI: *Saddhammanayarakṣā*

In the eleventh chapter, Śākyamuni Tathāgata told Śakra, Brahmā and the Cāturmahārājika gods that he had obtained enlightenment in this dark age of five impurities, rescued many beings from misery, and conquered the Māra. He now requested them to preserve and protect this treatise...which had been entrusted to their care by the assembled Buddhas.

Then Kautūhalika Bodhisattva enquired of Śākyamuni Tathāgata whether all the Māra gods had assembled there and whether they had all developed faith in the *triratna*. Śākyamuni said that a thousand Māra gods with their retinue had not faith in the *triratna* and were ever attempting to find fault with the *dharma* and to bring about its ruin but they would, ultimately, after seeing the large assemblage of Buddhas, develop faith in the *triratna* and would also attain enlightenment.

The last two chapters 12 and 13 are also missing.

17.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Sūryagarbhasūtra* (370)

Edward Conze writes: "This Sūtra first compares the concentration of a skilful Bodhisattva with the sun from seven points of view. It then sums up the metaphysics of Perfect Wisdom, enumerates the blessings derived from a study of the Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra, and ends up with a few *gāthās*". It was translated into Chinese by Dharmakṣema K.56 (13) = T. 397 (13) = N. 61 (13).

18.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Suvarṇaprabhāsāsūtra* (370)

The text was first translated into Chinese by Dharmakṣema. There are other translations into Chinese, German, French, Japanese and English. See Bibliography, Third Edition, I, 182-183 for references.[58] It comprises K. 1465 = T.663 = N. 127.

The present summary is based on Sitansushekar Bagchi's in Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 8 (Darbhanga 1967), pp. 1-18. "E" references are to the edition Bagchi provides in the same publication.

Summary by Sitansushekar Bagchi

1.*Nidānaparivarta*

(E1-3) This chapter "is devoted to the glorification of listening to this sacred text and its efficacy to lead to the attainment of different desired objects and the ultimate aims of human life and to the pacification of the baneful influence of evil spirits, unfavourable planets, celestial beings and the like."

2.*Tathāgatāyuḥpramāṇanirdeśaparivarta*

(E4-9) "The theme of the second chapter is pregnant with profound significance. The mind of the Bodhisattva Rucirāketu was assailed with a grave doubt. Śākyamuni himself practised what he preached as means of extending the length of human life. Yet his life came to an end at the age of eighty. Consequently his teachings and sermons cannot lay claim to authenticity. He was not immune from the sphere of metempsychosis like an ordinary creature. ...(With) a view to eliminating this sceptical attitude of...mind...*gāthā*s recited by the four Buddhas (Akṣobhya, Ratnaketu, Amitābha and Dundubhīśvara) and the long dialogue between Kauṇḍinya and the Litsavi prince have been set forth...The sum and substance of them is that the body of the Buddha is not composed of physical elements. It is essentially a spiritual one and as such immutable and imperishable. So there is absolutely no warrant for the alleged doubt."

3.*Svapnaparivarta*

(E10) Rucirāketu's dream.

4.*Deśanāparivarta*

(E11-23) "An account of the recitation of those *gāthā*s which were

heard by the Bodhisattva Rucirāketu."

5.*Kamalākarasarvatathāgatatattvaparivarta*

(E24-29) "...(T)he hymns of all the Buddhas which pass under the name of Kamalākara...(T)he way of reflection on emptiness of all things has been set forth in brief. Besides, the six sense-organs have been compared with the burglar of a village and the natural propensity to their relevant objects has been repeatedly stressed in it. The unsteadiness of *citta* has been brought to light. The four physical elements (*dhātu*) have been metaphorically identified with a serpent. The twelve links of dependent origination have been enumerated in its accredited order...It has called upon all spiritual aspirants to sever the net of afflictions by means of the sword of enlightenment and to realize the abode of conglomerations as absolutely empty and void...."

6. *Śūṇyatāparivarta*

(E30-35) Emptiness

7.*Caturmahārājaparivarta*

(E36-54) "The seventh chapter is chiefly devoted to the glorification of the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa-sūtra*...

8.*Sarasvatīdevīparivarta*

(E55-59) "The eighth chapter narrates that the goddess Sarasvatī appeared before the Blessed One and promised to provide the preacher of the Doctrine with presence of mind conducive to the embellishment of his speech..."

9.*Śrīmahādevīparivarta*

(E60-62) "...An account that Śrī Mahadevī appeared before the Blessed One and solemnly declared that she would provide both material and spiritual welfare for the preacher of the Doctrine..."

10.*Sarvabuddhabodhisattvanāmasaṁdhāraṇīparivarta*

(E63) "...The holy names of the Tathāgatas and Bodhisattvas..."

11.*Dṛḍhāpṛthivīdevatāparivarta*

(E64-67) "The earth-goddess, named Dṛḍhā, told the Blessed One that she would render the seat of the expositor of the Doctrine comfortable to

the highest possible degree..."

12.*Saṁjñeyamahāyakṣeṇāpatiparivarta*

(E68-69) "...Saṁjñeya, the great commander of the military forces of *yakṣas*, accompanied by other twenty-eight commanders, came near to the Blessed One and assured their loyal cooperation in the matter of promulgation of the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa*..."

13.*Devendrasamayaparivarta*

(E70-73) ...(D)eals with the science of government and political affairs (*rājaśāstra*)."

14.*Sasaṁbhavaparivarta*

(E77-82) "..(A)n account of the king named Sasaṁbhava whose dominion extended over the four islands..."

15.*Yakṣāśrīyārakṣavyākaraṇaparivarta*

(E83-89) ...(P)rotection extended to the listeners of the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa* by the Yakṣas and other Buddhist deities...

16.*Daśadevaputrasahasravyākaraṇaparivarta*

(E90-92) "...(T)he Blessed One's prediction that ten thousand gods will attain perfect enlightenment and the state of Buddhahood...."

17.*Vyādhipraśamanaparivarta*

(E93-97) "...(G)ives an account of providing remedy for malady (by Jalavāhana)."

18.*Jalavāhanasya satsyavaineyaparivarta*

(E98-105) "...(T)he legend of conversion of the fishes by Jalavāhana", to whom he provided water.

19.*Vyāghrīparivarta*

(E105-122) "...(T)he story which the Blessed One told...about the sacrifice of his life for the satisfaction of the hunger of a tigress."

20.*Sarvatathāgatastavaparivarta*

(E123-125) ...(H)ymns..recited by the hundreds of thousands of Bodhisattvas in order to extol the spiritual glory of the Tathāgata..."

21.*Nirgamanaparivarta*

(E123-125) "Those *gāthās* which were chanted by Kuladevatā...in honor of the Blessed Lord with a special emphasis upon emptiness. The Lord himself congratulated her on her brilliant performance."

19.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Caturdevarājasūtra* (ca. 377)

Translated by two Chinese monks who visited India, or at least Kabul, in the company of Fa-hsien and, returning home, translated (among others) this text. It is Nanjio's 722 (= K. 856 ≐ T.590). Nanjio gives the following rendition (hardly a translation!) of the title: "*Sūtra* spoken by Buddha on the four heavenly kings (*caturmahārāja*s), who go round the world on six fasting days every month, and who, observing the good or bad actions of mankind, raise their joy or grief". Lancaster tells us "Translation by Chih-yen and Pao-Yün: after the 4th year of Yüan Chia, Liu Sung dynasty (A.D.427-) in Chih-yüan Monastery, Yang-tu."

20.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra* (380)

There are a number of works with similar names to this. Here we refer to K.413 = T. 821 = N. 443, translated anonymously by someone between 350-431. It is a brief work of 2 fascicules. The translator lived during the Three Ch'in dynasteis (A.D. 350-431), according to Lancaster.

21.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Karmāvaraṇaviśuddhiśāstra* (ca. 380?)

Another anonymously translated work, constituting T. 1494 = N. 1094, presumably from the same period as the previous entry.

22.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Daśacakrakṣitigarbhasūtra* (385)

Anonymously translated. between 412 and 439. Constitutes K. 58 = T. 410 = N. 65. The translator is "listed in the *Pei Liang lu* (A.D. 397-439)", also known as the Nothern Liang dynasty, says Lancaster.

23.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Vajrasamādhisūtra* (385)

K.521 = T.273 = N.429, translated anonymously between 421 and 439. Constitutes eight chapters.

24.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Alpadevatāsūtra* (390)

Between 435 and 443 this was translated by Guṇabhadra as a part of the mammoth collection called the *Saṁyuktāgamasūtra* (K.650 = T. 99 = N. 544, section 49.6). See Bagchi, pp. 378-388 and S. Sengupta, op. cit., pp. 58-59, for Guṇabhadra and his translations. Another emissary from central India, Guṇabhadra arrived in China by way of Ceylon in 435 and died in China in 468.

25.AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
Bodhisattvagocaropāyaviṣayavikurvāṇanirdeśasūtra (390)

Also translated, apparently for the first time, by Guṇabhadra. Cf. K. 162 = T. 271 = N. 178 = Bagchi, p. 380, #5.

26.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Dvajāgṛhasūtra* (390)

Again a translation of Guṇabhadra's, it is another part of the vast *Saṁyuktāgamasūtra*. Cf. K. 650 = T. 99 = N. 544, Chapter 35, section 12.

27.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Jyotiṣkasūtra* (390)

K.505 = T. 540 = N. 453, translated by Guṇabhadra between 435 and 443 in Wa-kuan Monastery, Yang-tu. It is Bagchi's #13 of pp. 381-382.

28.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Mahāmatisūtra* (390)

Translated by Guṇabhadra during the same period and at the same place as the previous three. K. 499 = T. 177 = N. 527 = Bagchi, #11 of p. 381.

29.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Tsui fu pao ying ching* (390)

Translated by Guṇabhadra, same place and period. K838 = T. 747 = N. 741 = Bagchi, p. 383 (23). Nanjio (quoted by Bagchi) provides the following "title": "*Sūtra* spoken by the Buddha on transmigration throughout the five states of existence, being the result of both virtuous and sinful actions".

30.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Mahābherihārakaparivartasūtra* (390)

K.416 = T.270 = N.440 = Bagchi, p. 381 (10), who says the work was translated at the monastery of Tong ngan sse. Nanjio gives the following description of this work: "This *sūtra* contains three *jātaka*s, namely: 1.The Bodhisattva was once a woman of excellent (or silver) colour; and having cut off her breasts she saved one who was just going to eat his own child. 2.The Bodhisattva who was once a king and governed his country according to the right law, giving his body as charity to birds and beasts. 3.He was once the son of a Brāhmaṇa; and by fasting he asked to be allowed to become an ascetic. Throwing away his body he saved a hungry tigress."

31.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Caturvargaśikṣādharmasūtra* (390)

K.995 = T.771 = N.1417 = Bagchi, p. 383 (25). Translated by Guṇabhadra. Nanjio reports that it has been identified as an Abhidharma work.

32.NĀGĀRJUNA,
Īśvarakartṛtvanirākaraṇaviṣṇorekakartṛtvanirākaraṇa (400?)

Summary by Christian Lindtner

Though this refutation of Īśvara as the creator entitled "The refutation of Viṣṇu as the sole creator" is ascribed to Nāgārjuna it is more probably composed by one of his students.[59] Its prose is strikingly similar to that of *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and other early Madhyamaka works in prose. A comparison of its content with other early extant refutations of a creator seems to indicate that this is a fairly early text. Basically the author only argues that creation is impossible since there can neither be an object nor a subject of creation. Further, and more sophisticated, arguments may be found in *Dvādaśadvāraka,* Chapter X, translated into Danish by Lindtner.

The summary is based on the Sanskrit and Tibetan edited in *Papers of Th. Stcherbatsky* (Calcutta 1969), pp. 13-16. There are English translations by Stcherbatsky on pp. 10-12, and by George Chemparathy in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 12-13, 1968-69,

pp. 97-99, who gives a short summary.

Objector: Īśvara exists as a creator.

Answer: No, for what does He, hypothetically, create? He does not create what already exists, because it already exists. Nor does He create what does not exist, for then He might create e.g. oil out of sand, or hairs on a tortoise, etc. The third possibility, that He creates something that exists and does not exist, is also absurd, because these two exclude one another as light excludes darkness.

Furthermore, assuming for the sake of argument that Īśvara nevertheless creates something, one must ask: Is He himself created or not created to begin with? If He is not created He cannot create anything, because then the son of a barren woman might also be a creator. If, alternatively, He is created, we face two possibilities: Either He is created by himself - but that is absurd, not only because no activity can be its own object, no dancer can dance on his own shoulders, for example, but also because the agent of creation can never be identical with the object of creation (a father would be his own son). Or else He is created by another - but that is also wrong. Why? Well, either He is not there at all (i.e., uncreated), but in that case there is no one else to create Him (either because something that does not exist cannot be created, as we saw, or because the very concept of God excludes the possibility of another being there when He is not there). Or He may be there for another to create Him. But then that other God would also need another to create Himself in turn, etc., and that would involve an infinite regress which means that the process would never get started.

Finally, God cannot be created both by himself and another, for this would imply a double set of absurdities.

Hence a creator cannot be established.

33.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Nāgaśrīparipṛcchāsūtra* (400?)

According to Lancaster the translation is by "Hsiang Kung: during the years of the Liu Sung dynasty (A.D.420-479) in Nan Hai Prefecture". K. 12 = T. 234 = N. 16. Bagchi, p. 404, translates the title of N. 16 as "*Sūtra* on the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī's highest pursuit of seeking alms", and says this is the second translation, the first having been made by Yen Fo-T'ian. But this latter work is (p. 49 (2)) said to be lost. Thus while the translation by Hsiang Kung may not be the first translation it is the first

clearly identifiable among our four sources.

34.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Śuddhodanarājaparinirvāṇasūtra* (405)

K.796 =T. 512 = N.732, translated by a Chinese whose name is given by Lancaster as Chü-ch'ü Ching-sheng (various other spellings in other sources). The title is translated by Nanjio as "Sūtra spoken by Buddha on the Parinirvāṇa of the King Śuddhodana". Bagchi (pp. 221-223, although most of this translator's works are cited in a different place, pp. 394-398) describes the translator as "a man of great erudition and natural piety" who studied with Dharmakṣema and Buddhasena. Travelling to Turfan he procured a number of texts and translated them on his return to China "some time after the 2nd year of Hsiao Chian, Liu Sung dynasty (A.D.455) in Chu-yüan Monastery, Yang-tu and Ting-lin-shang Monastery, Mt. Chung" (acording to Lancaster). He died in 464. The dating of the works he seems to have been the first to have translated is thus a bit arbitrary. (It is to be noted that this translator appears to have made the first translations of quite a number of texts, only a few of which are identified here.)

35.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, "*Sūtra* on the advancement of learning" (405)

K.795 = T.798 = N.690 = Bagchi, p. 395 (5).. "*Sūtra* spoken by Buddha on advancement in learning", translated by Chü-ch'ü Ching-sheng at the same place and time as our #34 above. The Chinese title is given by Lancaster as *Chin hsüeh ching.*

36.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, "*Sūtra* on a pupil who received (seven days) after his death". (405)

K.842 = T.826 = N.767. = Bagchi, p. 396 (14). Same translator as #s 33 and 34 above.

37.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Candanavatdeśarājasūtra* (405)

K. 846 = T.518 = N.774 = Bagchi, pp. 395-396 (12). Same translator as the previous three.

38.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Mudrādeśarājasūtra* (405)

K.845 = T.519 = N.773 = Bagchi, p. 395 (10). Same translator.

39.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Malarājasūtra* (405)

N. 772. Same translator

40.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, "*Sūtra* on the five (elements) not returning again" (405)

K.847 = T.751 = N.742 = Bagchi, p. 395 (7). Same translator. Lancaster gives the Chinese title as *Wu wu fan fu ching*.

41.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Rājāvavādakasūtra* (405)

K.260 = T.514 = N.248 = Bagchi, p. 394 (2).

42.VASUMITRA, *Samayabhedopacakra* (405)

This is not a philosophical discussion, but rather a review of the schools of Buddhist thought of which the author knows at the time of writing. Chinese translations by Paramārtha and by Hsüan-tsang are known (T.1031-1033). Were these the earliest translations?

Another clue concerns the name of the author, which is regularly given as Vasumitra. The problem here is, which Vasumitra are we dealing with? Jikyo Masuda finds five Vasumitras referred to in Chinese texts, and gives reasons for his conclusion that our present author must have been the Vasumitra who is regularly referred to in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (see the summary of that work in Volume 7 of this Encyclopedia). This accords with the conclusion of "most Chinese scholars beginning with K'wei-chi (632-682 A.D.)",[60] although Tāranātha identifies our author Vasumitra with one who wrote a commentary on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*.

But it seems that we have no hard evidence that the text existed much before the beginning of the fifth century A.D. Furthermore, André Bareau reports that our present text stems from Sarvāstivādin origins and that some of the sects to which it refers are not known in India prior to the fourth century, for example the Sautrāntikas who are espoused by Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośa*. This sect is known to various

writers under various names such as "Saṁkrāntivāda", "Uttarīya", "Tāmraśatīya", and appears to descend from the Sarvāstivādins whose earlier texts are summarized in our Volume 7. From all this we may conclude that our present Vasumitra may have been the *Vibhāṣā* master but that we have insufficient grounds for concluding anything for certain about the date of this text.

Jikyo Masuda's translation is referred to here as "T". We have prepared the summary on the basis of the translation; there is no Sanskrit text extant. The work begins with five introductory verses which are likely later interpolations. Masuda provides extensive footnotes for practically every sentence explaining which schools are being referred to.

(T14-15) One hundred or so years after the Buddha's death, when a king named Aśoka living in the Magadha kingdom ruled over Jambudvīpa (i.e., India), the great Buddhist order for the first time split into four groups over the five points of Mahādeva. The four groups were the Nāgas, the Pratyantika (border) group, the learned (*bahuśrutīyas*) and the venerable (*sthaviras*). The first three constituted the Mahāsaṁghikas, the last the Sthavira schools.

(T15-16) From the Mahāsaṁghikas in the second century abd (i.e., after the Buddha's death) rose the Ekavyavahārikas, the Lokottaravāda, and the Kaukkuṭika sects. Even later the Bahuśrutīyas and Prajñaptivādins arose.

Toward the end of the second century another Mahādeva, a heretic (non-Buddhist) became a monk and was ordained in the Mahāsaṁghika order. He instigated further discussions about the five points, and as a result the order was split up into three (more) schools, the Caityaśaila, Aparaśaila and Uttaraśaila schools. Thus there are nine branches of Mahāsaṁghika.

(T16-17) The Sthaviravādins eventually in the third century abd separated into the Sarvāstivādins and the older Sthaviras, who named themselves the Haimavata. And one school, the Vātsīputrīyas, issued from the Sarvāstivāda, which soon (still in the third c. abd) separated again into the Dharmottarīyas, Bhadrāyaṇīyas, Sammatīyas and Channagirikas, and a bit later into the Mahīśāsakas. From this last, still during the third c. abd, arose the Dharmaguptakas, whose founder declared himself the successor of Maudgalyāyana. And at the end of the third c. abd one school, the Kāśyapīya, otherwise known as Suvarṣaka. And finally, at the beginning of the fourth century abd the Sautrāntikas, otherwise known as Saṁkrāntivāda, arose.

(T18-32) Doctrines common to the Mahāsaṁghikas, Lokottaravādins, Ekavyavahārikavādins and Kaukkuṭikas include: a number of beliefs about Buddhas, such as that they are transcendent, have no impure factors, have limitless material bodies and limitless powers, that a Buddha neither sleeps nor dreams, etc. About Bodhisattvas: they do not actually go through physical rebirth in the mother's womb, appearing to enter the womb as a white elephant and leave their mother's body from its right side; they are free from greed, anger or violence; can be reborn in any states they choose. The five consciousnesses occur both with and without attachment. The six consciousnesses are found in both the material and the immaterial levels. Sense-organs are only lumps of flesh and are not capable of consciousness by themselves. There are no neutral factors. There are nine kinds of unconditioned factors: calculated cessation, uncalculated cessation, space, the realms of infinite space, of infinite consciousness, of nothingness, and neither-identification-nor-non-identification, being a member of the chain of dependent origination, and being a member of the noble path. Proclivities are different from envelopers. Past and future factors do not exist. There is no intermediate state.

(T32-34) Later Mahāsaṁghika views include: that two awarenesses can occur at once; defilements occur while on the path; actions and maturations occur at the same time; the mind permeates the whole body.

(T35-36) Views of the Bahuśrutīyas. Transcendent doctrines are five: momentariness, frustration, emptiness, no self and liberation. Other doctrines are mundane. The five points of Mahādeva. Otherwise their views are the same as those of the Sarvāstivāda.

(T36-38) Views of the Prajñaptivāda school. Frustrations are not aggregates. The twelve organs (six senses and six objects) are not real entities. Traces only produce frustration in combination with each other. There is no death that is not determined by past karma. One attains the noble path by actions, not by meditation. Once attained the path is never lost.

(T38) Views of the Caitya-, Apara- and Uttara-śaila schools. Bodhisattvas can still be reborn into lower states. *Arhat*s can be tempted.

(T38-52) Views of the Sarvāstivāda school. Past and future factors exist. Birth, maintenance, old age and death are dissociated factors belonging to the category of traces. The stage of the highest worldly factors last but a moment; there is no regression from this stage. A noble being can regress, but a stream-enterer cannot.

An ordinary person can destroy desire and anger in the meditational level of desire. Even heretics can gain supernatural powers. Some gods lead a religious life. The limbs of enlightenment are acquired only through the seven meditative attainments (of mindfulness, investigation, energy, joy, tranquility, concentration and equanimity).

All the meditative stages are included in the establishment of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*). The four stages of streamenterer, once-returner, etc. are not necessarily attained serially. All proclivities are mental associates and so supporting objects of awareness. The proclivities are all envelopers but not vice-versa. An *arhat* is still governed by some aspects of dependent origination. Intermediate states are found only in the level of desire and the material level. The supporting objects of states of consciousness and associated mental states are actual entities. There are neutral factors. *Arhat*s are still subject to karma. No one ever dies while meditating. Bodhisattvas are still ordinary persons; their fetters are not yet destroyed. Traces perish at each moment. No one can actually transmigrate.

(T52-53) Views of the Haimavata school. Heretics cannot gain supernatural powers. No god can lead a religious life.

(T53-57) Views of the Vātsīputrīya school. A person is neither the same as the aggregates nor different from them. Some traces persist for a while; others cease immediately on being born. Factors are reborn only in connection to a person. A person is called "free from desire" when (s)he has abandoned the fetters destroyed in the path of vision, not those destroyed in the path of cultivation.

(T58-62) Views shared by all Mahīśāsaka schools. The future does not exist. The four noble truths are to be meditated on simultaneously. A proclivity is neither an awareness nor an associated mental state, and is never a supporting object. A proclivity is thus a dissociated factor, whereas an enveloper is an associated factor. No god can lead a religious life. There is no intermediate state. *Arhat*s do not gain satisfaction through action. Streamenterers can retrogress, while *arhat*s cannot. All traces cease at every moment.

(T62-63) Views of the later Mahīśāsakas. Past and future really exist. There is an intermediate state. Proclivites are always present, along with aggregates, sense-organs and elements.

(T64-65) Views of the Dharmaguptakas are mostly similar to those of the Mahīśāsakas.

(T65-66) Views of the Kāśyapīya school are largely similar to those

of the Dharmaguptakas

(T66-69) Views of the Sautrāntika school. The aggregates are reborn, which is why this school is called "Saṁkrāntivāda". Their views largely resemble those of the Sarvāstivādins.

43.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Bodhisattvabuddhānusmṛtisamādhi* (412)

N.71 = K.60 = T.414 = Bagchi, p. 399 (1) was translated by someone whose Chinese name is given (variously transcribed) as, e.g., Kong Tö-che or Kuṅ-tö-kih, which Bagchi suspects is a Chinese transcription of Guṇasatya, Nanjio renders as Guṇaśīla, and Lancaster decides should be Guṇaśāla. It was translated in 462 in Yang-tu.

44.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Mahāśrayārthaṛddhimantrasūtra* (412)

K.434 = T.1335 = N.473 = Bagchi, p. 243 (1). The translator's name is given as T'an Yao by Bagchi, op. cit., pp. 242-243 (supported by Lancaster), who provides a bit more information about him.

45.NĀGĀRJUNA, *Upāya(kauśalya)hṛdaya* (422)[61]

Yuichi Kajiyama in *Studies in Buddhist Philosophy* (Kyoto 1989) argues that this work is by Ur-Nāgārjuna and that it is prior to the *Nyāyasūtras*. Christian Lindtner (*Nāgārjuniana*, note 44 on p. 17) gives reasons why it is not.

Summary by Satischandra Vidyabhusana[62]

"The *Upāyakauśalyahṛdayasūtra*, the Essence of Skill in the Accomplishment of Action, is stated to be a work on the art of debate by Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna. In Chinese this work is called Fāṅpien-sin-lun. It was translated into Chinese by Ci-cia-ye and Thān-yāo in A.D. 472.

Seeing that the Vaiśeṣika and other systems were obscure in their terminology, Nāgārjuna, it is reported, undertook to write this book to give a clear exposition of the art of debate. The book is divided into four chapters styled respectively as (1) an elucidation of debate (*vādavisadīkaraṇa*), (II) an explanation of the points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*), (III) an explanation of the truths (*tattvavyākhyāna*), and

(IV) the analogue or far-fetched analogy (*jāti*).

(I) The first chapter consists of eight sections which treat respectively of (1) an example (*udāharaṇa*), (2) a tenet, truth or conclusion (*siddhānta*), (3) the excellence of speech (*vākyapraśaṁsā*), (4) the defect of speech (*vākyadośa*), (5) the knowledge of inference (*anumāna* or *hetujñāna*), (6) the appropriate or opportune speech (*samayocitavākya*), (7) the fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*), and (8) the adoption of a fallacious reason (*duṣṭavākyānusaraṇa*).

(1) The *example* is necessary to clear the reasons of a disputant and his respondent. It is of two kinds: (1) the affirmative or homogeneous example (*anvayī udāharaṇa*), and (2) the negative or heterogeneous example (*vyatireki udāharaṇa*).

(2) The *tenet, truth* or *conclusion* is of four kinds, viz. (1) that accepted by all the schools (*sarvatantra siddhānta*), (2) that accepted by a particular school (*pratitantra siddhānta*), (3) that accepted hypothetically (*adhikaraṇa siddhānta*), and (4) that which is implied or accepted on assumption (*abhyupagama siddhānta*).

The means, by which the tenets, truths or conclusions are established, are called *pramāṇa*s (the sources of valid knowledge) which are of four kinds, viz., perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna),* and scripture (*āgama*).

(3) A *speech is said to be excellent* if its words are neither inadequate nor redundant, and its reason and example well expressed.

(4) A *speech is said to be defective* if its words are inadequate, or redundant, or if it employs the same word to convey different meanings of different words to convey the same meaning.

(5) The *inference* is of three kinds, viz., (1) *a priori* (*pūrvavat*), (2) *a posteriori* (*śeṣavat*), and (3) *commonly seen* (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*). The respective examples are: on seeing a cloud one infers that there will be rain; and on seeing a man move from one place to another, one infers that the sun, which rises in the east and sets in the west, must have moved.

(6) The *appropriate* or *opportune speech* consists in its being pertinent to the subject and occasion, e.g. in the discussion as to whether there will be rain tomorrow one may appropriately speak of the condition of the sky of the previous day.

(7) The *fallacies* signify reasons which are derived from an imperfect perception, inference, or comparison, or which deviate from the scripture. There are various kinds of fallacies designated respectively as follows:

(a) The *quibble in respect of a term (vākchala)*, e.g. a man pretends to use the term *navakambala* in the sense of nine blankets when he really means a new blanket.

(b) The *erratic reason or undistributed middle term (savyabhicāra)*, e.g. to say that all external things are noneternal is to employ an erratic reason, because the sky is an external thing which is eternal.

(c) *Balancing the doubt or false assumption (saṁśayasama)*, e.g. there is doubt as to a certain tall object being a post or a man, and yet if we proceed to act on the assumption that it is a man, we commit the fallacy of false assumption.

(d) The *mistimed (kālātīta)*, e.g. we attempt to prove the eternity of the Veda on the ground that sound is eternal, when no proof has been given for the eternity of sound.

(e) *Balancing the point in dispute or begging the question (prakaraṇasama)*, e.g. the soul is eternal, because it is distinct from the body. (It is a matter of dispute if a thing which is distinct from the body is eternal or not).

(f) *Balancing the predicate (sādhyasama)*, e.g. the sky is eternal, because it is intangible.

(g) *Showing absurdity (vyāghātapradarśana)*, e.g. the five objects are non-eternal, because they are apprehended by the senses: the four elements being also so apprehended are non-eternal. If you say so it will follow that a tortoise possesses hair and salt possesses smell, because they are apprehended by the mind: this is absurd.

(h) The *contradictory (viruddha)*--either in respect of the example or in respect of the conclusion.

(8) The *adoption of a fallacious reason*--if in the course of one's argument one commits fallacies, one will be thrown into difficulties and disgrace.

(II) 'The points of defeat' are the following:--(1) The unintelligible (*avijñātārtha*), (2) non-ingenuity (*apratibhā*), (3) silence (*ananubhāṣaṇa*), (4) saying too little (*nyūna*), (5) saying too much (*adhika*), (6) the meaningless (*nirarthaka*), (7) the inopportune (*aprāptakāla*), (8) the incoherent (*apārthaka*), (9) hurting the proposition (*pratijñā hāni*).

(III) 'An explanation of the truths' deals mainly with the admission of an opinion (*matānujñā*).

(IV) The 'analogue' or far-fetched analogy is of various kinds as follows: (1) balancing an excess (*utkarṣasamā*), (2) balancing a deficit (*apakarṣasamā*), (3) balancing the unquestionable (*avarṇyasamā*), (4)

balancing the non-reason (*ahetusamā*), (5) balancing the co-presence (*prāptisamā*), (6) balancing the mutual absence (*aprāptisamā*), (7) balancing the doubt (*saṁśayasamā*), and (8) balancing the counter-example (*dṛṣṭānta-samā*)."

46.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Kusumasaṁcayasūtra* (422)

K.371 = T.434 = N. 402 = , it was translated by Ki Kia Ye (Kiṁkārya) around 472. Cf. Bagchi, pp. 244-245.

BUDDHAGHOSA (425)

We know little about this important writer, "the greatest known Pāli commentator and exegetist".[63] He seems to have been born in India and was brought up in Brāhmaṇic tradition, being converted to Buddhism, peregrinating to South India and eventually finding his way to Lanka (i.e., Ceylon or modern Sri Lanka). About his date, Law reports that tradition places him in Ceylon during the reign of Mahānāma, author of the *Mahāvaṁsa*, an important source for Buddhist chronology and belief. Mahānāma's headship at Anuradhapura is generally agreed to cover the period 409-421 or -431 A.D. Law discusses this tradition critically. He notes that all of Buddhaghosa's references are to persons whose dates seem to be no later than the fourth century A.D., and that one of his works, *Samantapāsādika*, was translated into Chinese in 489, so he must have been prior to that date. Law concludes that it is practically certain that Buddhaghosa was in Ceylon during Mahānāma's reign, thus fixing his date in the beginning of the fifth century A.D.[64]

Law considers the evidence that can be gleaned from Buddhaghosa's writings concerning his place of origin and what Buddhaghosa seems to know about the geography of India. He concludes that it is still unclear whether Buddhaghosa stemmed from North or South India. "It is certain that he was an Indian who went to Ceylon from the country of Cole in South India when Kāñcīpura was its capital."[65] But he seems to have only a dim understanding of the geographical locations of key places. On the other hand he is well-trained in Patañjali's Yoga, and is evidently acquainted with Nyāya. He also shows sound understanding of Pāṇini's grammar, which he cites several times in his writings. Law remarks that "he nowhere shows his knowledge of the Upaniṣads. There is nowhere in his writings evidence of his acquaintance with the two great Sanskrit

epics, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*."[66]

While still in South India he apparently wrote a work called *Ñānodaya* which is now lost. He refers occasionally to languages of India including a number of Dravidian dialects. We do not know precisely when he left for Sri Lanka, apparently urged there by one of his teachers. But having arrived there he must have spent some time studying the (now-lost) Sinhalese commentaries on the Abhidharma Buddhist texts, eventually writing commentaries on several texts. "The *Visuddhimagga* and other works of Buddhaghosa are full of personal reminiscences" of Ceylon: the tradition of the kings, the tradition of the monasteries and fellow monks, the social and religious life of the people, the shrines and monasteries, and the arts and crafts."[67]

Beside the works summarized below, Buddhaghosa is held to be the author of commentaries on the *Dīgha-, Majjhima-, Saṁyutta-* and *Aṅguttara-nikāya*s. These were written after the *Visuddhimagga*, since that work is referred to in them. He also is supposed by some to have written a commentary on the material concerning the *prātimokṣa.* Commentaries on still other parts of the Pāli canon (e.g., on the *Dhammapada, Jātaka, Khuddakapāṭha* and *Suttanipāta*), are ascribed to Buddhaghosa. Scholars disagree on most of these ascriptions.[68]

47.BUDDHAGHOSA, *Visuddhimagga*

After moving to Ceylon Buddhaghosa's works were written, according to Bimala Churn Law, in the following order: *Visuddhimagga*; commentaries on the first four *Nikāya*s; and then the commentaries on the seven Abhidharma books, following their usual order. However, as argued below, it seems unlikely that the seven commentaries were written by the same author as the composer of the *Visuddhimagga.*

The *Visuddhimagga* is not a commentary, but a compendious account of Ābhidharma Buddhism as a whole, based, according to Buddhaghosa himself, on the (now lost) Sinhalese *Aṭṭhakathās*. *Visuddhimagga* is a Pāli word meaning "path of purity"; the corresponding Sanskrit term would be *viśuddhimārga.* In our summary below we give technical terms in their Pāli spelling.

"E" references are to the edition by Dwarikadas Sastri, Varanasi 1977. "T' indicates the translation by Nanamoli in two volumes (Shambhala, 1976). Section headings correspond to those in T.

Summary by Karl H. Potter

Part I: Virtue (*śīla*)

Chapter 1: Description of Virtue

1-15 (E3-7; T1-6) When a man of insight is established in virtue,
Develops awareness and insight,
Then as an ardent and wise bhikkhu
He untangles this tangle. (*Saṁyuttanikāya* 1.13)

The "tangle" is the network of thirst which arises again and again as craving for one's own needs and awarenesses as well as those of others. It is the disentangling of this tangle which is the path of purification (*visuddhimagga*). A "man of insight" is a living being who possesses the understanding that arises from karma by way of the three causes mentioned here, viz., virtue, awareness and insight. Here "awareness" means specifically that awareness involved in meditation. The *bhikkhu* is "ardent" in that he burns up the defilements, and he is "wise" in that he has the protective understanding guiding affairs. A *bhikkhu*" is so-called because has sees fear (*bhayaṁ ikkhati*) of rebirth.

How these three causes relate to a series of distinctions found elsewhere in the tradition is now explained: how virtue, awareness and insight constitute the threefold training, the avoidance of extremes through the middle way, the abandoning of defilements, the reason for entering the states of stream-winner and the others.

16-23 (14? in T) (E7-11; T6-9) What is virtue? There is virtue as volition (*cetanā*), one who refrains from killing and practises duties, and the others of the first seven of the ten courses of action. There is virtue as concomitant of awareness (*cetasika*) in the abandonment of covetousness, absence of ill-will and right view, the last three of the ten. There is virtue of restraint in five ways: by the rules of the community, by mindfulness, by knowledge, by patience, and by energy.

The characteristic feature of virtue is "composing" consisting of being the locus of good factors and coordinating bodily actions. Its function is stopping misconduct and the achievement of blamelessness. Its manifestation is purity, and its proximate cause is conscience and shame.

The benefits of virtuousness are listed in the *Dīghanikāya* as five: wealth, good name, entrance into an assembly of peers without fear, unconfusedness at death, happy rebirth. Other accounts are mentioned.

25-161 (E11-47; T10-58) Now the kinds of virtue are classified according to different principles in nineteen different groupings:

1. As that which has the feature of composing, as above.

2. As of two kinds: doing what should be done and not doing what should not be done.

3. Two kinds: good behavior and the beginning of a life of purity. The latter consists in the code of *bhikkhu*s and *bhikkhuṇī*s, whereas the former involves the duties set out in the *Khaṇḍaka*s (of the Vinaya).

4. Two kinds: as abstinence and nonabstinence from killing, etc.

5. Two kinds as dependence and nondependence. Dependence itself is of two kinds: through thirst and through false views.

6. Two kinds as limited in time, or temporary, and as unlimited, or lifelong.

7. Two kinds as limited and unlimited by gain, fame, relatives, limbs or life.

8. Two kinds as worldly and otherworldly. The worldly is subject to contaminants, the otherworldly not.

9. Three kinds, as inferior, middling and superior in intensity of awareness, energy, etc.

10. Three kinds, as giving precedence to the self, giving precedence to the world, and giving precedence to the Dhamma.

11. Three kinds, as adhered to--dependent virtues of the kind in #5 above--as not adhered to by those on the path, and as tranquilized, for those who have achieved the fruit of the path.

12. Three kinds, as purified in one who has not committed a bad act or has made amends if he had, as impure--the reverse of the above--or as doubtful, in one who is not sure whether something he did was bad or how bad.

13. Three kinds, viz., the four paths and the first three meditative fruits--as practised by those in training (seekers), by those not in training, i.e., by those who have become *arhat*s, viz., adepts, and by those neither in training nor not in training--the rest.

14. Four kinds, as (a) that which partakes of destruction, (b) that which partakes of stagnation, (c) that which partakes of distinction, (d) that which partakes of penetration. The first has virtue mixed with bad, the second is for one contented with mere virtuousness, the third for one who has concentration as his goal, and the fourth for one who has disenchantment as his goal.

15. Four kinds, of male monks, of nuns, of those not fully admitted (into the order), of the layman or householder.

16. Four kinds: natural--belonging to Uttarakuru men,

customary--according to the group's rules of conduct, necessary--required by nature, and born of prior causes--such as Mahākassapa and the Bodhisattva in his various births.

17. Four kinds: the virtue of *prātimokṣa* restraint, the virtue of restraining the sense faculties, the virtue of purification of life, the virtuous use of the requisites. Each of these is explained at some length through quotes from *Vibhaṅga*, *Mahāniddesa* and other such works and copious illustrations through stories. The requisites include the monk's robe, alms food, his resting place, medicines. They are to be used for appropriate purposes only. Examples are given, and authorities.

18. Five kinds according to the *Paṭisambhidā* classifications of virtue consisting of limited purification, unlimited purification, fulfilled purification, unadhered-to purification and tranquilized purification. The first applies to those not fully admitted to the order, the second to those who are fully admitted. The third is the virtue of "magnanimous ordinary men" who deal with good factors and have given up attachment to life. The fourth is the virtue of seekers, while the fifth is the virtue of the Tathāgata's pupils and of the self-enlightened, Tathāgatas and *arhat*s.

19. Five kinds of virtue as abandoning, refraining, willing, restraint and nontransgression. A lengthy passage from the *Paṭisambhidā* explains these.

A section follows in which it is explained how virtue is defiled and how the defilement is purified. The exposition consists almost entirely of quotations from the *Aṅguttaranikāya*.

Chapter 2: Description of Ascetic Practice

(E48-67; T59-83) Practices intended to perfect the virtues indicated in the preceding chapter are classified here into thirteen varieties: (1) wearing of rags, (2) wearing of the triple robe, (3) seeking alms-food, (4) from house to house, (5) one meal a day, (6) from a single bowl, (7) refusing seconds, (8) forest-dwelling, (9) at the roots of a tree, (10) in the open air, (11) or in a charnel ground, (12) sleeping wherever he happens to be, but otherwise (13) remaining in a sitting posture rather than lying down. These are further classified and discussed.

Part II: Concentration

Chapter 3: Taking a Subject for Meditation

(68-72; T84-90) What is concentration? One-pointedness of mind. It is called "concentration" since it centers consciousness evenly and

rightly on a single object. Its characteristic feature is nondistraction; its function is to eliminate distraction; it is manifested as nonwavering; its proximate cause is satisfaction.

It may be classified in the following ways:

1. As one kind, viz., nondistraction.

2. As two kinds, as the practise of six kinds of mindfulness, and the unification of mind which follows in the first meditative state.

3. As two kinds, worldly in the first three meditative levels, and otherworldly in relation to the noble beings.

4. Two kinds, as accompanied by joy in the first two meditative levels, and without joy as accompaniment in the last two levels.

5. Two kinds, accompanied by satisfaction in the first three levels and accompanied by equanimity in the last level.

6. Three kinds, as inferior, middling and superior in development.

7. Three kinds, with initial thought in the first meditative level, without initial thought but with sustained thought in the second, without either initial or sustained thought in the last three levels.

8. Three kinds, as accompanied by joy in the first two levels, as accompanied by satisfaction in the first three levels, and as accompanied by equanimity in the last.

9. Three kinds, as limited on the plane of service, exalted in the material and immaterial levels, and unlimited in connection with the noble persons.

10. Four kinds, as (1) frustrating progress and difficult of understanding, (2) frustrating progress but easy of understanding, (3) satisfying progress but difficult of understanding, (4) satisfying progress and easy of understanding.

11. Four kinds, as limited with a limited object, limited with an unlimited object, unlimited with a limited object, unlimited with an unlimited object. A "limited object" is one that is unfamiliar and not a condition for a higher meditative level, whereas an unlimited object is one that is well-developed and capable of being a condition for a higher level.

12. Four kinds, according to the factors of the four meditative levels, viz. (1) the first level, having as factors initial and sustained thought, joy, satisfaction and concentration, (2) the second level, having as factors joy, satisfaction and concentration, (3) the third level, having satisfaction and concentration as factors, (4) the fourth level, having concentration and equanimity as factors.

13. Four kinds, as partaking of destruction, partaking of stagnation, partaking of distinction and partaking of penetration.

14. Four kinds, according to location in the desirous, material, immaterial or unlimited level.

15. Four kinds, as making interest predominant, making energy predominant, making awareness predominant, making one-pointedness of mind predominant.

16. Five kinds, according to the (alternate) classification of meditative levels into five (rather than four) sets of factors, by dividing what was called the second meditative level into two kinds, one involving the transcendence of initial thought and the other the transcendence of initial and sustained thought..

(E72-88; T90-112) How should concentration be developed? Briefly, worldly concentration is to be developed by one established in completely purified virtue, having cut himself off from the ten impediments (viz., residence, family, wealth, class, building, travel, kin, illness, books and magic powers), who approaches a good friend and gets from him one of the forty subjects for meditation which suits his temperament. He should then go to a monastery favorable for concentration, sever the lesser impediments to concentration and follow the directions for development.

The ten impediments are explained in detail with stories. The characteristics of a good friend are illustrated by references to traditions about teachers. Temperaments are classified into six (greedy, hating, confused, faithful, intelligent and speculative) or 14 if permuted by pairs and triplets. Some (specifically, Upatissa, author of *Vimuttimagga*) say that the first three kinds of temperament arise from previous habit, from the elements and humors expounded in the *Aṭṭhakathā*s. But the correct view is that they arise from the predominance in a person's karmic stock of the particular qualities (greed, etc.) leading to rebirth. The opponent (in Upatissa's passage, above) appeals to nonexistent and contradictory laws about elements and humors, and the explanation offered can't handle those of faithful temperament. It is then explained what sort of appearance and conduct characterize those of each of the six temperaments.

(E88-92; T112-118) The forty subjects for meditation can be understood in ten ways: 1. By enumeration, as ten meditative *kasiṇa*s, ten foulnesses, ten memories, four sublime states, four immaterial subjects, one conceptual identification, and one determining. The ten *kasiṇa*s are: earth, water, fire, air, blue, yellow, red, white, light and ethereal. The ten

foulnesses are bloatedness, lividness, etc.--various stages found in a dead body. The ten memories are of the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Saṅgha, of virtue, generosity, deities, death, the body, breathing, and peace. The four sublime states are friendship, compassion, restraint and equanimity. The one conceptual identification is the identification of repulsive food. The one determining is the defining of the four elements.

2. Which bring access only and which bring absorption: the former includes the ten *kasiṇa*s, remembering to breathe, the repulsiveness of food and the defining of the four levels. The rest bring absorption.

3. By the kind of meditative level brought: the ten *kasiṇa*s and remembering to breathe bring all four levels. Meditation on the ten foulnesses plus the memory of body bring on the first level. The first three sublime states bring on the first three levels. The fourth sublime state and the four immaterial subjects bring on the fourth level.

4. By what they overcome. There are two kinds of overcoming, (1) of factors and (2) of objects. Type (1) includes the sublime states, since they are required to reach the third and fourth level. Type (2) includes the four immaterial subjects, since for each the first of the *kasiṇa*s has to be overcome, and for the others its predecessor has to be overcome.

5. By extension and nonextension: only the ten *kasiṇa*s are necessarily extended, the subjects of the rest need not be.

6. By their objects: only twenty-two of the forty have corresponding supporting objects--the ten *kasiṇa*s, the ten foul things, memory of breathing and of body. Only twelve have essential factors as supporting objects--eight of the ten memories (excluding the two just mentioned), the repulsiveness of food, the defining of the four levels, the formless states of consciousness and neither-identification-nor-nonidentification. The remaining six are not classifiable as either. Eight have mobile objects (some of the foul states, together with water, fire and air); the rest are immobile.

7. By stage (*bhūmi*): the twelve (ten foul things, memory of body, repulsiveness of food) do not occur among the gods, and these plus memory of breathing do not occur in the Brahmaloka. Only the four immaterial states occur in the immaterial world. All occur among humans.

8. By (the way of) grasping: nineteen are apprehended by sight (nine *kasiṇa*s excluding air, ten foul things). Memory of body is grasped by sight or hearing (language) depending on which part of the body is in question. Memory of breathing is grasped by touch. The air *kasiṇa* is

grasped by sight and touch. The remaining eighteen are grasped by language.

9. By condition: the nine meditative *kasiṇa*s excluding space are conditions for the immaterial states. All ten *kasiṇa*s are conditions for higher faculties. Three sublime states are conditions for the last one. Each lower formless state is a condition for the next one. The neither-identification-nor-nonidentification formless state is a condition for cessation. All forty are conditions for satisfaction, for insight and for fortunate rebirths.

10. As to suitability to temperament: the foul things and memory of body are for greedy folks; the sublime states and four color *kasiṇa*s are for those who hate. Memory of breathing is a subject suitable for a deluded person or a speculative one. The first six memories are for faithful types. Memory of death, of peace, the defining of the four stages and repulsiveness of food are for intellectual types. The rest are for all sorts of temperaments. But this is to put it in extreme terms--meditation on any of these should suppress greed, etc.

(E92-94; T118-121) The procedures to be followed in seeking, receiving and practising meditation on any one of these forty topics is outlined.

Chapter 4: Description of the Earth Meditative *Kasiṇa*

(E95-99; T122-126) The meditator should go to a favorable abode. Eighteen defects of unfavorable abodes are described--too large, too new, dilapidated, too busy, etc. A favorable abode is one that is accessible but not too near; little frequented; free of physical distractions like wind, sun, flies; where food, lodging, robes, alms and medicine are available; where elder monks who are capable of explaining the meaning about which one is puzzled live. He should then cut his hair and nails, patch his clothes, and begin.

(E99-101; T126-130) The meditator should cognize a sign of earth. At the outset he will want to construct a piece of earth for himself, avoiding the colors blue, yellow, red or white, either a fixed piece or a movable one either the size of a bushel or the size of a saucer. Sitting in front of it, he should consider the dangers of sense desires, the happiness connected to the special qualities of the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha, and then should open his eyes not too wide nor too narrowly and meditate on the earth-sign. This sign is not to be confused with the color of the piece of earth in front; rather, he should concentrate on the

concept, the name "earth," so that he becomes able to conceptualize it with his eyes shut as easily as with them open. After that he no longer needs to sit in front of the piece of earth, but can contemplate it wherever he is. If his concentration is distracted he should return to the piece of earth and reconsider it.

(E101-102; T130-131) The foregoing procedure restrains the obstructions, the defilements subside, the mind takes up contemplation, and the day's sign arises. This sign differs from the piece of earth itself in that it lacks the faults apparent in the lump of clay, because it lacks such properties as color and shape. It is not cognizable by the eye.

Meditation is of tw-o kinds: access meditation and absorption. The difference is that in the former the factors are not strong, so that the meditator passes back and forth between concentration and ordinary experiencing. In the latter stage the mind can remain in concentration for a whole night and day.

(E102-109; T132-141) The absorption meditation is difficult to gain and thus must be carefully guarded by paying attention to the following seven kinds of threat: (1) an unsuitable abode, (2) an unsuitable village, (3) unsuitable talk, (4) association with unsuitable persons, (5) inappropriate food, (6) unsuitable climate, and (7) unsuitable postures. Or, if merely avoiding these unsuitable conditions is not enough, he should practise the ten kinds of skill in absorption: (1) cleansing body and mind, (2) maintaining balanced faculties (viz., faith, energy, memory, concentration and understanding) so that one does not preclude any of the others, (3) protecting the absorption once it has been developed in concentration, (4) choosing the proper time to meditate in different ways--initial thought when the mind is not keen, etc., so that keenness is developed naturally through inquiry (the factors of initial thought are described), (5) restraining the mind when it should be restrained--so that when the mind is overly energetic he should, instead of initial thought, practice tranquility (the factors of tranquility are described), (6) stimulation of the mind when it is slack, (7) looking indifferently on the mind when it is neither too energetic nor too slack, (8) avoiding nonmeditating persons, (9) cultivating meditating persons, (10) resoluteness in concentration.

(E111-112; T142-144) Now, while he is concentrating on earth in this way, a series of four or five impulsions--the access consciousnesses, the last of which is the absorption consciousness, which changes his lineage. Then concentration lapses and he returns to ordinary awareness.

This last or "absorption" consciousness is counted as a single moment of consciousness. (There are seven cases in which the normal way of counting moments doesn't apply: the first absorption, worldly faculty, the four paths, the fruit following the path, ordinary awareness in the material and immaterial conditions, neither-identification-nor-nonidentification as condition for cessation, and the fruit of cessation.)

(E112-122; T144-158) At this point the meditator has gained the first level. *Vibhaṅga* 245's description of this state is quoted and explained. Such a meditator is said to be "secluded from sense desires and from unprofitable things," his state is "accompanied by initial and sustained thought with joy and satisfaction born of discrimination (discrimination is explained as the disappearance of the obstructions), and joy and satisfaction are illustrated with stories. He has abandoned the five obstructions and possesses the five factors (of initial thought, sustained thought, joy, satisfaction and one-pointedness), is good in the beginning, middle and end, and has the ten features of those as described in *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (quoted).

(E123-125; T158-161) The meditator should now extend his ability by thinking of the sign as smaller and larger in extent, and thus making the boundaries of his thought stretch out to encompass the sun and the moon, etc. But one who has just come to the first meditative level should enter it often rather than strive too soon for the more advanced levels. He should practise the five meditation factors until he gains mastery of them. The five factors are adverting, attaining, resolving or steadying, emerging and reviewing. He should gain mastery at each of these, and thus be able to contemplate the flaws of the first level as he brings the second level to mind by using the earth *kasiṇa* (or some other) as before.

(E125-128; T161-165) Now *Vibhaṅga* 245, describing the second meditative level, is quoted and explained word by word. Initial and sustained thought are stilled, but confidence, singleness of mind, joy and satisfaction born of concentration are found here.

Objection: Isn't confidence present in the first level too, as well as single-pointed concentration? So why are they mentioned as distinguishing features of the second level?

Answer: The confidence and singleness are not fully attained in the first level.

(E128-132; T165-171) In a similar fashion he eventually masters the factors of the second level and is able to bring the third meditative level

to mind, still using the same sign (say, earth). Now, on this third level (again, following *Vibhaṅga* 245), there is nonattachment to joy; he gains equanimity; he experiences satisfactions through his body. His equanimity is of ten kinds: (1) six-factored equanimity, where the contaminants are destroyed as the six kinds of objects are viewed indifferently; (2) equanimity of sublime state, neutrality toward beings generally; (3) equanimity as a factor of enlightenment, neutrality as between various concurrently arising factors; (4) equanimity of energy, where he is neither too much nor too little energetic in practising meditation; (5) equanimity concerning traces comprises indifference among the various ways of terminating the obstructions, etc.; (6) equanimity of feeling, i.e., experiencing neither satisfaction nor frustration; (7) equanimity about insight is indifference to what is investigated; (8) equanimity as neutrality concerning the states born together such as interest, etc.; (9) equanimity of meditation is indifference even toward the highest satisfaction; (10) equanimity of purity is the indifference where there is nothing more to be quieted. Here what is intended (in the quote characterizing the third level) is the ninth item, equanimity of meditation.

In this third meditative level he is mindful and fully aware. Though he has no interest in experiencing satisfaction, he nevertheless does so in his name-body (*nāmakāya*) and so when he comes out of concentration he naturally experiences some in his material body as well.

(E132-136; T171-175) Similarly, having mastered the third level he is able to take up the fourth. On the fourth meditative level (*Vibhaṅga* 245 again) bodily satisfaction and frustration having been given up in previous levels, contentment and depression now likewise disappear. These cessations take place at the moment of access into the meditation, even though in some texts they are said to disappear in the meditation itself--what those texts mean is that the cessation of satisfaction and frustration is pre-eminent, in that it will not arise again through external stimulation in absorption. By the time of the fourth meditative level one has a feeling that is neither satisfying nor frustrating, that is, it consists in equanimity, which also involves purity of mēmory/mindfulness.

(E136-137; T175-176) The same development is briefly reviewed using the fivefold meditative reckoning.

Chapter 5: The Remaining *Kasiṇa*s

(E138-144; T177-184) The other nine *kasiṇa*s are explained one by

one. In each case one constructs or recognizes the sign in the appropriate medium--water, fire, air, colored things that are blue, red, yellow or white, in a patch of sunlight or moonlight, in any place of limited extension. Special powers accrue for those who utilize each of these *kasiṇa*s. We are also informed that no *kasiṇa* can be fruitfully meditated on by one who is burdened with one of the five kinds of bad karma that have immediate effect, or by one who has fixed wrong views, or who has not had several morally-positive rebirths, or who lacks faith, zeal or understanding.

Chapter 6: Foulnesses as Subjects for Meditation

(E145-160; T185-203) The ten kinds of foulness--various stages of decaying of dead bodies--are listed and explained. Each of them may be made the subject of meditation, and the way this can be done is explained fully in connection with the first of the ten (the bloated state) as illustrative of the others. Essentially the method is to make as before a sign of the subject, which is then developed through meditation so that it is seen large, small, in various places and times. For this the subject must be considered in a variety of ways--by its shape, its color, its location, etc. The body should be of the same sex as the meditator to avoid improper excitement. The purpose of this kind of meditation is to gain nondelusion, so that one will not be panicked and fearful in the presence of the dead.

The difficulty of developing this kind of meditation subject is shown by pointing out that the initial acquisition and the earlier stages require the meditator to be in the presence of a dead body. However, if he is interrupted by someone asking him the time of day, etc., he will likely lose the sign, and if by then the body has been disposed of he will have a difficult time regaining the sign. Thus he is counseled to continuously review the path by which he has gained the sign as a way of reinforcing it even in the absence of the original body on which it was acquired.

Ultimately the meditator gains reverence for the dead body and comes to love it, and through this meditation comes to believe he will be liberated from aging and death. And indeed once the "counterpart" sign is gained the five defilements are overcome and one gains access to the meditative level.

Chapter 7: Six Recollections

(E161-187; T204-246) Of the ten recollections mentioned among the forty subjects for meditation, six are considered in this chapter. The first is the (1) recollection of the enlightened one--that the Buddha is an *arhat*, with all that that implies; that the Buddha is fully enlightened, having understood all things rightly; that the Buddha has understanding and virtue--three kinds of the former and eight of the latter (following canonical sources); that the Buddha is *sugata*, literally well-gone, having gone by the noble path without returning to the defilements and speaking only things appropriate to the occasion; that the Buddha is a world-knower, knowing it in myriad ways which are described in suitably vast numbers; that the Buddha is an incomparable leader of those needing taming--those are the animals, men and gods who were disciplined by the Buddha according to tradition; that the Buddha is teacher of men and gods; he is enlightened and blessed.

(2) is the recollection of the *dharma*, rightly proclaimed by the Buddha; presently visible (or, alternatively, preaching the correct view); inviting inspection; directly experienced by wise men.

(3) is the recollection of the Order, taking a good path, comprising four or eight pairs of kinds of persons (depending on how one counts), i.e., whether one counts the person who is on the first path and the one who gains its fruits as one or two persons); fit for giving to, for hospitality, for offering, for salutation; an incomparable field of merit for the world.

(4) is the recollection of virtue, where virtues are listed following *Aṅguttara* 3, 286 and are explained.

(5) is recollection of generosity: various synonyms for "generous" are explained.

(6) is the recollection of gods, their special qualities of faith, etc.

These six recollections succeed only for noble persons, since they alone appreciate the special qualities of the Buddha, the *dharma* and the order, possess virtue, generosity and the kind of faith, etc., appropriate to gods.

Chapter 8: The Remaining Recollections

(E188-196; T247-259) (7) is the recollection of death. Here "death" does not mean the conventional momentary dissolution of traces normally associated with the word, but rather the distinction between timely and untimely death. A timely death is one that comes about through either

the exhaustion of merit or through the exhaustion of the normal life span of people of today, who live for only around 100 years. Untimely death is the death of those whose *bhavaṅga* is interrupted by a very bad act or who are felled by weapons, etc., due to previous karma. One meditating on this recollection properly destroys the defilements and gets access to the meditative levels. There are eight ways of properly recollecting death: meditating on death as a murderer, since it takes away life; meditating on it as the ruin of success; viewing it by comparison with famous persons reflecting that even these great ones eventually died, even the enlightened ones themselves; meditating on the body as the abode of many--many worms as well as the target of many others; meditating on the difficulty of keeping alive; meditating on it as without occasion, since beings die unpredictably; meditating on the shortness of a lifetime; meditating on the fact that, properly speaking, the lifetime of a being is a single moment of consciousness, that one dies every moment, so to speak.

(E196-204; T259-268) (8) The eighth kind of recollection is that occupied with the body. Actually this meditation is related to a number of topics--breathing, posture, the four kinds of comprehension, the kinds of repulsiveness, the kinds of elements, and the nine things of a funeral ground. Of these, posture, the comprehensions and the elements belong to the discussion of insight, while the things of a funeral ground have been implied in the foregoing discussion of the ten foulnesses. Breathing is treated as a separate topic (the recollection of breathing). Here the discussion is confined to the meditation on the body under thirty-two aspects. This involves considering the body under each of these aspects according to the seven kinds of skill in learning--by verbal recitation, mental recitation, consideration of color, shape, direction, location and limit--and the tenfold skill in attending--following the order of exposition, not too quickly and not too slowly, avoiding distraction, going beyond the name to the thing, abstracting the relevant parts, coming to absorption on each part, and linking energy with concentration through the *sūtras* dealing with the higher meditative levels, with mindfulness and with the factors of enlightenment.

(E204-217; T268-285) The thirty-two aspects are now considered one by one. They are the hairs of the head, the body hairs, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, bone marrow, kidney, heart, liver, the inner skin covering, spleen, the covering of the heart and kidneys, the bowel tube, entrails, gorge, excrement, brain, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat,

fat, tears, grease, spittle, snot, oil of the joints, urine (these translations mostly follow T, and only very approximately reflect the references of the descriptions provided).

(E218-239; TI285-317) (9) The ninth recollection is of breathing. The canonical account of 16 bases in *Suttanikāya* 5, 321-322 is quoted. Each of the sixteen ways of breathing are explained at length. This recollection of breathing brings peace and cuts off initial thought. It also perfects the four foundations of mindfulness, thus leading to perfection of the limbs of enlightenment, in turn leading to clear insight and liberation. The meditator on this kind of recollection will always be able to know how to bring his life to an end.

(E239-242; T317-321) (10) The tenth and last recollection is that of tranquility. One meditating on it contemplates the special qualities of *nirvāṇa* according to *Aṅguttaranikāya* 2.34, which is explained.

Chapter 9: The Sublime States

(E242-252; T321-332) The first sublime state is love. One developing meditation on it should choose a person of the right sort as supporting object--one who is not antipathetic or very close to one, who is neither neutral nor hostile, who is of the same sex and not dead. He should cultivate love as a way of warding off hatred and developing patience. He should begin with himself and with his teacher. After that he can move on to a dearly beloved, a neutral person, a hostile person, using the love felt toward each preceding one as a base for developing it toward the succeeding one.

Various texts are cited as providing methods for controlling resentment against difficult persons, e.g., by thinking on their positive qualities instead of their faults.

(E252-258; T332-340) The mark of possessing love is that one does not prefer any of the four--himself, the beloved one, the neutral person and the hostile one--but treats them with equal friendship. At this point he has attained the first meditative level. By practising with that sign he goes on to gain the other three levels. This is illustrated at length with quotations from scriptures.

(E258-261; T340-343) The second sublime state is compassion, the third restraint, the fourth equanimity. These are explained in terms parallel to the first.

(E261-264; T343-347) The four terms are analyzed etymologically. Each is further analyzed according to characteristic feature, its

manifestation, function, proximate cause and condition of success and of failure. Thus love's feature is the promotion of welfare, its function is to prefer welfare, its manifestation is the removal of annoyance, its proximate cause is seeing a being as lovable, and it succeeds when it makes malice subside and fails when it produces selfish affection. The feature of compassion is the producing of nonfrustration, its function is not allowing people to be frustrated; its manifestation is noninjury; its proximate cause is seeing people helpless in the face of frustration; it succeeds when it makes cruelty end and it fails when it produces frustration. The feature of restraint is delight; its function is nonenvy; its manifestation is the elimination of dislike; its proximate cause the success of beings; it succeeds when discontent subsides; and it fails when it produces derision. The feature of equanimity is neutrality towards beings; its function is seeing beings as the same; its manifestation is quiet resentment towards approval; its proximate cause is seeing that each being is the doer of his deeds and thus it is their choice how to live; it succeeds when resentment and approval subside; and it fails when it merely produces the equanimity of ignorance.

The general purpose of meditation on the sublime states is the satisfaction of insight and the attainment of a good rebirth, while the specific purposes of each are listed above.

Each sublime state has its long-term and short-term enemies. Love has greed as the latter and ill-will as the former. Compassion has depression based on the home life as short-term, and cruelty as long-term enemies. Restraint has joy based on home-life as its short-term and discontent as its long-term enemies. Equanimity has the equanimity of ignorance based on home life as its short-term, with passion and repugnance as its long-term enemies.

(E264-268; TI347-353) Why are they called "sublime states?" They are pure and superlative like Brahmā. Why only four of them? Because they provide four paths to purity for four types of persons. In what order should they be practised? In the order listed, since the ends--welfare, removal of suffering, gladness and equanimity--are naturally ordered that way. Why are they called "boundless" in the Abhidharma? Because they are taken toward beings without limit.

The first three are applicable in three meditative levels (of the fourfold classification, or four of the fivefold) only, since they are not dissociated from contentment. But the last applies only to the last level, being associated with equanimity.

Objection: But in *Aṅguttaranikāya* 4, 300 the Buddha teaches that the boundless states should be practised in all four meditations.

Answer: If it were so, then even contemplation of the body would apply on all four levels. So the Buddha must have had a different intention in the passage mentioned, and it is explained how to interpret the passage consistently with the thesis advanced here.

Still, each of the four is the basis for the next one.

Chapter 10: The Immaterial Levels

(E269-273; T354-360) One who wants to develop the organ called endless space sees danger in material things because of its leading to hitting with sticks and thousands of afflictions, and so he takes up the fourth meditative level through any of the nine meditative *kasiṇa*s excluding the limited-space *kasiṇa*. But though this gets him to the fourth level of the material level, he still wants to get beyond even the matter of the *kasiṇa*. So he turns his attention to endless space and takes it as his *kasiṇa*, seeing everything as boundless space. Then he removes the materiality from this *kasiṇa* by attending only to the space touched by matter but not to the matter, saying to himself "space, space." Developing this meditation through practice he follows the same stages of development as described under the earth-*kasiṇa* above, except that instead of looking at his *kasiṇa* he is looking at empty space.

Vibhaṅga 245 is quoted and explained in a word-for-word commentary.

(E273-281; TI360-371) Similarly, one who wants to develop boundless consciousness concentrates and meditates on it in parallel fashion. Likewise, one who wants to reach nothingness meditates on it. Fourthly and similarly for the final immaterial state, viz., neither-identification-nor-nonidentification. The remainder of *Vibhaṅga* 245 is quoted and explained with word-for-word commentary and several similes.

Chapter 11: The Remaining Subjects of Meditation

(E282-288; T372-380) The identification of repulsiveness in food is the next topic to be considered in the list of forty subjects of meditation. It is the "one identification" listed after the four immaterial states. "Food" in general isn't limited to physical nourishment, but also includes contact which nourishes feelings, conceptual identifications which nourish rebirth-linking, and consciousness which nourishes the psychophysical

complex at the moment of linking. However, here only physical food is intended. The repulsiveness of food and drink is reviewed from a variety of angles.

(E288-308; T380-406) Last of the forty subjects for meditation is the "defining of the four meditative levels". The authority for this is traced to the *Mahāsattipaṭṭhāna Sūtra*, where it is given in brief, and the *Mahātthipadūpamā*, *Rāhulavāda* and *Dhātuvibhaṅga Sūtra*s, where it is given in detail. The idea is that one meditates on the fact that everything is composed of the four elements and thus loses the conception of each thing as a single whole entity of some sort or other. Thus the subjects meditated on here are in fact the essential features of earth, water, fire and air. Each is analyzed into its essential features, and then it is shown how the meditator should analyze each of forty-two parts of the body--hairs, nails, teeth, skin, etc.--into its elementary constituents. Then it is explained that the meditator may consider the classes into which these forty-two (thirty-two?) items may be classified according to the number of components among the four elements. Again, the meditator may consider the meanings of the words used to designate each of the elements, the groups of factors of which each of the parts of the body is composed, the particles into which each part can be divided, the characteristic features of each element, how each part of the body originates, its variety and unity, the elements' necessarily arising in every minimal group of eight but being different in feature, their similarity and dissimilarity, their role in internal and external things, their connection, their conditions, their lack of consciousness and their collective conditions, viz., action, awareness, food and temperature.

This concludes the section answering the question (begun at E72, T90 above) "How should concentration be developed?".

(E308-309; T406-408) It is also asked, What are the benefits of developing concentration? This is the question which is now taken up in the next sections. The general answer is this. For noble persons whose contaminants are destroyed the benefit is satisfying views and states. For ordinary people and seekers the benefit is insight. When these have attained the eight absorptions and seek higher faculties, the benefit of developing concentration is gaining those faculties. For ordinary persons while in meditation the benefit is the gaining of rebirth in Brahmā's world. Noble persons who have mastered the eight absorptions gain cessation and eventually liberation.

Chapter 12: The Kinds of Higher Faculties

(E313-316; T409-412) There are five kinds of higher faculties: (1) supernormal power, (2) knowledge of the divine ear element, (3) knowledge of penetration of minds, (4) knowledge of recollection of past life, (5) knowledge of the passing away and reappearance of beings.

(1) Supernormal Power. The yogi who wishes to develop supernormal powers must attain in fourteen ways the eight absorptions from earth through white-color. The fourteen ways are as follows: (1) the yogi attains meditation first with the earth *kasiṇa*, then with the water *kasiṇa* and so on through the eight; (2) he does it in the reverse order; (3) he does it first in the order and then in the reverse order; (4) he attains each of the four meditative levels in order; (5) he attains them in reverse order; (6) he attains them first in order and then in reverse order; (7) he practises all eight *kasiṇa*s but skips every other meditative level; (8) he practises all four levels but skips every other *kasiṇa*; (9) he skips every other of both levels and *kasiṇa*s; (10) he attains the first level with the earth *kasiṇa* and then the other three levels with the same *kasiṇa*; (11) he attains the first level with each of the eight *kasiṇa*s; (12) he attains the first level with the earth *kasiṇa*, the second level with the water *kasiṇa*, third with fire, fourth with air, the meditation on endless space by removing the blue *kasiṇa*, the meditation on endless consciousness by removing the yellow *kasiṇa*, the meditation on nothingness by removing the red *kasiṇa*, and the neither-identification-nor-nonidentification meditation by removing the white *kasiṇa*; (13) he classifies the meditational states as having different numbers of factors respectively; (14) he classifies merely according to the objects of the *kasiṇa*s.

This extensive meditative practice is very difficult, and only a few can manage it. However, Buddhas, self-enlightened, chief disciples, etc., because of their special qualities, obtain supernormal powers merely on attainment of the state of *arhat* and don't need the prolonged meditation practice described.

(E316-317; T412-414) Now *Dīghanikāya* 1, 77 is given a word-by-word explanation. It describes how one who has attained the fourth meditative level through practising these fourteen kinds of meditative practice and thus has a concentrated, purified, malleable mind directs his thoughts to the supernormal powers, explained as derived from the word meaning "success."

(E317-322; T414-420) There are ten kinds of "success." (1) The first is the power of becoming many by resolving to be so. (2) The

power of displaying other forms. (3) The power created by mental activity in another body which he displays. (4) The power created by an *arhat*'s contemplating impermanence as Bakkula did who was preserved alive in the belly of a fish. (5) The power created by concentration, as Sariputta did when attacked during concentration, or Sañjīva who was set on fire during concentration and was not burnt. (6) The power of the noble persons who see repulsive things as unrepulsive. (7) The power born of the maturation of karma to fly through the air which is shared by birds, gods, some humans, etc. (8) The power of meritorious ones to travel through the air, etc. (9) The power gained through success in the sciences, a power of flying, bringing about various illusions, etc. (10) The power gained through right effort applied in appropriate places, e.g., when one overcomes lust through renunciation, or even everyday efforts such as making a cart, etc.

(E322-341; T420-445) It is now explained how the monk gains these powers. He must obtain the four stages, the four footings, the eight footings, the sixteen roots, and then he establishes himself in knowledge.

The four stages are the four meditative levels. The four footings are those bases which involve respectively zealous striving, concentration due to desire, energy, and inquiry. The eight footings are the strivings for each of the above four kinds of concentration, plus the four above-mentioned footings themselves. The sixteen roots are awarenesses free from various defects, as follows:[69] undejected consciousness, unelated consciousness, unattracted consciousness, unrepelled consciousness, independent consciousness, untrammelled consciousness, liberated consciousness, unassociated consciousness, consciousness rid of barriers, unified consciousness, consciousness reinforced by faith, consciousness reinforced by energy, consciousness reinforced by mindfulness, consciousness reinforced by concentration, consciousness reinforced by understanding, illuminated consciousness. He establishes himself with knowledge when, having attained these first four things, he attains meditation as a basis for a higher faculty and emerges from it. Then he can attain any of the ten kinds of power merely by reentering the meditation and resolving appropriately. Discrimination is commented on in this connection; Cula-Panthaka is cited, who became many through meditation after having been counselled by the Buddha. Other such miracles are detailed, and it is narrated at length how meditation on *kasiṇa*s of various sorts prepared the way for development of these supernatural powers.

Chapter 13: The Other Four Kinds of Higher Faculties

(E342-366; T446-478) The second kind of supernatural power is the divine ear. By "divine" is meant similar to the gods' hearing capacities. One who has this hearing hears both divine and human sounds, far off as well as near by, even from another world. The meditation for developing this capacity is described in parallel to the previous methods.

The third kind is knowledge of the minds of others. One who has this power knows another's mind as troubled, deluded, exalted, etc., according to what actually characterizes that other's mind. The monk gains this power by meditating on the color of the other's blood, which changes color according to the defect characterizing his consciousness. This works on the material level, and gradually he can extend the method to the finer levels required for the higher levels. Brief explanations are provided of the various defective and advanced kinds of consciousness.

The fourth kind is remembrance of past lives. Six kinds of people can do this: members of other sects, ordinary disciples, great disciples, chief disciples, those self-enlightened, and Buddhas. These in order are able to recall more and more past births (up to an infinity of lives for Buddhas); conceive births in a less and less material fashion; see their past lives in a progressively more glorious fashion; manage it faster and faster. The method of gaining this power is through carefully expanding one's recollective ability farther and farther back into the past. Special effort may be required for remembering the death prior to a birth, as well as the linking to the next birth. Eventually one will attain a remembrance of more and more past lives, so that one comes to remember lives that occurred even before the present eon.

This leads to a review of the temporal cosmogony set forth in classical Buddhist texts. The end of an eon involves prolonged drought, so that water-dwelling creatures die, as well as others who depend on vegetable matter for sustenance, including humans. Some who have attained meditative levels are reborn in the Brahmaloka; others who have not are reborn in the world of the gods where they develop concentration and eventually gain the Brahmaloka. The sun multiplies, so that there is no night, and the waters dry up, including even the oceans. This happens in all the 100,000,000 worlds along with ours, which all catch fire, so that the three lower Brahmalokas are consumed. After a period of darkness it begins to rain, and eventually the lower Brahmaloka reappears followed by the other divine worlds above. The wind holds the water together, and earth begins to form on it. Then those in the highest

Brahmaloka fall on to this lower world through the exhaustion of their merit or life span, and on eating the earth come to crave it. They thus become material beings themselves. This creation story is told at great length and with a wealth of detail.

One who has the fifth kind of supernatural power sees with his divine eye the passing away and rearising of beings according to their karmic deserts. He sees beings in hell and in heaven, and comes to know what kinds of karma brought these states about through his "divine eye," i.e., his special knowledge. There is no special preliminary work for this, any more than for knowing the future.

A final section explains the objects which are grasped by each of the five higher faculties. E.g., knowledge of supernatural powers grasps seven kinds of objects--limited, exalted, past, future, present, internal or external. Knowledge of the divine ear element grasps four kinds of object--limited, present, internal or external. Knowledge of other minds has eight kinds of objects--limited, exalted, measureless, path, past, future or present. Knowledge of past lives has eight kinds--limited, exalted, measureless, path, past, internal, external, neither-internal-nor-external. Knowledge of the divine eye has four kinds--limited, present, internal or external. Knowledge of the future has eight kinds--limited, exalted, immeasurable, path, future, internal, external, neither. And knowledge of faring according to one's deeds has five kinds--limited, exalted, past, internal or external.

Part III: Wisdom

Chapter 14: The Aggregates

(E367-375; T479-493) Wisdom is insight associated with good awareness. It is called "wisdom (*prajñā*)" because it is a knowing in a different mode from identification or consciousness. Whereas identification cognizes the object by identifying it as "blue" or "yellow," etc., and consciousness does this and also apprehends the distinguishing features of a blue or yellow thing, neither can apprehend an object as manifesting the path, whereas wisdom does this also. An example is given: whereas a child knows coins as round and colored, etc., but doesn't know that they are valuable, and a villager knows that too, the money-changer knows these things but in addition he knows all its features, where it was made and by whom, etc. Thus wisdom has as its characteristic feature knowing the natures of factors. Its function is to

abolish the delusion that hides these natures. And its proximate cause is concentration.

Wisdom can be classified in twelve ways. (1) As itself, it is of one kind. (2) As worldly and otherworldly, it is of two kinds, depending on which path is relevant. (3) As of two kinds, e.g., subject to contaminants or not subject to them. (4) As of two kinds, viz., material vs. immaterial (the rest of the aggregates). (5) As two kinds, that accompanied by contentment and that accompanied by equanimity. (6) As two, that wisdom which pertains to vision and that which pertains to meditative practice. (7) As three, as reasoned, heard, and meditatively developed. (8) As three, depending on whether its content is limited, exalted, or measureless. (9) As three, involving skill in improvement, skill in detriment, and skill in means. (10) Three, as interpreting the internal (one's own factors), the external (the factors of others) as well as of inanimate matter), and both. (11) Four kinds, according to knowledge of the four noble truths. (12) Four kinds, called the four discriminations--of purpose, of law, of language, and of perspicuity (ref. to *Vibhaṅga* 293, which is quoted and explained).

Wisdom is developed by first cultivating the "soil" of wisdom--aggregates, factors, elements, faculties, etc.--having perfected the "roots" of wisdom--the purification of virtue, the purification of awareness--and then developing the five purifications of the "trunk", namely, (1) purification of view, (2) purification of overcoming doubt, (3) purification through knowledge and vision of what is the path and what is not, (4) purification by knowledge and vision of the path, and (5) purification by knowledge and vision.

The Matter Aggregate

(E373-379; T489-502) This is divided into two varieties: primary material, viz., the four elements (cf. Ch. 11), and derived material, which has twenty-four kinds, as follows:

1. The visual organ. Its characteristic feature is the sensitivity of the primary elements ready for impact of visible things or (alternatively) the sensitivity of the primary elements arising from karma resulting from desire to see. Its function is to pick up something from among the colors. It is manifested as the basis of visual-consciousness. Its proximate cause is the primary elements born of karma arising from desire to see.

2. The auditory organ is explained in a parallel fashion, substituting

auditory for visual throughout.

3. The olfactory organ is explained likewise with relevant substitutions.

4. The gustatory organ is explained likewise.

5. The body is explained likewise, substituting "tangible" in the relevant places.

Another view (certain Mahāsaṁghikas, says *Paramatthamañjūṣā*) is that these five organs differ in that each has a certain element predominating--fire for the visual, air for the auditory, earth for the olfactory, and water for the gustatory, and the body has all four elements in balance, and it is thus that the differences between the five organs are to be explained. This view is rejected by Buddhaghoṣa as having no authority, and as ascribing different qualities to items composed of the same mixture of the same elements. The proper explanation for the differences among these five organs is rather the difference in the karma from which each arises.

(E375-380; T493-506) At this point the list of twenty-four derived material objects is begun again, with a different way of approaching the first five in the list.

1. The eye, what is called the "eye" in the world, is described as the pupil in which the sensitivity (=the organ) is located, and in which the images of things seen are reflected. It is assisted by the four elements through their respectively functioning to uphold, bind, mature and move. It is consolidated by temperature, consciousness, and food; it is maintained by life, and furnished with color, smell, taste, etc.

2. The ear is likewise described as the auditory cavity, with the remainder of the description following that of the eye.

3. The nose likewise,

4. The tongue likewise,

5. and the body likewise, as a sort of liquid that covers the physical body.

6. Color--or what is visible, is now defined. Its feature is to impinge on the visual organ, its function and manifestation to be the content of the visual consciousness, and its causes are the four elements. These defining characteristics are the same for the rest of the derived material objects following in this list, except where differences are indicated. The varieties of color are blue, yellow, etc.

7. Sound is likewise defined,

8. Smell, and

9. Taste.

10. The feminine faculty has as its feature the female sex, and its function is to reveal things as female.

11. The masculine faculty likewise relates to the male sex. Both (10) and (11) are coextensive with the body but not necessarily located either where the body is or where it is not.

12. The life faculty has as its feature that of maintaining matter that is born together (as a living body); its function is to induce, etc. Factors come to be because of their own causal conditions, but once arisen this faculty maintains them. When it is absent the maintenance no longer occurs, and it dissolves at the same time the matter it maintains dissolves, so that that matter does not continue.

13. The heart is the material support of the mental element and the mental consciousness element. Its function and manifestation is to support them. It depends on the blood in the heart (cf. Ch. 8, section 3).

14. Bodily intimation is the change in the air-element arising from awareness that causes bodily movement forward, etc. Its function is to display intention, and it is manifested as the cause of bodily excitement.

15. Vocal intimation is the change in the earth-element arising from awareness which instigates utterances of speech in the vocal apparatus. Its function is also to display intention, and it is manifested as that which causes verbal awareness.

16. Space limits matter, and functions to display the boundaries of things.

17. Material lightness functions to dispel heaviness.

18. Malleability is not stiff and functions to dispel stiffness. It manifests as the nonopposition to any activity.

19. Workableness of matter is that which enables matter to mold itself in accord with bodily actions on it. The distinction between (17), (18) and (19) is spelled out further through examples:

20. Growth of matter refers to the first arrival at a material state;

21. Continuity of matter is the noninterruption of a state. Since (20) and (21) in *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* are practically identified, Buddhaghosa quotes an *Aṭṭhakathā* in making the distinction.

22. Aging is the maturing of matter, leading on (to termination). Immaterial states of matter undergo hidden aging as well as the evident aging of material states such as tooth-decay and the continual aging of rocks, etc.

23. Noneternality of matter is its breaking up, destruction.

24. Physical food is matter that feeds other matter.

In the *Aṭṭhakathā* some more kinds of matter are added to these twenty-four, viz., matter as power, matter as procreation, matter as birth, matter as sickness. Some (Abhayagirins, says *Paramaṭṭhamañjūṣā*) also list matter as torpor. But this last is not a kind of matter according to canonical authority, and the others may be included within one or another of the twenty-four listed. Still, one may consider the number of kinds to be twenty-eight.

These twenty-eight kinds of matter are now classified in various ways: into contrastive pairs, as, e.g., internal vs. external to the self, gross vs. subtle, distant vs. near, produced vs. unproduced, sensitive (the organs) vs. nonsensitive, faculties vs. non-faculties, etc.

into triads as, e.g., karma-born, not karma-born, neither-karma-nor non-karma-born; consciousness-born, not consciousness-born, neither consciousness born nor not consciousness-born; nutriment-born, etc.; temperature-born, etc.

into fours, as, e.g., according to the faculty by which they are grasped (visual, auditory, sensing involving contact, and consciousness); as concrete, delimiting, mode and defining; as actual entity, door, both entity and door, neither entity nor door.

into fives, as, e.g., born of one, two, three, four or nothing.

The Consciousness Aggregate

(E381-382; T506-508) The words "*vijñāna*," "*citta*" and "*manas*" all mean the same aggregate. It may be initially classified into three major varieties: (1) good, (2) bad, and (3) neutral. Each of these can be considered in four ways: (a) in relation to the level of desire, (b) in relation to the material level, (c) in relation to the immaterial level, (d) in relation to the higher level.

(1a) Good in the level of desire are eight kinds of consciousness:

(1a1) accompanied by contentment, associated with knowledge, not conditioned--e.g., when one gives a gift spontaneously and with pleasure;

(1a2) accompanied by contentment, associated with knowledge, conditioned--e.g., gives the gift when urged to by others;

(1a3) accompanied by contentment, dissociated from knowledge

and not conditioned--e.g., when a child gives a gift to a monk in imitation of his parents;

(1a4) accompanied by contentment, dissociated from knowledge and conditioned--e.g., when the child is urged by others;

(1a5) accompanied by equanimity, associated with knowledge and conditioned--like the first except that there is no cause for pleasure;

(1a6) accompanied by equanimity, associated with knowledge, conditioned;

(1a7) accompanied by equanimity, dissociated from knowledge and not conditioned;

(1a8) accompanied by equanimity, dissociated from knowledge and conditioned.

As to the material level, there are five kinds of good consciousness:

(1b1) associated with all five meditation factors--initial thought, sustained thought, satisfaction, joy and concentration;

(1b2) associated with the last four of those;

(1b3) associated with the last three of those;

(1b4) associated with the last two of those;

(1b5) associated with concentration and equanimity only.

In the immaterial level there are four kinds of good consciousness (1c1-4) each associated with one of the four immaterial states, viz., concentration on infinite space, etc.

In the higher level there are four kinds (1d1-4) of good consciousness, each associated with one of the four paths. Thus the total number of kinds of good consciousness is twenty-one.

(E382; T508-509) All the bad kinds of consciousness occur in the level of desire only. They are:

(2a1) rooted in greed, accompanied by contentment, associated with views and not conditioned, e.g., when a man enjoys sensual desires and, believing in their substantial basis, has spontaneous consciousness;

(2a2) rooted in greed, accompanied by contentment, associated with views and conditioned--e.g., when that consciousness is urged on by something or someone;

(2a3) rooted in greed, accompanied by contentment, dissociated from views and not conditioned--e.g., when a man steals happily without being dominated by wrong views;

(2a4) the same, but he is conditioned by others;

(2a5-8) rooted in greed, accompanied by equanimity, associated with views and not conditioned, etc.;

(2a9) rooted in hatred, accompanied by depression and associated with repugnance and unconditioned--e.g., when one kills a living thing spontaneously;

(2a10) same but conditioned;

(2a11) rooted in delusion, accompanied by equanimity, associated with doubt;

(2a12) same and associated with worry.

(E382-384; T509-512) The neutral kinds of consciousness are divided into two main classes, (3) matured and (4) constructed or functional. They occur in most of the four meditative levels.

Among the matured kinds of neutral consciousness in the level of desire we find:

(3a1) having good results, without root-cause, visual consciousness;

(3a2) likewise, auditory consciousness;

(3a3) likewise, olfactory consciousness;

(3a4) likewise, gustatory consciousness;

(3a5) likewise, tactual consciousness;

(3a6) likewise, mental element - the mental state immediately following any of the above;

(3a7) likewise, mental consciousness element accompanied by contentment; and

(3a8) likewise, mental consciousness element accompanied by equanimity, in each of which objects come to be cognized, desirable objects in the case of 3a7, neutral ones in 3a8.

(3a9-16) These are the same as the preceding eight, except that they are with root-cause, which is to say that they are caused by such states as lack of greed, etc. This causation operates in karmic conditioning: the objects that are so caused are rebirth-linking, *bhava*, death and such factors.

(3a17-23) Here are those neutral consciousnesses having bad results, without root-cause only: they are (17) visual, (18) auditory, (19) olfactory, (20) gustatory and (21) tactual consciousnesses, (22) mental consciousness with the function of receiving, and (23) mental consciousness element having the five functions of investigating, etc. These have undesirable or neutral objects but not desirable ones.

At the material meditative level there are five kinds (3b1-5) of matured consciousness, corresponding to 1b1-5. But they occur in attainment of meditations as rebirth-linking, *bhavaṅga* and death.

At the immaterial level there are four kinds (3c1-4) corresponding to 1c1-4 among the good kinds of consciousness.

And in the transcendent level there are four kinds (3d1-4) corresponding to the maturation of each of the four paths comprising 1d1-4. Thus there are in all thirty-six kinds of maturation of neutral consciousness.

(E384-385; T512-513) The neutral functional *(kiriya)* kinds of consciousness occur in the first three levels. On the level of desire there are two kinds found, viz., (a) without root-cause and (b) with root-cause. Thus we have

(4a1) Mental element without root-cause, i.e., without nongreed, etc., and causing a result, which accounts for attending to objects of visual consciousness, etc., and the proximate cause of which is the interruption of the *bhavaṅga*. It is associated only with equanimity.

(4a2) Mental consciousness element without root-cause and devoid of nongreed, etc., and causing a result, which is shared by everyone, whereby cognition of the six kinds of sense-objects is accomplished.

(4a3) Mental consciousness element without root-cause, etc., but not shared by everyone, since it is accompanied with contentment and causes smiling by *arhat*s about things that are repulsive ordinarily.

(4a4-11) The desire-level kind of neutral functional consciousness with root-cause corresponds to 1a1-8 above.

There are five kinds of neutral functional consciousness at the material level, 4b1-5, corresponding to 1b1-5.

There are four kinds of neutral functional consciousness at the immaterial level, 4c1-4, corresponding to 1c1-4.

Thus there are 21 kinds of good consciousness, 12 kinds of bad consciousness, 36 kinds of neutral maturation and 20 kinds of neutral functional consiousness, for a total of 89 kinds of consciousness.

(E385-387; T513-518) These 89 kinds occur in 14 ways, as follows:

(1) When through the influence of 1a1-8 there is rebirth among the gods or men, then 3a8-16 occur as rebirth-linking consciousnesses having as their contents either the act, the sign of the act, or the result that appeared at the time of death (cf. Ch. 17 below).

When through the influence of 1b1-5 and 1c1-4 there is material level and immaterial level rebirth, then 3b1-5 and 3c1-4 resultant consciousnesses occur as rebirth-linking having as their content the karmic sign that occurred at the time of death.

When through the influence of 2a1-12 there is rebirth in a lower state, then 3a23 occurs as rebirth-linking having as content the action, sign or result that appeared at the time of death.

Thus 19 kinds of maturation consciousness are rebirth-linking.

(2) When the rebirth-linking consciousness has stopped, then, resulting from the same kind of karma (sign or result) that operated in the case of (1), there occurs the *bhavaṅga* consciousness of that same content and according to the same pattern as just reviewed under (1) above. This continuum goes on until something interrupts it, e.g., during the state of dreamless sleep. So 19 kinds of maturation consciousness are life-continuous.

(3) During this continuation of life, when a being's senses have become capable of apprehending things, and when a visual object comes into the field of the visual organ, there is a disturbance in the *bhavaṅga*, which then ceases and is replaced by the occurrence (4a1) having that visual content and creating attention (or adverting). This in turn is followed by the occurrence of 4a2 and a second moment of adverting. The same analysis applies in the case of auditory and the other doors. So there are two kinds of adverting consciousness.

(4) After that visual consciousness (3a1) in the visual door having the visual organ as its base, being 3a1 and 3a17 respectively for good and bad contents.

(5) The auditory consciousness (3a2 and 3a18),

(6) the olfactory consciousness (3a3 and 3a19),

(7) the gustatory consciousness (3a4 and 3a20),

(8) and the tactual consciousness (3a5 and 3a21). So there are ten kinds of maturation consciousness in these five ways.

(9) Next the mental element arises from each such sensory consciousness as receiving 3a6 and 3a22, depending on whether the content is good or bad. So there are two kinds of receiving consciousness.

(10) And in turn the mental consciousness element occurs investigating that same content received by the mental element, so that if the receiving is 3a22 because its content is bad the investigating is 3a23, while if the receiving is good the investigating will be either 3a7 or 3a8. So there are three kinds of investigating.

(11) After that 4a2 occurs determining that same content. So there is one kind of determining.

(12) If the visual, etc., content is vivid, then next in turn six or seven impulsions arise with respect to the visual, etc., content. If good these

are 1a1-8, if bad they are 2a1-12, and if they are neutral they are 4a3-11. This applies in the case of the five "external" doors. In the case of the mind the same impulsions arise after 4a2 mind-door adverting.

Beyond lineage-change any of the following 26 impulsions occurs: 1b1-5, 4b1-5, 1c1-4, 4c1-4, 1d1-4 and 3d1-4. Thus there are 55 kinds of impulsion consciousnesses.

(13) At the end of the impulsions, if the object is very vivid in one of the five doors, or is clear in the mind-door, at the level of desire one or two maturation consciousnesses arise as registering previous karma--3a9-16, or 3a7, 3a8 and 3a23--the content of this consciousness being some object other than the one that was the content of the *bhavaṅga* consciousness. So there are 11 kinds of registration consciousness.

(14) At the end of registration the *bhavaṅga* reassumes its sway. And when it is eventually exhausted the last living consciousness is called death-consciousness. It has the same 19 kinds as rebirth-linking (1) and *bhavaṅga* (2) above.

Feeling Aggregate

(E387-388; T518-520) Feeling can be studied under three headings--as good, bad or neutral under five headings--as satisfaction, frustration, contentment, depression and equanimity. Each of these is associated with the appropriate kinds of consciousness in among the 89 listed above under Consciousness Aggregate. Thus satisfaction is associated with 3a5, frustration with 3a21 and contentment is associated with 62 kinds of consciousness, viz.: 1a1-4, 3a9-12, 3a7, 4a4-7, 4a3, 2a1-4 at the level of desire; 1b1-4, 3b1-4 and 4b1-4 at the material level; 1d1-4 and 3d1-4 for each of the first four meditation levels (in the 5-level model) in the transcendent (i.e., leaving out the eight kinds of consciousness associated with the fifth meditative level). Depression is associated with 2a9-10, and equanimity is associated with the remaining 55 kinds of consciousness.

Each of the five--satisfaction, etc.--are analyzed in the standard fashion. Satisfaction has as its mark experiencing a desirable object through contact; its function is to intensify associated factors; it is manifested as bodily enjoyment; and its proximate cause is the bodily faculty. Frustration's defining mark is experiencing an undesirable object through contact; its function is to wither associated factors; it is manifested as bodily affliction; its proximate cause is the bodily faculty.

Contentment's mark is experiencing a desirable object; its function is to enjoy that desirable object; it manifests as enjoyment of awareness; its proximate cause is confidence. Depression's mark is experiencing an undesirable object; its function is disliking the undesirable object; it is manifested as mental affliction; its proximate cause is the heart. Equanimity's mark is the feeling of neutrality; its function is not to intensify nor to wither associated states; it is manifested as peace; its proximate cause is joyless awareness..

Identification Aggregate

(E388-389; T520-521) This aggregate can likewise be understood as three--good, bad or neutral. Since there is no consciousness without identification its kinds number 89 just as consciousnesses do. Its mark is identifying; its function is to make a sign which occasions recognition in the form of the awareness "this is just that"; it is manifested as identifying through the sign apprehended as the blind do who cognize an elephant; and its proximate cause is a cognitive field however it appears, as when fawns see scarecrows as men.

Traces Aggregate

(E389-397; T521-535) The mark of dispositional states or traces is conditioning. Their function is accumulation (says Nanamoli), their manifestation is operation, and their proximate cause is the three aggregates other than matter.

When associated with good kinds of consciousness traces are good, when associated with bad kinds of consciousness bad, and when associated with neutral kinds neutral. Each of the 89 kinds of consciousness (cf. above under Consciousness Aggregate) are examined and the associated dispositional states listed and explained. Thus, for example, the first and second kinds of consciousness (1a1-2) are found to have 36 traces: they are as follows: (1) contact or touch, (2) volition, (3) initial thought, (4) sustained thought, (5) joy, (6) energy, (7) life-force, (8) concentration, (9) faith, (10) memory/mindfulness, (11) shame, (12) fear, (13) nongreed, (14) nonaversion, (15) nondelusion, (16) bodily tranquility, (17) tranquil awareness, (18) lightness of bodily weight, (19) lightness of awareness, (20) malleability of body, (21) malleability of consciousness, (22) bodily adaptability, (23) adaptability of awareness, (24) bodily proficiency, (25) proficiency in awareness, (26) bodily rightness, (27) rightness of awareness, (28) interest, (29) resolve, (30)

attention, (31) neutrality, (32) compassion, (33) restraint, (34) avoidance of bad bodily action, (35) avoidance of bad vocal action, (36) avoidance of bad mental action.

1a3-4 have all the above 36 except for 15. 1a5-6 have the original 36 minus 5, 1a7-8 have the 36 minus 5 and 15.

1b1 have the 36 minus 34-36. 1b2 have those 33 minus 3, 1b3 those 32 minus 4, 1b4 those 31 minus 5, and 1b5 those 30 minus 32 and 33. 1c1-4 have the same as 1b5, while 1d1-4 have states as traces (the 36 minus 32-36). So much for the dispositional states associated with the good kinds of consciousness.

As for the dispositional states associated with bad kinds of consciousness: 2a1 has 17 dispositional states associated with it, viz., (1) contact/touch, (2) volition, (3) initial thought, (4) sustained thought, (5) joy, (6) energy, (7) life-force, (8) concentration, (37) shamelessness, (38) fearlessness, (39) greed, (40) delusion, (41) false view, (28) interest, (29) resolve, (42) worry and (30) attention. The new items 37-42 are each explained.

2a2 has these 17 plus 43 lethargy, which is explained. 2a3 has the 17 minus 41 and plus 44 pride. 2a4 lacks 41 but has 44 and the rest. 2a5 and 2a6 have the 17 associated with 2a1 except for 5. 2a7 is like 2a5 but also lacks 41. 2a8 is like 2a6 but also lacks 41 and 44. 2a9 has states 1-8, 27, 29-30 and 42, along with 37-38 and 40. 2a10 has the same as 2a9 plus 43. 2all has 1-7, 30, 37-40, and 42, plus (49) steadiness of consciousness and (50) perplexity. 2a12 has the same as 2all except for 50 and with the addition of 39.

Coming to the neutral maturational dispositional states: 3a1-5 and 3a8, and 3a17-21 and 3a23 have states 1-2, 7, 30 and 49. 3a6 and 3a22 have 1-4, 7, 24, 30 and 49. 3a7 has 1-5, 7, 30 and 49. 3a9-16 have the states associated with 1a1-8, except that they lack 22 and 23; this is if they are determined (*niyata*). Undetermined 3a9-16 also lack 34-36. 3b1-5, 3c1-4 and 3d1-4 have the same associated states as 1b1-5, 1c1-4 and 1d1-4.

Among the neutral functional states: 4a1 have the same dispositional states as 3a6. 4a2-3 have the same states as 3a7-8, except that 6 needs to be added and 8 is strong here. 4a4-11 have the same states as 1a1-8, except 34-37 are lacking. 4b1-5 and 4c1-4 have the same states as 1b1-5 and 1c1-4.

(E397-401; T535-541) What has just been given is the classification of aggregates according to the Abhidhamma-teaching (of the *Vibhaṅga*).

But in the *suttanta-bhajanīya* (of that text) the Buddha classifies traces under eleven headings, which are now reviewed. These eleven headings are (1) past, (2) future, (3) present, (4) internal, (5) external, (6) gross, (7) subtle, (8) inferior, (9) superior, (10) far and (11) near. Thus the first kind of trace, material, has past, future and present forms in four senses--that of (i) extent, referring to the time prior to rebirth-linking as past, after death as future, between those as present; (ii) continuity, so that when there is a change in the temperature or in the cognitions in a series, etc., what was before the change is past, what subsequent to a new change is future, what between present; (iii) period, in that for any temporal stretch--moment, minute, morning, day, etc.--which is present, what occurs prior is past, what occurs subsequently is future; (iv) moment, where the period of arising, maintenance and dissolution comprises a moment is present, what is prior to it past, and what subsequent future. Only the last is a literal sense of temporality, the others are relative. Internal and external have been explained for matter, as have gross and subtle, far and near. Some deities have inferior matter to others, which are thus superior to them.

Turning to the feeling aggregate, the first five headings are straightforward as above. A gross feeling versus subtle feeling can be understood in four ways: (i) according to its kind, since neutral feelings are subtler than good or bad feelings, and good ones subtler than bad; (ii) according to nature, since bad feelings are unsatisfying, catalyzing, disturbing and overpowering, while neutral feelings are the opposite and good feelings in between; (iii) according to person, depending on the state of attainment of the person having the feeling; (d) according to meditative level, depending on whether the feeling is experienced in a state subject to contaminants, etc., or not. We are warned not to confuse these various kinds of grossness and subtleness. Inferior and superior in feeling corresponds to the gross-subtle distinctions. And far and near here merely mean difference in kind, so that a bad feeling is "farther" from a good feeling than from another bad one, and even farther from a neutral one.

Likewise for the other three aggregates.

(E401-404; T541-546) Awareness of the aggregates is classified into six types: (1) as to order, whether the order of arising, the order of abandoning, the order of practice, the order of meditastive level, or the order in which taught; (2) as to species, e.g., whether an aggregate is being considered *per se* or as an object of clinging; (3) as to their being

just this number, viz., five, of them, because they collectively include all states of self and what pertains to self and because they include all other supposed kinds of aggregate; (4) as to what is figuratively likened to them--e.g., matter is like the hospital room where the sick man (=consciousness) lies, feeling is like his sickness, and so on; (5) how they should be seen, which is described both briefly and in detail: the idea is that the aggregates should be viewed under certain descriptions which are more conducive to progress than their alternatives; (6) as to what benefits accrue to one seeing an aggregate in the proper fashion, what specifically such a person gains.

Chapter 15: Organs and Elements

(E405-413; T547-558) There are 12 organs: (1) visual, (2) tactual, (3) stream, (4) faith, (5) olfactory, (6) smell, (7) tongue, (8) taste, (9) touch, (10) tangible, (11) pride, (12) factor. These are discussed under the following six headings:

(a) the respective meanings of each of the twelve, and the general meaning of the term "organ" (*āyatana*), examined etymologically;

(b) their respective characteristics;

(c) how many they are, no more, no less;

(d) the order in which they are listed;

(e) their classification in brief as the mental and material organs and objects, and in detail according to condition, destiny, the kind of being to which it belongs and the particular person involved;

(f) how they should be seen: as without intrinsic nature, with no past or future, unconscious, etc.

The elements are eighteen in number: (1) visual organ, (2) matter/form, (3) visual awareness, (4) auditory organ, (5) sound, (6) auditory awareness, (7) olfactory organ, (8) smell, (9) olfactory awareness, (10) tongue, (11) taste, (12) gustatory awareness, (13) touch, (14) tangible, (15) tactual awareness, (16) pride, (17) factor, (18) mental awareness. They are discussed under seven rubrics:

(a) the meanings of the individual terms and the term "element" (*dhātu*);

(b) the defining features of each;

(c) the order in which listed;

(d) why just that many, viz., 18, for in various places in the *sūtra*s and in Abhidhamma one finds references to other elements, e.g., progress? *(abha),* beauty (*śubha*), etc. (the passages are quoted), and each

of these must be reduced to one of the above eighteen;

(e) how classified;

(f) what each element conditions;

(g) and how they are to be seen for the most beneficial results.

Chapter 16: The Faculties and the Truths

(E414-416; T559-562) The 22 faculties are listed: (1) eye, (2) ear, (3) nose, (4) tongue, (5) skin, (6) mind, (7) femininity, (8) masculinity, (9) life-force, (10) satisfaction, (11) frustration, (12) contentedness, (13) depression, (14) equanimity, (15) faith, (16) energy, (17) memory/mindfulness, (18) concentration, (19) wisdom, (20) knowledge of what is unknown, (21) perfect knowledge, (22) knowledge that one knows. They are discussed under the following headings:

(a) the respective meanings of the individual terms and of "*indriya*" which relates etymologically to the idea of being a ruler (*indra*);

(b) the defining features of each;

(c) the order in which listed, which is the order of teaching, running from obvious and mundane to less evident and relating to liberation;

(d) as to what has varieties or does not--only one of the 22 has varieties, viz., life, which is divided into the material and immaterial life faculties;

(e) their functions. The visual, auditory, etc., organs function to cause visual consciousness, auditory consciousness, etc. The mind functions to coordinate factors born at the same moment, the life faculty to maintain those conascent factors. The masculine and feminine faculties allot the marks and habits of men and women respectively. The faculties of happiness, frustration, joy, sorrow and equanimity impart their special features to factors born with them. The faith, energy, memory, concentration and wisdom faculties function to overcome opposed states and to bolster confidence. (20) Knowledge of what is unknown functions in abandoning the fetters, while (21) perfect knowledge attenuates and destroys desire, passion, ill will, etc. The last faculty, (22) knowledge that one knows, functions to terminate any kind of endeavor.

(f) their meditative levels. Faculties (1-5), (7-8), (10-11), and (13) operate at the desire-level only. (6), (9) and (14), along with (15-19) operate on all four levels. (12) operates on three levels excluding the material, while (20-22) operate in the fourth, transcendent, level only.

(E416-428; T562-578) The four noble truths are now discussed under fifteen rubrics:

(1) according to the distinctions between the meanings of the constitutent terms, such as "*duḥkha*," etc.;

(2) through derivation, i.e., etymology, of the constituent terms;

(3) through division according to the defining marks, etc., of each truth; thus the frustration truth has the mark of binding, the function of burning, and is manifested as positive occurrence or activity. The second truth, of origin, has the mark of producing, the function of causing the unblocking of obstructions, and is manifested as awareness of obstacles. The third truth, of cessation, has as its mark peace, as function not being cut off, and is manifested as signless. The final fourth truth, the path, has as mark leading out, as function destruction of defilements, and is manifested as emergence.

(4) through understanding the meaning of "truth," and

(5) appreciating all its connotations;

(6) Why are there just four truths and no more? Because of the authority of the Buddha, and because four is the permutation of two and two--two kinds of happening (frustration, cessation) and two causes, one of each (origin, path).

(7) through considering the order in which the four truths are listed;

(8) with respect to birth, etc., shown by citing various *Vibhaṅga* passages in which the truths are alluded to. These characteristically involve terms such as

(a) birth, viz., the first manifestation of aggregates in a living being, manifested as frustration. Frustration has many kinds, including

(1) the frustration of frustration, "intrinsic frustration," bodily and mental frustration;

(2) bodily and mental satisfactions, which breed subsequent frustrations;

(3) indifferent feelings and the many other conditioned states in all the first three meditative levels;

(4) "concealed" frustrations, which are not exhibited publicly except upon questioning;

(5) unconcealed frustrations which are openly evident.

In the *Vibhaṅga* (1) is called "direct" frustration, while the rest are called "indirect" since they produce subsequent feelings.

(a) The frustration of birth stems from the awkward position in which the foetus finds itself positioned in its mother's womb, the heat,

jolting, etc., it undergoes there, etc., which are described in some detail.

(b) Aging is frustrating because one's limbs become tired, one's faculties lose their strength, memory is lost, etc. It is indirect frustration.

(c) Death is frustrating because it is a basis for future frustration in addition to the experiences of pain accompanying the event of death itself. It is indirect..

(d) Grief is frustration since it consumes one internally; it is direct frustration.

(e) Lamentation, crying out accompanying the loss of relatives, etc., a type of frustrating trace, and so indirect.

(f) Pain, i.e., bodily affliction, is both direct frustration and indirect frustration, the latter since it brings about mental frustration in turn.

(g) Depression is frustration, mental distress. It is direct but also indirect, since it brings on bodily frustration when persons mentally distressed tear their hair, commit suicide, etc.

(h) Despair is the dejection left over after grief and lamentation. It is a frustrating trace.

(i) Association with undesired things is an indirect frustration which brings about mental distress.

(j) Separation from what is desired is indirect frustratioin, for it is a basis for grief and so forth.

(k) Not getting what one wants is indirect frustration which is manifested as disappointment.

"In short," said the Buddha, "all the five aggregates are objects of clinging" and it is this clinging which occasions these various kinds of frustration.

The second noble truth speaks of the cause of frustration under the rubric thirst, and the third noble truth teaches the cessation of frustration stemming from the cessation of its cause, viz., that thirst.

(E428-430; T578-581) Here there is a section in which various questions about liberation are posed and answered.

Question: Is liberation nonexistent because unexperienceable like a hare's horn?

Answer: No, for it *is* experienceable by the right means, and it exists, otherwise the path would be futile.

Question: But what arises from the path is absence (e.g., of aggregates or defilements).

Answer: No, for absence (=nonoccurrence) of aggregates would leave

no support for the clinging contained in liberation with residues, and absence of defilements can occur even before the path is realized. Furthermore, if liberation were just (posterior absence or) destruction, then it would be temporary, conditioned, and obtainable even without right effort, and thus liberation would itself be frustrating.

Question: Isn't liberation destruction without any subsequent activity?

Answer: No, for there is no such destruction, and even if there were, the above faults would be committed; in addition, it would follow that the path was itself liberation, since subsequent to it there is no more activity. Liberation, unlike the path, has no beginning; it is not created but rather reached through the path; that is why liberation is free from old age and death.

Question: Then is liberation permanent like the atom (is claimed by some to be)?

Answer: No, there is no reason to say that, since the atom, etc., are unestablished. Liberation is not material since it goes beyond the nature of matter. Liberation can be thought of first as with residues, because it is experienced by the *arhat* during meditation while the results of past defilements are still clinging though one has stopped gathering further defilements. Secondly, it can be thought of as without residues, since after the *arhat*'s last awareness, since further defilements have been cut off, there is no further arising of the aggregates, there is no clinging left. But liberation is not unknown (not nonoccurrent) since in the highest sense it is (has?) an independent nature.

(E430-431; T582-584) The fourth noble truth, the eightfold path, is now reviewed. (1) Right view has right seeing as mark, its function is to reveal elements, and it is manifested as the removal of the blindness of ignorance. (2) Right thinking is characterized by directing one's mind on to liberation, its function is attainment, and it is manifested as the avoidance of wrongly directed volition. (3) Right speech is manifested as the avoidance of wrong speech. (4) Right (bodily) action is avoiding wrong bodily actions. (5) Right livelihood is the purification through right speech and action; purification is the mark, and it functions to bring about a proper life. (6) Right effort is the proper exertion not directed toward wrong, bad things. (7) Right mindfulness (or memory) is through right effort to come not to forget. (8) Right concentration is not being subject to distraction.

(E431-435; T584-591) (Returning now to pick up the rest of the discussion of the noble truths under 15 rubrics which was begun at E416,

T562) (9) With respect to the function of awareness, awareness of the truth(s) is of two kinds, (i) awareness of the ideas involved, and (ii) understanding of them. The former comes through hearsay, etc., and is worldly; the latter involves understanding and belongs to the higher levels. So, the type-(i) awareness of the first truth precludes the wrong view that there is a self, of the second truth precludes nihilism, of the third truth precludes eternalism, and of the fourth truth precludes the false view that moral actions are inefficacious. Again, the first truth precludes wrong views about the results of karma through seeing beauty and permanence in the aggregates, etc.; the second precludes wrong theories about causation such as those which identify God, *prakṛti*, time, essential nature, etc., as ultimate cause; the third precludes wrong theories of liberation such as that one which locates it in the material world or in a (Jain) shrine; and the fourth precludes wrong theories about what the way of purification is.

(10) As to how the various factors are to be included within which truths, the first truth may involve all the factors except for desire and noncontaminating factors. The second includes the 36 types of thirsty behavior, the third is unmixed (?). The fourth can be subdivided into its eight components, so that (1) right view includes investigation, the faculty of wisdom, wisdom itself and the factors of enlightenment; (2) right thinking includes the three beginning with initial thought the renunciation of factors; (3) right speech includes the four varieties of right way of speaking; (4) right action includes the three right ways of acting; (5) right livelihood includes a minimum of wishes of contentment; (6) right effort includes the four right exertions, the faculty of energy, energetic power; (7) right mindfulness includes the foundations of mindfulness, mindful power and (8) right concentration includes concentration with and without initial thought, with and without sustained thought, concentration of awareness, concentration of faculties, the power of concentration, joy, confidence, and right equanimity .

(11) With respect to similes the truths are respectively likened to various things, e.g., the first truth is like a burden, the second like taking it up, the third like putting it down, and the fourth the means of putting it down.

(12) In a fourfold manner, since the combinations of frustration and noble truths are four: (a) factors which are frustrating but not noble truths, such as factors associated with the path and its fruits but not experienced by one knowing the truths; (b) factors which are aspects of

noble truths but not frustrating, viz., cessation or liberation; (c) factors which are both truths and frustrating, e.g., the aggregates and the factors associated with them; (d) factors which are neither noble truths nor frustrating, viz., the states associated with the path as experienced by one who knows and is living a life of purity.

(13) With respect to emptiness--all the truths are empty, since there are no knowers, no doers, nothing liberated, no goers. Or it may be interpreted to mean that each truth is devoid of the other three, etc.

(14) With respect to their analysis into one, two or more kinds. E.g., frustration is of one kind as it occurs, of two kinds since it is both name and form, three kinds as being at the level of desire, the material level or the immaterial level, four kinds according to the four nourishments, etc. Similar classifications are proposed for the other three truths. The classification of the constituents of the path.

(15) As to their similarities and differences. All four truths are similar by being not false, devoid of self and hard to understand. The first two are alike in being worldly and impure, but they are unlike in that one is result and the other cause, one to be understood and the other to be avoided. And so on.

Chapter 17: The Grounds of Wisdom
Part One: Dependent Origination

(E436-440; T592-599) The "grounds of wisdom" are the factors classed as elements, organs, aggregates, and dependent origination as well as the dependently originated factors. The factors of dependent origination are the twelve listed in the *sūtra*, while those that are dependently originated are those that are generated by the twelve.

Dependent origination lists the conditions for the continuation of frustration, for the wrong path. It is termed "suchness" because as long as the conditions function these factors are produced. It is termed "not non-such" (*avitathā*) since when the conditions coexist the effect must occur. It is called "not otherness" (*ananyatathā)* since only the correlated effect can arise from a given set of conditions. And it is specific conditioning since each factor (of the twelve) is itself conditioned in the same way.

An alternative etymology is refuted, according to which "*pratītyasamutpāda*" is derived from *pratītya* + *sama* + *utpāda*, so that it is taken to apply to those rightly-considered effects of any causes whatever (where "rightly-considered" excludes the wrong views of other

schools). This derivation is wrong: there is no *sūtra* authority for this interpretation; furthermore, it contradicts what is said in various *sūtra*s; it is not sufficiently deep in meaning to warrant the attention the chain of dependent origination is paid in the scriptures; and it is syntactically ill-formed.

Instead, "*pratītyasamutpāda*" must be taken as combining *pratītya* + *sam* + *utpāda*, where "*sam*" gives the sense, with "*utpāda*," of arising together, while "*pratītya*" indicates that this arising together is to be understood or gone (deeply) into (*prati* + *i*). (Other methods of etymology for the word are also set out.)

(E441-447; T599-608) Dependent origination is difficult to explain. It is now discussed under five rubrics:

(1) According to different ways of teaching, i.e., from the beginning, from the middle to the end, from the end, and from the middle back to the beginning. The Buddha teaches in these various ways because he wants to show how insight can be gained from understanding dependent origination wherever one plunges into it. However, there are also specific purposes for each of the four ways: for the first (from the beginning), when the teacher wants to show the lawfulness and particular order of the twelve items; for the third (from the end) he wishes to show how he himself discovered them; for the fourth (from the middle back to the beginning) in order to show how the chain runs back indefinitely into the past; for the second (from the middle to the end) to show how future lives follow from present causes for rebirth. Here the method followed is the first, from beginning to end.

Why are the first (viz., ignorance) and the "middle" (viz., desire) picked out particularly as starting-points in discussion as above? Because these two are the critical causes of karma leading to happy and unhappy future lives. Ignorance leads to the performance of actions, such as killing, which gives no happiness and leads to unhappy future outcomes, while desire leads to performance of activities, such as refraining from killing, which gives satisfaction and leads to happy future outcomes.

(2) According to the meaning of each of the twelve terms. Traditional explanations, mostly etymological, of the terms are provided.

(3) According to defining features, etc.--that is, each of the twelve is identified briefly according to the now-standard formula, giving its differentiating feature, its function, how it is manifested and what its proximate cause is. In fact, part of the series was already accomplished in previous chapters.

(4) According to groupings as singles, pairs, triads, etc., and

(5) According to the role of each in an endless "wheel of becoming" which breeds grief, etc.

(E447-449; T608-611) Now each of the twelve is taken up in turn for detailed examination.

(1) Ignorance is ignorance of the four truths (according to *Suttanta* method) and about the past, the future, about both and about dependent origination and the originated factors (according to the Abhidharma method).

(2) Traces are classified into good, bad, and neutral plus bodily, mental and vocal. Of these (i) the good include thirteen volitions constituted by eight of the desire-level and five of the material level; (ii) the bad comprise twelve bad thoughts beginning with killing, etc.; (iii) the neutral are the four immaterial good thoughts. (iv) Bodily traces are the eight good thoughts at the level of desire and twelve bad thoughts, which occur in the bodily "doors" of action. (v) The same are called vocal and mental when they occur in the speech door, except that higher-faculty-awarenesses and worries are not to be included as they are not conditions for consciousness (at conception). (vi) All twenty-nine traces are "mental" when they arise in the awareness door. It is shown in detail how each depends on ignorance.

(E449-457; T611-622) Twenty-four conditions are listed by the Buddha. Each is a condition in virtue of its assisting in bringing about a result. So, (1) a "root" or stable causal factor which assists in bringing about results is a state, like a tree (as opposed to moss), which is firm and stable; (2) an object condition is a factor that assists by being a content of awareness, such as the data of sense; (3) predominant conditions are two sorts: (i) those which are conascent with their result, and (ii) those which function as contents of awareness; (4) proximate and (5) and (directly) antecedent conditions, factors that operate as condition by being proximate or contiguous in the order of events leading to awareness, e.g., visual consciousness is proximate cause of mental consciousness, which is again proximate cause of mental consciousness, etc. (Buddhaghosa thinks that (4) and (5) come to the same thing, and refutes the opinion of others who differentiate them.) (6) A conascent condition is a condition which assists by arising together with its result, as a lamp assists by lighting itself up along with its surroundings. (7) Supporting condition is a factor that assists by giving, together with others, mutual support. (8) Necessary condition assists by providing a

base, e.g., as the earth does for trees. (9) A decisive support condition *(upaniścayapratyaya)* is a strong cause of one of three sorts: (i) as content, something the presentation in awareness of which is critical in conditioning an effect; (ii) as proximate strong causing condition which cannot occur without that effect; (iii) by nature, i.e., a condition which arises by the very natural circumstances of the person involved, e.g., faith, virtue, habitual food, climate. (10) Prenascent condition is a condition which arose previously and is present conditioning the result, as e.g. a visual organ is such a condition with respect to its visual consciousness organ and the associated factors. (11) Postnascent, a condition which exists alongside the result and helps by providing a base. For example, the appetite for food assists young birds' bodies in this way. (12) Repetition condition which assists the immediately following factors' efficiency and power, e.g., repeated study of a book. (13) Karmic condition, which assists through an intervening period of awareness. It has two kinds: (a) good and bad thinking performed at another (earlier) time, and (b) conascent thought. (14) Karmic maturation condition, by which factors experienced during a life arise and in particular by which rebirth-linking operates. (15) Nourishment condition, the four kinds of food. (16) Faculty condition, viz., the twenty-two faculties listed at the outset of Chapter 16 minus the masculine and feminine faculties, which assist by being predominant conditions. (17) Meditative condition, which assists in the arising of the factors arising on specific levels. (18) The twelve path conditions that assist in leading away to liberation. (19) Connected condition: the conditioning a set of factors that occur in the same place or with the same object have for each other. (20) Dissociation conditions which condition the factors that do not have the same basis or object, etc. (21) Presence condition, conditioning by being present, of seven sorts: immaterial aggregates, great elements, the psychophysical complex, awarenesses and mental associates, faculties, and entities. In each case when a factor occurs of one of these kinds it is assisted by others of that kind. (22) Nonexistent conditions are those which by ceasing previously assist in causing the arising of another factor. (23) Disappearance conditions, the same factors as the nonexistent condition, since they have disappeared when the effect arises. (24) Nondisappearance conditions, the factors that constitute the presence condition (21), since they have not disappeared at the time of the arising of the effect.

This section follows the *Paṭṭhāna*, quoting liberally from it.

(E457-460; T622-626) Now it is explained how ignorance is a condition: It is so as object condition of meritorious traces when it is comprehended at the level of desire that ignorance is liable to destruction, and at the material level when one knows another's mind as confused. It is so as a supporting condition of meritorious traces at the level of desire when one practises giving, etc., in order to surmount ignorance, and at the material level when one meditates to the same purpose, or when one makes merit for the purpose of sensory satisfaction being confused by ignorance. It is a condition for bad factors in many ways. It is a condition for neutral traces only as supporting condition (7), as above.

Question: Is ignorance the only condition for traces, or are there others?

Answer: There are other conditions, and furthermore for any set of conditions there are a multitude of effects. Talk of one condition and one effect is only for convenience, besides which one may speak of a certain condition alone because it is representative of and more basic (say) than the other conditions.

Question: How can ignorance, which is bad, be a condition for meritorious and neutral traces?

Answer: The conditions of things in the world are found not to be always like their effects in their essence, function and so forth.

(E460-461; T626-628) (3) Consciousness. The awarenesses which are conditioned by traces are of thirty-two kinds, viz., (3a1-23), (3b1-5) and (3c1-4). This is known from the fact that these awarenesses are maturations of karma and thus require conditioning through stored karma. Otherwise everyone would experience every kind of awareness indiscriminately.

(E462-466; T628-635) All conditioned awarenesses occur either during an individual's life or at the moment of rebirth-linking. Among the thirty-two kinds of awareness listed in the previous paragraph, 13 (viz., (3a1-7) and (3a17-22)) occur only during life while the remaining 19 can occur either during life or at conception. The process during life is reviewed following the *bhavaṅga* pattern.

(E466-470; T635-641) Now the operations of karma at death and birth are explored. One can consider karma (a) as mixed with matter or not, and whether even if so mixed it has masculine or feminine nature (at the level of desire) or neither (as at the material level); (b) as to whether the birth is egg-born, womb-born, born of moisture (e.g., sweat), or

constructed, (c) in terms of its varieties of outcome; (d) according to its stations of consciousness; (e) according to the abodes of beings. A passage ensues which describes death and rebirth-linking, emphasizing that the process which pushes karma on to the next life involves desire and traces which operate whether or not there is any supporting entity, just as a man crosses a river by hanging on to a rope tied to a tree on the bank--the conditions which operate may merely involve the object condition, etc. Thus the series' parts are related neither by identity nor difference. Not identity, for then curd could not come from milk, and not difference, for the same reason.

Question: Then why must the fruits of karma one experiences be one's own? And anyway, who is there to experience anything?

Answer: It is like the fruit growing from the seed: the seed contains traces which are responsible for the maturing of its fruits and not another seed's; but the traces do not exist when the fruit arises. As for who experiences, the notion of an experiencer is merely conventional.

Objection: But even so, these traces must produce the fruit either when they are present or when they are not present. If it is when they are present, they can't produce maturations of karma in a time future to the seed's existence, and if it is when they are not present, they should be bearing fruit all the time.

Answer: Traces are conditions of their fruit not because of being present or not present, but rather because the act in question has been performed. It is just as in ordinary life: an agent's activity--buying something, say--is the condition for completing the transaction, and once the activity is over it does not bear any further fruit.

(E470-472; T641-644) Now it is shown which of the traces are operative in bringing about which kinds of resultant awarenesses both at the time of birth and during life in each of the several stages. So, referring once again to the eighty-nine consciousness-factors as before, the good factors (1a1-8) condition, as karmic condition and decisive support condition, the kinds of resultant consciousness (3a8-16) at birth in a happy life on the level of desire. (1b1-5) likewise produce (3b1-5) at birth in the material level. On the other hand, (1a1-8) produce (3a1-7) during a life in the realm of desire in a happy course, but not at birth; they also produce (3a1-2) and (3a6-8) on the material level in a happy course, of (3a1-8) on the level of desire in unhappy lives, (2a1-12) condition at birth on the level of desire in an unhappy course, but not during life; of (3a17-22) during life but not at birth, and so on. This is

then reanalyzed to show the same thing under the respective headings.

(E472-475; T644-649) (4) The psychophysical complex. Consciousness is the condition for the psychophysical complex (*nāmarūpa*) -- "*nāma*" meaning the three aggregates of feeling, identification and traces, "*rūpa*" meaning the material aggregate. The factors involved can be reckoned in various ways, depending on whether we are considering the psychophysical complex that determines rebirth or the complex that occurs during a lifetime.

(E472-478; T649-652) (5) The six organs are conditioned by the psychophysical complex. It is explained in detail how *nāma* and *rūpa* and the two together condition either the sixth sense, viz., the mind, or the five exclusive of mind, or all six together, at rebirth and during life.

(E478-479; T652-654) (6) Contact is of six kinds corresponding to the six organs. In all there are thirty-two kinds of consciousness resulting, viz., five good (3a1-5), five bad (3a17-21), and twenty-two associated kinds of resultant consciousness (3a6-16, 3a22-23, 3b1-5 and 3c1-4).

But which are the six that condition the arising of these thirty-two kinds of consciousness? There are two different theories. According to the first, the six are the six organs including the mind. According to the second, it includes these as well as the corresponding six "external" *āyatana*s, viz., the color, sound, taste, etc., grasped by the organs.

Several of the organs jointly condition their resultants--e.g., eye contact is produced from the visual organ and the mind, from the mental organ functioning as visual consciousness, and from the "factor organ" consisting of the remaining associated factors.

(E479-480; T654-655) (7) Feelings. These can be classed as six according to the "door," i.e., organ, that conditions them, or as ninety-eight when classified in association with the 89 kinds of consciousness.

(E480-481; T655-657) (8) Desire. Again, these are of six kinds depending on the door involved--they are so named after their contents in the *Vibhaṅga*. But each of the six has three kinds depending on whether it occurs as sense-desires respectively for visible, etc., things; as the desire for becoming when it involves greed conditioned by the view that things are continuants (eternalism); and as the desire for nonbecoming when it involves greed accompanied by the view that everything is destruction (nihilism). So there are eighteen kinds. But since each of the eighteen can be considered with respect to both one's own contents and with respect to the contents of others, they become

thirty-six in number, and when one remembers they can be past, present or future the number becomes one hundred eight.

(E481-483; T657-660) (9) Clinging. There are four kinds of clinging: (i) clinging to sense-desires, (ii) clinging to false views, (iii) clinging to monastic vows, (iv) clinging to the theory of a self. These are unpacked into a large number of factors.

(E483-487; T660-665) (10) Becoming. It has two kinds. The former (*karmabhava*) is volition together with the factors associated with it such as higher faculties, etc. The latter *(upapattibhava)* comprises the aggregates produced by karma, of nine kinds according to the *Vibhaṅga* (namely, the coming to be of desire, matter, immaterial things, identification, nonidentification, neither identification nor nonidentification, existence in one group, in four groups and in five groups). The factors associated with each are explained, and it is also explained in detail which kinds of clinging are conditions for which kinds of becoming.

(E487-; T665-) (11-12) "Birth, etc.," by which is meant the karmic process leading to the gradations of kinds of rebirth. These involve sorrow, etc., and can also be referred to under this term.

Part Two: The Wheel of Becoming

(E488-489; T666-668) Dependent origination should be viewed as a wheel without beginning, spinning ceaselessly, without any creator or experiencer of it--this is its emptiness. But four questions are raised.

1. Question: If it is a continuous wheel, ignorance, the first of the twelve members of the chain, must have a cause. What is that cause?

Answer: It is "sorrow," etc., which always involve ignorance. Or, as said in *Madhyamāgama* I. 54, "when there is the arising of contaminants there is the arising of ignorance", and it is the contaminants that give rise to sorrow, etc.

2. Question: How does this wheel of becoming have no beginning, since ignorance is identified as its beginning?

Answer: No, for ignorance is listed first not only because it is the first but because it is fundamental, being both basic to the production of bondage and basic for one who by abandoning it achieves liberation from bondage.

3. Question: How is it that there is no creator nor experiencer?

Answer: There is no creator such as Brahmā that makes the round of rebirths, and there is no single self that experiences all these states of

happiness and frustration.

4. Question: What is its emptiness?

Answer: These twelve things are devoid of permanence, of beauty, of happiness, of self-nature.

(E489-495; T668-678) Among these twelve items in the chain of dependent origination the first two, ignorance and traces, belong to the past, the next eight belong to the present, and the last two, birth and aging (and death) belong to the future.

As to the causal roles the items play in rebirth-linking, a verse is offered which speaks of "five causes in the past" (viz., ignorance, traces, desires, clinging and becoming, which are conditions for linking to the status gained in the next birth), "a fivefold result" (viz., consciousness, the psychophysical complex, the six senses, contact and feeling, which are the things conditioned by those five causes just mentioned), "five causes in the present" (viz., desire, clinging, becoming, traces associated with them, and ignorance which is their concurrent condition), "and in the future five kinds of result" (viz. consciousness, the psychophysical complex, the six senses, contact and feeling).

A final section considers the chain of dependent origination or wheel of becoming from several additional points of view: as to how it can be classified under the headings of the four noble truths; as to the functions of each of the twelve items, largely repetitive of things said earlier; as to how understanding several of the items prevents one from wrong views; as to similes by which the understanding of the working of the chain and its members can be assisted; as to the profoundness of implication for understanding, for law, for teaching it, and for the penetration of its insights.

Chapter 18: Purification of Views

(E496-504; T679-692) It was said (in Chapter 14, T379; E488) that wisdom is cultivated "having perfected the 'roots' of wisdom--the purification of virtue, the purification of awareness--and then developing the five purifications of the 'trunk,' namely (1) purification of view, (2) purification of overcoming doubt, (3) purification through knowledge and vision of what the path is and what it is not, (4) purification by knowledge and vision of the path, and (5) purification by knowledge and vision." The purification of virtue was explained in Chapters 1 and 2, and the purification of awareness in Chapters 3 through 13. The present chapter begins the discussion of the five purifications of the 'trunk,' viz.,

purification of view.

Purification of view is right vision of the psychophysical complex. The psychophysical complex can be classified from various perspectives--(i) by studying either *nāma* or *rūpa* first and then understanding the other as support, etc.; (ii) classified under the eighteen elements; (iii) classified under 12 organs; (iv) classified under the aggregates; (v) classified in brief under the four elements. In one of these fashions one learns to distinguish the material from the immaterial. If he fails to accomplish this he should continue examining materiality, until he begins to discriminate the awarenesses associated with sense-contacts from the physical characteristics of the things contacted.

In this way he distinguishes the matter aggregate from the other four aggregates, which are collectively *nāma*, and realizing that all factors are exhausted under one or the other of these categories of *nāma* and *rūpa*, he understands that there is no self distinct from these factors. The chapter concludes with citation of similes that have been offered to illustrate this point.

Chapter 19: Purification by Overcoming Doubt

(E505-511; T693-703) The "doubt" in question is the doubt whether I existed in the past and will continue to exist in the future. This is "overcome" by examining carefully the conditions for the psychophysical complex, that is, the conditions under which I exist. First I reflect that there always are such conditions--that I don't exist conditionlessly--and second, I consider that karma and its results summarize those conditions as taught in such teachings as dependent origination, which I may study by considering it both in its given order as well as the reverse order.

Karma can be classified in various ways. (1) As of four kinds, explained as (i) the volition of the first impulsion among the seven awarenesses in a single cognition, whether good or bad, gives rise to its result in the same lifetime; (ii) the volition of the seventh impulsion in the series produces its result in the next life; (iii) the volitions of the five impulsions in between give rise to their results in a future lifetime when the opportunity is provided and never lapses; (iv) lapsed karma is karma of type (i) that cannot produce its result in this lifetime; it lapses and does not produce any result.

(2) Karma can also be classified as (i) heavy, very bad or very good karma such as matricide or action in the higher levels; (ii) habitual karma which is repeated and thus matures quicker than otherwise; (iii) vivid

karma remembered at the time of death and thus determining his next birth; (iv) stored up karma, karma not included under the previous three and bringing about rebirth-linking in the absence of the others' operation.

(3) Karma can again be classified as (i) productive karma, producing material and immaterial maturations, good or bad, both at the time of rebirth and during life; (ii) consolidating karma that prolongs the type of experience--satisfying or frustrating--produced by the maturation of karma of types (i) or (iv); (iii) attenuating karma, which gradually diminishes the type of experience produced by karma of types (i) or (iv); (iv) supplanting karma, which terminates weak karma and makes its own result arise.

Having seen all these twelve kinds of karma and realizing that the entire psychophysical complex is due to conditioning by one or more of them, he understands that in the past as well as in the future the conditioning also holds, and thus he comes to understand that nothing makes (*kṛ*) any result except karma itself, that there is no maker over and beyond the makings, and so his doubts about whether he--something over and beyond the series of makings--exists, existed in the past or will exist in the future, disappear.

Chapter 20: Purification by Knowledge and of The Path and What It Is Not

(E512-517; T704-713) After doubts have been overcome one should next develop that point of view of insight involving understanding of the groups. This understanding comes in three worldly varieties: (i) understanding of what is known, (ii) understanding as investigating, and (iii) understanding as abandoning. (i) involves understanding the characteristic specific features of the factors, the materials for which have been set forth in Chapters 18 and 19. (ii) involves understanding what general features, e.g., impermanence, characterize groups of factors; it is set forth in this chapter and the next through the contemplation of the rise and fall. (iii) is that understanding which consists in not seeing general features such as permanence. It is set forth in the remainder of Chapter 21.

Understanding of the groups is set forth in a long passage in the *Paṭisambhidhāmagga*, here quoted.

It explains how the adept should practise meditation on the factors. Next Buddhaghosa describes various methods for strengthening understanding of the general features of factors, such as

impermanence--some forty such features in all. Factors are to be understood as impermanent, frustating, disease, boils, darts, calamities, afflictions, etc. The number can be calculated as fifty by adding ten more. He also describes nine ways of sharpening one's senses, counsels avoiding the seven unsuitable things as was explained in the section about the earth *kasiṇa* (Ch. 4) and cultivating their suitable opposites, and explains that one should distinguish what is material from what is immaterial and meditate on them at different times.

(E517-520; T713-719) Matter is produced from four kinds of conditions--karma, awareness, food and temperature. Each is discussed in turn, explaining what precisely is produced by each. As far as the first condition, karma, is concerned, it produces the factors (3a1-3b5) plus seventy kinds of matter. The eighty-nine kinds of awareness produce the three immaterial aggregates and seventeen kinds of matter comprising the nine starting with sound, bodily consciousness, verbal consciousness, the space element, lightness, pliancy, adaptability, growth, and continuity. Matter born of food includes fourteen items and eight kinds of stuff, space, lightness, pliancy, adaptability, growth and continuity. Matter conditioned by temperature includes sound, smell, taste, feminine and masculine faculties, life faculty, heart, bodily intimation, vocal intimation, space, lightness, pliancy, adaptability, growth and continuity--15 in all.

(E520-521; T719-720) The process by which awareness of immaterial factors arises is reviewed; it has the same stages as the process of awareness of material factors described at E385-387; T513-518.

(E521-528; T720-728) Turning to (ii) understanding of the general characteristics, of which there are three (frustration, momentariness, no self), one may meditate on either the material factors or the immaterial ones in seven aspects. As to material factors, (1) they are taken up (at rebirth-linking) and put down (at death), showing the impermanence, frustratingness, and selflessness of such factors; (2) they mature and decay, showing the same things; (3) those material factors that are conditioned by food (see E517-520; T713-719) have the same three features since those factors that occur while one is hungry disappear before one is satisfied, while those that occur before one is hungry again disappear also; (4) those material factors that are conditioned by temperature (cf. E517-520; T713-719) occur when it is hot or cold but no one of them is sustained during both periods; (5) those material factors that are born of karma are such that any one such factor that occurs in the visual door is absent in the other doors, and so forth, and so they have

the three features in question; (6) those material factors that are conditioned by consciousness arise either when one is happy or dissatisfied but not both, and so they have the three features; (7) all material factors have as their nature materiality; the meditator realizes that any such factor goes through stages--e.g., a branch of the *aśoka*-tree is first pink, then red, then green, then darker as it withers--and so the three features are once again found.

(E528-530; T728-731) The immaterial factors are likewise found to have the three characteristics. There are two methods for seeing this: (i) the method following the *Viśuddhikathā*, and (ii) following the noble *kathā*.[70] In the treatment here the latter method is followed. An immaterial factor is found to have the three characteristics since (1) each awareness can be grasped by a subsequent one as impermanent, frustrating and not self; (2) each awareness *x* by which one grasps a material factor as having the three characteristics, together with the awareness *y* that grasps that *x*, form a pair which in turn can be grasped (by a third awareness (*z*)) as having the three features; (3) one can grasp that any awareness occurs at and is limited to a moment and disappears thereafter; (4) these methods can be extended into indefinite series of awarenesses about any such series where it can be grasped that that series has the three characteristics; (5) by removal of false views one grasps that all factors have the three features; (6) by overcoming pride one does so; (7) by bringing an end to attachment one does so.

(E530-531; T732-734) There are eighteen principal insights which one practises as a meditator now that one has understood the material and immaterial factors in the foregoing manner. These eighteen are:

(1) the contemplation of impermanence
(2) the contemplation of frustration
(3) the contemplation of selflessness
(4) the contemplation of aversion
(5) the contemplation of nonattachment
(6) the contemplation of cessation
(7) the contemplation of abandonment
(8) of destruction
(9) of vanishing
(10) of change
(11) of the signless
(12) of the aimless
(13) of emptiness

(14) of higher wisdom
(15) of the awareness of things as they are
(16) of disadvantage
(17) of reflection
(18) of turning away

In attaining each of these insights one comes to abandon its opposite in each case, e.g., one comes to abandon the notion of permanence by (1), of satisfyingness by (2), etc.

(E531-534; T734-738) Now the meditator proceeds to contemplate the rise and fall of all things, i.e., the fact that everything is conditioned and so subject to immediate decay. Thus various aspects of the noble truths, the chain of dependent origination, the truth that causality is continuous (thus precluding nihilism) but that every effect is new (thus precluding eternalism). Understanding thus he once again understands the selflessness and the frustrating features of all things.

(E534-538; T739-744) There are ten imperfections of insight. They do not arise for a noble person who has fully understood or for immoral persons, but only for those moral ones who are meditating assiduously but who are beginners. These ten imperfections constitute distractions. They are: (1) brightness, (2) knowledge, (3) joy, (4) tranquility, (5) satisfaction, (6) resolve, (7) determination, (8) establishing, (9) equanimity, and (10) attachment. The idea is that the meditator is distracted by each of these accompaniments to meditation, so that attachment to them becomes an obstacle to further success, even though they are not bad things in themselves.

Chapter 21: Purification by Knowledge and Vision of the Path

(E539-553; T745-766) Insight culminates in eight knowledges, with conformity to truth as the ninth. The eight are: (1) knowledge of the rise and fall of things (discussed in the previous chapter), which allows the meditator to see the three characteristics clearly; (2) knowledge of the contemplation of dissolution, when one realizes that conditioned factors are destroyed and thus sees the three characteristics, he does not further grasp such factors and so is not further reborn; (3) knowledge of appearance (of things) as fearful: one so meditating comes to see all conditioned factors as continually ceasing: what he sees is fearful, but he does not fear it; (4) knowledge of contemplation of danger: meditating thus, he realizes there is no recourse from destruction in any conditioned thing; (5) knowledge of contemplation of disenchantment: meditating thus

on danger, he loses interest in all conditioned factors and sees no joy in them; (6) knowledge of desire for liberation: thus losing interest, he comes to desire liberation from all conditioned factors; (7) knowledge of contemplation of reflection: so desiring, he now reflects on the three characteristics in their application to all conditioned factors in order to develop a path to liberation through recognizing the emptiness of them all; (8) knowledge of equanimity about conditioned things: one thus becomes completely indifferent to all conditioned factors.

(E553-556; T766-772) The meditator now settles on one of the three characteristics and adopts it as a gateway to liberation. One who adopts impermanence as his gateway leads to the signless liberation; who adopts frustratingness as his gateway leads to desireless liberation; who adopts selflessness as his gateway leads to emptiness liberation. It is noted that in "the Abhidhamma" there are only two gateways to liberation, viz., the last two, and this is explained in a passage from the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, quoted here.

This knowledge of equanimity conditions seven kinds of noble persons: (1) one who understands impermanence, the faith-follower at the time of entry into the stream who then becomes (2) the one liberated by faith. When he understands frustratingness he is called a (3) body witness, and when he reaches the higher meditations (4) one liberated both ways. When in addition he understands selflessness he becomes (5) a *dharma*-follower at the moment of entering the path, (6) one who has attained vision, and (7) finally, one liberated by insight.

In the list of the eight kinds of knowledge in the previous section the last three--viz., knowledge of contemplation of disenchantment, knowledge of contemplation of reflection, and knowledge of equanimity about traces--are three names for the same state, the difference consisting in the first naming the beginning of it, the second the middle, and the third the end.

(E556-561; T772-778) Attainment of the eighth knowledge--knowledge of equanimity about traces--leads to the culmination of insight and emergence on the path. The kinds of emergence are classified into eighteen varieties depending on which type of insight one starts from. This insight and emergence is then illustrated by twelve similes, beginning with stories about a bat, a black snake, a house, oxen, etc.

(E561-563; T778-782) It is argued in this section that it is the differences in knowledge of equanimity about traces that governs the differences in enlightenment, type of path and meditative stage, in

opposition to three other theories about what governs these things. Each of these three theories counts the factors of enlightenment, of the path and of the stage of meditation as different in number from the other two theories. The first theory (attributed by Dhammapāla to Cūlanāga) says it is the meditative stage used as the basis for insight leading to emergence that governs the difference in these numbers. The second (ascribed by Dhammapāla to Mahādatta) says it is rather the aggregates which are the objects of the insight that make the difference. The third theory (ascribed by Dhammapāla to Cūlabhayā) says that it is the individual intention of the meditator that governs. However, since knowledge of equanimity of traces is present at each point of arrival at enlightenment, a path or a meditative stage, Buddhaghosa contends that it is these awarenesses constituting that knowledge that in each case governs the number and distinctions in these three aspects of progress.

(E563-565; T782-784) As the meditator develops this knowledge of equanimity about traces he sinks into the *bhavaṅga*, after which mind-door adverting occurs in which one attends to traces as fleeting or frustrating or not-self. After this comes the first impulsion awareness, and the process leading to it is called "concentration" (P. *parikamma*). After that a second impulsion awareness arises with the same kind of content, and this is called "access-concentration" (*upacāra*). The third impulsion awareness constitutes adaptation (*anuloma*)--but adaptation to what? To the truth involved in the eight kinds of insight knowledge that preceded and the thirty-seven allies of enlightenment which are to follow. So the ninth stage of the path is conformity to knowledge, the last stage which takes traces as the object of meditative awareness.

Chapter 22: Purification of Knowledge and Vision

(E566-568; T785-788) Next comes "change-of-lineage" knowledge. It falls between the purification by knowledge and vision of the path, just discussed, and the purification by knowledge and vision about to be discussed, so it doesn't strictly fall within either, although it conforms with its precedents as being a kind of insight.

The purification of knowledge and vision, the subject of the present chapter, is the understanding of the four paths of stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner and *arhat*.

The meditator who has arrived at the ninth kind of knowledge by passing through the others has thereby reached the first of these paths (of stream-enterer). The awareness of such a one recoils from every trace as

he practises conformity knowledge. Every sign and activity seem to him to block enlightenment. For such a one who has practised this conformity knowledge change-of-lineage knowledge ensues, an awareness whose object is *nirvāṇa*. This awareness is the first adverting to this new meditative object, and thus indicates the entering (of the meditator) into a new lineage, the lineage of the nobles. (Various analogies are offered to illustrate this.)

(E569-571; T788-792) This first adverting is immediately followed by two or three resultant awarenesses that are transcendent and good. (Other accounts of the number of resultant awarenesses are considered and rejected.) One who has arrived at this point, after these two or three resultant awarenesses, is called "second noble," since he is now on the path and must attain liberation after seven rebirths.

The stream-enterer now reviews the path, the resultant awareness, and the defilements he has abandoned along with those still to be overcome, and he meditates on liberation. The once-returner and non-returner also review all these five things when they arrive on their paths, but the *arhat*, having no defilements left to overcome, does not meditate on any such. So the total number of reviewings on the way to *nirvāṇa* is nineteen.

Next the stream-enterer strives for the next stage--that of once-returner--by reducing his desires and passions, and he goes through the same series of meditations about the traces as was explained in the previous chapters. And in due course conformity and change-of-lineage awarenesses arise and he becomes a once-returner, and is called "third noble." The "fourth noble" is the once-returner when he has experienced the resultant awarenesses which follow upon this arising of the conformity and change-of-lineage awarenesses.

In a parallel fashion the once-returner now strives to eliminate desires and passions altogether, and going through the same stages arrives at a meditative insight which is called the "fifth noble" and is the beginning of the stage of non-returner. The non-returner who experiences the resultant awarenesses that follow is the "sixth noble."

And now this non-returner strives to reach the fourth stage (of *arhat*) by eliminating all passions in the immaterial as well as the material meditative levels, as well as eliminating pride, agitation and ignorance, goes through the meditative process once again and arrives at the stage of *arhat*, the "seventh noble." And experiencing the resultant awarenesses this *arhat* is known as the "eighth noble." He is now

occupying his final embodiment, has laid down his burden, reached the final goal of liberation.

(E571-581; T792-808) The next section indicates the stages the seeker goes through along the path to enlightenment in the fashion followed earlier which relates the stages to the factors involved.

Thus, the fulfilment of the states sharing in enlightenment relates to thirty-seven factors--four applications of mindfulness, four right exertions, four supernatural powers, five faculties, five powers, seven limbs of enlightenment and the eightfold path. The four applications of mindfulness are here the constant awareness that (1) the body, (2) feelings, (3) consciousness and (4) factors are foul, frustrating, noneternal, not self, and they bring about the abandoning of their opposites, the awarenesses of cleanliness, satisfaction, eternality and self-nature in those four. The four right exertions follow, since the one who is constantly aware as just described abandons bad things already arisen, preventing the arising of bad things not yet arisen, arousing unarisen good things, and maintaining good things already arisen. The four supernatural powers, which are higherworldly as well as worldly, lead to success in pursuing the subsequent stages of the path. The five faculties and five powers were explained earlier, as were the seven limbs of enlightenment and the eightfold path.

A section now details which of these thirty-seven factors are meditated on in the earlier stages of the path. When one arrives at the four kinds of awareness just described (corresponding to the stream-enterer, etc.) all thirty-seven factors are meditated on in one single awareness, and the resultant awareness cognizes thirty-three (thirty-seven minus the 4 right efforts).

A lengthy quotation from the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* follows which explains how the various elements in the eightfold path emerge from entry onto each of the four paths of stream-enterer, etc., and how the various powers are combined in these in the course of these paths. Likewise, the factors that need to be abandoned, and how they are to be abandoned, are rehearsed once again, beginning with the fetters, defilements, wrongness, worldly factors, stinginess, perversions, knots, wrong path, contaminants, floods, obstructions, adherence, clingings, proclivities, impurities, bad paths of action and bad arisings of awareness. Then it is explained how each of the varieties of these factors is overcome by which of the four kinds of knowledge (of the stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner and *arhat*).

Once again a long quote from *Paṭisambhidāmagga* is given to answer a sophistical argument designed to show that the abandoning of defilements, etc., cannot come about since the defilements cannot be past, present or future consonant with the teaching. The answer is explained by Buddhaghosa as involving analysis of the several meanings of terms indicating past, present and future time. For example, the term "arisen" is shown to have at least eight different meanings as applied to different kinds of cases or contexts. To say something has arisen may be to say (1) that it is occurring now, (2) that it has been and gone, (3) that it has been laid down (e.g., karmic traces) and will ripen eventually, (4) that it has arisen in potentiality (say, on that plane), (5) that it is happening (same as (1), a fact noted by Buddhaghosa himself), (6) that it has arisen in virtue of having been seen on a previous occasion (e.g., a defilement due to seeing something inauspicious), (7) that it has not been suppressed yet, (8) that, though suppressed, it is still not abolished since the possibility of its rearising has not yet been cut off.

(E581-588; T808-818) When one arrives at truth during any one of the four path knowledges, that knowledge is said to perform four functions at once, viz., full-understanding, abandoning, realizing and developing. Each of these is explained as penetrating respectively each of the four noble truths--thus such a knowledge at one and the same moment understands fully frustration, understands the cause of frustration by understanding its abandonment, understands the path by understanding its development, and understands cessation of frustration by realizing it. The four functions are also explained and analyzed independently. Thus, full understanding is said to be of three kinds: fully understanding (something) by having complete direct awareness of it, fully understanding it by investigating it completely (in terms of the kinds of distinctions developed in the present work), fully understanding it by abandoning it. Abandoning is also divided into three: abandoning by suppressing, abandoning by suppressing opposites, and abandoning by cutting off. Eighteen varieties of the second (designated as "18 great insights") are detailed. Realizing has two kinds: ordinary and otherworldly. Since the otherworldly can be divided into view and practice, one could also count three kinds. Worldly realizing involves the arrival at the first meditative state and so on, when one thinks "I have realized this stage". Realizing as vision is the seeing of liberation at the time of arriving on the first path, and realizing as developing is that awareness of liberation at the other moments during progression on the

path. Finally, developing, the fourth function, is likewise divided into two, worldly and otherworldly.

Chapter 23 : The Benefits of Developing Understanding

(E589-592; T819-824) The last question (in Chapter 14, T698) was "What are the benefits in developing understanding?" Though these benefits are impossible to summarize completely, still one may divide them into the following four major classes: (1) removal of the many defilements, (2) experiencing the taste of the "noble fruit," (3) the ability to obtain cessation, and (4) achievement of worthiness to receive gifts, etc. The "noble fruit" is explained as the outcome of the paths of stream-entering, etc., not merely the abandoning of the fetters, etc. A number of questions are asked about this "fruit.".

1. What is it to attain it? To become absorbed in the cessation in which it consists.

2. Who do and 3. Who do not attain it? Ordinary men do not, and all *arhat*s do attain "noble fruit." In addition, each of the three--stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner--attain fruit appropriate to their stage. It is to be noted that there are those who think that the stream-enterer and once-returner do not reach the "noble fruit," but only the non-returner and *arhat*, because only the latter show achievement in meditation. But this is to be rejected, since if to show achievement in meditation were all that is required for the results to be called "noble fruit," even ordinary persons who succeed in their meditations would be so-called.

4. Why do *arhat*s attain the "noble fruit"? To experience the satisfaction accruing.

5. How does attaining it come about? Through meditating on nothing but liberation. That is, after attaining the change-of-lineage knowledge about traces the meditator's awareness becomes absorbed in cessation since his fruit has come about, and here it is just the fruit, not the path,, that arises even in a seeker.

Objection: When a stream-enterer arrives at insight he becomes a once-returner, and a once-returner achieving insight becomes a non-returner.

Answer: Then a non-returner becomes an *arhat*, an *arhat* a self-enlightened Buddha, and a self-enlightened Buddha a Buddha. But that is nonsense. The correct view is that even the seeker when he arrives at

insight achieves a fruit, in the meditative stage relating to the path he has arrived at, but he does not achieve the result of the entire path until he has travelled it.

6. How does the meditator make the noble fruit last? By not meditating on signs, by meditating on the *dharma* without signs (viz., liberation), and then through prior volition to emerge from meditation at a particular time.

7. How does the meditator emerge from the noble fruit? By thinking on signs and not meditating on elements without signs.

8. What comes next after the noble fruit? Either more fruition or else the *bhavaṅga*.

9. What does the fruit immediately follow? Fruition comes either through the path, after (a previous) fruition, after change-of-lineage insight, or after the organ which is neither identification nor nonidentification.

(E592-598; T824-833) Concerning the ability to achieve cessation a similar series of questions is now asked and answered.

1. What is the attainment of cessation? The nonoccurence of awareness and the concomitants of awareness.

2. Who attains cessation? Non-returners with cankers destroyed attain it.

3. Who do not attain it? Ordinary stream-enterers, once-returners, non-returners or *arhat*s do not attain it. These lack, but the attainers possess, two powers of serenity and insight, the tranquilization of three traces--verbal ones in the second meditative level, bodily ones in the third level, and breathing in and out in the fourth level, sixteen kinds of exercise of knowledge, nine kinds of exercise of concentration, and five kinds of mastery--in adverting, attaining, resolving, emerging and reviewing. A lengthy quotation from *Paṭisaṃbhidāmagga* explains these.

4. Where do they attain it? In the state involving all five aggregates. In the state involving only four aggregates (the disembodied state) one cannot attain the first meditative level, so cessation is not available there.

5. Why do they attain it? Because they are tired of traces and wish to reach the state without awareness.

6. How does this attainment of cessation come about? One who strives with serenity and insight causes the cessation of the awareness of the neither-identification-nor-nonidentification stage. One who strives with serenity but not insight reaches the fruit of the neither-identification-nor-nonidentification stage and remains there; one who strives with

insight but not serenity attains the fruit of his endeavors and remains there; but one who strives with both reaches cessation. This is the account in brief. There follows a detailed review of the conditions under which meditation ensues, and the order of attainments from meditation. We are also told what the meditator who reaches the stage of meditation on nothingness does: it involves four things, (i) being without property of his own, he uses others' bed, bowl and robe, etc., but does not damage them; (ii) availability to the order; (iii) availability to the master's summons; (iv) close attention to the length of his expected life; the last because, since one can't die during cessation, he will be inadvertently brought out of meditation if he has to die during the required period (here specified as seven days).

7. How is cessation made to last? It lasts as long as it is predetermined to do so, unless it is interrupted by death, the behest of the order, or the master's summons.

8. How does emergence from cessation come about? Either by not returning in the case of the non-returner, or through attainment of the state of *arhat*.

9. On what does one who has emerged think? On liberation.

10. What is the difference between one who has attained and one who is dead? Though for both traces have ceased, for the attainer life has ceased, but not for the dead person; the dead person's faculties are still whole, while those of the attainer have broken up.

11. Is the attainment of cessation conditioned or unconditioned? The question does not arise, because there is no essential nature to ask about. Likewise with other questions, such as whether cessation is worldly or otherworldly, etc.

(E598-599; T833-835) The one who is able to attain cessation is also worthy of being paid reverence in the form of gifts and offerings. In particular, one who understands the first path with sluggish insight and limp faculties is one who will be reborn seven times at most; with medium insight and medium faculties is one who goes for two or three rebirths from noble family to noble family; with sharp insight and keen faculties he is a once-returner. Such a one has obtained understanding of the second path. A non-returner who has developed understanding of the third path, after he has departed from this world, completes his course either early in the next existence, more than halfway through, who completes it without prompting, with prompting or else he is "one who is going upstream bound for the highest gods" and becomes extinguished

there. It is the one who follows the fourth path who is termed liberated and who follows the path of purification, who attains noble understanding and unties the knot; it is he who is worthy of reverence.

After the *Visuddhimagga* Buddhaghosa is said to have written four works concerning the Buddhist *Āgamas* or Pāli canon. These are titled *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, *Sāratthappakāsinī*, *Papañcasūdanī* and *Manorathapūraṇī*. A brief account of their contents may be found in B.C.Law, op. cit., pp. 82-87. These four works are supposed to be followed by commentaries on the seven books of the Pāli Abhidhammapiṭaka.

48.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (ascribed to Buddhaghosa), *Aṭṭhasālinī* on the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*

It is commonly said that Buddhaghosa wrote commentaries on the seven Theravāda Abhidharma works. However, there are reasons to think that the author of these commentaries was not the same person as the author of the 47.*Viśuddhimagga*. The reasons for this are neatly summed up by N./A. Jayawickrama.[71] The author of works #48-54 identifies himself in various places as having been requested by Buddhaghosa to write these commentaries, and makes no claim to having been the author of the *Viśuddhimagga* and the Āgama commentaries which Buddhaghosa wrote. When he cites these latter works he always treats them as authoritative works by someone else. Finally, P. V. Bapat has pointed out twenty-five instances where the interpretations in the *Aṭṭhasālinī* differ from those in *Viśuddhimagga* and the Āgama commentaries.[72] It seems likely that the author of the seven Abhidharma works that follow was a Ceylonese pupil of Buddhaghosa. On the other hand, the author(s) of these works #s 48-54 sometimes refer to himself (themselves?) as author of the *Visuddhimagga*, which is not decisive either, as students are regularly known in India to ascribe their works to their teachers.

"E" references are to the edition by P.V.Bapat and R.D.Vadekar, Bhandarkar Oriental Series No. 3, Poona 1942. "T" refers to the translation by Pe Maung Tin, *The Expositor (Aṭṭhasālinī)*. Section numbering accords with that in the summary of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, Volume Seven of this Encyclopedia, pp. 137-164.

Summary by Karl H. Potter

Introduction

(E1-2; T2-3) The author proposes to explain the doctrine of the Buddha that was passed down through Śāriputra and Ānanda to the brethren. The immediate occasion for this exposition is a request from Buddhaghosa to explain the meaning of that Abhidhamma that was first taught by Mahākassapa and was brought to "the peerless isle" (Ceylon) by Mahinda, where it was written down in the local language "of Tambapanni". Our author announces he will eschew that language and write down on palmleaf in "the faultless tongue" (presumably Pāli) the true meaning of Abhidhamma free from the heresies of people with different views. He remarks that in his *Visuddhimagga* he has already explained matters affecting the behavior of monks, meditation and other matters, and that here he will expound the declarations of the *sūtra*s

(E2-6; T3-8) "Abhidharma" means what goes beyond and improves on *dharma*, i.e., on the *sūtra*s. E.g., Abhidharma explains the aggregates more completely than the *sūtra*s do; likewise, the twelve organs, eighteen elements, etc. Abhidharma classifications include those of the *sūtra*s as well.

The seven works of Abhidharma are *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, *Vibhaṅga*, *Dhātukathā*, *Puggalapaññati, Kathāvatthu, Yamaka and Patthāna.* The wranglers (*vitaṇḍāvādins*, explained in the *Maṇidīpa* commentary to be the Abhayagiri and Jetavana sectarians referred to as "people of different views" in E1-2 above) exclude *Kathāvatthu* and replace it with a book called *Mahādharmahṛdaya*. This account is refuted by the contention that the Buddha foresaw that 218 years after his own death Moggalaputra Tissa would explain the *Kathāvatthu* to 1,000 monks following the Table of Contents he (the Buddha) had laid down.

(E6-10; T8-13) There now follows a resumé of the contents of the seven works of Abhidharma in the order cited above.

(E10-11; T13-16) There are four oceans--of repeated births, of water, of method and of knowledge. The ocean of repeated births has no known beginning (though it is implied that there was a beginning). The ocean of waters is immeasurable. The ocean of method is the *Tripiṭaka*, and in particular the *Vinaya-* and *Abhidharma-piṭaka*s, by means of which the limits of the watery ocean are made apparent, though its limits--the limits of the *Paṭṭhāna*--are not. This ocean consists of the myriad distinctions taught by the Buddha as classified in the Abhidharma. Finally, the ocean of knowledge is omniscience, without which the foregoing three oceans cannot be understood. In the present context we have to do with the third

ocean, that of method.

(E12-16;T16-22) There follows a traditional account of the Buddha's meditating and then teaching the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* to Śāriputra and Ānanda, which took three months. Śāriputra in turn taught it to his 500 pupils.

(E16; T22-23) The entire corpus of the Buddha's teachings constitutes three *piṭaka*s, five *nikāya*s, nine *aṅga*s and 84,000 *khaṇḍa*s. The *Vinayapiṭaka* comprises two *prātimokṣa*s (for monks and for nuns), two *vibhaṅga*s (for monks and for nuns), 22 *khaṇḍaka*s and 16 *pravara*s. As to the *Sūtrapiṭaka*, the *Dīgha Nikāya* comprises 34 *sūtra*s beginning with the *Brahmajāla*; the *Majjhima Nikāya* comprises 152 *sūtra*s beginning with the *Mūlapariyaya sūtra*; the *Saṁyutta Nikāya* comprises 7,762 *sūtra*s beginning with the *Oghavataraṇasūtra*; the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* of 9,557 *sūtras* beginning with the *Cittapariyadānasūtra* and the *Khuddaka Nikāya* comprises 15 treatises: *Khuddakapāṭha, Dhammapāda, Udāna, Itivuttaka, Suttanipāta, Vimānavatthu, Petavatthu, Theragāthā-Therigāthā, Jātaka, Niddeśa, Paṭisambhidāmagga, Apadāna, Buddhavaṁsa,* and *Cariyapiṭaka*. The *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* comprises the seven books listed earlier.

(E16-20; T23-29) The *Vinaya Piṭaka* sets forth the principles (viz. methods relating to the seven classes of offences dealt with in the *prātimokṣa* and *vibhaṅga*) and precepts (viz., the methods taught in the remaining sections, which interpret how to follow the original ordinances which guide the activities of both the body and of speech). The *Sūtrapiṭaka* shows what is good for oneself and others. And the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* is the book that shows the worthwhile factors, which makes understanding of them grow in one. The term "*Piṭaka*" means both a "basket" that contains wisdom and the study thereof. Various ways of distinguishing the respective thrust of each of the three baskets are explained. The *vinaya* is taught from authority, instructs offenders, is about restraint and control. The *sūtra* concerns popular philosophy, is adapted to various circumstances, and refutes heretical views. The *abhidhamma* concerns metaphysical truths, is directed to those who wrongly imagine a self-nature in collections of factors, speaks of the distinction between *nāma* and *rūpa*.

(E20-21; T31-37) The five *nikāya*s are identified again. The "nine *aṅga*s" are: (1) *sūtra* (including *Suttavibhāga, Niddesa, Khandaka, Parivara, Maṅgalasūtra, Ratanasūtra, Nālakasūtra*); (2) (*geya*) (i.e., the *Saṁyuttanikāya* in verse; (3) *veyyakaraṇa* (the *Abhidhammapiṭaka* and other non-versified words of the Buddha); (4) *gāthā*, including

Dhammapada, Theragāthā, Therigāthā and those portions of the *suttanipāta* not called *sūtra* and entirely in verse; (5) *udāna*--eighty-two *suttantas* in verses due to knowledge and joy; (6) *itivutthaka* (112 *suttantas* that begin with *"itivutthaka")*; (7) *jātaka*, the 550 birth-stories; (8) *abbhūta*, about wonderful things; (9) *vedalla, suttantas* in the form of questions asked through repeated attainment of delight and understanding. The entire text can be analysed into 84,000 units, and it is indicated what the principle of analysis was, and that it was self-consciously planned by those at the First Council. Examples are given of just how the *Tripiṭaka* was composed through the combined efforts of various teachers expounding on the *sūtras*, and how volunteers were critically examined to ensure that they were up to the mark. The Abhidharma was composed in the same way as the other two baskets, it is asserted; this is in reply to critics who feel that the Abhidharma is not as authoritative as the other two baskets. Indeed, only Buddhas can teach the Abhidharma.

(E25-31; T37-45) Objection: If the Abhidharma had been taught by the Buddha it would have had an introduction (*nidāna*), just as other sections taught by the Buddha, e.g., *Jātaka, Dhammapada*, etc., have introductions, e.g., "one day the Blessed One was staying in Rājagṛha", etc.

Answer: But since only Buddhas can teach the Abhidharma, whereas others might well preach the *dharma* or prescribe for the order, no introduction is necessary. Furthermore, Tissabhūti wrote what was intended as an introduction to Abhidharma, viz., the *Padesavihārasutta*, but Sumanadeva found such a thing misleading and irrelevant and produced a one-line introdction indicating that the Buddha taught the Abhidharma to the gods in Tavatiṁsa. In fact, there are two introductions to Abhidharma, one on *adhigama* (the career and goal) and the other on *darśana* (the teaching). Since these two relate to different moments in the Buddha's career, consideration of them will provide the necessary information about the place of teaching, the audience, the time, the occasion, and the line of teachers who transmitted the Abhidharma doctrine to India and eventually to Sri Lanka.

BOOK ONE: On the Arising of Awareness
Chapter One: Good Factors
Section One: Relating to the Sensuous Universe
First Type of Awareness
Part One: The Table of Contents (*matika*)

Chapter One: Triplets

(E31-39; T46-60) Buddhaghoṣa reviews the *matikas* (to be found in Book Three of the summary of *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* in Volume 7 of this Encyclopedia). He notes that there are fifteen divisions--one of triplets, fourteen of pairs.

Now Buddhaghoṣa enters into extended explication of each of the technical terms used in the *matika*. These explications utilize etymological derivations sometimes but not necessarily. For example, "*kusala*" has different meanings in different contexts. Likewise with the word "*dhamma*" which in context may mean a text, a causal condition, virtue, etc.

Question: In the phrase "*kusala dhamma*" do both words have the same meaning or different meanings? If they have the same meaning "*kusala*", "*akusala*" and "*avyākṛta*" would all have the same meaning, being synonymous with "*dhamma*". But if they have different meanings one couldn't ask which *dhamma*s are the good (*kusala*) ones.

Answer: "*Dhamma*" has generic meaning, specified differently by each of "*kusala*", "*akusala*", and "*avyākṛta*". So the question above is unproductive.

Explications of the terminology in which each of the triplets is expounded.

(E36; T54) "Associated with" is explained by reference to *Kathāvatthu* as having a common origin, a common end, a common basis and common sense-content.

(E36; T54-55) "Factors which have results" are those which intrinsically involve the production of results.

(E36; T55) "Factors grasped at and favorable to grasping" are those material and immaterial factors that are born of karma accompanied by the contaminants.

(E37; T56) "By seeing" means by the stream-enterer, since with it he gets his first sight of *nirvāṇa*. However, since he has not yet gotten rid of the defilements he does not really have such sight. "By development" (*bhāvanā*) means by the last three of the paths.

(E37-38; T57) "Factors whose causes are to be eliminated by neither (seeing nor training)" does not refer to factors not removable by either, but rather to those factors which do not have causes removable by either insight or training.

(E38; T57-58) "Accumulation" (*ācaya*) means what is accumulated by karma and defilements, i.e., rebirth and death. "Leading to accumulation", then, means good and bad factors accompanied by accumulation. "Elimination of rebirths" (*apacaya*) is the same as *nirvāṇa*, and what leads to it is the noble path.

(E39; T60-61) "Confined to persons" means those factors occurring in one's own stream.

Chapter Two: Pairs

(E40; T61-62) We confine ourselves to explaining terms not already explained in the previous section on the triplets.

"Moral causes" (*hetu*) are root (*mūla*) conditions. There isn't any actual difference between occurring within moral causes and being associated with moral causes; the distinction is made occasion for spelling out the particular things which are accompanied by moral causes.

(E40; T63) "Factors have conditions (*pratyaya*)" which occur together with their own completed causes. They are called "conditioned" (*saṁskṛta*).

(E41; T63) Contaminants are things which flow out from the senses or the mind. Or, they flow up to the stage of change of lineage and, like space, to the highest place. Or they are intoxicants like the fermented juices of the *madira* fruit. Or they catalyze the frustrations of many rebirths.

(E41; T64) Fetters are factors which bind a person. Factors which, becoming supporting objects, help the fetters to grow are called "favorable to the fetters".

(E41; T64-65) Knots are factors that tie the person to repeated rebirths.

(E41-42; T65) Those factors are called "floods" which sink the person into repeated rebirths.

(E42; T65) The perverse factors are those which, e.g., are taken to be permanent and so handled perversely.

Chapter Three: *Sūtra* phrases

(E43; T68) Factors are said to be like lightning because of their inability to destroy corruptions, like thunderbolts because of their ability to destroy corruptions completely.

I.1.1.1.1A. Analysis of Terms

Chapter One: Good Factors

(E46-48; T73-766) The exposition in *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* proceeds for each topic by way of question, exposition of occasions, exposition of factors, and conclusion. There are five kinds of questions: those that show something not seen before, those that evoke discussion of what is already seen, those to clear up doubts, those that elicit opinions, and those that explain. The first three kinds of questions are not asked by Buddhas, since they do not need answers to them. But the other two kinds of questions do occur to Buddhas, and the questions in this work should be understood in those last two senses.

(E48-53; T76-85) A lengthy commentary on the phrase "(on which occasion) good awarenesses relating to the sensuous universe" is now given. The word "occasion" (*samaya)* is explained as having many meanings according to context. Five meanings are selected: (1) collection of sufficient conditions (*sāmagrī*); (2) the opportune moment (*kṣaṇa*) for gaining merit; (3) time (*kāla*), (4) causal condition (*pratyaya*), (5) collections of factors (*samūha*). The usefulness of each of these meanings is illustrated. By showing that the causal conditions are a collection one shows that there is no single agent. By showing that the moment of opportunity occurs infrequently one shows how difficult it is to achieve merit. By indicating the shortness of the time a good thought takes we are advised to be zealous in intuition. The other two meanings emphasize the multiplicity and mutual dependence of factors.

The world of desire is now explained. Briefly, it is the realm of things (*vastu*) and defilements (*kleśa*).

By "good" is meant either moral worth or skill. "Awareness" (*citta)* is so-called because it thinks (*cit*), comes in a series (*cinoti*) or is varied (*citra*) in its effects.

(E55-57; T88-92) The "arising of awareness" is now explained. It means that awareness occurs, but it does not occur alone but with many associated factors. For worldly factors awareness is the forerunner or principal, while for otherworldly factors intuition or wisdom is the forerunner or principal.

(E57-59; T92-94) The rest of the terms in the opening sentence (of the summary) are explained, and sensory contents are illustrated in lengthy detail. The functions of the various phrases are explained as follows: good factors include all stages; by specifying the sensuous universe the awarenesses of the three higher stages are excluded, leaving

the eightfold sensuous good awarenesses. Specifying "accompanied by joy" reduces the relevant awarenesses to those excluding hedonic neutrality; and "connected with knowledge" excludes two of those four, those dissociated from awareness. What are left are the two types of awareness known as "consciously prompted" and "automatic (or not consciously prompted)".

(E59-61; T94-98) Each sense-content comes into the "avenue" of two doors, the sense-door and the mind-door. So, the visible content comes into the avenue of the mind-door as soon as it contacts the sense-organ and causes the life-contiuum to vibrate. Right after this, the vibration is cut off through the sense-door and attention arises (or may arise), after which an awareness of the content occurs. This holds for the five "external" sense-contents; where the mind is the (sixth) sense-"door" there is of course no contact between sense and content. These processes are illustrated at length.

(E61-62; T98-99) Another way of explaining is found in the earlier commentaries (*aṭṭhakathā*) and that distinguishes between experience, where both doors are operative, and the gaining of information by being told something, which does not involve actual contact with the sense-organs.

(E62-63; T99-101) Good awareness of the "experiencing" type arises with a content that is attractive, desirable or at least pleasing.

Objection: How can such an awareness be good, since it is the cause of greed?

Answer: Because it is the awareness of a person who practises good deeds, who has his mind bent on good things. Faith, purity of views, and other good characteristics produce awareness which is accompanied by joy. The thoughts of the *bodhyaṅgavibhaṅga* are summed up in this connection.

(E63-67; T101-108)The "automatic" type of moral awareness is brought about by giving, virtue or meditation. These are illustrated. It is suggested that any sense-contents may be good if thought of in these ways--the sight, sound, smell, etc. of the monastic robe is offered as a case in point.

Part Three: On the Doors

Chapter One: The Door of a Bodily Act

(E67-71; T109-114) The doors of action are bodily, vocal and mental. Bodies are fourfold: (1) those grasped at, viz., material qualities arising

from karma beginning with visual and ending with the faculty of life, plus the four elements along with color, smell, taste and nourishing essence (*ojas*); (2) the qualities made from food; (3) those same qualities produced from the caloric order; (4) the same born of awareness.

Specifically, when one thinks "I will move forward" or "...backward", bodily qualities arise. The one called "fire" can move the body, but mere attending--in the first six moments--leads to a seventh moment that sets up movement. As to the bodily qualities born of awareness, these are certain bodily signs which intimate or communicate one's intentions or wishes. These four kinds of bodies then are "doors" through which bodily actions occur, as well as those of speech and mind.

Chapter Two: Door of a Speech-Act

(E71-72; T114-116) The intimation (*vijñapti*) which accompanies language-sounds is the door of a speech act, according to the *Mahā-Aṭṭhakathā*. The *Āgamāṭṭhakathā*s construe it as sound produced by the initial application of analytic attention (*vitarka*) and spoken in sleep or while in a faint, thus revealing the speaker's intention. The interpretation of the *Paṭṭhāna* is also cited.

Chapter Three: Door of a Mental Act

(E72; T116-117) The internal organ or mind is the door of the mental act. It has different varieties according to the plane under consideration: there are 54 kinds of mind on the level of desire, 15 on the material level, 12 on the immaterial level, and 8 in the higherworldly level.

What does a mental act make (*karoti*)? It is that volition (*cetanā*) by which are accomplished higher or lower faculties, malice or lack of it, false or true views. It is this volition that is the "mental act" (*manokarman*).

Chapter Four: On Karma

(E73-74; T117-119) Bodily, vocal or mental karma is volition, as cited scriptures show. Those factors associated with volition are also acts of four varieties--(1) pure and productive of purity, (2) impure and productive of impurity, (3) both pure and impure and productive of both, (4) neither pure nor impure and productive of neither. This fourth variety consists of the seven aids to enlightenment and the eightfold path. These fifteen factors together with the six mentioned in the previous chapter

(higher and lower faculties, malice and lack of malice, true or false views)--are the factors associated with volition.

The transcendent path can be classified under the three kinds of karma as follows: restraining wickedness of transgression by the body is bodily restraint of desire, and the same by speech is vocal restraint of (talk of) desire. This pair comprehends right living. The other five factors--right view, intention, effort, memory and concentration--are included under mental restraint of desire.

(E74-79; T119-126) Certain occasions involve action which has not been completed even though certain bodily or vocal motions have taken place, and are classed under the rubric of "doors". An example is a hunter who has prepared to hunt and made many bodily and vocal movements but has not shot anything--is this bad? No, it is merely bodily misconduct. However, the case is different with mental acts, for there it is just the thought that constitutes the immoral act--one who intends to kill with ill will commits a bad act even though he doesn't actually kill anything. Thus bad mental action arises in all three doors (bodily, vocal, mental), unlike the other two kinds of action.

Objection by a "*vitaṇḍāvādin*": No. Bad bodily action may arise in the mental door. In the *Kulumpasutta* we are told of an infanticide carried out by someone thinking evil thoughts about an embryo in some womb.

Answer: There are ten kinds of powers by which killing could take place: which is the one you have in mind?

Objector: By meditation.

Answer: No, you misunderstand the *sūtra*.. It refers to the power gained by those who practise the kind of magic spoken of in the Atharva Veda, but these magical acts--austerities, repeating certain formulas--do involve bodily and vocal doors, so your contention is incorrect.

A bad vocal act can arise in the bodily door, as when one "speaks" falsely by misleadingly pointing.

Objector: A bad vocal act can arise in the mental door, when a monk remains silent rather than confess a sin that he remembers.

Answer: But no act has been performed--only an omission. There is an offence committed, that of frustratingness, though not an act of lying. The Buddha's authority is cited for the classification of this case as one of omission in the vocal door, not the mental one.

Examples are given of the varius possible combinations of acts and doors.

Chapter Five: On the Paths of Bad Actions

(E79-85; T126-136) The five consciousnesses--seeing, etc.--are awarenesses arising through five doors--viz., visual, auditory, etc. Volition arising through these doors is mental action, not the other two. The six contacts (of eye, ear, etc. and mind) and the six doors of contact are likewise explained. And the right nonrestraints (*asaṁvāra*) are those of eye, ear, nose, tongue, touch, of the motor-body (*copanakāya*), speech and mind.

These nonrestraints concern five factors, viz., immorality, forgetfulness, ignorance, impatience and laziness. Nonrestraint arises only at the moment of exercitive awareness. It is then called "arisen in five doors". This nonrestraint doesn't arise for mind-contact, for volition, for consciousness, for initial and sustained thought, but only for any one of the five external sense-organs.

When the exercitive awareness by the mind-door and having a supporting object of matter, etc. occurs without the help of the vocal door and results in a purely bodily act, then it is called mind-contact. The volition is called a bodily act and is not spoken of as by the mind-door. Likewise, a volition involving movement of the vocal door without the body door is a mind-contact, but not spoken of as by the mind-door. But when the volition involves the pure mind-door without bodily or vocal doors it is mind-contact and a mental act.

There are eight restraints corresponding to the eight nonrestraints, explained in a parallel manner.

Now ten courses of immoral action are listed: taking life, theft, wrong actions, falsehood, calumny, harsh speech, frivolous talk, covetousness, ill-will and wrong view. These are explained and illustrated, with reference to Buddhaghosa's *Samantapasādikā* on the *Vinayapiṭaka*. These ten courses can be considered as factors, as groups, as supporting objects, as feelings and as roots. As factors the first seven courses are volitions and the other three are accompaniments of volition. As groups the first seven plus wrong view are courses of action and not roots, while covetousness and ill-will are both courses of action and roots. The objects of each of the ten are explained, as are the feeling associated with each. And the roots of each are also explained.

Chapter Six: Courses of Good Acts

(E85-86; T136-138) Likewise, there are ten courses of moral action, the opposites of the foregoing. They are explained in parallel manner.

Part Four: Good Awarenesses

(E87-88; T141-142) "...(A)nd they (the good awarenesses) are accompanied or followed by..." (in summary of text in Volume 7). This indicates there is no particular order in which the contents of awareness are cognized. Or, according to the *Mahā-Aṭṭhakathā*, it merely means that awareness may have any content.

(E88-90; T142-145) Now each of the fifty-six items in I.1.1.1.1A of the text are considered.

1.Contact. It is mentioned first because it is the first relation between awareness and its content that arises. The characteristic feature of contact is touching; its function (*rasa*) is impact, its manifestation (*paṭṭhāna*) is contiguity, and its proximate cause (*padasthāna*) is a thought-content. The "contiguity" in question is the coming together of three--the object, the organ and consciousness. And the proximate cause is the attention to it by awareness.

(E90-91; T145-146) 2.Feeling. Its characteristic feature is being felt (*vedayitā*); its function is experience, i.e., possessing a desirable form as content; its manifestation is "taste of the mental properties" (T says the phrase is *cetassika assada*); and its proximate cause is tranquility. Experience is not confined to pleasurable only. The "taste" which feeling is capable of is contrasted with the more limited experiences that contact, identification, volition and thought have of the object; it is like the contrast between the king's enjoyment of food, involving full mastery and expertise, and the cook's, who merely tastes the dishes to see if they are worthy of being served up. And since it is a tranquil body that feels pleasure, tranquility is called its proximate cause.

(E91; T146-147) 3. Identification's characteristic feature is identifying an object as blue, etc. Its function is recognizing what has been identified. Examples are the carpenter's recognition of a piece of wood, or the king's servant identifying a desired garment by its label. Its manifestation is attending, as exemplified in a blind person's identification of an elephant, and its proximate cause is the object which is identified.

(E91-92; T147-148) 4. Volition has as its characteristic feature binding to itself associated factors as supporting objects. Its function is conation, but only in good and bad factors, not completely in the case of good and bad acts: there the function is a matter of energy which instigates it, like the landowner whose energy catalyzed fifty-five workers. The manifestation of volition is directing.

(E92-94; T148-151) 5. Awareness is characterized by cognizing. Its

function is forerunning, its manifestation is connecting, and its proximate cause is the psychophysical complex. It is called the "forerunner" because, like a guard at the crossroads who can see travellers coming from various directions, it functions in cognizing through any of the doors. It is "connecting" since it arises immediately following a preceding moment of thought. As for its proximate cause, it only occurs to an organism (a mental and material complex of five aggregates).

Question: Is awareness different from or the same as the type of awareness mentioned previously above at E53=T84?

Answer: The same.

Question: Then isn't the present passage redundant?

Answer: Just as although there is no difference between the sun and its quality, heat, since they arise together although they are distinct, likewise though thought arises with one or more of the foregoing factors such as contact, etc., still it is distinct from them and so listed as distinct here.

(E94; T151) 6. Initial thought. Characteristic feature: the initial directing of one's attention to an object. Its function: the striking or impinging of thought on its object. Its manifestation: the binding of thought to the object.

(E94-95; T152-153) 7.Sustained thought. Feature: contemplation on the object. Function: linking the concurrent facts with its object. Manifestation; the binding of thought.

Sustained thought involves vibration, a mental thrill associated with discovery like a bird about to fly or a bee alighting on a flower. Reflection is a calmer, contemplative state of mind. Again, attention is like holding a dirty bowl and reflection is like cleaning it with a brush.

(E95-96; T133-154) 8. Joy has five kinds ranging from ordinary thrills to transporting rapture, the latter illustrated by Mahātissa's rapture when thinking on the Buddha. There is an inspiring description of this culminating stage of joy, stopping just short of the ecstatic concentration that represents the pinnacle of meditation.

(E96-97; T154-156) 9. Satisfaction has the same features as joy. The difference is that joy is a trace, satisfaction a feeling; the former is delight in attaining a desired object, the latter the enjoyment of the function of what is acquired. This distinction is illustrated by the gladness of a parched man on hearing of a lake nearby as contrasted with the bliss of having bathed and drunk.

(E97; T156-157) 10. One-pointed awareness is concentration. The

Aṭṭhakathā says its characteristic feature is leadership and nondistraction. Another explanation is that its characteristic feature is non-scattering and nondistraction; its function is the bringing together of concurrent factors, its manifestation is equanimity or knowledge, and its proximate cause is a peculiar satisfaction.

(E97-99; T157-158) 11. The faith-faculty has purifying as its feature, or, on another view, as its function. On this latter account its characteristic feature is confiding, its function purifying or aspiring, its manifestation is freedom from pollution, and its proximate cause is an object worthy of faith, or the factor of stream-winning.

(E99; T158-159) 12. The faculty of energy has as its feature strengthening. On another account it has energy as its feature, strengthening the associated factors as function, and stubbornness as its manifestation.

(E99-100; T159-161) 13. The faculty of mindfulness or memory has as its feature not allowing the object to slip away from awareness, not forgetting as its function, guarding or attention as its manifestation, and firm identification as its proximate cause.

(E100; T161) 14. The faculty of concentration is that which overcomes distraction. Its features are as in (10) above.

(E100; T161-162) 15. The faculty of wisdom has illumination or understanding as its feature. On another account it has penetration of essential nature as its feature, illumination as its function, nondelusion as its manifestation.

(E101; T162) 16. "Mind" is a synonym for "awareness".

(E101; T163) 17. "Contentedness" is another term for satisfaction.

(E101-102; T163) 18. The faculty of life has as feature ceaseless watching over its own factors, as function the activity of those factors. The fixing of those factors is its manifestation, and those factors which must be kept operative are its proximate cause.

(E102-104; T164-167) 24-30. These seven are called "powers" because they do not shake. The last two, conscientiousness and shame, are distinguished: conscientiousness is subjective, shame has an external cause; conscentiousness is based on shame, shame is based on fear. Examples are offered. Conscientiousness involves obedience, while shame involves fear of wrong-doing.

(E104-106;T167-170) 31-33. Through noncovetousness one is not reborn among the ghosts, since it is greed that causes rebirth there. Through restraint there is no rebirth in the intermediate state, since it is

hatred that causes rebirth there. And through understanding one is not reborn as a lower animal, since it is confusion that causes rebirth there. The places of these three at various points on the path are indicated.

(E108-109;T174-176) There are nine more factors beyond the fifty-six listed above as types of good awareness: these are interest, resolve, attention, equanimity, pity, restraint, abstinence from bodily misconduct, abstinence from vocal misconduct and wrong living. The first four are acquired together at the same time; the others at different times.

Interest has as its characteristic feature the desire to be an agent, as its function seeking for an object, as its manifestation the availability of the object, and as its cause the object so desired.

Resolve has determination as its feature, opposition to slinking as its function, unshakeableness as its manifestation, and *dharma* fit to be determined as its cause.

Attention has three kinds: (a) attention regulating an object, (b) attention regulating order of appearance, (c) attention regulating exercitive awareness. The first kind (a) has as its feature bringing associated factors to mind with a content, its function is joining those factors to the object, its manifestation is facing the mind toward the object. The second kind (b) is the attention of the mind at each of the five doors. (c) is the attention of directing the mind-door.

Equanimity has as its feature treating awareness and associated properties equally, its function is warding off defect and excess, its manifestation is middleness.

Pity and restraint will be explained below under the sublime states, except that here they belong to the level of desire.

(E109-111; T176-180) The sixty-five factors discussed in the present section are now classified in various ways. An objector who sees this classificatory activity as pointless is answered by likening the Buddha to the wise king who apportions wealth to his subjects according to their knowledge of one or several skills.

Chapter Two: On Exposition

(E112-124; T180-202) A variety of ways of considering these factors in relation to each other are reviewed For example, they can be compared and contrasted according to the word-stems, according to their prefixes, according to the meanings expressed, or they can be compared and contrasted according to name, characteristic feature, function, and which

factors they are opposed to. Then each of the terms used in the foregoing section is reviewed in the light of these points of comparison and contrast. (As making sense of the subject requires knowledge of Indian linguistics we shall not attempt to summarize.)

Chapter Three: Summary Classifications (I.1.1.2)

(E124-126; T202-205) Explanation of the various classifications of p.140 of the summary of *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* in Volume Seven of this Encyclopedia.

The Eight Types of Awareness (1.1.1.3-10)

(E126-132; T206-215) Each of eight types of good awareness is illustrated. 1.Emptiness is the awareness of the 65 factors as merely factors in consciousness but without any being in themselves. 2.A monk who first considers it too far to go to see the shrine, then reconsiders and goes. 3.The respect shown to a monk by young children even though they do not understand the *dharma*. 4.Parents prompt their children to pay homage. 5-8 are like the first four except they are acccompanied by equanimity.

There is also a discussion of ten bases of good acts: charity, virtue, cultivation, respect for elders, dutifulness, sharing of merit, giving thanks, teaching, listening to the *dharma* and correcting of mistaken opinion.

The four infinities are explained: space, worlds, beings and the knowledg of a Buddha.

Section Two: Relating to the Material World

Chapters 1-4: Meditation--the Fourfold System (I.1.2.1)

First Meditation

(E133-138; T216-225) A number of critical terms in I.1.2.1A of the text are explained, notably *bhāvanā*. Here it means the practice by which seekers develop the four applications of mindfulness. "Taking leave of desires..."--in the first meditative state one has left sense-desires. "Sense-desires" are the desires specified in, e.g., the *Vibhaṅga*, those involving passion and interest, i.e., the defiling sense-desires based on objects.

"...Involving initial and sustained thought...", that is, the first meditative stage arises together with initial attention to and sustained consideration of the same factors that were listed in Section One. "In solitude", i.e., free from the obstructions. "Accompanied by joy and

satisfaction", i.e., the fivefold joy that is the basis of concentration.

There are two kinds of meditative stage: in one kind one meditates on supporting objects, in the other one meditates on characteristic marks. Here it is the first kind that is spoken of.

"Earth-gazing": meditating on the after-image. (We are directed to the *Visuddhimagga* for a detailed account.)

Second Meditation

(E138-140; T225-228) In the second meditation "he suppresses initial and sustained thought". "becomes tranquil" through faith, and "dwells on high", since he is not held down by initial and sustained thought.

Question: Isn't all this true of the first meditative state as well?

Answer: Faith is not completely strong in the first stage, but becomes so in the second.

Question: Aren't all the last three stages such that initial and sustained thought are suppressed?

Answer: No, since in the last two they have never arisen, they do not exist.

Third Meditation

(E140-144; T228-234a) "Neutral". There are ten kinds of neutrality: (1) the sixfold neutrality of a monk toward the six kinds of sense-objects, since he is without the contaminants and is thus neither happy nor sad but neutral. (2) The neutrality of the sublime states, of one who is neutral regarding beings and occupies a part of a region with an equanimous mind. (3) The neutrality of the factors of enlightenment, where neutrality is developed toward the simultaneously arising factors. (4) Neutrality of energy, which is neither too intense nor too slack. (5) The neutrality of the traces, that is, the neutrality regarding the number and kinds of equanimity that arise by concentration. (6) The neutrality of feeling is free from satisfaction or frustration. (7) The neutrality involving equanimity in investigation, in which one puts aside reflection on what has come to be. (8) The neutrality of equanimity which balances things equally. (9) The neutrality of knowledge in which one lives without even the satisfaction of the third meditative level. (10) The neutrality of purity, which is the neutrality of the fourth level and is purified of all opposed conditions. The neutrality referred to in the text is (9), that of knowledge.

Objection: Isn't this neutrality of knowledge the same as the neutrality

of equanimity, available in the first and second meditative levels?

Answer: That neutrality is overcome by initial and sustained thought, etc., but the neutrality of the third level is not thus overcome and has a distinct function.

"Being mindful and self-aware"--mindfulness is remembering, watchfulness; self-awareness is not being confused, free from doubt. In this third meditation, in contradistinction to those factors in previous levels. awareness is maintained like a man moving on razors.

Despite his renouncing satisfaction one in this stage may still experience bodily satisfactions associated with his mental state, which produce a subtle bodily matter which is however essentially mental.

Fourth Meditation

(E144-146; T235-239) But in the fourth meditative stage even these last-mentioned satisfactions and frustrations are taken leave of. There is a discussion of just when satisfactions and frustrations are abandoned in each meditative stage--before arriving at the stage, or during the experiencing of the stage. The author's view is that it is in the stage that the abandonment takes place. But then, it is asked, why are satisfaction and frustration, settled or unsettled mind, still present to be abandoned in the fourth stage? The answer is that this is for the purpose of effecting the teaching--the Buddha is not saying these are still present, but praising the final fourth stage where they are not present.

The neutrality free of satisfaction and frustration experienced in the fourth stage is not merely absence of those, but a third feeling. The uniqueness of this fourth stage lies in the purity of mindfulness, which has not occurred in the previous stages. It is this purity which allows the light of neutrality (likened here to a crescent moon) to shine with full radiance.

The Fivefold System

(E146-149; T239-243) The genesis of this system arose because the Buddha taught in a manner fitting certain persons' inclinations. For them the Buddha distinguishes five stages, in which the second stage contains sustained thought but not initial thought, and the fourth stage lacks sustained thought while maintaining joy, satisfaction and one-pointedness, and the fifth comprises only neutrality and one-pointedness. The application of this analysis is illustrated by a lengthy story.

Chapter Six: The Fourfold Progress (I.1.2.1B)

(E149-150; T243-246) Depending on the nature of the meditator, progress in meditation along either the fourfold or fivefold system may be slow, painful and sluggish, or quick and easy.

Chapter Twelve: The Three Liberations (I.1.2.4)

(E155-156; T255-257) The illustration given is of the meditator associating various beautiful colors with the parts of his body that display those colors, but without awareness that they are parts of his body. The *Paṭisambhidāmagga* is quoted.

Chapter Thirteen: The Sublime States (I.1.2.5)

(E156-161; T257-263) The four states are explained extensively. They are called "sublime" because just as Brahmadevatās live with our thoughts, so the aspirant who cleaves to these four states lives like them. These four states are also called "boundless", since objects of love, compassion, etc. should be without limit.

Section Three: Relation to the Immaterial World (I.1.3.1-4)

Part Four

(E164-173; T269-283) "Neither-identification-nor-nonidentifi-cation" is to be taken as indicating that in this stage there is neither feeling nor nonfeeling, consciousness nor nonconsciousness, contact nor noncontact. By "identification" is to be understood the taking note of objects. In the state in question there is not enough identification to effect such noticing, but since the satisfactions born of traces still remain it is not nonidentification alone.

These four attainments of space, etc., on the immaterial level have gone beyond objects, but not altogether beyond the factors, since two meditation factors still remain, namely neutrality and one-pointedness.

Section Four: Stages of Good Awareness (I.1.4.1)

(E173-174; T284-287) There are five methods (*naya*) in each of the four planes--a basic one, a low, a medium, a high, and a method dominated by interest. So there are twenty methods, and they are related to the section of the *Paṭṭhāna* which is called "Low Triplet".

Section Five: Relating to the Transcendent (I.1.5)

Part One: The First Path (I.1.5.1)

(E175-177; T289-293) One who cultivates this meditation and produces a single, momentary awareness of absorption goes out of this world, does not accumulate residues but rather demolishes birth and death.

In the list of fifty-six factors, under heading #19, the faculty of coming to know what is unknown, along with #s 22-24, are distinctive to this stage. These, along with the designation of "being an item in the path" are specific to this list; otherwise, this list is identical with the list given earlier. What is new is the development through successive stages.

So, the fivefold path (items 19-23 of the original list of fifty-six factors in I.1.1.1A, together with the new #s 22-24 of the list in I.1.5.1, make up the Eightfold Path.

(E180-184; T298-304) "There is an emptiness section..."; here "emptiness" indicates the name of the path of the higher world. "Aimless" also indicates the name of the path.

Objection: The Buddha gives three names to the path: emptiness, signless, aimless. Why has the second been left out here?

Answer: Ultimately a "signless" path is deficient. The signless liberation is said to be distinguished from the others through involving the discernment of noneternality, so that faith is the dominating faculty there, just as wisdom is for emptiness and concentration is for aimlessness. Now wisdom and concentration are factors in the noble path, but faith is not, any more than interest and awareness are path factors, and just as those two do not determine a name of the path, faith should not either. This is the opinion of another teacher. However, on the authority of the *sūtra*s it may be allowed, though on Abhidharma principles there can be no signless path.

(E184-190; T304-314) A verse (from an earlier commentary?) is quoted. It mentions "internal" and "external" aspects of "the material, the immaterial, the five, the evolution of seven or eight, the sign, the path and the chief." This verse is explained as follows. One is convinced that he is composed of the five aggregates and that they are impermanent, frustrating, without self, and so goes beyond the "subjective". He is then led to analyze other persons and arrives at the same understanding, thus getting on the path. So also with the analyzing of the impermanence, etc. of the material and the immaterial. As for the "evolution of seven or eight", this reflects the different number of factors of enlightenment and of the path in the differing accounts of the four meditative stages. There

are seven allies of enlightenment and eight allies of the path in the fourfold method (see above), while in the fivefold method there are only six allies of the path in the fourth stage and seven allies of the path in all the stages. The difference arises from the presence of neutrality and joy in the first three, but of joy alone in the fourth. This is the view of one group of Theras, but two other opinions are also rehearsed.

In explaining the last three references in the quotation (viz., the sign, the path, the chief) the discussion here reverts to a moment-by-moment analysis of the meditation process. The sign, i.e., the object of meditation, brings about adoption, but (depending on the ability of the meditator) after two or three repetitions comes path-consciousness, then one or more moments of maturations of this consciousness, after which awareness lapses into the *bhavaṅga* again. The path-consciousness is what destroys the proclivities.

(E190-194; T314-319) The different paths of stream-entry, etc. are now distinguished. The streamenterer gets rid of four false views and doubts. It is these that produce matter/form; they are the consciousness aggregate and the aggregates of feeling, identification and traces associated with it. What the streamenterer accomplishes is a state in which these materialistic interpretations of what comes through the senses are precluded, so that for them matter is not grasped at.

The once-returner and the nonreturner get rid of four kinds of awareness dissociated from false view as well as two kinds accompanied by depression. The *arhat* gets rid of the four immoral awarenesses dissociated from false view and one accompanied by distraction. It is explained why these paths are necessary in order to avoid future rebirths. The streamenterer's path cuts off the five defilements--three fetters, the proclivity to wrong view and the proclivity to doubt--and thus brings about the discontinuing of the clinging aggregates, which would otherwise continue in force. If the once-returner didn't practice his path he would experience five more rebirths after the two he will still have to experience. And if the nonreturner didn't do his thing he would experience another rebirth after the next. If the *arhat* doesn't practice his path he will be reborn on the material and immaterial levels.

Is progress wavering or not? Tales of the progress of the Buddha, or Śāriputra and Mahāmogallāna show that it does.

Thus cultivating all or some of the twenty great aspects according to one's inclinations, when one practises meditation on these topics he also practices the path leading to escape from rebirth.

Part Two: The Second Path (I.1.5.2)

(E194; T319-320) The once-returner is not as frequently beset by desires and ill will, and when these do arise they are weaker, though some say they arise in great strength but less often.

Parts Three and Four: The Third and Fourth Paths (I.1.5.3-4)

(E194-200; T320-329) Comparison of the thousands of methods taught in this text for attaining the stages of the path in contrast to the even larger number of methods taught in the *Vibhaṅga.*

Comparison of the subtler mistaken views that are still to be found in the streamenterer, the once-returner and nonreturner. Actually, the last three paths do not involve cognition of anything not known to the practitioner of the first path.

Chapter Two: Bad Factors

Section One: Twelve Types (I.2.1-13)

(E200-211;T330-347) After a review of the thirty-two types of factors that can be bad, the generic meaning of terms such as "bad", "perversion", etc. ensues. The various factors discussed are not classsified as lower or higher, as they are all bad. Except for the eleventh type of bad awareness, viz., the type accompanied by neutrality and perplexity, all of them occasion bad rebirths.

Question: Why do these constitute exceptions, while the kind involving doubt does not?

Answer: The other eleven are removed through the path of insight, but these are not.

The remainder of this commentary explains the terms used in the text along the lines indicated in the portion given above.

49.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (attributed to Buddhaghosa), *Sammohavinodanī* or *Aṭṭhakathā* on the *Vibhaṅga*

Summary by Bimala Churn Law

This work was edited by A.P.Buddhadatta as Pali Text Series 93, 1921. It is not translated. B.C.Law makes the following remarks:

"In many places we find that this commentary and the *Visuddhimagga* comment on the same subjects. This book consists of 18

sections dealing with the expositions of five *khandhas* (e.g., *rūpa, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhāra,* and *viññāna*), *āyatanas* (spheres), *dhātus* (elements), *sacca* (truth), *indriyas* (senses), *paccayākāra* (causes interdependent), *satipaṭṭhāna* (right recollection), *sammappadhāna* (right concentration), *iddhipādas* (bases of miracles), seven *bojjhaṅgas* (supreme knowledge), *magga* (the Noble Eightfold Path), *jhāna* (stages of meditation), *appamañña* (four *appamaññas* consisting in an unlimited or perfect exercise of the qualities of friendliness, compassion, good will, and equanimity), *sikkhāpadas* (precepts), *paṭisambhidā* (analytical knowledge), *ñāna* (true knowledge), *khuddakavatthu* (minor points), and *dhammahadaya* (religious heart)..It should be noted that in the section on the *dhātus*, 32 parts of the body have been discussed. In the section dealing with truth, the noble truths (*ariyasacca*) are deal with. In the section on the Paccayākāras we find a disucssion of the topic of dependent origination....The *Sammohavinodanī* contains short notes on *avijjā* (ignorance), *kāya* (body), *jāti* (birth), *jarā* (old age), *taṇhā* (desire), *domanassa* (despair), *nibbāna*, *nāma-rūpa* (name and form), *bhava* (existence), *bodhi* (enlightenment), *macchariya* (sloth), *marana* (death), *māyā* (illusion), etc."

50.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Aṭṭhakathā* on the *Kathāvatthu*

Summary by James P. McDermott

The Kathāvatthu Commentary's prime contribution is to identify the Theravādin's opponent in the Kathāvatthu debates, and to indicate to whom the questions and answers during the course of the debates are attributable.

"E" references are the edition by N. A. Jayawickrama, Pali Text Society Text Series No. 169 (London 1979). "T" refers to the translation by Bimala Churn Law in *The Debates Commentary* (London 1940, 1969). Numbering of sections corresponds to the numbering followed in the summary of the *Kathāvatthu* at pp. 266-304 of Volume Seven of this Encyclopedia.

Introduction

(E1-2; T1-2) The Buddha in the *deva*-world set forth the outline of

the *Kathāvatthu* ("Points of Controversy"), knowing that at the time of the third Council Moggaliputra Tissa would fill in the details here on earth. The finished text would include 500 discourses expressing his own views (Sakavādin), and 500 those of his opponents (Paravādins). The Buddha began with a discourse on the theory of the person (*pudgala*) in eight sections involving four questions, each of two fivefold divisions. He then provided a table of contents for the remainder of the text according to the same pattern, descended to earth, and attained final *nirvāṇa*.

(E2; T2) The collection of the *dharma* (doctrine) and discipline under Mahākassapa is noted. One hundred years later the Vātsīputrīya monks called for relaxation of the monastic rules, and 10,000 seceded forming the Mahāsaṁghika school. The Gokulikas and Ekabyokārikas seceded from this. From the Gokulikas there arose the Prajñaptivādins and the Bāhulikas or Bahuśrutīyas in turn, and among these the Cetiyavādins.

(E3-5; T2-5) In the second century the Mahiṁśāsikas and Vātsīputrīyas split from Theravāda. From the Vātsiputrīyas there further split the Dharmottarīyas, Bhadrayāṇikas, Channagarikas, and Sammitīyas. From the Mahīṁśāsakas arose the Sarvāstivādins and Dharmaguptakas. From the Sarvāstivādins arose the Kāśyapīyas, and from them in turn the Saṅkrāntikas. From the latter the Sūtravādins arose as an offshoot. This lineage of 17 schismatic schools (Theravāda is considered orthodox) is based on the *Dīpavaṁsa*.

(E6-7; T5) Subsequently the Haimavatikas, Rājagirikas, Siddhārthikas, Pūrvaśailas, Aparaśailas and Vajirīyas also arose.

(E7-8; T5-7) The decline of the monastic order at the time of King Aśoka's patronage is outlined. In order to reform the order, Aśoka called on Moggaliputra Tissa. On the basis of what he taught, Aśoka convened the order and expelled 60,000 heretics. It was then that Moggaliputra Tissa filled in the details of the Points of Controversy, effectively crushing the dissident points of view. At this time the *Abhidharma* was recited and included as the third scriptural collection.

BOOK ONE

1.(E9-36; T9-43) The debated questions and answers cannot be attributed to any specific person, thus the convention of classifying the views expressed as Sakavādin (one of ours = Theravādin) and Paravādin (the opponent).

The view that the person (*pudgala*) exists is attributed to the Pudgalavādins, that is, to the Vātsīputrīyas and Sammitīyas. "*Pudgala*"

means "self, being, vital principle (*atta satto jīvo*).

The method of argument is explained. The Theravādin conditionally establishes the opponent's proposition in order to refute it. This involves positing (*sthāpana*), gaining (P. *papana*), and assigning (P. *aropana*).[73] Negative and affirmative presentations are each fivefold, involving proposition, rejoinder, refutation, application, and conclusion. The opponent's arguments are considered pretentious, those of the Sakavādin well done and his victory just.

The Commentary notes that the debate over the reality of the person is expanded by a simple comparison with other realities, this being followed by a comparison by way of analogy. The argument proceeds following a fourfold discussion of dependence which leads the opponent to the verge of admitting nihilist views.

When in the course of debate the Sakavādin acknowledges the statement "there is a person" he is doing so in accordance with the *sūtra* only in a conventional sense.

Since all reals with the exception of liberation are conditioned by relations, the inquiry considers whether characteristics can be associated with the person.

An examination of terminology follows. To say the person "is got at", "is found," "is a reality," "exists" are all synonymous. To say two terms are "the same in meaning" is to say the only difference is one of expression.

The term "transmigrates" means "moves on continuously". After examination of rebirth, the debate focuses on the concept of derivation, and then in turn on human action. The contrast between one who does a deed and an instigator of action is defined. An instigator is one who acts by commanding, instructing or the like.

The term "*bhava*", "becoming", is defined as "the state of being reborn (*upapatti*)". When *Suttanipāta* 1119 speaks of looking on the world as empty, it means to contemplate the world of aggregates as empty of being (*sattā*). The term "*abbhantara gato*" refers to one who has entered into material form and persists therein. The term "*anattā*" refers to the absence of self, vital principle, or person. Again it is noted that scriptural use of the term "person" in both its general and specific sense is but popular convention rather than expressive of metaphysical truth. In this vein it is noted that the Buddha taught in both popular terms and at a higher level of discourse characteristic of thing as they really are. The two levels of discourse must be recognized for what they are.

2 (E36-40; T43-48) The view that an *arhat* can backslide (*parihāni*) is ascribed to the Sammitīyas, the Vātsīputrīyas, the Sarvāstivādins, and some Mahāsāṁghikas. Some hold that an *arhat* can fall away from that state, some that nonreturner can fall, and some that a once-returner can. No one believes it possible for a streamenterer to fall away.

3 (E41-42; T48-51) The meaning of the term "religious life" (*brahmacarya*) is twofold: (1) renunciation of the world, (2) cultivation of the way. No god renounces the world. Except for those on the unconscious plane, they may cultivate the way. The Sammitīyas, however, deny that gods of the Paranirmitavasvatti class and above can cultivate the way.

4 (E42-43; T51) The view that the corruptions are given up piecemeal (*odhisodhiso*) is held by the Sammitīyas, among others.

5 (E43-44; T51-52) The position that an average person who achieves higher states does so while still a man of the world is that of the Sammitīyas, for example.

6 (E44-50; T52-60) It is the Sarvāstivādins who hold that everything exists.

8 (E51-52; T61-62) The view that the past survives in part in the present is held by the Kāśyapīyas.

9 (E52-53; T62-63) The view that the factors are applications of mindfulness arose among the Andhakas. This group includes the Pūrvaśailas, Aparaśailas, Rājagirikas and Siddhārthikas.

10 (E53-54; T64) The view that things exist in one temporal mode only is also held by the groups listed in I and IX above.

BOOK TWO

1 (E55-56; T65-66) Pūrvaśailas and Aparaśailas wrongly hold that gods of the Māra class can cause an *arhat* to have an impure seminal emission.

2-4 of E, 2 of T (E56-57; T66) Pūrvaśailas also hold: (1) an *arhat* can be ignorant, (2) can experience doubt, and (3) can be excelled by others.

Pūrvaśailas and others hold that on attaining the state of streamenterer an individual who has entered the first meditative level utters the truth of frustration.

5-6 of E, 3 of T (E57-58; T67-68) One can induce insight by repeating the word "*duḥkha*". Thus reciting the word is considered part of the path by the Pūrvaśailas.

7 of E, 5 of T (E58; T70-72) The Andhakas believe that the apparent continuity of consciousness in meditation implies that a single state of consciousness can last over an extended period of time.

8 of E, 6 of T (E59; T70) Gokulikas hold that all conditioned things are, without distinction, no better than an ash-heap.

9 of E, 7 of T (E59-60; T70-72) Andhakas, Sarvāstivādins, Sammitīyas and Bhadrayāṇikas hold that one can become a streamenterer, etc., gradually through realization of the truths one by one.

10 of E, 8 of T (E60-61; T72-73) The Andhakas hold that the Buddha's everyday hearing, speech, etc., is transcendent or mundane depending upon whether what is heard, said, etc., is transcendent or mundane.

11 of E, 9 of T (E61-62; T73-74) The Andhakas and Mahīṁśāsakas hold that there are two kinds of liberation.

BOOK THREE

1 (E63-64; T75-77) The Andhakas hold that all the powers of the Buddha are shared by his disciples.

2 (E64-65; T77-79) The Andhakas further maintain that all ten powers of insight are to be considered noble. It is noted that two kinds of emptiness are to be distinguished, namely emptiness of self and emptiness of conditioned things. "Emptiness of self" refers to the emptiness of these aggregates. "Emptiness of conditioned things" refers to detachment from what is conditioned. That is, it is a reference to *nirvāṇa*.

3 (E66; T79) It is the Andhakas who hold that it is awareness (*citta*) which is filled with lust, hatred and/or delusion and which is emancipated from these impurities.

4 (E66-67; T80-82) The view that liberation is a process is based on confusion concerning the relationship between partial liberation from obstacles to meditation on the one hand, and complete liberation in a path-moment on the other. The error is in thinking that the partial liberation of the former is completed in the latter through a gradual process.

5 (E68; T82-83) The Andhakas and Sammitīyas assert that an individual at the eighth or lowest stage of entry on the path is no longer subject to doubt and wrong views. The Sakavādin maintains doubt and wrong views are left behind only at the state of streamentry.

7-8 (E68-70; T84-85) It is the opinion of the Andhakas and Sammitīyas that biological vision and hearing become higher (*divya*) vision and hearing when they are the medium of a spiritual idea.

10 (E70-71; T87-88) notes that self-restraint implies reference to a matter over which such restraint ought to be exercised.

11 (E72; T88) Andhakas think there is perception among beings in the sphere of nonperception.

12 (E72; T88-89) Andhakas also believe it wrong to say there is perception in the sphere of neither-identification-nor-nonidentification.

BOOK FOUR

1 (E73; T90) On the basis of the case of Yasa, who attained perfection while living the lay life, the Uttarapāṭhakas hold that a layman can become an *arhat*.

2 (E73-74; T90-91) The Uttarapāṭhakas hold that one can become an *arhat* in the first moment of rebirth-consciousness.

3 (E74; T91-92) It is further the opinion of the Uttarapāṭhakas that everything about an *arhat* is free from the intoxicants.

4-5 (E75; T92-93) The Uttarapāṭhakas hold that spiritual attainments can be permanently acquired. The Sakavādin recognizes only two types of spiritual attainment, namely (1) actual attainment during one's life and (2) attainments which arise at the moment of rebirth as a result of actions in a past life.

6 (E76-77; T93-95) The term "*bodhi*" refers to (1) insight into the fourfold way and (2) the omniscience of a Buddha. The Uttarapāṭhakas do not distinguish the two meanings, and hence hold that one becomes a Buddha through *bodhi*

7 (E77; T95-96) The Uttarapāṭhakas further hold that one possessed of the thirty-two supernatural marks is a Bodhisattva (i.e., is destined for enlightenment).

8 (E78; T96-97) The terms "*niyāma*" and "*brahmacarya*" are synonyms for the noble path. Some, such as the Andhakas, hold that the Bodhisattva actually entered the path of assurance at the time of Kāśyapa Buddha.

9 (E78-79; T97-98) The Andhakas, for example, hold a person practising to attain the fourth state and become an *arhat* permanently possesses the fruits of the three previous stages of attainment.

10 (E79; T98) The Andhakas further maintain that *arhat*ship means the total putting off of all fetters.

BOOK FIVE

1 (E80; T99-100) The Andhakas indiscriminately maintain that any knowledge of liberation has the quality of liberation.

2 (E80-81; T100) Uttarapāṭhakas hold that seekers such as Ānanda have the knowledge of *arhat*s.

3 (E81-82; T100-102) Some, such as the Andhakas, think that perception can be perverted in the case of one who has attained meditation using a device.

4 (E82-83; T102-103) It is the Uttarapāṭhakas who hold that in one not yet fixed on the path there is insight requisite for going on to assurance. The term "assurance" (*niyama*) is a synonym for "the way.".

5 (E83-84; T103-104) The Andhakas believe that in the case of an *arhat* all awareness is transcendental, that is, discrimination (*pratisaṁvid*).

6 (E84; T 104-105) The Andhakas do not admit the distinction between conventional and ultimate truth.

7 (E84-85; T105-106) The Andhakas, among others, hold that insight into the awarenesses of another has no other object beyond that state of awareness itself.

8 (E85-86; T106-107) It is the Andhakas who hold insight into the future to be possible. The Commentary notes that the following terms are synonymous: "root" (*mūla*)", "cause" (*kāraṇa*), "reason" (*nidāna*), "source" (*sambhava*), "rising" (*samutthāna*), "nutriment" (*āhāra*), "supporting object" (*ālambana*), "condition" (*pratyaya*), "origination" (*samudaya*).

9 (E86-87; T107-108) The Andhakas hold possible insight into the present as a whole.

10 (E87-88; T108-109) Andhakas further maintain a disciple can have knowledge of the spiritual fruition of another.

BOOK SIX

1 (E89; T110-111) Andhakas, among others, consider assurance or fixedness on the path to be unconditioned, that is to say, eternal.

2 (E89-90; T111-112) Pūrvaśailas and Mahīṁśāsakas hold the members of the chain of dependent origination to be unconditioned.

3 (E90-91; T112-113) Pūrvaśailas hold the four noble truths to be unconditioned.

5 (E91-92; T113-114) Attainment of cessation means suspension of conscious procedure in meditation. Andhakas and Uttarapāṭhakas hold that because this cessation is not conditioned it is unconditioned.

6 (E92; T114) Three types of space are distinguished: (1) enclosed, (2) removed from an object in absorption, and (3) open. Enclosed space is conditioned, the others mere concepts. Uttarapāṭhakas and Mahīṁśāsakas hold that since (2) and (3) are not conditioned they must be unconditioned.

7-8 (E92-93; T114-115) Andhakas maintain that empty space, the earth element, etc., are visible.

BOOK SEVEN

1 (E94; T116) Rājagirikas and Siddhārthikas hold that particular material qualities cannot be classified under the single generic concept of matter.

2 (E94-95; T116-117) Rājagirikas and Siddhārthikas maintain mental states are not interconnected.

3 (E95; T117-118) The same two groups assert that properties of awareness do not exist as things.

4 (E95-97; T118-119) The term "*dāna*" refers to (1) liberality, (2) abstinence or the act of giving, (3) the gift itself. This triple distinction involves (1) a mental state and (2) material offerings. Rājagirikas and Siddhārthikas recognize *dāna* only as a mental state.

5 (E97-98; T119-122) Rājagirikas, Siddhārthikas and Sammitīyas think that merit increases with enjoyment.

6 (E99; T122) Rājagirikas and Siddhārthikas hold that what is given in this life remains in the word of ghosts.

7 (E99-100; T123-124) Andhakas hold that land is a result of karma.

8 (E101; T124-125) Some actions lead to the worsening of life, that is, to old age or decay. Some actions lead to death. Thus the Andhakas hold that old age and death are maturations of karma.

9 (E102; T126-127) Andhakas further hold that the mental objects of the *arhat* are not maturations of karma.

10 (E102-103; T127-128) They also think that results entail further results.

BOOK EIGHT

1 (104; T129-130) Andhakas and Uttarapāṭhakas hold that the *asuras* (demons) form a sixth, separate realm of rebirth.

2 (E105-106; T130-132) On the basis of an incorrect interpretation of the scriptural passage "completed existence within the interval" (*Dīghanikāya* III. 237) Pūrvaśailas and Sammitīyas posit an intermediate

state of existence between death and rebirth.

3 (E106-107; T132-133) Pūrvaśailas limit the term "*kāmadhātu*" to only the five strands of sensuality (*kāmaguṇa*). The Sakavādin, however, more broadly applies the term to (1) the objects of sense desire, (2) corrupt worldly desires, and (3) sensuous existence.

4 (E108; T133-134) Pūrvaśailas hold the term "*kāma*" refers only to the five strands of sensuality. The Sakavādin, to the contrary, maintains that defilements constitute sensuality.

5 of E, 5--6 of T(E108-109; T134) Andhakas apply the term "*rūpadhātu*" (sphere of form or material element) only to material qualities (*rūpa*), and the term "*arūpadhātu*" (immaterial sphere or element) only to the immaterial sphere as a level of existence.

7 of T (E109-110; T135-136 Andhakas and Sammitīyas maintain that beings in the material sphere have all six senses.

6 of E, 8 of T(E79; T134-135) Andhakas hold that a subtle, refined type of matter, but not grosser matter, exists in the immaterial sphere.

8-9 of E, 9 of T (E110-111; T136-137) Mahīṁśāsakas and Sammitīyas hold that physical and vocal acts are immaterial, and thus that matter can be of ethical import.

10 (E111-112; T137-139) Pūrvaśailas and Sammitīyas think there is nothing material in the life-faculty (*jīvitindriya*).

11 (E112-113; T139-140) Pūrvaśailas and Sammitīyas argue that because of calumny against an *arhat* in a previous life, an *arhat* can backslide. They do not discern any assurance (*niyama*) in becoming an *arhat*.

BOOK NINE

1 (E114-115; T141-142) Andhakas maintain that only in seeing liberation as commendable are the fetters put off.

2 (E115; T142-143) Pūrvaśailas consider the deathless as an object of thought to be a fetter.

3 (E116; T143) Uttarapāṭakas hold matter is a co-condition (*sālambana*) since it causes mental presentation. They do not distinguish between a supporting object (*ālambana*) and a causal condition (*pratyaya*) as the Sakavādin does.

4 (E116-117; T144) Andhakas and some Uttarapāṭhakas hold that immoral proclivities lack a corresponding mental object since they are distinct from mind, unconditioned, and neutral.

5 (E117; T145) The opponent is the Andhaka.

6 (E117; T145) The opponent is the Uttarapāṭhaka.

8 of E (E118; T146-147) Uttarapāṭhakas hold that all thought is sustained. The Sakavādins, on the other hand, distinguish between an object of sustained thought and thought sustained in its operation.

9 (E118; T147-148) Pūrvaśailas, defining sound as the diffusion of sustained thought, maintain that sound can be cognized apart from the operation of sense.

10 (E119; T148) Pūrvaśailas further contend that speech and action can proceed even without conscious thought.

11 (E120; T148-149) Andhakas hold that past and future experiences can be possessed in the present by those who have attained past and future states of absorption. This view fails properly to distinguish between the notions of being in possession of (*samanāgata*) and of acquisition (*pratilābha*).

BOOK TEN

1 (E121-122; T150-151) Andhakas hold that before one congeries of five aggregates ceases, another set of karmically functional aggregates arises.

2 (E122; T151) Mahīṁśāsakas, Sammitīyas, and Mahāsaṁghikas contend that right speech, right action, and right livelihood are material and, hence, that the body of one practising the path is included in the path.

3 (E122-124; T151-154) It is the view of the Mahāsaṁghikas that one can practise the path while enjoying fivefold sense-consciousness.

5 (E124-125; T154-155) Mahāsaṁghikas consider fivefold sense-consciousness co-ideational.

6 (E125; T155-156) Mahāsaṁghikas recognize both a worldly and an otherworldly morality.

7 (E126; T156) Mahāsaṁghikas further affirm that morality is nonmental.

9 (E126; T156-157) The Mahāsaṁghika is the opponent.

10-11 (E127-128; T157-158) Mahāsaṁghikas and Sammitīyas think that manifesting (*vijñapti*) acts are moral, and the former thinks that nonmanifesting acts are immoral.

BOOK ELEVEN

1 (E129; T159) Mahāsaṁghikas and Sammitīyas consider proclivities morally neutral, without root conditions, and independent of

consciousness.

2 (E129-130; T159-160) Mahāsaṁghikas argue that one who has overcome spiritual ignorance cannot have insight and mundane thought simultaneously.

3 (E130; T160) Pūrvaśailas hold that insight is not conjoined with mundane consciousness.

4 (E130-131; T161) The opponent is identified as the Andhaka.

5 (E131-132; T161-163) Mahāsaṁghikas believe one possessed of magical power can live an entire *kalpa*. The term "*kalpa*" can refer to (1) a great cycle, (2) part of a cycle, (3) a lifetime.

6 (E132-133; T163-164) Sarvāstivādins and Uttarapāṭhakas hold that continuity in the flow of consciousness constitutes concentration. They do not take the term "concentration" (*samādhi*) to mean "collectedness of thought".

7 (E133; T164) Andhakas consider each term in the chain of dependent origination to be predetermined.

8 (E133-134; T165) They also consider impermanence itself predetermined.

BOOK TWELVE

1 (E135; T166-167) Mahāsaṁghikas hold that both self-restraint and its lack are karmically efficacious.

2 (E135-136; T167) They also hold that all action produces karmic results. Although the Buddha spoke without qualification of volition (*cetanā*) as karma, he meant that only good or bad volition entails karmic result.

3 (E136-137; T167-168) Mahāsaṁghikas consider sound a karmic result.

4 (E137; T168) They also hold sense-organs to be a result of karma.

5 (E137-138; T169-170) Uttarapāṭhakas hold that an individual who is said to be liable to seven more rebirths at most becomes subjectively assured of final liberation only at the end of the seven. The Sakavādin does not admit such an immutably fixed pattern. The only two fixed orders are (1) the truth order of the Noble Path which assures an individual that he will not be punished in purgatory and that he is destined to attain the fruits of the path, and (2) the false order of acts which inevitably result in retribution in the immediately succeeding existence.

7 (E138-139; T170-171) Pūrvaśailas hold that since an individual who has attained sound views is not necessarily free of enmity, such an individual can willfully deprive a creature of life.

8 (E139; T171) The opponent, who is identified as the Uttarapāṭhaka, arrives at a bad rebirth as a result of failing to distinguish between evil ways and natural desires.

BOOK THIRTEEN

1 (E140; T172-173) The contested view is that of the Rājagirikas.

2 (E141; T173) The Uttarapāṭhakas arrive at this position through failing properly to distinguish between the lower goodness of the world of sense-desire and goodness in the ultimate sense.

3 (141-142; T173-175) One can instigate a crime entailing immediate retribution in two ways, namely (1) through a permanent, standing injunction or (2) through an occasional injunction. The former way assures one's doom because there is volition to carry through. In the latter case, the Sakavādin considers reform possible, which the Uttarapāṭhaka denies.

4 (E143; T175-176) Assurance is of two types depending on whether it is in the right or wrong direction. The latter leads to immediate retribution; the former is the Noble Path. Pūrvaśailas and Aparaśailas fail to make this distinction.

5-6 (E143-144; T176-177) Uttarapāṭhakas hold that only one who is obstructed by the hindrances or fetters can overcome them.

7 (E144; T177) Andhakas maintain that one who attains absorption enjoys it.

8 (E145; T178) The opponent is the Uttarapāṭhaka.

9-10 (E145-146; T178-179) Here the opponent is the Pūrvaśaila.

BOOK FOURTEEN

1 (E147; T180-181) That which is good cannot immediately follow that which is bad. Mahāsaṁghikas, however, hold that the good and bad roots can be directly linked to one another.

The terms "adverting" (*āvartana*) and "adjusting" or "aiming" (*praṇidhi*) are defined as referring to the turning of the mind. In adverting, the mind is turned to the life continuum. In adjusting or aiming

the mind moves on to a definite mental object.

2 (E148; T181) Pūrvaśailas and Aparaśailas contend that the six sense-organs all originate together at the moment of conception as the result of single act. The Sakavādin holds that only the co-ordinating organ and organ of touch originate at conception, the other four sense-organs taking 77 days to develop, partly through the action that resulted in conception and partly through other karma.

3 (E148-149; T182) It is the Uttarapāṭhakas who maintain that one sensation immediately follows another.

4 (E149; T182-183) Uttarapāṭhakas also hold that the noble forms of speech and action are material qualities.

5 (E149-150; T183-184) Andhakas hold that proclivity toward a vice is different from open manifestation of that vice

6 (E150; T184) The opponent is identified as the Andhaka.

7 (E150-151; T184-185) Those expressing the contended position are the Andhakas and the Sammitīyas.

8 (E151; T185-186) When applied to maturational consciousness, action, matter and liberation, the term "neutral" (*avyākṛta*) means "cannot be said to be either moral or immoral because of the absence of ripeness (*avipākatva*)". Applied to speculation on unproved matters it means "undeclared" (*akathitatva*). Because they do not make such a distinction, Andhakas and Uttarapāṭhakas hold that speculation or false doctrine (*dṛṣṭigatha*) is neutral.

9 (E151-152; T186) The opponent is the Pūrvaśaila.

BOOK FIFTEEN

1-2 (E153-154; T187-188) The opponent is the Mahāsaṁghika.

6 (E155; T189) Death and decay are not predetermined, and hence not to be considered to belong either to the category "mundane" or the category "transcendent." Mahāsaṁghikas wrongly class them in the latter category.

7-8 (E155-156; T190) Hetuvādins hold that to attain cessation of the experience of identification is (1) transcendent, (2) mundane.

9 (E156-157; T190-191) Rājagirikas hold that one who has entered the state of cessation of consciousness can nonetheless die.

10 (E157; T191-192) Attainment of the cessation of consciousness is of two types, mundane and transcendent. The former only leads to rebirth in the sphere of unconscious being. The Hetuvādins do not recognize this distinction.

11 (E157-158; T192-194) Andhakas and Sammitīyas hold that action is one thing and its accumulation another. They further maintain that the accumulation of karma is undetermined and not a mental object.

BOOK SIXTEEN

1-2 (E159; T196) Mahāsaṁghikas hold that power in the world is genuine only if it includes power to control the consciousness of others. Here "to control" is taken to mean "to prevent an offence which involves corruption".

3 (159-160; T195-196) Hetuvādins believe one can produce happiness in others.

4 (E160-161; T196-197) There are two aspects to attention, depending on whether we consider the object or the method of attention. When we attend to present things, we cannot attend to the consciousness by which they arise. But Pūrvaśailas and Aparaśailas generalize to argue that one can attend to all things at once.

5-6 (E161; T198) The term "cause" (*hetu*) can refer specifically to motives or moral conditions, or more generally to any causal relation. Making no such distinction, the Uttarapāṭhakas hold that primary material qualities are the causes of secondary qualities.

7 (E161-162; T199) Mahīṁśāsakas and Sammitīyas maintain that the physical motions involved in action are moral or immoral.

8 (E162; T199) Andhakas and Sammitīyas hold that material qualities arise as a result of action.

9-10 (E162-163; T200) The opponent on these issues is the Andhaka.

BOOK SEVENTEEN

1 (E164; T201) Andhakas contend that an *arhat* can accumulate merit.

2 (E164-165; T201-202) Rājagirikas and Siddhārthikas claim an *arhat* cannot die an untimely death.

3 (E165-166; T203-204) These two groups also hold that all the cycles of actions, corruptions and results arise from karma.

4 (E167; T204-205) Frustration is to be understood as bound up with the faculties or as not so bound. In the latter case, "frustration" refers to being subject to the law of impermanence. Hetuvādins, not drawing this distinction, hold that frustration is constituted by painful feeling alone.

5 (E168; T205-206) Hetuvādins contend that with the exception of the noble path all conditioned things are frustrating.

6 (E168-169; T206-207) The Vetulyakas, also known as the Mahāśūnyatāvādins, are the opponents in this debate and apparently in 17.7-9, although the commentary does not make this explicit.

11 (E171; T209-210) Uttarapāṭhakas hold that a gift is sanctified by the donor, not by the recipient.

BOOK EIGHTEEN

1 (E172; T211) The Vetulyakas hold that when the Buddha descended into this world from the Tuṣita heaven it was merely as a docetic chimera.

2 (E172-173; T212) As a corollary of the former thesis, the Vetulyakas hold that the Buddha himself did not teach the *dharma* here on earth.

3 (E173; T212-213) The way those who have not conquered their passions respond to the misfortune of others suggests the identification of pity with passion. Thus the Uttarapāṭhakas hold that the Buddha, being free of passion, felt no compassion.

4-5 (E173-174; T213-214) Out of indiscriminate devotion for the Buddha certain Andhakas and Uttarapāṭhakas hold (1) that the fragrance of even the Buddha's excrement surpasses that of all other things, and (2) that the Buddha realized the fruits of all stages of the religious life simultaneously.

6 (E174-175; T214-215) Mahīśāsakas and certain Andhakas hold the passage from one state of absorption to another is immediate without intervening procedure.

7 (E175-176; T215-216) Sammitīyas and certain Andhakas hold that in delineating the fivefold absorption series the Buddha did not intend to classify five types of concentration, but only to indicate three distinct types. According to the Sakavādin, these three types of concentration are states of meditation, but not meditative intervals.

8 (E176-177; T216-217) The opponent here is the Pūrvaśaila.

9 (E177-178; T217-218) Mahāsaṁghikas contend that it is the sentient surface of the eye which sees.

BOOK NINETEEN

1 (E179; T219) Uttarapāṭhakas hold that we can put away the corruptions of our past and of our future. To say the latter is nothing

more than to say that for the person who attains liberation corruptions do not arise.

2 (E179-180; T220-221) The term "emptiness" refers (1) to absence of self as a feature of the aggregates and (2) to liberation. In holding that the empty is included in the aggregate of mental formations the Andhakas ignore this twofold analysis.

3 (E180-181; T221) The Sakavādin defines "fruit of monkhood" (*śramaṇyaphala*) as "the consciousness resulting from the thought processes in the noble path and occurring in the mental process accompanying the attainment of its fruits." Pūrvaśailas, however, define the term differently, holding that the fruit of monkhood is simply success in putting away the corruptions and, hence, is unconditioned.

4 (E181; T221-222) This is the opinion of the Pūrvaśailas.

5 (E181-182; T222) Uttarapāṭhakas believe in suchness as an immutable reality in the very nature of all things. They consider this suchness immutable.

6 (E182; T222-223) The term "good" (*kuśala*) can be applied to mental states both because they lead to desirable results and because they are free of corruptions. The Andhakas do not admit this twofold aspect. They thus define *nirvāṇa* as good because it is free from corruptions. The Sakavādin denies that liberation can be classified as good, since it leads to no further results.

7 (E(E182-183; T223-225) Some Uttarapāṭhakas hold the ordinary person can possess final assurance.

8 (E183-184; T225) Hetuvādins and Mahīśāsakas contend the faculties are not worldly.

BOOK TWENTY

1 (E185-186; T226-227) This is the opinion of the Uttarapāṭhakas.

2 (E186; T227-228) Knowledge (*jñāna*) is of two kinds: (1) worldly knowledge concerned with righteousness and the like, and (2) spiritual knowledge concerned with the path and its fruits. Hetuvādins do not distinguish between the two, applying the term "*jñāna*" only to spiritual knowledge.

3 (E187; T228-229) Andhakas deny the existence of guardians in hell.

4 (E187-188; T229-230) Various gods assume the shape of animals. On this basis the Andhakas wrongly assume that animals are reborn in the realm of the gods.

5 (E188-189; T230) Mahīṁśāsikas consider the noble path as fivefold only.

6 (E189; T231) Pūrvaśailas and Aparaśailas consider transcendental insight to have a twelvefold base.

BOOK TWENTY-ONE

1 (E190; T232) Uttarapāṭhakas hold that the Buddhist religion was reformed as a result of the three Councils.

2 (E190-191; T232-233) Whereas the Uttarapāṭhakas maintain that an ordinary person cannot be separated from phenomena of the three worlds, Sakavādins teach only that the individual cannot be separated from mental phenomena which arise in him at present.

3 (E191; T233) Mahāsaṁghikas think that one can attain perfection without actual elimination of the fetter of ignorance.

4 (E191-192; T234) Supernatural power does not make all things possible. For example, it cannot make permanent what is impermanent. Andhakas, however, contend that supernatural power makes possible whatever is resolved.

5 (E192; T235) The Andhakas are the opponents.

6 (E192-193; T235) Here the opponent is the Mahāsaṁghika.

7 (E193-194; T236-237) That all things are fixed (*niyata*) in their fundamental nature is the view of the Andhakas and certain Uttarapāṭhakas. The Sakavādin argues that things are fixed in two ways only, namely in rightness and wrongness.

8 (E194; T237) The Andhakas and Uttarapāṭhakas also hold all karma to be fixed.

BOOK TWENTY-TWO

1 (E195; T238) Since one can attain final liberation without achieving omniscience, Andhakas argue that final liberation can be attained without casting off one of the fetters, viz., ignorance.

2 (E195; T238-239) Since an *arhat* is lucid at the moment of final death, Andhakas consider him to have moral consciousness at that moment.

3-7 (E196-198; T239-242) These contended views are held by the Uttarapāṭhakas.

8 (E198; T242) Pūrvaśailas and Aparaśailas hold that as impermanent, all conditioned phenomena persist but for a moment of consciousness.

The Sakavādin, however, considers it arbitrary to equate imutability with momentariness.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

1 (E199; 243) This is held by the Andhakas and Vetulyakas.

2 (E199; T243) Uttarapāṭhakas espouse this view.

3 (E199-200; T243-244) The Andhakas hold this opinion.

4 (E200-201; T244-245) These views are also ascribed to the Andhakas.

5 (E201; T245-246) Uttarapāṭhakas and Hetuvādins consider only frustration to be predetermined.

51.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (ascribed to Buddhaghosa), *Aṭṭhakathā* on the *Yamaka*

"E" refers to the edition by C.A.F. Rhys-Davids in "Yamakappakaraṇaṭhakathā", Journal of the Pali Text Society VI, 1910-1912, pp. 51-107. The work is untranslated.

Summary by Karen C. Lang

This section of the *Pañcappakaraṇāṭṭhakathā* contains a concise commentary, little more than a table of contents in some cases, on the three volumes of the *Yamaka*. Buddhaghosa follows the arrangement of the *Yamaka* and discusses in order the ten topics: I. roots (*mūla*), II. aggregates (*skandha*), III. bases (*āyatana*), IV. elements (*dhātu*), V. truths (*satya*), VI. traces (*saṁskāra*), VII. proclivities (*anuśaya)*, VIII. consciousness (*citta*), IX. factors (*dharma*), and X. faculties (*indriya*). He begins each topic with a discussion of the arrangement of the paired questions (*yamaka*) into various sections and then comments on selected passages from the text.

I.1 (E52-54) Good, bad, neutral and mental (*nāma*) phenomena are subjected to twelve questions each: four which refer to four synonymous terms, i.e., root, root-condition (*mūlamūla*), being caused by a root (*mūḷaka*), or being caused by a root-condition (*mūlamūlaka*); each of these is in turn examined by three pairs of questions with regard to root, having the same root, or having reciprocal roots.

I.2 (E54-57) Commentary on selected terms used in the questions and answers, e.g., three good phenomena are included within the group

of good roots, i.e., the absence of greed, hatred, and confusion. The remaining good phenomena such as contact are not. Mental phenomena include the four mental aggregates and liberation.

II.1 (E57-61) Questions and answers on the aggregates classified according to a fourfold method of analysis: (1) examination of terms, (2) series based on the examination of terms, in which each aggregate is examined in relation to the others, (3) simple aggregates, (4) the series based upon the examination of simple aggregates.

II.2 (E61-69) Discussion of the marks origination, destruction, and both as applied to persons, places and both under six divisions of time: past, present, future, present-past, present-future, and past-future. For example, present phenomena which arise for persons are understood through direct perception; past phenomena, through prior experience based on direct perception; and future phenomena, through an inference based upon prior experience of direct perception. A further division of questions into four types, based upon the number of terms (one or two), sound and unsound questions, and answers into five types, based upon how the meaning of the term is determined from the text, the reply, similarity, negation, or exclusion, occurs. These types are further subdivided into 27 classes with reference to person, place, and combinations of the two.

II.3 (E69-71) Discussion of the person's full understanding of the aggregates in regard to the transcendent path of noble persons.

III (E71-76) Discussion of the twelve bases under the same fourfold method of analysis and in regard to persons and places under the same six divisions of time as in II.1-3.

IV (E76-77) Same method of analysis applied to the elements.

V (E77-79) Discussion of the arising and ceasing of three of the noble truths, the exception being the truth of cessation, which neither arises nor ceases. The section on full understanding mentions three types: full understanding of the known, full understanding as investigating, and full understanding as abandoning. Since these three types of understanding do not apply to transcendent phenomena, there are two truths, i.e., conventional and ultimate.

VI.1 (E79-81) Explanation of the expressions "bodily formations", "verbal formations", and "mental formations". "Bodily formations", here used as an equivalent for in and out breathing, is so called because it refers to the body which arises from karma, its cause. Verbal formations consist of applied and sustained thought, which give rise to speech. The

mental formations designate the mental factors, e.g., identification and feeling, which arise simultaneously with mind.

VI.2 (E81-83) Discussion of the arising and ceasing of these formations, e.g., bodily formations do not arise at the moments of dying and rebirth.

VII (E84-98) Discussion of the seven proclivities, sensual desire (E87-88), hatred (E89-90), pride (E90-91), erroneous views (E91), doubt (E91), desire for existence (E91), and ignorance (E91), as arranged in seven sections: (1) proclivities, (2) possessed of proclivities, (3) abandoning the proclivities, (4) full understanding, (5) abandoned proclivities, (6) arising of proclivities, and (7) their spheres. The discussion of which people, e.g., ordinary people, stream-enterers, once-returners, non-returners, and *arhat*s, possess these proclivities and in which of the levels the possession occurs is much the same as in the first section, e.g., sensuous desire arises in ordinary people, stream-enterers, and once-returners and occurs on the sensuous level with regard to pleasant and neutral sensations. The other sections, with the exception of the arising of the proclivities which is said to have been discussed in the first section, are briefly mentioned: the path is the means for ordinary people, etc., to abandon the proclivities (E95); full understanding refers to the three types (E95); the proclivities are abandoned once the path is cultivated (E95-96); and for which persons and in which place the proclivities arise depends upon action and its maturation (E96-98).

VIII Discussion of the arising and ceasing of consciousness in regard to persons, phenomena, and both (E98-102). E.g., for persons whose proclivities have been exhausted, e.g., the *arhat*, the consciousness of dying arises in one moment, but at that time the moment of destruction has not yet occurred. After the moment of destruction has occurred, the consciousness of this person will cease and no longer arise because of the absence of rebirth-consciousness.

IX Discussion (E102-104) of the arising, cessation, and both of good, bad, and neutral phenomena with reference to persons, places, and both, according to the six divisions of time. The third section is entitled "cultivation" rather than "full understanding" since good phenomena are to be cultivated (bad phenomena are to be abandoned, and neutral phenomena neither cultivated nor abandoned).

X Discussion (E104-107) of the 22 faculties, according to the method of analysis developed for the aggregates; because of the number

of aggregates and the series of paired questions which analyze them this is the longest topic treated by the *Yamaka*.

52. AUTHOR UNKNOWN (ascribed to Buddhaghosa), *Aṭṭhakathā* on the *Paṭṭhāna*

Summary by Bimala Churn Law[74]

"This is a commentary on the most difficult of the seven Abhidhamma treatises known as *Paṭṭhāna* or *Mahāpakaraṇa*. The most important dissertation on the subject of the twenty-four *paccaya*s or relations is found in the first two sections, namely, *uddesavāra* and *niddesavāra*. Buddhaghoṣa's explanations of the relations differ, in some respects at least, from the treatment of the subject by Vasubandhu in his *Abhidiharmakośa*. In this work Buddhaghoṣa rightly points out that the term *hetu* is employed neither in the Nyāya sense of the major premise in a syllogism nor in the philosophical sense of cause (*kāraṇa*); it is employed just in the psycho-ethical sense of 'motive' or 'spring of action' (*mūlaṭṭena*)."

53.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (ascribed to Buddhaghosa), *Aṭṭhakathā* on the *Dhātukathā*

Summary by Bimala Churn Law[75]

"This is a commentary written by Buddhaghosa on the third book of the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* presumably at the request of the Bhikkhu or Yati Buddhaghosa. It has fourteen sections containing interpretations of the five *khandha*s (constituents), twelve *āyatana*s (spheres), sixteen *dhātu*s (elements), and the like."

54.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (ascribed to Buddhaghosa), *Aṭṭhakathā* on the *Puggalapaññatti*

Summary by Bimala Churn Law[76]

"This commentary has an important dissertation on the *Paññatti*s or concepts classified and defined according to three different *naya*s or methods, namely, the *Pālinaya*, the *Aṭṭhakanaya*, and the *Ācarīyanaya*. According to the first method, these are to be classified as the concepts of *sacca*, *khandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, *indriya* and *puggala*, the last forming the subject-matter of the treatise itself. According to the second method, we are to discuss the logical significance of the concepts divided into two groups of six each. According to the third method, too, the concepts are to be considered as divided into two groups of six each..."

BUDDHADATTA (425)

B. C. Law writes: "Buddhadatta was born in a town called Uragapura, which was in the Kaveri kingdom of the Colas.[77] Buddhadatta, we are told, came back from the island of Sri Lanka after failing in his attempt to translate back into Pāli all the commentaries and sub-commentaries on the Master's teaching which were stored up in Singhalese. At the same time Buddhaghosa was on his way to Sri Lanka to undertake the same great task. It is said that when the two ships met the two great authors greeted one another and on hearing of Buddhaghosa's plans, Buddhadatta said, 'I could not fulfill my wish to complete the task that you now intend to do. I could only do such lesser works as the Jinālaṅkāra and the Dantadhāubodhivaṁsa. When you accomplish the task kindly send your works to me so that I may summarise them'. Buddhaghosa, it seems, did complete the task and send his work as promised. Buddhadatta is said to have composed his *Vinayavinicchaya* from Buddhaghosa's *Samantapasādika* and his *Abhidhammāvatāra* from the Abhidhamma commentaries."

K.R.Norman points out that the story in Vācissara's *Vinayasāratthadīpanī* agrees that Buddhadatta made summaries of Buddhaghosa's works which were translations of the Sinhalese *Aṭṭhakathās*.

According to the *Gandhavaṁsa* Buddhadatta wrote the two works summarized here plus two more, the *Vinayavinicchaya* and *Uttaravinicchaya*, which are summaries of the *Vinayapiṭaka*. K.R.Norman expresses doubt that Buddhadatta did indeed summarize Buddhaghosa's works--he doesn't say he did. A commentary on the *Buddhavaṁsa*, ascribed to Buddhadatta, must have been compiled at a later date.[78]

C. V. Udaya Sankar reports that Buddhadatta "wrote the *Vinayavinicchaya* in a monastery at Bhutamangala in the heart of the Chola kingdom", and wrote the commentary on the *Buddhavaṁsa* "while residing at Kaveripattana, a sea port that seems to have been modern Puhar at the mouth of the Cauvery". The commentary is titled *Madhuratthavilāsinī*.

55.BUDDHADATTA, *Abhidhammāvatāra*

"E" references are to the edition by A.P. Buddhadatta, Pali Text Society 7, London 1915. The edition and translation (Delhi 1987) by Mahesh Tiwari contains a lengthy summary of this work.

"T" references are to the two volume edition in Burmese script of the *Ṭīkā* of Sumaṅgala, now available in the Vipassana Research Institute's 'Dhammagīti' CD-ROM. "Porāṇaṭīkā" refers to the small commentary of unknown authorship found in Volume One of the same work of Sumaṅgala's.

Summary by Lance S. Cousins

1. The *Abhidhammāvatāra* or 'Entrance to Abhidhamma' is a survey of the basic notions of the systematic Abhidhamma as it had developed down to the closure of the *aṭṭhakathā* literature in Sinhalese Prakrit. It consists of 24 chapters. In the first thirteen the ground covered closely parallels Buddhaghosa's Abhidhamma commentaries, especially the *Aṭṭhasālinī* (Asl) and the *Sammohavinodanī*, but omitting matter which relates specifically to the canonical texts concerned. Chapter XIV of the *Visuddhimagga* (Vism) also contains much corresponding material. The next ten chapters of *Abhidhammāvatāra* give an account of the path very similar to that given in Vism except that no material from the first two chapters of Vism (i.e., the section on *sīla*) is included. The last chapter gives a description of the system of 24 conditions.

2. The work is mainly in verse but prose sections are used for technical material and in order to present controversial issues in debate form. Numbering in this summary refers to the verses, pagination ("pp.") to the pages of E. A verse number followed by f. indicates prose matter subsequent to the verse indicated (e.g., 21f.).

3. (E1-7) Introduction. Before commencing the first chapter Buddhadatta pays homage to the three jewels and gives a brief statement

of the preaching of the Abhidhamma in the godly realm. He refers to developing skill in the 'highest *piṭaka*' in order to break down the 'door of delusion' which prevents entry to the 'great city of *abhidhamma*.' He concludes the introduction by emphasizing that the work should be read with a concentrated mind.

4. (E1-15) Verses 8-66. Chapter One: Factors are declared to be of four kinds: awareness *(citta)*, associated or concomitant mental factors (*cetasika*), matter/form (*rūpa*) and liberation (*nirvāṇa*) This is apparently the first explicit occurrence of this important distinction, although it is implied in the couplet *mātikā* of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*.

5. The chapter enumerates the types of awareness in much the same manner as *Visuddhimagga* 452-7, but following a slightly different order for neutral awareness. That followed in *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* is slightly different from either. In general Buddhadatta includes almost everything in the *Visuddhimagga* lists but makes some additional points. Notably he gives more numeric breakdowns: onefold, twofold, threefold and the like. Vism tends to give only the minimum necessary; e.g., Vism refers to awareness as onefold and threefold initially whereas Buddhadatta adds twofold.

6. Good (*kusala*) awareness (10-27): 21 kinds, divided initially into four levels (*bhūmi*) of desire (*kāmāvacara*) and so on, dealt with in sequence. The term *kāmāvacara* is discussed, distinguishing between desire (as the defilement which loves) and desires (as the objects which are loved). *Kāmāvacara* refers to the type of awareness which frequents the region in which the two kinds of desire predominate, i.e., the eleven lowest forms of existence (4 lower, human, 6 divine realms). Alternatively it is the type of awareness which brings about rebirth in that region (19).

7. The eight desire-level skilful types of awareness are described as at Vism 452-3 but adding mention of the ten bases for making merit (Asl 157 foll., cf. also 77 foll.). Buddhadatta also adds a mention that the eight can be further analyzed into 17,280 types (27). According to the twelfth century *Ṭīkā* this is made up by multiplying the eight awarenesses by: 10 bases, 8 objects of sense, 4 dominating factors, 3 kinds of action (body, speech and mind) and distinguishing them all into weak, medium and refined.

8. The remaining levels of good awareness are enumerated as in Vism with additional numeric breakdowns. "Material" level (*rūpāvacāra*) awareness, for example, is twofold because it can occur in two of the

three levels of existence (i.e., of desire and material). It is manifold because of the many different meditational objects which can give rise to it. Material realm awareness is, for example, single because it can only be joined with one kind of feeling (equanimity). Transcendent awareness is single because it has only one type of object, i.e., the unconditioned factor of *nibbāna*, but is, for example, twentyfold when analyzed by its four types together with the five meditation factors. Buddhadatta also mentions which fetters are abandoned at each of the four stages of transcendent awareness.

9. Bad awareness (29-31): 12 kinds. Apart from additional numeric breakdowns for unskilful awareness in general, Buddhadatta describes this in the same way as does Vism 454.

10. Maturational (*vipāka*)[1] awareness (pp. 7-12): 36 kinds. Desire level maturation is taken first. Within that, skilful maturation is first divided into caused and causeless. The caused skilful maturations are the eight great maturations (*mahāvipāka* (as at Vism 455-6) which occur as *bhavaṅga* and similar awarenesses (31-32). Buddhadatta points out that these eight awarenesses cannot produce *vijñapti*, can only have small objects and occur only in the reealm of desire. He also explains why they can never be accompanied by compassion, restraint, the three kinds of unmanifest matter or the four dominant factors (37-399).

11. Causeless maturational awareness (42 ff.) is of eight kinds (Vism 454-5). Almost everything found in the Vism account is given here. Buddhadatta adds a fivefold analysis and one or two others. He also specifies seven types of person for whom skilful maturational mental consciousness elements can be the rebirth-linking and *bhavaṅga* awarenesses.

12. The remaining thirteen good maturations belong to the three higher levels (42 -53). They are listed as at Vism 456, but Buddhadatta discusses why the maturational awarenesss are categorized in exactly the same way as the corresponding good awarenesss (44-47). He points out that these awarenesses cannot be the result of actions performed in an earlier life than the one immediately previous, at least in the case of an individual who has not fallen away from meditation. He adds that the

[1]Cousins notes that the rendering of "*vipāka*" as "maturational" is based upon Tibetan doctrinal biases, i.e. Sautrāntika doctrines of the "seed".

four dominant factors occur in the transcendent maturational awareness but not in any other maturational awarenesses and also refers briefly to the discussion of the use of the terms "empty", "signless" and "aimless" for different kinds of maturational awareness (50-51; cf.Asl 221-5).

13. The seven bad maturational awarenesses again correspond closely to the treatment at Vism 456 and 457.

14. *Kiriyā* awareness (55-62). Twenty kinds. It is divided in accordance with the three levels (excluding transcendent) with the first level split into caused and causeless. Caused *kiriyā* is eightfold as at Vism 457.

15. Causeless *kiriyā* awareness (pp.12-13) is of three kinds. To a straightforward treatment Buddhadatta adds (in the context of the mental consciousness element with pleasant feeling) an account of the thirteen laughing awarenesses. Laughter takes place by means of one of the desire-level awarenesses accompanied by pleasant feeling.

16. The *kiriyā*s of the two higher levels (57 ff.) are enumerated. Buddhadatta points out that these differ from the corresponding good awarenesses in that they are not meritorious acts of cultivation but a kind of quasi-cultivation. Presumably the point is that *arhat*s have no need to develop the path. He also makes the interesting comment that if an *arhat* has developed meditation prior to becoming an *arhat*, his attainment (*samāpatti*) remains good until he next enters meditation (58-9). Buddhadatta also comments that there are no transcendent *kiriyā*s because the path occurs for only one moment (61).

17. At intervals during this chapter and throughout most of the book we find verses of a more "poetic" kind, employing alliteration and other stylistic features (e.g., 29, 31, 55, 62, 66). These are probably intended to lighten the dryness of Abhidharma enumeration.

18. Chapter Two: Explanation of accompanying mental factors or (mental) concomitants (*cetasika*) (67-88; pp.16-28). These are defined either as closely joined (*samprayukta*) with awareness or as existing in awareness. Then the concomitants which occur in the first type of awareness are enumerated, first the 29 explicitly mentioned (in the canonical texts) and invariably present, then the four which are invariably present but are taken as referred to obliquely in the canonical literature under the heading of "or whatever others", and finally the five which are not necessarily present in this kind of awareness but may occur. The list is more or less as at Vism 462-3, but with the addition of feeling and identification which Vism treats elsewhere under their respective

aggregates.

19. Buddhadatta points out that loving kindness and equanimity are not included in the third category because they count as faultless and middling (*tatramajjhattatatā*) (in the first and second categories respectively). He then raises the question as to why the factors of the second and third categories are not specifically mentioned (i.e., in *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*). He gives three reasons: (a) some (i.e., those in the third category) are not necessarily present, (b) some are omitted because they do not belong to one of the groupings of factors (in *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*), (c) some are omitted because they are weak (71-2).

20. He then discusses the reason why contact is placed first in the list (74-80). This is a versified version of the arguments also found at Asl 107-8.

21. Then the speaking, definitions, function, proximity and usually the footing of these 38 factors are given, as at Vism 463-467. Buddhadatta does, however, cite a variant opinion in regard to the kinds of unmanifest matter (*virati*) (p. 21 below). The differences for the remaining good awarenesses are then given as at Vism 467.

22. Bad awareness and its factors are then dealt with in the same way (pp. 22-26; cf. Vism 468-71). Then come resultant (pp. 26-7) and *kiriya* (pp. 27-8). The treatment includes the descriptions as at Vism 471-2 but follows the same order as in Chapter One.

23. Buddhadatta adds a discussion of the reason why the sensory consciousnesses (excluding touch) have only calm feeling. This is attributed to the fact that they involve contact between clinging matter, whereas touch involves the powerful impact of (three of) the primary elements upon the tranquil matter (vv.84-6).

24. Chapter Three: Explanation of the distribution of concomitant awarenesses (89-126; pp.29-31). Buddhadatta now lists the 52 concomitant awarenesses and specifies the 121 clinging awarenesses (89-90). He then goes through the concomitant awarenesses in order, detailing in mnemonic verses how many awarenessess each concomitant is associated with (93-113). Finally he examines meditation factors, organs, path factors and powers. In each case he specifies how many awarenesses have e.g. five factors and so on (114-126). He notes that meditation factors do not occur in the sensory consciousnesses and path factors are absent from all causeless awarenesses.

25. Chapter Four: Explanation by numerical groups (127-128; pp.32-5). This is clearly intended to develop facility in the system, both

in terms of ease of recall and to increase the understanding of Ābhidharmika monks (127).

26. Awareness is single because all awareness has the nature of discriminating (*vijanana*). It is of two kinds as causeless and caused (128-30). It is of three kinds with regard to base (*vastu*), i.e., with, without or either (131-134). Similarly with regard to supporting object, i.e., having one, having five or having six. Interestingly the first kind includes not only the sensory consciousnesses, but also the transcendent awarenesses and even the *mahāgatta* awarenesses (apart from the higher faculties). The second kind is of course the three types of mind element. Again awareness is of three kinds as being good, bad or neutral (135-8).

27. Awareness is of four kinds with regard to cause, i.e., having none, having one, having two or having three (139-42). This simply follows *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*. Another analysis into four kinds concerns which types of awareness can affect matter/form in which ways. (a) 32 kinds of awareness originate material entities, control modes of activity and communicate (*vijñapti*); (b) higher consciousnesses do not generate physical communication; (c) most of the remaining types of consciousness can only originate matter/form; (d) the fourth group of 16 awarenesses do not affect matter/form in any way, i.e., the sensory consciousnesses, immaterial resultants, all rebirth-linking awarenesses and the dying awareness of an *arhat* (143-50).

28. Awareness is of five kinds with regard to the consciousness process (P. *citta-vīthi*) according as it occurs in only one position of the ten, in two, three, four or five (151-165). It is of six kinds by division into the six consciousnesses but sevenfold with regard to the consciousness elements (165-166). It can be divided into eight kinds: the five sensory consciousnesses, the higher consciousnesses which can only be supporting objects of factors, mind element and the remaining mental consciousness element because these can have either a single specified object, or five objects only, or any of the six kinds of object.

29. The sevenfold list is subdivided in various ways to lists of nine kinds, of ten kinds, of eleven kinds and twelve kinds. A list of fourteen kinds is derived from the consciousness process. Finally awareness is declared to be manifold, given the diversity of levels and persons.

30. Chapter Five: Explanation of the Arising of Awareness (182-2-90). This gives an account of which awarenesses occur in which levels and to which kinds of individuals. Thirty levels are employed: the four lower realms (*apāya*), human beings, six kinds of desire-level gods, five

in the Pure Abodes and ten other kinds of Brahmās on the material level, four kinds of immaterial Brahmās. The thirty-first level of the nonidentifying is omitted, since it is without awareness. After mentioning that persons can be similarly classed as thirty and that twenty kinds of person can be distinguished from the point of view of rebirth-linking, Buddhadatta concentrates upon an elevenfold classification. Three kinds of ordinary person are distinguished according as their *bhavaṅga* awareness is causeless, two-caused or three-caused (v.188).

31. Most of the content of this chapter can be derived from the final Dhammahadaya section of the *Vibhaṅga*, but Buddhadatta arranges it very simply and systematically.

32. First of all he explains how many awarenesses are found in all 30 levels, then how many in each of the three levels and how many in two or three of them, then how many in 26 levels, 25 levels, 24, 23, 22, 21, 17, 11, 7, 6, 3 or in just one level (190-205). Then he goes through the levels in ascending order: 37 awarenesses can occur to beings in the four descents, 80 occur to human beings and desire-level gods, 65 on the lower material levels, 51 in the pure abodes, 46 can occur on the immaterial level (206-14).

33. Various items can easily be extracted from all of this. In the four lower realms no higher consciousness can occur. Also the *bhavaṅga* mind there is impoverished: always unskilful maturations and lacking the richness of the normal *bhavaṅga* mind of the human level. Human beings and desire-level gods have the widest range of experience, but cannot experience the nine awarenesses which act as rebirth-linking and *bhavaṅga* in the two higher meditative levels. Sensory experience in the material level is restricted to seeing and hearing. (The young Aristotle appears to have held a similar view.) Hatred does not occur to beings in the two higher levels. Brahmās of the pure abodes do not experience doubt or fixed view. Awarenesses connected with sensory experience do not occur to beings of the immaterial level.

34. In the next section the eleven persons are taken in ascending order and placed in the various levels also in ascending order. Some examples to illustrate this: 54 awarenesses can occur to an ordinary person born in the Brahmā realms; 50 awarenesses can occur to a stream-enterer who is a human being; 44 can occur to a human *arhat*; 31 awarenesses can occur to a once-returner who is reborn on the first meditative level; in the pure abodes 31 awarenesses can occur to a never-returner, 27 to an *arhat*; 21 awarenesses are possible for an

ordinary person in the fourth immaterial level; 17 are possible for the stream-enterer there. Most unified of all is the mentality of an *arhat* born on the fourth immaterial level. He can experience only 12 awarenesses

35. It is again possible to extract a few points of special interest. A defective human being with a causeless *bhavaṅga* is like the inhabitants of the four lower realms in that he never experiences the caused good maturations. These would occur to a normal human being as adventitious, e.g., on viewing attractive scenery, producing a temporary state of passive goodness (215-6). Again those whose *bhavaṅga* awareness lacks wisdom can never experience adventitious life-continua with wisdom (217) nor can they experience any *mahāgatta* or transcendent awarenesses (218-19).

36. Beings reborn in any of the four meditational levels are still able to develop all four material meditations and all four immaterial meditations too (228-31). This is not the case with beings born in the immaterial level, who do not experience either material awarenesses or immaterial awarenesses of a level lower than their own. So a Brahmā reborn on the first immaterial level can experience all four good immaterial awarenesses, but one reborn on the fourth level can only experience the fourth of the good immaterial awarenesses (247-273, especially 261-262).

37. In the final section of the chapter various groupings are pointed out. 19 awarenesses occur only to *arhat*s. 13 awarenesses occur both to ordinary beings and to never-returners in addition to the 17 which occur both to all three kinds of ordinary beings and to all four "bearers of noble bodies." Various other such combinations are considered (274-85).

38. Throughout the work Buddhadatta adds little encouraging verses to relieve the aridity of constant enumeration and motivate the reader. This chapter concludes with two examples:

"After examining what is before and after and thinking again and again, the person of penetration should search out and grasp the meaning. The man who constantly and thoroughly ponders and recites this extremely pithy *Entrance to Abhidhamma* - in high degree a light to the darkness of the delusion of beings - him greed and hate will not long approach (289-90)."

39. Chapter Six: Analysis of supporting object (291-375). In Abhidharma awareness is seen as necessarily supported by an object. An unsupported awareness is not conceivable since awareness is precisely defined as that which discriminates an object. The activity of

differentiating is what is labelled *citta* or *vijñāna*. In the sixth chapter Buddhadatta takes up the subject of the various objects which different awarenesses can have. In fact the basis for his discussion is the early elaboration of this topic in *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* and its matrix with some material from the *Paṭṭhāna*

40. First, however, he defines the six types of supporting object (292-306). The *dharma*-object is defined as covering everything other than the objects of the five senses; it includes even the three marks which are the object of insight and also the various kinds of nominal designations. Buddhadatta rejects the notion that sensory objects which are too brief or too small to be perceived by the sensory consciousness would be supporting object factors. In other words he accepts that the mind when operating to perceive such things would be classifed as e.g. a supporting object of a material thing

41. The different awarenesses are then examined from the standpoint of the matrix triplet: (a) having a small object, (b) having a large object, (c) having a measureless object (306-320). 25 awarenesses can only be (a). This means that they can only take as their object material or desire-level awarenesses and concomitants, not nominal designations. Of these 13, all causeless, can only have matter/form as their object. Notably the eight great resultants and the three kinds of investigating are included in (a). These include every kind of *bhavaṅga* possible to beings on the material level.

42. Two kinds of immaterial-level awareness can only be (b). Transcendent awarenesses can only be (c) - their object is always liberation. 20 awarenesses lacking wisdom can be (a) or (b) or triplet-excluded i.e. with nominal designations as their object. 11 others (10 with wisdom + the determining consciousness) can also be (c). All the remaining awarenesses can only be triplet-excluded, in most cases because their object is a nominal designation.

43. The next section employs the triplet: (a) having a past object, (b) having a future object, (c) having a present object (321-27). The 2 + 5 sensory consciousness naturally come into category (c), while all awarenesses whose object is liberation or a nominal designation are triplet-excluded. This is presumably because they are nontemporal in nature.

44. Then follow several groupings (328-38). The main point seems to be that it is not possible to know that part of the mind of another which is beyond one's own highest level of attainment. Eleven

awarenesses can know *nirvāṇa*, transcendent, material-level and immaterial-level awarenesses, but only six of them (all karmic) can have the path or fruit of *arhat*ship as their object.

45. Buddhadatta then proceeds in order through the types of awareness - good, bad, maturational and *kiriya* (339-56). He lists for which groups each type of awareness can be the supporting object condition. The same is then done with matter, liberation and nominal designations in order. Then follows a section dealing with the complications which arise for immaterial level awarenesses due to the fact that the second and fourth immaterial meditations have as their object the first and third respectively (366-74).

46. Chapter Seven: Explanation of the occurrence of maturational awareness (376-474).[79]

47. Buddhadatta begins by pointing out that the list of awarenesses includes 29 which are actions and 32 which are maturations (377). "With one volition one relinking has been made known" (379). Each action is like a seed which can give rise to only one shoot. This is not quite rigid, since there is some variety in the possible rebirth-linking awarenesses which can arise from a given act, but there could only be one rebirth-linking from a given volition. Variations are allowed, but must follow the principle that variation is from stronger to weaker and not vice versa, e.g., three-caused action can lead to two-caused rebirth-linking but not the reverse way round (380-384).

48. The implication of the simile is that the shoot will then give rise to many different fruits (414); for "with one good feeling there are sixteen maturational awarenesses" (385). This leads into a discussion of various aspects of sensory experience.

49. Two important points are made. Firstly it is emphasized that at the stage of initial sensory processing the nature of the feeling is entirely controlled by the nature of the object (386). If this is strongly desirable, then the feeling is pleasant. If only moderately desirable, then the feeling will be neutral. Of course if it is undesirable, the feeling will be neutral or unpleasant and the maturational awarenesses will be unskilful maturations. This means that the initial feeling is a mechanical response to the external sensory stimulus. Even at the exercitive stage this may still be the case and at the end of the process the feeling of the subsequently supported objects is still governed by that initial stimulus. (Of course subsequent mental process might well overlay this.)

50. The second point concerns the subsequently supported objects.

These always take the same object and closely resemble the exercitives preceding (at least in the paradigm case of skilful exercitives). The significance of saying that it "takes the same supporting object" is that it is a kind of temporary *bhavaṅga* which momentarily displaces the usual *bhavaṅga*. Of course the usual *bhavaṅga* still has the same object as the original action which brought about the life in question. Buddhadatta (like Asl) in fact uses the terms "root *bhavaṅga*," "visiting *bhavaṅga*" and "after *bhavaṅga*" to refer to various types of subsequently supported objects (e.g., 391, 394, and 402). The figure of 16 maturations is made up of the eight great maturations, the five sense consciousnesses, receiving, and two investigating awarenesses, i.e., all 16 good maturational desire-level awarenesses. The texts, however, indicate that this is only applicable if the rebirth-linking awareness was accompanied by wisdom. The different possibilities are spelt out in the text (387-411). If the rebirth-linking awareness was one of the four great maturations lacking wisdom, then the number of possible maturations in sensory activity is reduced to twelve. Since the original action which brought about rebirth lacked wisdom it cannot have as its result any of the four great maturations which are associated with wisdom. The different possibilities are again spelt out (415-29).

52. In the remaining case of defective human birth the action is two-caused, there being no lesser good actions, but rebirth-linking is causeless. Since the subsequently supported object cannot be superior to the rebirth-linking and *bhavaṅga* awarenesses, all eight great maturations are excluded. The number of maturations is then eight and the different possibilities are again spelt out (430-49). This case in effect covers those reborn in the four lower realms. Although their rebirth is the result of bad action and their *bhavaṅga* is a bad maturation (causeless) investigating, they can experience good resultant, i.e., desirable sensory stimuli, but only as a result of the advent of a being of a much higher spiritual order whose intervention can alleviate their condition - the example given is that of Mahāmoggallāna's descent to the hell realm.

53. All of this assumes that the exercitive awarenesses are good. If they are bad, the case is different. Only the causeless awarenesses can follow as subsequently supported object and hate awarenesses cannot be followed by subsequently supported objects with pleasant feeling (451-7). Buddhadatta then raises a dilemma based upon the *Paṭṭhāna* rules for succession condition (458-67; cf. Asl 278). In the case of someone regretting the loss of meditation, a problem arises if the normal *bhavaṅga*

awareness lacks pleasant feeling. The rules do not permit a subsequentlysupported material-level object; so an exercitive awareness with a desire-level object from past experience occurs momentarily.

54. The chapter concludes with a brief account of the five kinds of law (*niyama*) (468-73; cf. Asl 272-4). The five are the laws of cycle (*ṛtu*), seed, action, factor and awareness.

55. Chapter Eight: Explanation of the *Prakīrṇaka*. Asl 279 cites a verse listing a number of similes under the heading of *Pakinnaka-naya* and then comments upon them (Asl 279-84). This chapter begins with the same material (476-511). Most ofit elaborates the sensory process.

56. First comes the simile of the thread of the ground spider in which the ground spider with threads in five directionsis like the mind awaiting stimulation at the five senses (476-488). Buddhadatta intorduces the smile of the bird alighting on a branch at the same moment as its shadow strikes the ground. He then simply refers to other smiles without listing them (497).

57. He then details four condiitons which must concur in order for one of the sensory consciousnesses to arise (498-511; cf. Asl 282-3). For eye consciousness these are (1) a healthy eye, (2) a visual object within the sensory field, (3) light, (4) attention. Similarly in the case of the other senses including mind.

58. After a brief discussion of the nature of the objects of the 19 awarenesses which can be rebirth-linking (512-514), the 11 kinds of subsequently supported object awareness are discussed (515-532). Subsequently supported object awareness is completely absent from both the material and the immaterial levels. The reason given for this is that the seed for relinking awarenesses on those levels cannot beget subsequently supported objects when a sensory process occurs (520). The point seemt to be that a subsequently supported object is normally produced because the passive state (rebirth-linking or *bhavaṅga*) being a desire-level state still has a tendency to be concerned with sense objects and can therefore incloide to take a sensory object during sensory stimulation. Materil-level awareness has no such tendency and so a subsequently supported object does not occur. The fact that some sense consciousnesses do occur on those levels is not a valid objection, since they are produced by the power of the senses and not because of a tendency towards sensory objects in the passive state.

59. Other cases where a subsequently supported object does not occur

occur are listed in some detail (523-31). It does not follow higher or supernormal exercitive awarenesses. The reason given is that it only follows a desire-level exercitive which resembles the kinds of awareness which produce subsequently supported object awareness. In other words if, for example, material-level exercitives were followed by material-level maturational awarenesses performing the function of a subsequently supported object, those maturational awarenesses would not have a suitable producing action - a desire-level action acting as seed to produce the shoot of desire-level rebirth-linking will not be able to bear as its fruit a material-level subsequently supported object.

60. Nor can a subsequently supported object occur when the exercitive has as its object higher consciousness. This is because such objects are unfamiliar. Moreover the authority of the *Aṭṭhakathā*s is cited in support of a list of exercitives which are not followed by subsequently supported objects; exercitives whose object is name and family, nominal designations or the three marks (i.e., strong insight meditation); exercitives which are factors fated to wrongness; exercitives whose object is higher factors, transcendent factors or even the rebirth-linking knowledges.

61. The more normal case of sensory process in the four lower realms as opposed to the exceptional case (above 51) is then described (535-6). Now only seven maturations would occur: the five sense consciousnesses, receiving and investigating - all bad resultants. Rebirth-linking would always be bad resultant investigating.

62. *Kiriyā* is distinguished as of two kinds: not exercitive and exercitive. The former is "just doing" like "a wind-blown flower." Those which occur as exercitive (i.e., to *arhat*s) are nevertheless without karmic fruit like "the flower of a tree whose root has been cut"'(537-8).

63. The remainder of the chapter is concerned with various aspects of conditionality (539-58). A condition for a given factor is defined as "whatever factor assists the arising or continuation of that factor." Other terms meaning cause or "producing" are viewed as synonyms for condition.

64. Causal condition (*hetupratyaya*) is discussed in detail. It is defined as "that which assists in the sense of being the root." This is explained as meaning that it brings about goodness for good factors, bad for bad, etc., in the other cases. Buddhadatta rejects this on the grounds that the explanation does not cover the case of matter/form factors which are conditioned by one of the six (or nine) causes. He prefers the

explanation that a cause functions as a root in the sense of making a factor well-established (541-547).

65. The different factors which can be conditioned by cause condition are listed (548-554). Then the four dominant conditions are listed. "Dominant condition" is defined as "that which assists in the sense of being chief." It may be noted that causal condition is the first of the 24 conditions while dominant condition is the third. Object condition, which is the second, was covered in Chapter Six.

66. Chapter Nine: Explanation of the conditions for good resultants (560-621; pp.60-63). The chapter begins with a description of which resultants occur in different levels of being as a result of good, bad or neutral traces. The levels of being are classified in terms of a series of lists - 3 existences (*bhava*), 4 origins (*yoni*), 5 courses, 7 stands of consciousness and 9 abodes of beings, but only the first is given in full. The case of rebirth-linking (and life-continuum) is distinguished from the situation of mental activity during the course of life.

67. The eight desire-level wills which are fortunate manufacturers are conditions at rebirth-linking for nine desire-level maturations in a pleasant course on the level of desire in two ways: (a) by the condition of action applying to various moments; (b) by the condition of determination (*upaniścaya*) (563-564). The various other cases are then set out, varying the type of manufacturer and the level of being (565-86).

68. Buddhadatta then discusses the nature of the change from one life to the beginning of the next (587-90). Material and immaterial do not cross over from one life to the next "because it is a past state," i.e., a causally produced state of being has dissolved. Because there is no crossing over, it follows that awareness will not appear without a cause (588). It is simply material and immaterial as product of conditions which arise. There is no person who transmigrates to another state.

69. The next section describes the sequence of rebirth-linking which is "very hard to understand" (591-599). Taking as its starting point the dying body in which the senses have perished, the awareness is dependent upon the heart base. At this point it takes as its object some previously performed action or something symbolizing that, whether a fortunate act or an unfortunate one. The danger in that object is concealed by ignorance. Craving inclines consciousness towards it and the conascent traces impel the mind onto it. The actual process of transition between one life and the next is compared to crossing a watercourse by means of a rope. The near bank is compared to the body as the support condition

for consciousness in the previous life, while the far bank is compared to the new body of the next life as the new support condition for the rebirth-linking awareness.

70. Buddhadatta again takes up the nature of the transition and discusses various possible objections (600-620, cf. Vism 555). The rebirth-linking awareness has not come here from the former life, but neither has it arisen spontaneously from nothing since it could not appear without karma and other causes. He cites the examples of an echo, light or the impression of a seal to illustrate this.

71. The connection is one of serial continuity (*saṁtāna*); hence there is neither identity nor difference. If continuity means that subsequent things remain identical, then milk would always remain milk and never become curds. If it means that they become different, then the owner of the milk would not own the curds. Hence complete identity or complete difference are equally unacceptable.

72. An objection to this is possible. Given that there is no transmigration of the aggregates from one life to another and given therefore that there is equally no transmigration of the original karma either, why should we not regard the result as related to a different person or the product of a different karma? Buddhadatta quotes a verse from the commentarial tradition in reply. The point is illustrated by a simile referring to the practise of dressing seeds with honey in order to produce sweeter fruit at a later stage. The fruit is not identical with either the seed or the honey. However, seed is part of the same continuity and would not have been sweet without the honey acting as a condition. Similarly skills acquired in childhood bear fruit in old age (607-15).

73. A dilemma is then raised by asking whether the action which is the condition for the fruit is existent or nonexistent. If the former it would occur at the same time as its result. If the latter, then it could equally operate at other times and bear fruit constantly. Buddhadatta again cites a commentarial verse in reply which gives the simile of a guarantee for repayment. It is the fact that action has been performed that is relevant, not whether it still exists or not.

74. Chapter Ten: Explanation of matter/form (622-767; pp. 64-78). It is defined as that which is afflicted (*rūpati*). Alternatively it is that which reveals (*rūpāyati*). The four great elements are distinguished from the 24 dependents (*utpāda*). For each the name is explained (i.e., the *vacanakathā*). Then the defining mark, function and proximity are given for each one. These terms are defined (633-634). The mark is either the

general nature or the essential characteristic of a factor. Its *rasa* is either its function or its quality. Its proximity is either its result or the way in which it manifests. Which of these alternatives is intended seems to vary with the context.

75. The basic list is identical (apart from a slight variation of order) with that used in Vism. Almost identical definitions are given (632-695; cf. Vism 433 foll.). Only a few additional points can be mentioned.

76. Buddhadatta gives a brief account of the five kinds of "eye made by wisdom" as well as of the more material kinds of eye (vv.635-656; cf. Asl 306 foll.). He rejects the theory (attributed by Vacissara's *Ṭīkā* to some among the Mahāsaṁghikas) that the difference between the senses is due to a difference in the predominating element - energy, fire/light for the eye, space for the ear, wind for the nose, water for the tongue and earth for the tactile organ. He does not cite the alternative theory which gives wind for the ear, earth for the nose and all for the body (cf. Asl 312 foll.; Vism. 444). The reason given for rejecting such theories is that the matter which forms the effective portions of the sense-organs is precisely a state of tranquility of the four elements.

77. The nature of the female (and male) sense-organs is discussed (664-672 f.; Asl 321 foll.). The female organ is produced by weak good action, the male by strong good action. Even a hermaphrodite would have only one of these two senses; in such a case the sexual appearance would not be produced by the sense-organ but by karma- supported passionate awareness.

78. The difference between food in its Abhidharma sense of nourishment and the gross matter of food and drink is explained (675-677 f.; cf. Asl 330-1). The gross matter removes distress due to hunger (explained as karma-born fire). The nourishment protects life. The two act together.

79. Bodily communication (*kāyaviññapti*) is explained as a specific mode of activity of the wind element, acting to produce bodily movement. It takes effect at the seventh exercitive moment; so the wind element can only be referred to as bodily communication when it occurs at that time. It is always consciousness-originated and only occurs in mind-door processes. From another point of view it is simply a form of bodily action. Verbal communication is similar except that it is a specific mode of activity of the earth element, i.e., the hardness of the vocal organs acting to produce sounds. Buddhadatta points out that the two communications are not consciousness-originated in the same sense as the

basic eight material things. It is simply so called because it is a specific alteration of material things which is consciousness-originated (687). It is both the cause of communication and the actual act of communicating (686).

80. The remaining kinds of dependent matter are given standard explanations and definitions. So space is defined as simply a gap in material things (688). Lightness of matter, softness of matter and readiness of matter are explained as "specific modes of activity of matter" (689). Accumulation of matter and continuity of matter are both understood as birth matter. The difference is simply that whereas accumulation refers to the first occurrence, continuity refers to the subsequent birth of a similar matter (692). Aging of matter is considered more evident than aging of non-matter.

81. The next section of the chapter is devoted to explaining a collection (*prakīrṇaka*) (696-742 f.; pp.71-77). Similar but for the most part less complete material is found at Vism 450 foll. and especially at Asl 339 foll., presumably deriving from the old commentaries. Buddhadatta gives five headings in effect for this: (1) summation, (2) origination, (3) the conditioned, (4) objection and refutation, (5) the ascending number of guidelines of analysis.

82. "Summation" refers to the sum total of material factors being 28. The view that sleepiness (*middha*) is a kind of matter (attributed by the *Ṭīkā* to the Abhayagirivāsins) is rejected. Buddhadatta cites *Suttanipāta* 541, *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* 206 and two passages from the *Paṭṭhāna* as textual refutations. A view from the ancient commentary (cf. Vism 450) which expands the list of material factors to 32 is also rejected on the grounds that power (*bala*) matter is a form of the wind element, cohesion is the water element, birth matter is accumulation and continuity, while sickness (*roga*) matter is aging and impermanence. It is however interesting to note that earlier in the chapter (644-647) Buddhadatta does include cohesion and all four elements as distinct items in an enumeration (cf. also 726). Presumably this was an established view in the earlier tradition.

83. "Origination" gives an account of the four modes of origination of material factors: awareness, cycle, food and karma. 26 of the material factors are classified according as they originate from one or more of these. Aging of matter and impermance of matter cannot however be so classified. They are the maturing and breaking up of what is originated (707). If they were themselves originated, they would mature and break

up. By implication there would be an infinite regress.

84. The objection could be brought against this that in that case the same would apply to (the two factors which constitute) birth (cf. Vism 452). This however is denied on the grounds that origination is a designation which refers to the state of being conditioned by a supporting (*janaka*) condition. Birth is so conditioned. Aging and impermanence are not conditioned in this way at their moment of potency (717) and hence cannot be referred to as "being born" or "existing."

85. It can of course be objected that this either implies that they are nonexistent "like a flower in the sky" or that they are permanent like the unconstructed, i.e., liberation. This again is denied on the grounds that they are conditioned by the four elements as support conditions (like the other dependent material factors). Since they exist when the four elements do, they are not nonexistent. Since they do not exist when the four elements do not exist, they are not permanent.

86. (3) "The conditioned" refers to the distinction between the 18 material factors which are produced and the remaining 10 which are unproduced. The 10 unproduced material factors are simply modes of activity (or alterations? *vikāra*) of the 18 kinds of produced matter. Hence they are not unconstructed.

87. (4) "Objection and refutation" brings up an objection to the traditional statement that femaleness or maleness, life, cohesion and also bodily sensitivity are in every place (726-732). "From the highest standpoint one thing within another does not occur," i.e., space is a construction based upon irreducible factors - they are not themselves spatial. This objection is refuted on the ground that what is meant here is simply that difference of place cannot be declared in the case of factors which cannot be separated. Nevertheless there is no mingling. These factors are distinct factors because their marks, function and proximity differ.

88. An elaborate numerical analysis of matter follows (733-742 f.; pp.75-77). All matter is single insofar as it is worldly, not a cause, constructed, capable of being the object of contaminants and dependent upon conditions. It is twofold from various standpoints, threefold from others and so on up to elevenfold and manifold. The 28 varieties of matter are assigned appropriately in each case.

89. The final section (5) of the chapter discusses material bundles and the different realms of being (743-764; pp.77-8). As regards the modes of birth some ghosts, hell beings and most gods always arise

spontaneously. Otherwise all four modes of birth occur.

90. The basic eight material factors are the simple octad. With the life faculty they are the life nonad. With in addition one of the sensory tranquilities, the (heart) base, masculinity or femininity they form the appropriate decad. At conception human beings and mammals would normally have three decads - base decad, body decad and one of the gender decads. The last would be absent in some defective human beings and mammals, as well as being absent in all egg-born creatures. Since the other four senses are operational from conception, beings that arise spontaneously as well as mature human beings have seven decads, i.e., 70 kinds of matter. Brahmās of the material level lack the senses of smell, taste and touch, as well as gender. They have only three decads, but the mass of their body consists of the life nonad - a total of 39 kinds of matter. (This must mean at birth.) Nonidentifying beings have only the life nonad. Human beings who are defective would have less than the full seven decads, but always at least three (body, base and tongue).

91. In summary 27 of the 28 material factors would occur for a given desire-level being, but only 23 for Brahmās. All four kinds of lives occur on the level of desire, i.e., karma-born, mind-born, cycle-born and food-born. The last is absent in the material level. Nonidentifying beings also lack mind-born material factors. The external world has only one kind of life, i.e., cycle-born matter (761). At conception matter is first of all exclusively action-born.

92. Chapter Eleven: Explanation of liberation (768-77; pp. 79-82). Buddhadatta explains "*nirvāṇa*" as "absence of weaving (*vāna*)," i.e., absence of craving which links one life to another life. Peace is its mark; absence of passing away is its quality or bringing security is its function; the signless is its proximity and escape is its result.

93. An objector (according to the *Ṭīkā* this is the Vitaṇḍavādipakkha) argues that from the highest standpoint liberation is not a single entity "because it cannot be apprehended, like the self of sectarians or the horn of a hare." Buddhadatta rejects this on the grounds that it is apprehended "by the wisdom eye of those investigating and by appropriate practice on the part of those seeking it."

94. The objector cites the canonical passage (*Saṁyuttanikāya*.IV 251) in which liberation is referred to as "the destruction of desire" in order to prove that liberation is the mere absence of something and not an existent in its own right. Buddhadatta replies that in the same canonical context an *arhat* is defined in the same way. On the objector's interpretation this

would imply that the supreme supernormal fruit awareness was also the mere absence of desire. In Buddhadatta's view "destruction of desire" is simply the type of figurative expression in which the cause is given the name of its result. Liberation determines the destruction of desire but is not identical with it.

95. Moreover if liberation were nothing but the cessation of desire, then it would be reached whenever desire ceases. Everyone would reach it, not just the saintly. There would be a multiplicity of liberations. *Nirvāṇa* would be constructed and hence impermanent and necessarily frustrating.

96. Again, even if extinction of desire is the object of the fruition awareness, how could it be the object of the prior awarenesses when that extinction has not yet taken place. That being so, what could be the object of those awarenesses?

97. Since the extinction of desire is something which can be brought about by appropriate practice, it could not be the same thing as liberation, which is not brought about by anyone. Buddhadatta cites the passage (*Dhammapada* 97) where the *arhat* is described as "knower of the unmade" in a "punning" verse. Hence liberation, the undying, is unmade, i.e., unconstructed.

98. Discussion then follows of the use of the word "abandoning" (*niḥsaraṇa*) as applied to liberation. Buddhadatta points out that when abandoning of sense objects is referred to, this does not imply the nonexistence of the first meditative level. So there is no reason why escape from "whatever is constructed and dependently originated" should imply the nonexistence of liberation.

99. Buddhadatta then goes on to prove by means of various canonical citations that the Buddha, speaking from the highest standpoint, has referred to liberation as a factor, and in the small triplet he classes it together with the paths and fruits. Since immeasurability could hardly apply to a mere absence, liberation is from the highest standpoint a single existent. It is not then nonexistent as is the *prakṛti* (of Sāṁkhya), the self of sectarians and the horn of a hare.

100. Buddhadatta also rejects the possibility that liberation could be just nominal. He points out that this is ruled out by the small object triplet where the paths and fruits are declared to have an immeasurable object. Those factors whose object is a nominal designation are declared not to have an object which can be defined in terms of this triplet.

101. Liberation, says Buddhadatta, does exist. It is the object

condition for the paths and fruits. It is permanent since it does not arise. It is not matter since it lacks the appropriate characteristics. It is free from all proliferation (*nisprapañca*). He concludes the chapter with four verses listing epithets which refer to *nirvāṇa*:

Ultimate end, deathless, peace, without beginning or end, undecaying,

Subtle and safe refuge, shelter, sanctuary and support,

Untroubled, deep, true, extinction of suffering, free from contaminants,

Very hard to see, other, far shore, liberation, beyond the visible,

Extinguishing of craving, firm, island, free from distress, without troubles,

Passionless and cessation, liberation and freedom too. By these names *nirvāṇa* is spoken of.

102. Chapter Twelve: Explanation of nominal designations (778; pp. 83-4). Buddhadatta treats the topic of nominal designations entirely in prose except for a single concluding verse. He distinguishes two ways of looking at designations. A nominal designation is either (a concept) to be made known or (a label) which makes known. (According to the *Ṭīkā* this is equivalent to the distinction between an object (*artha*) and a name (*nāma*) designation.)

103. Buddhadatta cites the *adhivacana* couplet (*Dhammasaṅgaṇī* 226; *Vinaya* V 176; *Niddesa* I 124, etc.) and gives definitions of the ten words given there as equivalents (including *prajñapti* itself) (much as Asl 390-91). According to him the first four refer to designation in the first sense. In this sense such concepts as the ego, although referring to factors such as matter and although conditioned and caused by them, do not arise and pass away like them but are simply brought about by general agreement. The remaining six refer to the second sense of designation. In this sense a designation is simply the word or label which makes a given factor known.

104. Nominal designation divides into three types: (a) appropriate, (b) dependent, (c) relative. Appropriate designations name realities. Dependent designation is itself of two types - either a compound which refers to a collection of factors such as a bear or hyena, or a simple which is the case with such things as the directions, space, time (signs and so on).

105. It is mind door exercitive consciousness, following ear door exercitive consciousness and taking hold of a prior label, which is

conscious of designation. That designation is then made known by (a further) mind door exercitive consciousness taking hold of the prior label.

106. A set of six is then given, describing the various combinations of (a) designation based upon the existent and (b) designation based upon the nonexistent. For example, "the sound of a woman" would be classified as (a) based upon (b), since sound is a real entity and woman is not. All of these are however included under dependent designation.

107. Relative designation is also a kind of dependent designation. This refers to such cases as long in relation to short, where one concept is related to another.

108. Chapter Thirteen: Penetration of the agent (779-788; pp.85-88). This Chapter also is largely in prose, apart from verse quotations from the canon. It begins with an objection: the skilful and other factors have been explained, but not the self which is the agent of these things. Yet without a self as agent and experiencer there could be no good or bad factors, in which case there could be no resultants. Obviously if there were no results of good and bad factors, there would be no point in teaching about them.

109. Buddhadatta points out in reply that if the nonexistence of an agent might imply the nonexistence of good factors, it would equally imply the nonexistence of the assumed self. If the agent and the self are taken as identical, this must be so. (The point is that if factors are produced by an agent, the agent would be absent whenever the factors are absent. If self and agent are identical, then the self would be impermanent, which of course contradicts the definition of self as the permanent ego.) If on the other hand it is argued that the self persists as the performer even in the absence of an agent who is actually doing something, then there is no valid objection to the occurrence of good and other factors in the absence of an agent. The fact that the objector is fond of the notion of (self as) the performer, is no argument.

110. It can also be compared to the way in which shoots and other parts of plants are produced as a result of such conditions as the elements or the right season. Similarly good and other factors are produced because of a sufficient collection of causes and conditions.

111. If it is said that it is ascertained by wisdom that a self, which is the constant and permanent performer of good and other actions, exists from the highest standpoint then we must examine this. Does this self which is the agent and experiencer, possess volition? If it lacks volition, it would be as incapable of being an agent or experiencer as grass or trees.

112. If it does possess volition, then either the self is the same thing as volition or the two are different. If they are the same thing, then the destruction of volition would entail the destruction of self precisely because they are not different. If the intention is to argue that because self is (by definition) permanent, it is not destroyed even when volition is destroyed, the reply to this is to assert that if self is not destroyed then volition will not be destroyed.

113. For, given that self and volition are held to be identical, it is not reasonable to speak of one being destroyed and the other not. Since they cannot be distinguished, it is just as possible to speak of a self as being destroyed and volition as not being destroyed. Conversely if it is held that when volition is destroyed, self is not destroyed, then it follows that self is different from volition; for destruction of a self, which is not volition, would not entail destruction of volition. So your thesis that self and volition are identical is faulty. Alternatively given no difference between self and volition and the nondestruction of self, there could be no destruction of volition. That however is not the case -the proposition is faulty.

114. In the case of the opposite position -that self and volition are different - the question arises as to precisely what is meant by difference. Is it affirmed that the two are different in characteristic mark or in location? In the first case the difference between self and volition is argued to be parallel to the difference of characteristic mark between such things as visual appearance and taste even when they occur in one place. However if uncooked vegetables are burned by fire, we find that when the visual appearance changes, so does the taste. This is precisely because they occur in one place. If it is claimed that this is not the case with the self and volition, it can be replied that the fact that the two are inseparable implies that one would not be destroyed without the other. If of course they can be separated then this would imply that one could have volition without self (the very proposition which is being denied).

115. If you do not assert that they occur in one location, then the comparison with visual appearance and taste is invalid. So if you do assert that they occur in one location, it follows that the indestructibility of self will entail indestructibiliy of volition. This is unacceptable; so your proposition is faulty .In the converse case the possibility of separation will entail the destruction of self and nondestruction of volition. Otherwise there is no occurrence in one place.

116. In the second case, where the difference between self and volition is held to be one of location, the difference would be like that between a pot and a piece of cloth. If so, they would be quite distinct and there would be no inseparability. The self would lack volition in which case it could not be the agent and experiencer.

117. The objector then responds with a series of passages in which the Buddha speaks in terms of personal identity. Buddhadatta counters this with the claim that such passages were spoken from the conventional viewpoint, not from the highest standpoint, and cites a counterpassage (S I 135).

118. So one should not hang on to just the mere words nor cling to them foolishly and rigidly. It is necessary to "serve the lineage of the teachers," understand the intention of the phrases in the *sūtras* and make an effort to understand their meaning. It is important to understand the two truths--highest and conventional--without confusing them. Having understood these, one should investigate on the basis that there is no permanent fixed self that is the agent or experiencer according to highest truth. Then the wise seeker should develop insight into the occurrence of factors through the concordance of conditions and practice in order to make an end of frustration.

119. Chapter Fourteen: Explanation of the bringing into being of material-level concentration (789-979; pp.89-99). The next five chapters are entirely in verse as are Chapters 20-22. In fact, as mentioned above, most of the remainder of the *Entrance to Abhidharma* consists of a summary of the stages of the path along the same lines as are found in *Viśuddhimagga*.

120. After eight verses praising morality and emphasizing the necessity for it, the ten obstacles are listed (cf. Vism 90 and VinA II 416). After cutting those off, the aspirant should approach the teacher. The qualities of the ideal teacher are briefly described. The aspirant should perform the duties owed to the teacher.

121. The teacher should accept him as student when he knows the character type (*carita*) of the aspirant. The usual list of six character types is given. Then an expanded list of 64 types is mentioned (805; the *Ṭīkā* attributes this to Upanandatthera). The 40 karmic states are listed and assigned to the appropriate character types.

122. The 40 are then analysed from various points of view. Ten bring access, the remainder absorption. The latter are divided in accordance with the level of meditation possible when they are practised.

The *kasiṇa*s have to be increased; the remainder not. 22 karmic states can become semblance signs; the others cannot. 12 (10 foul ones, food and body mindfulness) do not occur for gods. 13 do not occur for Brahmās (adding mindfulness of breathing to these 12). Only the four immaterial karmic states occur in the immaterial level.

123. 19 karmic states can be grasped only by seeing. 18 can be grasped only by hearing. Mindfulness of the body may be either of these. Breathing mindfulness is grasped by touching. Wind meditative *kasiṇa* is grasped by seeing and touching. Five karmic states cannot be grasped right from the beginning of meditation practice. The rest can. Nine of the *kasiṇa*s can lead to the immaterial levels. All ten can lead to higher faculties. Three sublime states can lead to the fourth. All forty can lead to insight, to success in achieving a state of being and to happiness.

124. If the meditator continues to dwell with the teacher, the karmic state should be expounded as experiences occur. If he wishes to live elsewhere, it should be expounded "neither too succinctly nor in too much detail" (837). The karmic state is referred to as the vital spot of the mind-born god (i.e., Kāmadeva).

125. The aspirant should live in a suitable dwelling place free from the 18 possible defects and located neither too far from a village nor too near. Any minor housekeeping tasks which have been left undone should be got out of the way. Instructions are then given for the construction of a *kasiṇa* and the method of meditating on the earth *kasiṇa* is explained (843-862).

126. When the object of meditation is as clear to the mind's eye of the yogin with his eyes shut as it is when looked at with open eyes, the acquired sign has arisen. Fixing the mind on this gradually obstructs the hindrances until the mind becomes concentrated in access (*upacāra*) concentration (863-870). At this point the semblance sign arises. This emerges as if breaking up the acquired sign "like the polished disk of a mirror drawn from a bag" and appears to the meditator as much purer than the acquired sign. Nevertheless it is simply produced by meditation practice - a mere mode of appearance, born of conceptual identification (870-876).

127. The mind enters concentration in two ways: at the moment of access by abandoning the hindrances and at the moment of obtaining meditation through the appearance of the meditative factors. The difference is that in the first case the factors are weak, whereas in

absorption they have become strong and that state can be maintained even for a whole day (877-880).

128. Instructions are then given for the development of the semblance sign. If absorption cannot be reached immediately it must be carefully guarded. Unhelpful things must be avoided and helpful circumstances cultivated. The ten kinds of skill in absorption should be accomplished. If absorption is still not attained, the meditator should not give up but try to make the mind occur evenly, free from lax and energetic states (881-893).

129. The mind door process in which absorption is attained is then described. After three or four desire-level exercitive moments, absorption occurs at either the fourth or the fifth moment. Reference is made to the view of the Ābhidharmika Godatta which allows absorption to arise even in the sixth or seventh moment on the ground that these awarenesses have the support of previous repetition to strengthen them (904). This is rejected on the ground that the *bhavaṅga* is near - just as someone running towards a cliff is unable to stop at the edge even if he wishes to do so. The absorption moment is a single material-level awareness followed immediately by falling into *bhavaṅga* and then by a new mind door process in which the mind recollects the meditation (907-908).

130. The five hindrances and the five meditative factors are listed and reasons given why each factor overcomes a particular hindrance (910-916). The first meditative level which abandons the five hindrances and has these five factors is also beautiful in three ways and has ten characteristic marks.

131. The greater the care taken in the prior process of purification, the longer the meditation will last. For fuller development the semblance sign should be expanded; so instructions for this are given (920-923). When the first meditative level has been obtained, it must be thoroughly mastered. The five kinds of mastery are listed: adverting, attaining, controlling, emerging and recollecting. Only when these five are fully developed, should any attempt to obtain the second level be made.

132. Four types of meditation are described. That of the careless yogin whose identification and attention turns to sense objects is classified as "tending to decline." That of the slow yogin for whom mindfulness of this kind becomes settled is classified as "tending to stability." The trance of the careful yogin whose identification and attention turns to absence of applied thought is classifed as "tending to distinction". If however identification and attention turn to

disenchantment, then the trance is classified as "tending to penetration" (928-931).

133. When it is time to go on to the second meditational level, the wise yogin sees the danger in the first meditation - its factors are weak because it is still near to the stage when the unskilful is overcome and because conceptual and sustained thought, the first two factors, are relatively gross. He therefore reflects on the second level as peaceful, overcomes affection for the first level and undertakes the practice to attain the second level of meditation. In due course the second level is reached in a similar way to the first. The mind door process again culminates in the fourth or fifth moment with a single material-level awareness, this time of the second trance (932-943).

134. A similar process of succession from the second to the third level and then from the third to the fourth is described (946-975). Finally the difference between the method of five levels and that with four is briefly outlined (976-977).

135. Chapter Fifteen: Explanation of the bringing into being of immaterial-level concentration (980-1042; pp.100-103). The meditator now becomes disenchanted with matter/form and seeks to go on from the fourth meditational level which he has thoroughly mastered. He therefore spreads the sign out as far as he wishes and directs his attention to the area pervaded by it.

136. The process of attainment of immaterial-level meditation is similar to the material-level meditations. The succession from level to level is now however a matter of changing the object of attention rather than diminishing the number of meditation factors. The second immaterial mind is reached by directing attention to the consciousness of the first immaterial level as limitless. Buddhadatta (surely correctly) points out that the consciousness which then occurs is known as "the limit of consciousness", not as "limitless consciousness" (1005-1006). In order to reach the third immaterial level the yogin must direct his attention to the consciousness of the first immaterial level as "empty of that." In due course that disappears and the third meditational level arises "seeing just the absence of that." To attain the fourth he directs attention to the consciousness of the third immaterial meditation.

137. In each case the level which has been reached must be let go of. The danger of it is seen, affection for it is overcome and the next level is seen as peaceful. In the case of the attainment of the fourth level the situation is slightly different. One sees the very peaceful nature of

the attainment which can "abide with pure nonexistence as its object." This is surmounted not by disenchantment but "because there is no desire to reach" the fourth stage. Thereby he reaches a nonidentifying awareness which is extremely subtle, i.e., attains the fourth immaterial mind, known as neither identification nor nonidentification (1020-1032).

138. In fact in this highest stage not only identification but also feeling and all other mental concomitants are similarly subtle. Identification and the others do not perform their function; hence they are "not cognition." Because they are the residuum of traces, they occur with subtlety; hence they are "not noncognition."

139. Chapter Sixteen: Explanation of the higher faculties (1043-1103), pp.104-7). After the eight attainments have been produced, the yogin should bring into being the five ordinary higher faculties. Indeed even a thorough mastery of just the fourth meditative level would allow this to be attempted. The higher faculties are the origin of limitless advantages. When they are produced, the bringing into being of concentration has reached its goal (1047).

140. First of all the attainments must be thoroughly mastered in the fourteen ways - such things as the ability to move directly from the first to the third level or moving from a level involving one *kasiṇa* directly to another with a higher *kasiṇa*. The prior state of mind possesses eight qualities: it is purified, clear, unmarked, without affliction, realized, ready, firm and unmoving. Before trying to arouse one of the higher knowledges, the meditative level which is the basis for that should be entered. Then, on emerging, the preliminary work for the higher knowledge in question is undertaken. This takes the form of making the appropriate resolve..

141. Eventually the resolve succeeds in arousing the basic meditation, but after emerging from the basic meditation (whose object is the semblance sign) he resolves again. This time the resolve succeeds immediately. The process is similar to that which occurs on first attaining one of the material or immaterial levels: three or four moments of ever stronger material-level awareness followed by a single moment which is a material-level awareness of the fourth meditative level. The mind then immediately lapses into *bhavaṅga* awareness.

142. The five higher faculties all follow this basic pattern. Knowledge of the various higher faculties is the product of a resolve for the faculty in question - "may I be a hundredfold" and so on. Knowledge of the divine ear is the product of adverting to various kinds of sound.

Later it must be strengthened by delimiting larger and larger areas in which the sounds will be heard and can be investigated.

143. Knowledge which encompasses minds is based upon the divine eye but developed by increasing the light so as to see the color of the blood which occurs dependent upon the heart matter/form. Then the yogin can become conscious of the awareness of another. When this knowledge has been strengthened by practice, he will not need to see the color. Recollection of previous lives is aroused by direct attention to the past, commencing from just previously and extending recollection further and further back. Divine eye is developed on the basis of an energy (fire) *kasiṇa*, white *kasiṇa* or best of all, light *kasiṇa*. Absorption must not be aroused. Instead attention is directed to visual objects appearing in the light established and enlarged on the level of access. Eventually the yogi can position light where he wishes and see images at will.

144. Chapter Seventeen: Explanation of the objects of the higher faculties (1104-1168; pp.108-111). For this chapter the five higher faculties are expanded to seven by the addition of knowledge of the future and knowledge of proceeding in accordance with karma. These two are taken as modifications of the divine eye (1101). The seven are analysed in terms of the four *Dharmasaṁgraha* triplets concerned with objects (cf. Vism. 429-35).

145. Knowledge of the various higher faculties can have seven types of object, i.e., small, great, past, present, future, personal or external. Examples are given of each of these. However, they are not all mutually exclusive (1107-1115).

146. Divine ear can only have four types of object, i.e., small, present, personal or external. If one hears the sound of one's own belly, the divine ear would have a personal object (1116-1118).

147. Knowledge which encompasses minds can have eight kinds of object: small, great, immeasurable, path, past, present, future and external. Buddhadatta specifies that it can only have a path object figuratively speaking (1122).[80]

148. Some discussion also occurs in relation to the fact that this knowledge is said to be able to have present objects. The point is that awarenesses unlike matter last for a single moment only. Since knowledge which encompasses minds must as an exercitive awareness be preceded by adverting awareness whose object will be the mind which is being encompassed, by the time the knowledge arises its object will have already ceased. Buddhadatta then distinguishes three kinds of "present."

"Present" can refer to a single moment, i.e., as made up of the three smaller moments (of arising, persisting and ceasing). It can refer to the period of one or two continuities (cf. Vism 431). Finally it can refer to the present existence.

149. The view is cited that knowledge which encompasses minds has a present object in the first sense of present (1128 cf. Vism 432, Asl 421). This is rejected on the grounds that it entails a difference of object between the adverting awareness and the subsequent exercitive awarenesses. The other two senses of "present" are considered appropriate.

150. The recollection of previous abodes can have eight kinds of object: small, great, immeasurable, path, past, personal, external or unclassifiable (i.e., a concept such as a name or family) (1143-1152).

151. Divine eye can have only four types of object, exactly as in the case of divine ear. It is interesting to note that this limitation does not apply to its two modifications, nor to knowledge which encompasses minds even though that is developed by means of the divine eye (1153-1154).

152. Knowledge of the future has eight kinds of object: small, great, immeasurable, path, future, personal, external or unclassifiable (vv.1155-1163). Knowledge of proceeding in accordance with karma has five kinds of object, i.e., small, great, past, personal and external.

153. Chapter Eighteen: Explanation of purification of view (1170-1225; pp.112-115). Since wisdom should be brought into being as soon as concentration and the higher faculties have been brought into being, Buddhadatta devotes the remainder of the book to that topic.

154. Five questions are set out as headings for the discussion of wisdom. First, wisdom is defined as "insight wisdom associated with meritorious awareness." Secondly, the meaning of the word "wisdom" is given as that which understands or as many-sided knowing. At this point a discussion is introduced of the difference between wisdom, consciousness and identification (cf. Vism 437). The latter two have limited functions. Wisdom is "a many-sided knowing" because it does everything that consciousness or identification can do and more besides, since it can bring to the path. Thirdly the mark, function, and proximity cause are given (as Vism 438) (1172-1180).

155. Under the fourth heading is given a numerical analysis. Wisdom is single as to defining mark. It is of two kinds, ordinary and otherworldly, according as it is associated with the ordinary or the

transcendent path. It is of three kinds according as it is produced by thinking, by learning or by bringing into being. The first of these is wisdom produced by one's own thinking. The second is wisdom obtained after hearing from another, while the third is that obtained by absorption concentration (1181-1185).

156. Wisdom is of four kinds with reference to the four discriminations. The first is knowledge as to things and refers to knowledge of five things: whatever has arisen through a condition, resultant, karma, liberation and the object of what has been spoken. The second is knowledge of factors and refers to the knowledge of the corresponding things: the cause, the noble path, what has been spoken, the skilful and the unskilful. The third is knowledge of grammar and refers to the Pāli language which describes things and factors. The fourth is knowledge which reviews the first three knowledges and which is considered as perspicuity. The five causes which produce perspicuity are listed (1186-1191).

157. The fifth and final heading is the bringing into being of wisdom itself. Prior to this the yogi should familiarize himself with such lists as the five aggregates by study, since these lists are the ground (in which wisdom grows). He should first have aroused the two purifications of morality and awareness and then subsequently arouse the purification of view and the remaining four purifications (1192-1194).

158. The five aggregates are each briefly defined (11951201). Then they are grouped as (1) name, i.e., 4 aggregates or the concomitant awarenesses together with the 81 kinds of ordinary awareness; (2) matter, i.e., one aggregate or the 28 kinds of matter. "Matter" is defined as that which is affected. "Name" is defined as that which impels. Having understood the difference between the two, the nonexistence of any individual is established. The two are compared to a mechanism made of string and wood which is in fact lifeless but appears to move and have life. They are mutually dependent. Name is without force; for it cannot accomplish anything with its force. Matter/form also is without force; for without name it too cannot accomplish anything (1202-1223).

159. It is this seeing in accordance with reality, with the notion of a being entirely removed from "name and form" i.e., (from the psychophysical complex) which is called "purity of view" (1224).

160. Chapter Nineteen: Explanation of purification by crossing over doubt (1227-1261; pp.116-119). The knowledge which is called crossing over doubt is established when one knows the causes and conditions of

the psychophysical complex and crosses over doubt as to the three times. Buddhadatta describes two methods for doing this.

161. The first method commences with grasping the 32 parts of the body and then seeking the causes and conditions of the body. Ignorance, craving, clinging and action are given as the four causes of the material body, while food is given as its condition. The difference between a cause and a condition is explained as the difference between what produces and what protects. So a seed is the cause of a shoot, while such things as soil are its conditions. In this case ignorance, craving and clinging are comparable to a mother. Karma is the producer comparable to the father as the begetter of his son, while food is the maintainer like the (wet) nurse for a boy (1228-36).

162. Then the conditions for the psychophysical complex are grasped. Eye consciousness, for example, arises in dependence upon eye, visible object and light. When the yogin sees that both name and form occur as a result of conditions, he should contemplate the universal nature of its occurrence in this way. As he contemplates this, all doubts as to the past, future or present are abandoned (1236-41).

163. The second method is by means of understanding karma and maturation. Karma is described by means of three sets of four. The first set consists of karma to be experienced: (a) in this visible state, (b) upon rebirth, (c) some time after and (d) "has-been karma". The first of these occurs in the exercitive process as the volition constituting the first exercitive moment. It produces maturation in this life, but if it cannot do so, it is has-been karma. (The reference is to Pati II 78.) In that case it will never produce any maturation. The second is the seventh exercitive moment of thought which either takes effect in the next life or is has-been karma. The third category is the karma of the remaining five exercitive moments. This will take effect sometime in the course of the cycle of rebirths when an opportunity occurs (vv.1242-3 f.).

164. The second set of four is karma which is (a) serious, (b) frequent, (c) near (to death), (d) performed. Nothing is said about this set. The third set consists of (a) producing, (b) supporting, (c) hindering, (d) destroying. The first of these produces the maturation aggregates whether at conception or subsequently. The second cannot itself produce maturational aggregates but supports and lengthens the effect of the producing karma. The third hinders or weakens the effect of the producing karma. Destroying karma, however, overrides the producing karma and produces maturations of an opposite kind. Such maturations

created by destroying karma are termed "arisen" (vv.1244-45 f.).

165. By understanding the way in which these twelve kinds of karma bring maturations in the circle (of birth and death), he is able to generalise to the universal nature of the succession of action and maturation as an aspect of the linking of cause and result. After quoting eleven verses on this subject attributed to the *Porāṇa*s (as at Visṃ 602-3), Buddhadatta concludes the chapter with three synonyms for "knowledge known as crossing over doubt." It is the same thing as knowledge of the abiding nature of *dharma*, knowing things as they really are and as perfect seeing. The yogin who possesses this knowledge is known as a "lesser stream-enterer" (1254-1261).

166. Chapter Twenty: Explanation of purification by knowledge and seeing of path and false path (1262-96; pp.120-122). One who wishes to reach knowledge of path and false path should make effort (*yoga*) by means of comprehending through groupings. The yogic path understands that the psychophysical complex is not collected together from a pre-existent heap or accumulation, nor does it go anywhere when it ceases. It is comparable to (the sound produced by) a musical instrument (*vīṇā*) which does not come from anywhere nor go anywhere when the music stops - it is simply the product of various conditions (1262-1267).

167. This comprehension of rise and fall in brief can be elaborated in detail by means of the analysis of this knowledge. Fifty characteristic marks, ten for each of the five aggregates, can be elaborated (from Pati I 55; cf. Vism 630-1) (1268-70).

168. When he sees the rise and fall of the various factors clearly, he comes to know clearly the evanescence and insubstantial nature of all factors. The *yogin* has attained young (*taruṇā*) knowledge and is a beginner in insight (1271-6).

169. It is by means of this young insight that ten afflictions arise: radiance, joy, tranquility, knowledge, faith, mindfulness, happiness, equanimity, strength and affection.[81]

170. These various afflictions distract the yogi who believes he has attained the goal. In this way he grasps a false path and enjoys the various experiences, departing from the insight process. So long as he keeps directing attention to these afflictions, his cultivation declines. When, however, he can clearly separate the afflictions as "the false path" and insight as "the path," then knowledge of path and false path is established in his mind (1277-1296).

171. Chapter Twenty-One: Explanation of purification by knowledge and seeing of the way (1297-1317; pp.123-4). Insight reaches its peak by means of eight knowledges. These eight consist of a very clear knowledge free from the afflictions (1) of rise and fall, (2) of breaking up, (3) of fear, (4) of danger, (5) contemplation knowledge of disenchantment, (6) knowledge consisting in desire to be released, (7) renewed consideration, (8) knowledge of balanced viewing of traces.

172. Purification by knowledge and seeing of the way is a name for the ninth knowledge which succeeds these (1297). This is known as knowledge which inclines to the truths or simply as inclination (*anuloma*). When the yogi contemplates traces as impermanent, suffering, not-self and progresses stage by stage through the eight knowledges, his insight becomes well-established, reaches its peak and is on the way to emergence. It is just this which is called knowledge of inclination to the truths, i.e., the ninth knowledge is simply the eighth occurring at the time when the noble path is arising (1300-1305).

173. The process of the attainment of that path is described in a similar way to that of the attainment of the meditative levels. Four moments of ordinary exercitive awareness culminate with lineage membership. Each of these has traces as its object. These moments are given the same names as the corresponding moments in the attainment of meditation. The first is called preparatory, while the second is known as access. The third is called inclination for two reasons: it follows the inclination of the previous eight knowledges and it inclines towards the factors of enlightenments.

174. Chapter Twenty-Two: Explanation of purification by knowledge and seeing (1318-73; pp.125-28). At the next moment there comes the mind of the lineage member. This strictly falls between purification by knowledge and seeing of the way and purification by knowledge and seeing because it is in the position of adverting in relation to the path awareness. The word "lineage member" can be understood in two ways. Either it means one who has transcended the family of ordinary beings or it means one who is of the lineage, "lineage" being a name for *nirvāṇa* (according to the *Ṭīkā* because it preserves the noble name).

175. Lineage membership differs from the preceding exercitive moments in having a different object; for it is both the first adverting to liberation and the first experiencing of that. So in this special case there is a change of object within the exercitive process. Membership stands in the place of adverting, although not in fact adverting, and gives, as it

were, an identification of the path. It acts as a condition for the path in six ways (cf. Vism 673) (1325-30).

176. The path now arises. Henceforth the way to the hells is shut. The eightfold wrong path is rejected. The yogi becomes a true son of the Buddha and wins many advantages. This knowledge of the first path is knowledge and seeing, i.e., it accomplishes the seventh purification (1333-1337).

177. The path awareness is followed immediately by two or three resulting awarenesses, two or three because the alternative allowed for the meditations, but not mentioned previously here (173 above), of either three or four desire-level exercitive awarenesses prior to the breakthrough to the higher consciousness is being envisaged. Membership may be preceded either by preparatory, access and inclination moments or by access and inclination moments only. In the latter case there would be three fruit awarenesses, since exercitive awarenesses run for seven moments and no further. The preparatory, access and inclination moments can all be referred to by these three names (1340; cf. v. 898).

178. Buddhadatta also mentions the view of some that there can also be one or four resultant awarenesses (cf. Vism 138 and 675). He rejects the possibility of four resultant awarenesses on the grounds that this would require a single inclination awareness and a single inclination awareness would not constitute the necessary repetition condition. Presumably the possibility of one resultant awareness (allowed at Asl 231 for those of sluggish wisdom) is rejected on the same grounds as those given in relation to meditation (v.904-6). In the succeeding exercitive processes arise exercitives which recollect the path, the fruit, the abandoned defilements, the defilements yet remaining and liberation. In full there are 19 kinds of recollection knowledge (for the four kinds of nobles), since *arhat*s do not have any remaining defilements (1339-1347).

179. The yogi is now a stream-enterer. He commences work (*yoga*) for the second level by contemplating the five aggregates as impermanent, frustrating and not-self and plunges directly into the process of insight. The stages up to balanced viewing of traces develop as before and the second path of once return arises. Ill will and passionate desire are weakened by this. The process of attainment and subsequent recollecting are as for the first path (1348-1355).

180. Again the same course of development is undertaken. This time the third path is reached. Ill will and passionate desire are totally destroyed. The never-returner is of such a nature that he never returns (to

rebirth here), but attains *parinirvāṇa* there (in the Brahmā world). For the last time the wise individual commences work (*yoga*) in order to reach the fourth level. By the same process he attains to the path of the *arhat*. He is the eighth noble person, has destroyed all the fetters, reached the real goal and is unsurpassed (1355-1371).

181. Chapter Twenty-three: Discourse on the abandoning of defilements (1374-1393; pp.129-33). The first part of this chapter consists of a prose passage on the abandoning of defilements with one introductory (1374) and one concluding verse (1375). The contents are extremely close to the parallel passage in Vism (pp.682-85) with a few omissions. It seems likely that this section is an addition (earlier than the *Porāṇaṭīkā*) derived from Vism. Chapter 22 may have originally concluded at the end of the present Chapter 23 as indicated by the title still preserved there in the manuscripts.

182. The remainder of the present Chapter 23 is concerned with the topic of full understanding of the truths. At each of the four levels the four functions of comprehending, abandoning, realizing and bringing into being occur in a single moment at the time of path knowledge. The three similes of a lamp, the rising sun and a boat are given in detail (Pat 134; cf. Vism 690-91) (1376-1393).

183. Explanation of conditions (1394-1398 f.; pp.134-7). The final chapter is devoted to an account of the 24 conditions. Most of this chapter is in prose. It is difficult to see why it should be placed here as the final chapter since there is no parallel at this point in Vism.

184. The 24 conditions are listed and then a brief summary is given of each one. (1) Root or cause condition is the six roots. (2) Object-content condition is all ordinary and transcendent factors. (3) Dominant condition is of two kinds. Conascent dominant is the four dominants. Object dominant is everything except for matter which is bad and is the object of bad resultant, neutral action, hate awareness, doubt or worry. (4) Directly antecedent or proximity and (5) directly following or contiguity conditions are immediately ceased awareness and concomitant factors. (6) Conascent and (7) mutual conditions are awarenesses, concomitants, the great elements and heart base. (8) Dependence condition is the base material factors, the great elements, awarenesses and concomitants. (9) Strong dependence condition is of three kinds. Object dependence condition is the same as object dominant condition. Directly antecedent dependence condition is the same as directly antecedent condition. Natural dependence condition is various qualities

and environmental factors. (10) Prenascent condition is of two kinds. Base prenascent is the material factors of the bases. Object prenascent is other material factors such as those of the present moment. (11) Postnascent condition is awareness and concomitant factors. (12) Repetition condition is ordinary good, bad and karmic factors apart from the two adverting.

185. (13) Act or karma condition is of two kinds. Conascent karma is all volition including higher awareness volition. Karma involving a plurality of moments is good or bad contaminating volition. In the case of purely good it takes effect immediately. (14) Maturation condition is karmically resultant awareness and concomitants. (15) Nutriment condition is the four kinds of food. (16) Faculty condition is 20 of the 22 faculties. (17) Meditation condition is the five meditation factors. (18) Path condition is the nine factors which make up the perfect and false paths. (19) Association condition is awareness and concomitants. (20) Dissociation condition is both prenascent bases and postnascent awarenesses and concomitants. (21) Presence condition and (24) nondisappearance condition is life faculty, food in mouthfuls, object prenascent and support condition. (22) Absence condition and (23) disappearance condition are the same as directly following condition (pp.134-5).

186. The relations between matter and nonmaterial factors are then examined. Matter can be a condition for matter in seven of the 24 ways. It can be a condition for psychological factors ("name") in 11 ways. No material factor is a condition for the two mixed together.

A nonmaterial factors can be a condition for nonmaterial things in 21 ways. It can be a condition for matter in 15 ways. It can be a condition for the two together in 13 ways. The two together may be a condition for matter in four ways. They may be a condition for immaterial things in six ways. The two together are never a condition for the two together (1395-1397).

187. Prenascent condition is exclusively matter. Twelve conditions are exclusively immaterial. The remaining eleven are mixed (1397ff).

188. Fifteen conditions are invariably present. Five conditions are invariably past. Act condition is either past or present. Object, dominant and dependence conditions may be past, present, future or nontemporal (1397-1398).

189. All of the 24 conditions are included in four conditions, i.e., object, support, act and presence conditions (1398).

190. The work ends with 17 concluding verses (1399-1415). Buddhadatta says he was requested to compose it by Sumati. He advises the reader to think and investigate very carefully if he finds any fault in the meaning or the text or the argument. He declares that it is based upon the way of exposition of the Mahāvihāravāsins and is not mixed with the opinions of other schools. He mentions that he wrote it while dwelling in the eastern hall of the *vihāra* constructed in Kāveripaṭṭana by Kaṇhadāsa (vl. Khaṇṭhadāsa).

56.BUDDHADATTA, *Rūpārūpavibhāga*

"E" references are to the text provided by Binayendra Nath Chaudhury, *Abhidhamma Terminology in the Rūpārūpavibhāga*. Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series No. CXIII (Calcutta 1983). "T" is the edition of the Pāli text and English translation by Dipak Kumar Barua, *Rūpārūpa-Vibhāga of Ācariya Buddhadatta Thera* (Calcutta 1995). The summary below is found in Binayendra Chaudhury, "Life and works of Buddhadatta", Journal of the Department of Pali, University of Calcutta 4, 1987-88, pp. 75-77. Chaudhury provides Pāli technical terms, which have been omitted.

"The *Rūpārūpavibhāga* is a manual or handbook written by Buddhadatta to enlighten the beginners in the Abhidharma system of thought....(It) may be regarded as the most abridged summary of the entire Abhidharma. It deals in a nutshell with four topics, viz., (1) *Rūpa* or matter and material qualities; (2) *Citta* or state of consciousness; (3) *Cetasika* or mental concomitants; and (4) *Cetasikasamprayoga (nirvāṇa)* under two heads, viz., *Rūpārūpavibhāga* which treats of different aspects of *rūpa* and the *Arūpavibhāga* which deals with the remaining three topics.

Summary by Binayendra Chaudhury

(E1-4; T27-32) According to the *Rūpārūpavibhāga*, 28 kinds of material elements which constitute the normal physical side of a being are as follows: element of earth; element of water; element of fire, element of wind; elements of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, vision or visible form, sound, odor, taste, touch; female sex; male sex; vital force or life-

principle in matter; heart base; element of space; intimating elements, bodily and vocal; lightness or buoyancy; pliancy or softness; adaptability; collection or integration; continuity; decay, unsubstantiality; and bodily nutriment or food value in matter. These 28 kinds of material elements have been classified in the *Rūpārūpavibhāga* in different groups according to their qualitative function. For instance, the first four *rūpa*s are basic elements of corporeal existence and the rest are *upādārūpa*, i.e. the forms subsisting on something else. Again, the first 12 material elements except the element of water are gross material qualities, while the rest are subtle qualities, etc. Truly speaking, the above 28 kinds of matter are combined together to form a normal healthy human being. In the blind, the dumb, and certain others having organic defects, all 28 material elements are not found.

(E4-10; T33-59) In the section on states of consciousness 89 types of consciousness have been classified according to the gradation of four planes or spheres, viz., sensuous sphere, form sphere, formless sphere, and transcendent sphere. Consciousness which arises on the level of desire is non-reflective and the consciousness appertaining to the remaining three spheres is reflective. The types of consciousness arising at the desire-level may be good, bad, resultant or *kiriyā*; but the types of consciousness belonging to other sphere are not bad.

(E10-11; T60-65) In the section on mental concomitants or factors seven universal mental factors which are common to all types of consciousness, six mental factors which may or may not be common, fourteen immoral concomitants, twenty mental factors common to moral consciousness, three belonging to abstinences and two belonging to the category of illimitables -- 52 factors in total have been dealt with.

(E11-12; E65-68) Under the section of *cetasikasamprayoga* the types of consciousness that arise in liberation have been treated. This topic has not been adequately discussed in the *Rūpārūpavibhāga*. Here liberation is described as a stage which is infallible, permanent, tranquil and unconditional."

57.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (ascribed to Vasubandhu), Title unknown (usually referred to as "*Tarkaśāstra*) (425)

The title given was probably not the work's actual title; *Tarkaśāstra* is a generic term for works on logic, of which a number seem to have existed by shortly after Vasubandhu's time. The Japanese title of this work is *Ju-shih lun*. Boris Vassiliev has made an extended study of this work,[82] but is unable to come to any firm conclusions about its date and authorship. Its earliest translation is by Paramārtha around 555, and there is evidence to suggest it was at that point a large work of some 2,000 *śloka*s, but Vassiliev suggests that by that time it may have been mixed together with possibly two other works on logic which are otherwise lost from the Chinese literature.

Giuseppe Tucci in Gaekwad's Oriental Series 49 presents a Sanskrit (re?)-translation of the work, our "E". There is no translation into any Western language. Vidyabhusana's summary appears in his *History of Indian Logic* (Calcutta 1920; reprinted Delhi 1970), pp. 268-269.

Summary by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana

CHAPTER ONE: The Five Parts of an Argument

(E3-11) In Chapter I, Vasubandhu treats of a proposition (*pratijñā*), a reason (*hetu*), an example (*udāharaṇa*), an application (*upanaya*), and a conclusion (*nigamana*), which constitute the five parts of a syllogism.

CHAPTER TWO: Futile Rejoinder

(E12-32) In Chapter II there is an account of the Futile Rejoinder (*jāti*) which is subdivided under three heads as follows:--

A. A rejoinder on the basis of reversion (*viparyaya-khaṇḍa*) which consists of (1) balancing the homogeneity (*sādharmyasamā*), (2) balancing the heterogeneity (*vaidharmyasamā*), (3) balancing the thesis (*sādhyasamā*), (4) balancing the unquestionable (*avarṇyasamā*), (5) balancing the mutual absence (*aprāptisamā*), (6) balancing the non-reason (*ahetusamā*), (7) balancing the demonstration (*utpattisamā*), (8) balancing the doubt (*saṁśayasamā*), (9) balancing the nondifference (*aviśeṣasamā*), and (10) balancing the effect (*kāryasamā*).

B. A rejoinder on the ground of meaninglessness (*nirarthakhaṇḍana*) which consists of (11) balancing the point in dispute (*prakaraṇasamā*), (12) balancing the counter-example (*pratidṛṣṭāntasamā*), and (13)

balancing the infinite regress (*prasaṅgasamā*).

C. A contrary rejoinder (*viparītakhaṇḍana*), which consists of (14) balancing the nonproduced (*anutpatttisamā*), (15) balancing the eternal (*nityasamā*), and (16) balancing the presumption (*arthāpattisamā*).

CHAPTER THREE: The Ways of Losing an Argument

(E34-40) Chapter III deals with twenty-two kinds of points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) enumerated below:--

(1) Hurting the proposition (*pratijñāhāni*), (2) shifting the proposition (*prajñāntara*), (3) opposing the proposition (*pratijñāvirodha*), (4) renouncing the proposition *pratijñāsaṁnyāsa*), (5) shifting the reason (*hetvantara*), (6) shifting the topic (*arthāntara*), (7) the meaningless (*nirarthaka*), (8) the unintelligible (*avijñātārtha*), (9) the incoherent (*apārthaka*), (10) the inopportune (*aprāptakāla*), (11) saying too little (*nyūnatā*), (12) saying too much (*adhika*), (13) repetition (*punarukta*), (14) silence (*ananubhāṣaṇa*), (15) ignorance (*ajñāna*), (16) non-ingenuity (*apratibhā*), (17) evasion (*vikṣepa*), (18) admission of an opinion (*matānujñā*), (19) overlooking the censurable (*paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa*), (20) censuring the non-censurable (*niranuyojyānuyoga*), (21) deviating from a tenet (*apasiddhānta*), and (22) the semblance of a reason or fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*).

58.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Samantapāsādikasūtra* (438)

K.937 = T.1462 = N.1125 = Bagchi, pp. 408-409, which goes by a different title in Nanjio and Bagchi. Bagchi informs us that it is studied in detail by M. Takakusu in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1896, pp. 415-439 and shown in fact to be the *Samantapāsādika*. The translator is named Saṁghabhadra; it was translated in the year 488 in Chu-lin Monastery, Kuang-chou.

59.ULLAṄGHA (440?), *Pratītyasamutpādaśāstra*

Summary by Marek Mejor

PSK is a short treatise on the central Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination. It was composed in Sanskrit by a Buddhist master *Ullaṅgha. It consists of two parts: thirty stanzas (*kārikā*) and a brief commentary

thereon (*vyākhyāna*). It has been preserved in two Chinese translations and in a Tibetan version.[83]

Nothing is known about the author of the text. According to the *Foreword* by an anonymous Chinese author which precedes T.1652, the master Ullaṅgha composed his brief treatise to supplement the **Pratītya-samutpāda-ādi-vibhaṅga-dharmaparyāya* (PSAVDh). The *Foreword* is also appended to the Chinese translation of PSAVDh by Dharmagupta (T.716; T717). Further it is said in the *Foreword* that Ullaṅgha always gets to the point, follows the threefold division of the vehicles (*triyāna*), but does not favor the standpoint of a particular school. It seems that the translators Dharmagupta and his Chinese counterpart Yancong (Yen-ts'ung, d. 610) first translated PSAVDh and afterwards the present work. It is translated into German by Vasudev Gokhale, *Pratītyasamutpādaśāstra des Ullaṅga, kritisch behandelt und aus dem chinesischen ins Deutsche übertragen*. Inaugural-Dissertation (Bonn 1930).

Doctrinally Ullaṅgha's treatise is based on the Abhidharmic exposition of dependent origination, with clear traces of Mahāyāna teachings. Ullaṅgha includes five stanzas (our of the total seven[84]) from Nāgārjuna's *Pratītyasamutpāda-hṛdaya-kārikā (PHK)* (Work No. 39 of Volume Eight of this Encyclopedia), which he intersperses in his treatise. (PHK 2 = PSK 6, PHK 1 = PSK 26, PHK 3 = PSK 27, PHK 4 = PSK 28, PHK 5 = PSK 30). It seems that Ullaṅgha shaped his work after Nāgārjuna's model. Some of the classifications and subdivisions show close similarity to those found in the Sanskrit text of the golden plate inscription from Indonesia which contains a version of this text.[85]

According to V.V.Gokhale's inaugural dissertation (cited above), after a careful study of the internal criteria, the probable time of Ullaṅgha's *floruit* is the first quarter of the fifth century. Gokhale provides a helpful table on pp. 8-9 displaying the contents of the treatise.

The treatise can be divided into three main parts: in the first part (stanzas 1-5) the twelve links of the dependent origination fomula are defined; the second part (stanzas 6-16) is devoted to various classifications and divisions of the twelve links; in the third part (stanzas 17-30) is explained the philosophical meaning of causal relations in general, with reference to the canonical *sūtra*s (stanzas 20-21), examples (st. 30), etc. My translation of the versified part of Ullaṅgha's text that follows is based on Gokhale's German translation from the Chinese, and verified against the Chinese and the Tibetan version. (We have replaced

translations of technical terms with the ones used in this Volume, as usual. (KHP).)

1. From one arise three, from these three arise (also) six; from the six (arise) two, from the two arise six, from the six originate (also) six.

2. From the six are three and from the three are (also) three; from the three four arise, from the four originate three.

3. From the three one is born, and from the one originate seven; that much of suffering which is (inherent) in these (factors) was declared by Muni as "all", in short.

4. There are twelve different kinds which are called "empty" by clearly perceiving (people); by virtue of the links of dependent origination these should be known as twelve states (*dharma*).

5. (These are:) ignorance, traces, consciousness, name and form, sense-organs, assemblage of the three (factors), perception, thirst, grasping, origination, ripening, and the other end.

6. The first, the eighth, and the ninth are (called) defilement (*kleśa*), the second and the tenth are (called) action (*karman*), (while) the remaining seven are (called) suffering (*duḥkha*); (thus,) the twelve factors are comprised in three rubrics.[86]

7. The first two (belong) to past time, the last two (belong) to future time, (and) the remaining eight are (grouped) in the present time; these are called three-times-factors.[87]

8. From defilements originate actions which accomplish karmic maturation (*vipāka*). By means of result originate defilements, and defilements produce actions; by virtue of action there is karmic maturation.

9. How can there be action while the defilements are absent? When action is annihilated there is no result either. When there is no result, defilements are excluded too. In such a way the three are excluded themselves.

10. The cause which consists of five members brings forth results (*phala*); they are known as defilement and action: seven members make the result which is to be considered as sevenfold suffering.[88]

11. An empty cause does not include any effect, nor does cause (itself) include any cause. An empty effect does not include any cause, nor does an effect (itself) include any effect. Both cause and effect are empty; wise men should remember this.

12. In the course of time, as a result of the connection of cause and

effect, there is a fourfold division, and one should consider that the connection of defilement, action, and result becomes the six-membered desire.

13. When being (*bhava*) is taken as a node (*sandhi*), as a result there are two nodes and three groupings (*saṁkṣepa*); when a node is causally conditioned, in consequence there are three nodes and four groupings.[89]

14. Two, two, three, three, and two - these are the five factors (*dharma*) which occur during the (state of) suffering; they refer to: agent, womb, sphere of (sense) activity, effecting, and arising.[90]

15. Delusion-effect and development-effect, as well as result-effect and natural consequence-effect (produce,) under their respective bases, (the following) links: one, one, three and two.[91]

16. The effects, passion and misery, as well as the effects development and natural consequence, produce in the other related division factors (with the respective numbers:) two, one, one, and one.

17. These are of twelve kinds; when they are of the same power, they originate out of themselves in mutual dependence. They are to be known as inanimate, lifeless, and immovable (*acala*).[92]

18. There are four kinds of ignorance regarding emptiness, viz., when it is related to the nonexistent self, when it is related to the nonexistent "mine", when it is (related to) the nonexistent "I", when it is related to the nonexistent cause of self. The remaining links are (to be known) like that.

19. The middle way is what avoids both extremes: nihilism and eternality. When complete perfection is accomplished, the Buddhas (attain to) full comprehension of intrinsic nature.

20. After having attained to complete perfection, the Noble Sage proclaimed to the multitude of beings (worlds) the nonexistence of a self. The meaning (of it) has already been explained by the Guide (Exalted One) in the City Simile Sūtra (*Nāgaropamāsūtra*).

21. The *Kātyāyana(-sūtra)* explains right view and view of emptiness, and the *Phalaguṇasūtra* also explains the most excellent (teaching of) emptiness.

22. When dependent origination is well cognized, then its equality with emptiness is accordingly cognized. When dependent origination is not cognized, emptiness is not cognized (also).

23. When arrogance arises with regard to emptiness, then there arises no (repentance) towards the five aggregates (of attachment). When there is no negative view with regard to them, one is deluded as to the sense

of dependent origination.

24. When one is not deluded as to dependent origination, one understands emptiness as having abandoned arrogance, and because of regret towards the aggregates (of attachment), one is not deluded with regard to the connection of action with effect.

25. When the stream (of life) arises due to conditions produced by actions, then a condition which has not come about by action does not exist; when it exists with regard to the condition of emptiness, the result of action is experienced.[1]

26. Twelve different links, which were earlier explained (by the Sage) as originated in dependence, are put together, according to the Teaching, into three: defilement, action and suffering.

27. From three arise two, from two arise seven, from seven arise three again. In this way the wheel of life moves around.

28. Cause and effect make the world, and the sentient beings are not different from them. There are merely empty factors from which come forth again empty factors.

29. Defilement arises only as a conditioned (factor), action arises only as a conditioned (factor), and result also arises only as a conditioned (factor). There exists nothing unconditioned.

30. By (means of examples like) recitation, light, stamp, mirror, sound, sun-stone, seed, and sour (taste), the wise men should perceive both the connection of the aggregates and the non-appearance of transition.

60. AUTHOR UNKNOWN,

Anyūnatvāpūrṇatvānirdeśaparivartasūtra (440)

Translated by Bodhiruci this constitutes K.490 = T. 668 = N. 524. Nanjio, p. 255, as also reported in Bagchi, p. 255 (8), who does not try to produce a Sanskrit title, but translates the Chinese title into English as "*Sūtra* on neither increasing nor decreasing." B.E.Brown, *The Buddha*

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[1]Gokhale's German translation may be rendered as: "Action as condition produces arising of stream (of life), and (when it fails,) there is also no origination which was conditioned by it. It should be empty conditioning by which action is accompanied with the visible consequences."

Nature (Delhi 1991), p. 43, implies that the doctrine of *dharmakāya* is first found in this *sūtra*.

61.SĀRAMATI, *Ratnagotravibhāga* and *Vyākhyā* thereon (450?)

Summary by Jikido Takasaki

This text is also known in the Tibetan tradition as *Uttaratantra*. The *Ratnagotravibhāga* (Analysis of the Mine of the (Three) Jewels) is a treatise on the so-called *tathāgatagarbha* theory written by a Yogācāra author in the fifth century. It consists of three parts, namely the basic verses called *śloka*s, the commentary verses and their explanation in prose furnished with quotations of the sources. Besides the Sanskrit text edited by E.H.Johnston,[93] our "E", we have at present the Chinese[94] and the Tibetan[95] translations. There are English translations by E. Obermiller[96] and by Jikido Takasaki,[97] our "T". [98]

As for the author, there is no name recorded in the Sanskrit text, but the Chinese tradition gives the name Sāraṁati to the whole text, while the Tibetan tradition attributes the verse sections, both basic and commentarial, to Maitreya as one of his five treatises, and the prose commentary (called *vyākhyā*) to Asaṅga. Because of the relative antiquity of the Chinese tradition, we here accept hypothetically Sāramati as the author. But the fact that the text actually consists of the basic verses and the commentary allows for the existence of a second author who made the commentary on the basic verses, and there is a possibility that Sāramati is that second author.[99]

The peculiarity of the *Ratna* lies in the fact that it consists of two parts, in verse and in prose, while the verse section consists again of two parts, one basic, and the other supplementary. In other words, the basic part of this text is in verse only, while the other part, the commentary, is in both verse and prose. The prose section of the commentary is quite detailed in Chapter I but quite scanty for other chapters.

The Chinese translation includes a kind of *ślokagrantha* which, except for the eighteen verses in the beginning, matches mostly with the collection of verses regarded as basic. On the basis of this Chinese selection and adding a minor revision, we get 170 basic verses.[100] (The Chinese text adds one verse each in Chapters I and II, which are to be classified as *uddāna* or index of subjects.)

Sources of the Ratnagotravibhāga.[101] The *Ratnagotravibhāga* is the only text extant in Sanskrit that elucidates the *tathāgatagarbha* theory. It is composed on the basis of various scriptures expressing this theory or referring to the basic ideas consituting this theory. In the commentary many of these scriptures are quoted and by this the text offers us a pregnant mine of the source materials of the *tathāgatagarbha* theory prior to the *Ratnagotravibhāga.*

The first declaration of this theory in terms of "*sarvasattvās tathātagarbhāḥ*" comes from the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra,*[102] which explains it merely with illustrations. It was succeeded on the one hand by the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, which created the term "*buddhadhātu*" for *tathāgatagarbha* and modified the saying as "*asti buddhadhātuḥ sarvasattveṣu*" ("there exists the Buddha nature in all living beings"). On the other hand, it was deepened at the hands of the authors of the *Śrīmālāsūtra* (#109 of Volume 8) and the *Anyūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśasūtra* (#60 of the present volume), making the term "*tathāgata-garbha*" an internal principle identified with the *dharmakāya* and at the same time differentiating it from the latter in its state of being covered with defilements. The *Ratnagotravibhāga* follows mainly these two scriptures in elucidating the core of the doctrine. For the interpretation of doctrinal concepts, however, the *Ratnagotravibhāga* received a great deal of influence from the works of the Yogācāra such as the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra*, the *Madhyāntavibhāga* and the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* of Asaṅga. But the concept of *ālayavijñāna* and the *vijñāna* theory in general is not referred to at all.

Neither the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra* nor the concept *tathāgatagarbha* was known to Nāgārjuna, and we can see that this theory is, like the Vijñānavāda, a later development after him. But the origin of each concept component of the theory goes back to early Mahāyāna scriptures such as the *Prajñāpāramitā*, the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, etc., those names being mentioned in the *Ratnagotravibhāga.* A special influence came from the *Tathāgatotpattisambhavanirdeśasūtra* (#51 of the works listed in Volume Eight of this Encyclopedia) of the *Avataṁsakasūtra*, as shown in the composition of v. I, 27 of the *Ratnagotravibhāga.* This *sūtra*, treating the meaning of the enlightenment of the Buddha, established the concept of *dharmakāya*, i.e., the Buddha identified with *dharmadhātu.* The *Jñānālokālaṁkārasūtra* (Adornment of the Illumination of Wisdom) belongs in the same line as the *Avataṁsakasūtra*. The one path (*ekayāna*) doctrine of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* is another source for the declaration

of the possibility of enlightenment for all living beings due to Buddha's compassion. To this should be added the influence of the Amitāyus cult, which is confessed at the end of the basic text of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*.

There are many other scriptures quoted in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*. Among them the most important ones are those belonging to the group of the *Mahāsannipātasūtra* (Big Collection of Sūtras) such as the *Dhāraṇīśvararājasūtra* (#144 of Volume 8), the *Ratnadārikasūtra*, the *Sāgaramatiparipṛcchā*, the *Gaganagañjaparipṛcchā*, the *Ratnacūḍasūtra*, and the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra* (#73 of Volume 8). These texts mostly deal with the practice of Bodhisattvas and on the doctrine of the pure innate mind. Besides them we find quotations from the *Kāśyapaparivarta* (#17 of Volume 8), the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* (#46 of Volume 8), the *Dṛdhādhyāśayaparivarta*, etc., and from the Āgamas of early Buddhism. There are also independent verses of unknown sources quoted as authorities.

Thus the *Ratnagotravibhāga* is a composite of doctrines collected from a vast area of the Mahāyāna scriptures, but its basic tone is the eulogy of the Buddha's equanimity and compassion and the emphasis of faith in it rather than the gradual practice towards the goal. It may well be said to be representing a side of Buddhism as a religion of faith.[103]

The work is translated into English by Ernst Obermiller from its Tibetan translation in Acta Orientalia (Copenhagen) 9, 1931, reprinted Shanghai 1940. David Seyfort Ruegg has provided several important analyses of the concepts developed in this work.[104]

CHAPTER ONE

(E1-25; T141-195) 1-4.There are seven thunderbolt topics (*vajrapada*): the Buddha, the *dharma*, the order, the element (*dhātu*) of the Buddha, the enlightenment, the Buddha's qualities and his actions. The first three are explained as the three refuges, while the last four together are characterized as the source of the three refuges, with the analogy shown of a mine (*gotra*) from which jewels (*ratna*) are coming out, and to be of inconceivable purity

(E25-59; T196-267)[105] 5-26. All sentient beings are possessed of the embryo[106] of the Tathāgata (*tathāgatagarbha*). This fundamental truth is analyzed under ten aspects.

1.Essential nature: the Buddha is undefiled by nature.

2.Cause: there are four causes of obstruction-resistance to the *dharma* (*icchāntikas*), belief in a self (heretics), fear of transmigration

(seekers), and indifference to the purposes of beings (self-enlightened). Antidotes to these are, respectively, faith in the doctrine, wisdom, meditation and compassion.

3.Result. The outcome of these antidotes is purity, union, happiness and eternity.

4.Function: One has aversion to the frustrations of rebirth, and prays to gain liberation.

5.Has its foundation in factors causing purification and with result.

6.Manifestation in ordinary folk, *arhats*, and Buddhas

7.States: impure, pure and impure, and perfectly pure.

8.Pervasiveness of the basic awareness' clean nature.

9.Changelessness of the impure in ordinary beings, the pure and impure in the Bodhisattva, and the perfectly pure Buddha..

10.Undifferentiatedness of liberation, of the essence of the Buddha.

(E59-78; T268-309) 27-57. Nine illustrations of how the embryo of the Tathāgata is covered over by limitless defilements

The threefold nature of the *tathāgatagarbha*: as the Buddha's *dharmakāya*, thusness, and the essential nature of the lineage. The *dharmakāya* has two aspects: the *dharmadhātu* or sphere of nondiscriminative wisdom, and its outflow as the communication of the teaching to others. Thusness is naturally unchangeable, perfectly pure. The lineage of the thus-gone is illustrated.

The *tathāgatagarbha* exists everywhere and at all times among living beings. It is the ultimate instrument of knowledge, accessible only by faith. In relation to emptiness it is thus: to it nothing can be removed from nor added to it, and one who sees it becomes liberated. It is free from defilements, perfectly pure.

Question: If this essence is so difficult to understand why teach it to ordinary beings who can't understand it?

Answer: In this doctrine the Buddha taught the existence of the cause of enlightenment in every living being in contrast to the previous scripture which teaches the emptiness of all, in order to prevent the defects caused by the previous teaching, namely a depressed mind, contempt for inferiors, clinging to things unreal, speaking ill of truth, and affection for one's self.

CHAPTER TWO

(E79-90; T310-335) 1-13. The pure thusness of the Buddha constitutes his revolution at the basis free from impurity, to be known under eight categories.

1.Its essential nature: what is known as the *tathāgatagarbha* in the defiled state is to be called pure (*viśuddhi*), the natural revolution at the basis.

2.Its cause is transcendent wisdom.

3.Its result is liberation from the defilements and from the obstructions to knowledge.

4.Its function is one's own and others' aims.

5.Its foundation is qualities inseparably associated with it.

6.It is manifested as the three bodies of the Buddha, viz., the essential body, the enjoyment body and the apparitional or magical body, which are characterized respectively by profundity (*sūkṣma*), magnificence (*audārya*) and magnanimity (*māhātmya*).

7.He is eternal, having infinite compassion, powers, wisdom and bliss.

8.He is inconceivable.

CHAPTER THREE

(E91-97; T336-350) 1-39. The Buddha's qualities comprise 64 pure sorts:

ten powers: of the right and wrong occasions for things, of maturations of actions, of the faculties, of the elements, of resolve, of the path leading everywhere, of pure and impure contemplation, of the memory of previous abodes, of the divine eye, and of peace.

four convictions: understanding of all factors, destruction of all obstacles, preaching the path, and gaining cessation.

eighteen unique properties: without error, without bad speech, without failure to remember, without distraction, unaware of any identifications, indifferent, uncalculating, with no lack of interest, nor of energy, nor of memory, nor of wisdom, nor of liberation nor the awareness of his liberation, performing wise bodily, vocal and mental acts, with knowledge of past, present and future.

The Buddha's thirty-two marks of a great person are reviewed.

CHAPTER FOUR

(E98-114; T351-379) 1-98. The Buddha acts without effort and without interruption. Nine stories are told illustrating these qualities of the Buddha.

CHAPTER FIVE

(E1156-119; T380-390) 1-28. The merits of having faith in the Buddha's teaching.

ANALYSIS

The Basic Text. The subject of the basic text is, as shown in the title, the analysis of the mine of the Jewels in four aspects being the realm of the all-perceiver, i.e., the Buddha (v. I, 23), inconceivable even to men of pure mind (i.e., *bodhisattva*s) (v. V, 1). The interrelation of the four aspects is that the *tathāgatagarbha* within living beings, characterized as the Reality mingled with pollutions, is the cause of Buddhahood, while that Buddhahood, otherwise called Enlightenment, being the result of purification of the *tathāgatagarbha*, is characterized as Reality free from pollution, which is endowed with virtuous qualities of the Buddha and has activities of discipline for the sake of living beings, working forever without effort and unceasingly. Thus the three aspects after the second represent Buddhahood in contrast to unpurified living beings, but fundamentally both are identical as signifying Reality. This reality (*tathatā*) is the substratum (*dhātu*) of the Three Jewels (*dhātu* = *gotra*). The main part of the text consists of four chapters in accordance with the four aspects of the mine of the Jewels, while the author's expression of taking refuge to the Three Jewels in three verses is given prior to the main part, and the merit of faith in this doctrine is emphasized in the last chapter. In the last verse (V, 25) the author expresses his prayer of transfer of merits made by him to living beings so that they may have a chance to see the Buddha Amitāyus and achieving the highest enlightenment.

In the main part, the highest importance is put on the first aspect, i.e., the Tathāgatagarbha, the embryo of the Tathāgata. It is first of all an epithet of living beings (*sattva*) in the expectation of their growing finally into *buddha*s, because of their identity with the Buddha in their essence, and this essence is sought for in their "innate pure mind"

(*cittaprakṛti*). In actuality, however, living beings are polluted by temporary defilements (*āgantukakleśa*) which cover the pure innate mind. So the text starts with the elucidation of the Buddha's saying that all living beings are possessed of the embryo of the Tathāgata (v. I, 27), then proceeds to the explanation of the essential characteristics as the cause or the substratum of the Buddhahood in ten aspects beginning with his essential nature, and next has the explanation of the polluted states with the nine illustrations taken from the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra*..

Of the ten aspects, the first six, i.e., 1. *svabhāva* (essential nature), 2. *hetu* (cause), 3. *phala* (result), 4. *karman* (function), 5. *yoga* (association), and 6. *vṛtti* (manifestation) are a set of categories used for denoting any subject: they appear in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* of Asaṅga.[107] Its applications are observed in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra*. The *Ratnagotravibhāga*, too, utilizes these categorical terms, but it adds some other items for a further explanation of the last one, i.e., the meaning of *vṛtti*. It may be called a kind of modification. A similar modification is observed in Chapter II, where two items (*nitya* and *acintya*) are added for denoting duration and mode of manifestation.

Description of the *tathāgatagarbha* by means of these six categories in the basic verses goes as follows:

> "Being always undefiled by nature like a pure jewel, sky and water;
> Following after faith in the doctrine, the excellent intellect, meditation and compassion; (I.30)
> Having the climax of virtues of purity, unity, happiness and eternity as its result;
> Having aversion from suffering and desire for and vow to attain quiescence as its functions (I, 35)
> Being like the ocean, the imperishable receptacle of treasures of innumerable qualities,
> Being united inseparably with its properties by nature, like a lantern (with its light); (I.42)
> And as its (manifestations in the forms of) ordinary beings, the sages and the Buddhas are not distinct from reality
> This embryo of the Victors (existing) in the living beings is taught by those who perceived the truth." (I. 45)

Among all verses, however, the most important one is Verse I, 27 (*śloka* 5) which elucidates the fundamental statement of this doctrine. It goes as follows:

"The wisdom of the Buddha penetrates into the groups of living beings,
Its immaculateness is nondual by nature,
Its result is imposed upon the lineage of the Buddha,
Therefore it is said: "all living beings are possessed of the embryo of the Buddha."

The first three lines show in succession the reasons for the statement in the last line, and the commentary makes three meanings out of these lines, namely, (1) penetration of the *dharmakāya* of the Tathāgata, (2) undifferentiatedness of the Reality of the Tathāgata, and (3) the existence of the lineage of the Tathāgata. It regards the *dharmakāya, tathatā,* and *gotra* as the threefold essential nature of the *dhātu* (cause as well as substratum) of the Tathāgata (=*tathāgatagarbha*). Here we find another expression of the *ratnagotra* with various aspects.

The *dharmakāya* shows the result aspect as the same as *nirmalā tathatā*, and *tathāgatagotra* shows the cause aspects as the same as *samalā tathatā*, while the *tathatā* may be termed the ground aspect common to both. But the undifferentiatedness of Reality is again said to be due to the penetration of the *dharmakāya* as activities of Buddha's wisdom (based upon his compassion). Thus the doctrine of this text is well characterized as the monism of the *dharmakāya*.

The Commentary. In the present Sanskrit text the title of the commentary is not clear, but the term *ślokārthasaṁgrahavyākhyāna* appearing in the colophons of Chapters I, IV and V suggests the character of the commentary, namely, the "summing up" (*saṁgraha*) of the meaning of the basic verses (*ślokārtha*) which may indicate the verse section of the commentary, and the "detailed explanation" (*vyākhyāna*) the meaning of the basic verses, the prose section. The verse section or commentary verses exist constantly throughout the text, but the prose section is scanty after Chapter II. This fact may mean that the author of the commentary put the stress on the *tathāgatagarbha* aspect, from which he wished to explain the monistic structure of this doctrine.

A typical style of the commentary is shown, for example, in the passage on the Jewel of the Buddha. It starts with the heading "Here is a *śloka* on the *buddharatna*", and after mentioning the basic verse (*śloka* 1 = v. I, 4), it gives the summary of the contents in four verses (vv. 5-8), then proceeds to the explanation in prose of the eight points on Buddhahood picked up in the verses. The eight points are: 1. immutable,

2. free from effort, 3. awakened without help of others, 4. wisdom, 5. compassion, 6. (supernatural) power, 7. fulfilment of self benefit, 8. fulfilment of benefit for others. Lastly it quotes the *Jñānālokālaṁkārasūtra* as the source authority for composing the basic verse.

Thus the commentary follows the structure of the basic text, but in some passages it has its own explanation apart from the basic verses. As these passages have a special importance for the interpretation of the doctrine, we shall turn to them next.

(1) Introduction -- Seven adamantine subjects (vv. 1-3). Prior to explaining the meaning of the *śloka*s the commentary explains the frame of the text as the seven adamantine subjects (*vajrapada*). They are, namely, the Three Jewels and the four aspects of the lineage. This enumeration corresponds to that in the last verse of the basic text (v. V, 25). The fourth subject, i.e., the first aspect of the lineage, is here called "*dhātu*", which signifies *buddhadhātu*, the cause of the *buddha*, or Buddha nature. This term *dhātu* is favored by the commentator as the basic concept for speaking of a monistic doctrine because of the pregnancy of its meaning (i.e., substratum, cause, the whole realm (of activities)). (The terms *gotra* and *garbha* are synonymous with *dhātu* and also pregnant in meaning, but they are more analogical and signify merely the sense of cause or latent.) After mentioning authorities for each subject, the commentator says that the whole frame of seven subjects is taken from the *Dhāraṇīśvararājasūtra* and explains it through quotations of its passages. In this *sūtra*, Buddha's activities are compared with the jewel-maker's acts of polishing precious stones after taking them out from the mine (*gotra*). It may show the origin of the title of the basic text, and from this fact we can assume the possibility of the same person's writing both the basic text and the commentary.

(2) The three jewels as refuges (vv. 19-22). In this passage, the significance of the three jewels is explained and Buddha's state as the ultimate refuge is concluded (the source is the *Śrīmālādevīsūtra*).

(3) Nine kinds of defilements and the threefold nature of the Buddhadhātu (vv. 130-143, 144-152). Though this passage belongs to the section on the nine illustrations taken from the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra*, doctrinal application of the illustration is unique to the commentary. Of them the explanation of the threefold nature has a special significance.

(a) The *dhātu* as *dharmakāya* (vv. 145-147) is explained as of two kinds, *dharmadhātu* (foundation of teachings) signifying the realized truth

(*adhigamadharma*), and its natural outflow, the teachings of the Buddha (*deśanādharma*), which again divides into two, one being for Bodhisattvas representing the ultimate truth, and the other being for Śrāvakas representing the conventional truth. These three correspond to the first three illustrations, respectively.

(b) The *dhātu* as *tathatā*, the Reality, representing the unalterable character of the pure innate mind, is analogous to the gold in the fourth illustration. Here, Tathāgata is interpreted as the reality (*tathatā*) that reached (*āgata*) to its purity (quoting *Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra* IX, 37).

(c) The *dhātu* as *tathāgatagotra* (lineage of the Tathāgata). This includes the two kinds of *gotra* and the triple body of the Buddha, illustrated by the remaining five examples, respectively. The relation between the two *gotra*s and the triple body is explained as follows: that from the innate (*prakṛtistha*) *gotra* comes the Body of essential nature (*svabhāvakāya*), while from the developed *gotra* comes the Body of enjoyment (*sambhogakāya*) and the apparitional Body (*nirmāṇakāya*). These terms originally belong to the doctrine of the Yogācāra, but their implication is rather unique in this text. At the end, a famous *Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra* referring to the beginningless foundation (*anādikālako dhātu*) is quoted and explained by quoting the *Śrīmālādevīsūtra* to the effect that this "*dhātu*" means *tathāgatagarbha*.

A further important point in relating to the threefold nature of the *dhātu* is the threefold way of interpretation of the term *tathāgatagarbha* in accordance with the threefold nature. Namely,

(1) all living beings are the "embryos of the Tathāgata" (i.e., are inside the *dharmakāya* which is all-pervading),

(2) the "Tathāgata," being the Reality (*tathatā*) is the "embryo" of these living beings (i.e., living beings are possessed of *tathāgata* or *tathatā* in the inside),

(3) the embryo of these living beings is the cause (*dhātu=hetu*) of the Tathāgata (i.e., the living beings are possessed of the cause to be *tathāgata*s).

Of them the second one is near to the original sense used in the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra*. ("*Garbha*" used as a latter part of a compound means having something in the interior, or containing; it is a possessive (*bahuvrīhi*) compound.)

(4) inaccessibility of the *tathāgatagarbha* and necessity of faith (vv. 153-155).

The doctrine that all living beings are possessed of the embryo of

the Tathāgata, as the logical truth showing the nature of things (*dharmāṇāṁ dharmatā*) regardless of appearance or nonappearance of Tathāgatas, is so inaccessible that even the Bodhisattvas in the tenth stage can hardly perceive it. Therefore for most living beings it is accessible only by faith in the doctrine. Here those who need that faith are said, according to the *Śrīmālādevīsūtra*, to be (1) ordinary people being dominated by the Ego concept, (2) Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas who delight in the reverse concept and (3) those Bodhisattvas, newly entered on the path, whose mind deviates from emptiness. For the second group, the doctrine of the four perfections of virtues, i.e., eternity, bliss, the highest self, and purity, taught in the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra,* is inaccessible, while for the third group the *tathāgatagarbha* as representing the emptiness is inaccessible. The emptiness signified by *tathāgatagarbha* means that the *tathāgatagarbha* is empty of temporary defilements, but is not empty of, i.e. is filled with the virtues of the Buddha. This is directly taken from the *Śrīmālādevīsūtra*. This is a kind of expression of the sole reality of the Buddha as representing the truth of emptiness, possessed of virtues and acting constantly for the sake of living beings. Interpretation of emptiness in this way is, however, quite peculiar to the *tathāgatagarbha* theory.

62.SĀRAMATI, *Mahāyānadharmaviśeṣaśāstra* (450)

Summary by Jikido Takasaki[108]

"(T)his small *śāstra* is attributed to Sāramati in the Chinese Tripiṭaka. From its contents, this work seems quite consistent with the *Ratnagotravibhāga*. The main point of doctrine in this work is the *bodhicitta* which is synonymous with *cittaprakṛti* in the *Ratna*, and hence is nothing but the *tathāgatagarbha*. The text describes this *bodhicitta* under 12 divisions, namely: (1) *phala*, (2) *hetu*, (3) *svabhāva*, (4) *paryāya*, (5) *abheda*, (6) *avasthāprabheda*, (7) *asaṁkliṣṭa*, (8) *nitya*, (9) *yoga*, (10) *anarthakriyā*, (11) *arthakriyā*, and (12) *ekatva* (or *ekadhātu*), and is mainly based upon two Sūtras, the *Āryaśrīmālā* and the *Anyūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa*.

"This division has a resemblance, not only in its terminology but also in its contents, to the ten meanings of the *gotra* (in the *Ratna*). In particular, (6) *avasthāprabheda* is fully identical with that in the *Ratna*

in its classification of living beings into *sattvadhātu*, *bodhisattva*, and *tathāgata* in the *Anyūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa*. Besides, under (1) *phala* the text says that *phala* means *nirvāṇadhātu* which is nothing but the *dharmakāya* characterized as *āśrayaparivṛtti*, and explains it in the same way as the *Ratna* did in its explanation of the *śuddhāvasthāyāṁ avikārārtha*. Under (2) *hetu* it explains 4 causes, i.e. *dharmādhimukti, prajñā, samādhi* and *karuṇā*, with a verse containing the same ideas as verse 1.34 of the *Ratna*. Under (3) *svabhāva*, *prakṛtyasaṁkliṣṭatva* is said to be the own nature of *bodhicitta*. In (4) *paryāya,* a synonym of *bodhicitta* in its *phala* state, is called *śubhāmasukhanityapramitā* and so authorized by a quotation from the *Śrīmālādevīsūtra*. The verse in (8) *nitya* is identical with verses I.53 and 54 of the *Ratna* in its contents, explaining that *dharmadhātu* is, like *ākāśadhātu*, of neither origination nor destruction (*anutpādanirodha*). Under (9) *yoga* the text has two verses of which the first one is identical to the *śūnya* and *aśūnya* of the *gotra*. And lastly, the contents of (12) *ekatva* are the same as those under "*asambheda*" (X) in the *Ratna*, saying that the *bodhicitta* is nothing but the *dharmakāya*, the *tathāgata*, the *āryasatya* or *nirvāṇa*, and emphasizing the oneness of *nirvāṇa* with *buddhatva*.

"The remaining parts above seem to be taken mostly from Chapters II and IV of the *Ratna*. Namely, a reference to the two sides of *bodhicitta*, termed *śukladharmamayalakṣaṇa* and *vaimalyapariśuddhi-lakṣaṇa*, reminds us of the characterization of *dharmakāya* as *prakṛtiviśuddhi* and *vaimalyaviśuddhi* (p. 80) or the distinction of *prakṛtisthagotra* and *samudānītagotra* in the *Ratna*; a verse under (7) *asaṁkliṣṭa* resembles v. II.3 in the *Ratna*; similes used under (10) *anarthakriyā* and (11) *arthakriyā* are the same as those in Chapters 1 (among 9 illustrations), II and IV of the *Ratna*; and the 10 characteristics of *asambheda* under (5) can be traced one by one in various passages in the *Ratna*.

"Thus examining the contents, we may say that the author of this text composed it on the basis of the *Ratna*, compressing and revising the form according to his own view....(I)t is possible that...(the) Sāramati to whom this work is attributed may have been the author of the commentary on the *Ratna*."

63.SKANDHILA or SUGANDHARA, *Abhidharmāvatāra* (450)

Summary by Christian Lindtner, with Fred Greiner

This *Introduction to Abhidharma* is the work of a certain *Skandhila, a fifth century[109] Sarvāstivāda scholar living in the Himatala district, intellectually and geographically not far from Kashmir. He closely follows the doctrine of the Vaibhāṣikas, apparently only differing from them on three minor points: (i) there are four neutral roots, (ii) wickedness or regret (*kaukṛtya*) can be undetermined, and (iii) sleepiness and excitedness are included in the contaminants. Otherwise *Skandhila classifies, enumerates and defines the factors in accordance with the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, but, of course, in accordance with the scope of an introductory manual, in an extremely abridged and much more systematic form. Thus his intellectual background is much the same as that of the authors of the *Abhidharmakośa*, *Abhidharmadīpa*, *Nyāyānusāra*, etc., though the way he arranges his material is significantly different from their way of doing so. In this respect he seems to have influenced Candrakīrti's *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*.

*Skandhila's work is now lost in its original Sanskrit form and thus only (apart from a few fragments in Tocharian) available in a Chinese (Taisho 1554) and Tibetan (Peking edition 5599) version. The Tibetan text is edited and translated into French by Marcel Van Velthem (Publications de l'Institute Orientaliste de Louvain 16: Louvain-la-Neuve 1977). K. Dhammajoti in Sri Lanka Journal of Buddhist Studies 2, 1988, 160-174 edits and translates a few passages on the *viprayuktasaṁskāra*s.

In my summary I follow the Tibetan version, for the sake of convenience referring to the Peking edition. The Chinese version often interpolates or rearranges the original text. I also refer to Marcel van Velthem's French translation made from the Chinese version[110] (referred to below as "F").

After a brief prologue paying homage to the Buddha and stating the purpose of this manual, the author claims that all the factors of Buddhism can be summarized under eight main headings. They are dealt with as follows:

I. Matter (Peking 393b ; Comm. 319a3; F2-11)

Basically there are two kinds of matter: (i) the four great elements,

viz., earth, water, fire and wind. They have, respectively, the nature of solidity, humidity, heat and movement, and their function is, respectively, to support, cohere, cook and expand. Space (*ākāśa*) is not to be considered a great element. (ii) Moreover there are eleven kinds of derived matter, viz., eye, ear, nose, tongue, body; visible matter (i.e., color and shape, having, respectively, twelve and eight subdivisions), sound, smell, taste and a part of tangible derived matter (viz., softness, hardness, gravity, levity, coldness, hunger and thirst).

Apart from these five senses and five objects - each of which is defined and subdivided - there is an eleventh kind of matter, namely unmanifested matter. It consists in not informing others about the various changes going on in one's mind and (mental) attitude. There are three kinds: When it is due to self-discipline - of which there are, again, three kinds - it is good mental karma. When it is due to lack of self-discipline it is bad mental karma. Sometimes, however, it is not due to any of these two. In such cases the moral value of one's action depends on the value of the vocal or physical actions one actually performs. Like the five senses unmanifested matter can only be known by one's own mental cognition.

II. Feeling (Peking 396a2; Comm. 330b2; F11-12)

A feeling may either be satisfying or pleasant, frustrating or unpleasant, or neither. It is born from a corresponding contact with an object of experience, be it external or internal. It forms the basis of desire.

III. Identification (Peking 396b2; Comm. 331b8; F13)

A notion makes us aware of a specific mark, a name or a thing. It is the cause of initial and sustained thought. Depending on the object apprehended it may be considered a small, big or immeasurable notion.

IV. Traces (396b6; Comm. 331b8; F13-69)

Traces or synergies (*saṁskāra*) may either be associated with mind or dissociated from mind. That they are associated with mind means that they are similar to mind in five ways, viz., in regard to basis, object, aspect, time and substance. The opposite applies to traces dissociated from mind.

First of all thirty-seven formations associated with mind are enumerated, defined and, usually, briefly discussed:

1. Volition,
2. Contact,
3. Attention, of three types: (a) seeker's, the nondefiled attention of the seven seekers, (b) adept's, the attention of the *arhat*, (c) neither, i.e., all defiled attention.
4. Interest,
5. Resolve,
6. Faith,
7. Energy,
8. Memory/Mindfulness,
9. Concentration,
10. Discernment or wisdom, determining the inclusion, association and relationship of things as well as their causes, conditions, effects, specific and common characteristics,
11. Initial thought,
12. Sustained thought,
13. Heedlessness,
14. Heedfulness,
15. Dispassion or disgust toward life
16. Delight,
17. Tranquility,
18. Noninjury,
19. Shame,
20. Modesty,
21. Equanimity,
22. Three good roots, viz., (i) nongreed, (ii) nonhatred and (iii) nondelusion,
23. Three bad roots, viz., (i) greed, (ii) hatred and (iii) delusion,
24. Four neutral roots, viz., (i) desire, (ii) dogmas, (iii) conceit, and (iv) ignorance,
25. Nine fetters, viz., (i) affection, (ii) repugnance, (iii) pride, of which there are seven kinds, (iv) ignorance, (v) dogmas, of which there are three kinds, (vi) firm adherence or overestimation (*parāmarśa*), viz., taking an inferior view as superior, and mistaking adherence to ritual and vows as the correct path, (vii) perplexity, (viii) envy, and (ix) stinginess,
26. Three bonds, viz., (i) greed, (ii) hatred, and (iii) delusion
27. Seven kinds of proclivities, (i) sensual passion, (ii) repugnance, (iii) lust for rebirth, (iv) conceit, (v) ignorance, (vi) false view, and (vii) perplexity; they are analyzed in detail based on the differences of sphere

of existence, aspects and classes,

28. Minor afflictions, viz. - to mention only the most important ones - (i) deceit, (ii) arrogance, (iii) violence, (iv) perversity or spite, (v) vengefulness, and (vi) craftiness,

29. Ten envelopers, viz., (i) languor (*styāna*), (ii) torpor (*middha*), (iii) excitedness, (iv) anger, (v) jealousy, (vi) stinginess, (vii) shamelessness, (viii) disregard, (ix) malice, and (x) hypocrisy,

30. Three contaminants: (i) pleasure, (ii) existence, and (iii) ignorance,

31. Four floods, viz., that of (i) pleasure, (ii) existence, (iii) dogmas, and (iv) ignorance,

32. Four bonds, as in 31,

33. Four kinds of clinging, i.e., to (i) pleasure, (ii) dogmas, (iii) rule and ritual, and (iv) belief in a self,

34. Four bodily knots, viz., (i) desire, (ii) malice, (iii) rule and ritual, and (iv) attachment to views,

35. Five obstructions in the form of (i) longing for sensual pleasures, (ii) ill-will, (iii) languor and torpor, (iv) excitedness and malice, and (v) wavering.

Before passing on to the final traces associated with mind and to those dissociated from mind *Skandhila presents a survey of the various divisions of the three worlds: (i) the world of sensual pleasure comprises twenty levels, i.e., eight hells, animals, ghosts, human beings living in four continents, and six kinds of gods, (ii) the material world, i.e., the first, second, third and fourth meditative level comprising, respectively, two, three, three and eight levels, and (iii) the immaterial world comprising four places of birth, five destinies and four ways of birth. Some of these are impure, others pure.

36. Ten cognitions, namely (i) cognition of the Dharma, (ii) the cognition following that (cognition of the Dharma), (iii) cognition of the mind of others, (iv) conventional cognition, be it impure or pure, etc., (v) cognition of frustration, (vi) cognition of its origination, (vii) cognition of its cessation, (viii) cognition of the path (to its cessation), (ix) cognition of the extinction (of the impurities), and (x) cognition of the nonorigination (of the impurities).

37. Of the eight kinds of patience or competence, the first four are concerned with cognition of the Dharma in relation to frustration, its origin, its cessation and the way to it, whereas the remaining four are concerned with the cognition following the cognition of the Dharma in

relation to frustration, etc. All these kinds of patience must be distinguished from certain knowledge, and are to be abolished as one progresses along the path of vision After providing a brief survey of the way a monk gradually gets rid of all the defilements according to orthodox Sarvāstivāda, *Skandhila deals with the fourteen kinds of traces dissociated from mind as follows:

1. Possession is a real thing (*dravya*) that accounts for the fact that someone can acquire something and keep it in his possession, be it good, bad or neither. Without it there would be no continuity in one's development. In some cases possession will be simultaneous with its object, in other cases before or after it. It is, as said, an independent thing in its own right, but its moral value depends on the object one attains and keeps in one's possession.

2. Nonpossession is, obviously, the opposite of possession but it cannot be defined as either good or bad. It applies to factors belonging to the past or future.

3. The nonidentifying level is a good factor without mind (*citta*) or mental phenomena (*caitta, cetasika*) - including, of course, identification - belonging to the fourth level; it is the result of effort, not of renunciation.

4. The cessation meditation is also a good factor; it is obtained by effort and occurs at the summit of existence, and constitutes bliss in this life.

5. Unconscious absorption (*asaṁjñika*) is rebirth among the "unconscious gods"; it is the fruit of the fourth meditative level but morally neutral.

6. Life-force is simply a term for the reality of the *bhavaṅga* due to one's previous karma.

7. Homogeneity-force accounts for the fact that the same groups of living beings are alike or different in regard to their activities and desires; if it did not exist there would be no difference between saints and common people and all worldly usages would be confounded.

8. Birth is the internal causal power accounting for the origination of factors when the necessary external causes and conditions are present.

9. Duration is a factor having the power to project new effects and thus account for temporal duration.

10. Old age is a power preventing new factors from arising.

11. Impermanence is a destructive power causing present things to become past.

Now these four marks characterize all conditioned things, including, in a certain sense, themselves. In order, however, to avoid the absurdity of their characterizing one another - for this would imply a total confusion - these four marks are said to have each their own secondary mark, i.e., birth, for instance, is conditioned by birth, etc., not by aging, etc. Thus, in other words, each of the four basic, or primary, marks characterize eight factors whereas a secondary mark only characterizes one basic, or primary, mark. In the moment one factor is born there is thus a simultaneous production of nine factors, i.e., that factor itself and the eight primary and secondary marks.

12-14. The three final traces dissociated from mind are (12) name-collection, (13) phrase-collection and (14) phoneme-collection. They are all communicated through speech and reflect a sort of knowledge of how things are. They are not, as the Sautrāntikas maintain, to be regarded as belonging to the aggregate of matter, but rather as independent traces dissociated from mind and apart from the things or meaning to which they give expression.

V. Consciousness (P414a3; Comm. 384b5; F70-71)

Consciousness, the fifth aggregate, is defined as a conscious distinction (*prativijñapti*) of the six kinds of sense-objects. It is an immediate awareness supported by the sense-organs, of perceptible or conceivable things as such.

Before passing on to the three unconditioned factors *Skandhila now gives a survey of the classical Sarvāstivāda theory of causality (P414a8; Comm. 385b1; F71-74). As mentioned above under birth, external causes and conditions necessarily supplement the internal causal power that accounts for the origination of things. There are, then, six causes: (i) connected (*samprayukta-*), i.e., mind and the ten permeating mental phenomena when perceiving an object, (ii) simultaneous (*sahabhū-*), (iii) homogeneous (*sabhāga-*), (iv) pervasive (*sarvatrāga-*), (v) causes of retribution (*vipākahetu*), and (vi) instrumental (*karaṇa-*). These six are the causes of all conditioned things and in various combinations they give rise to five corresponding kinds of result. Moreover, there are four conditions: (i) causal conditions (*hetupratyaya)*, i.e., all the causes mentioned above except the efficient one, (ii) immediately antecedent condition (*samanantarapratyaya*), i.e., all past and present thoughts and mental phenomena, apart from the final thought of an *arhat*, (iii) supporting object as condition (*ālambanapratyaya*), i.e.,

any factor, and (iv) dominant factor as condition (*adhipatipratyaya*), i.e., the instrumental cause mentioned above.

VI. Space (P415b1; Comm. 389b1; F74-75)

Space (*ākāśa*), the first of the three unconditioned traces, is defined by its capability to contain, or give room to resistant and compact things. It is provided with light and is a substance giving support to the element wind. Thus it cannot just be defined as lack of something tangible as the Sautrāntikas do.

VII. Calculated Cessation (P415b5; Comm. 389b7; F75-77)

Calculated cessation (*pratisaṁkhyānirodha*) is an extinction due to a special kind of insight bringing about the final cessation of frustration, i.e., of rebirth, when one understands the four noble truths. It is just as unlimited as all the things that have to be abandoned.

VIII. Uncalculated Cessation (P416b6; Comm. 391b8; F78)

This unconditioned trace prevents the arising of certain future factors for good. It is a real power that is, however, not due to intellectual insight or "calculation" (*pratisaṁkhyā*) but rather due to the insufficiency of conditions (*pratyayavaikalya*). It can be compared to a situation where one's being absorbed in impressions from one sense-organ prevents other sense-impressions from coming to mind. This kind of cessation must be clearly distinguished from cessation due either to impermanence or, as said, to insight.

A concluding epilogue reaffirms that this manual was composed in order to provide beginners with an introduction to orthodox Buddhism.

64. ŚAMATHADEVA, *Ṭīkopāyika* on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* (450?)

This work is lost in the original Sanskrit, and exists only in a Tibetan translation by Jayasri and Ses-rab-hod-zer, Peking/Tokyo Tibetan Tripitaka volume 118, pp. 97-275. The date given here is a wild guess. Marek Mejor reviews some passages from this commentary on Chapter Three of the *Abhidharmakośa.*[111]

It is a large work. The colophon says that the author was "born in Nepal." It is "a collection of full quotations and extracts from the canonical *sūtra*s,"[112] which Schmithausen[113] shows are not from

Sarvāstivāda but from the *Saṁyuktāgama* of the Mūlasarvāstivādins.

Summary by Stefan Anacker

Of all the curious works that claim to be commentaries on the *Kośa* (cf. Vinītabhadra, Dignāga), this is by far the strangest. It includes very few quotations from the *Kośa* or explanations of difficult passages in that work. Its aim seems instead to be to demonstrate that almost the entire range of Abhidharma categories derives from the *Sūtrapiṭaka*. As a result, it consists almost entirely of *Sūtrapiṭaka* passages. These quotations are all from the basically accepted canon, and include no Mahāyāna references. The author, of whom one knows practically nothing, was obviously a very erudite scholar. He attempts to show in many passages that an assiduous study of the *Sūtrapiṭaka* would have made many of the later Abhidharma controversies impossible. The work makes very interesting reading, but as it consists almost entirely of *sūtra* quotations, it is not very apt for summarization in an encyclopedia of this kind. It is this work, rather than that of Vinītabhadra, which should be called "*Sūtrānurūpiṇī.*" Its "*upāya*" is precisely that it wishes to demonstrate that the entire framework of Abhidharma is contained already in the *Sūtrapiṭaka*!

I. Begins with vast *sūtra* quotations which serve as a commentary on Vasubandhu's introductory verse: in these he gives the original *Sūtrapiṭaka* citations for the aggregates, sense-bases, etc.

(p. 101, 3, lines 6-7) Śamathadeva states that there is a difference between the appropriating (*upādāna*) aggregates and the immaculate aggregates of the Buddha endowed with ultimate knowledge. The latter can in fact not be limited by the usual definitions of the aggregates, but are rather (1) ethical conduct (*śīla*), (2) meditational concentration (*samādhi*), and (3) ultimate insight (*prajñā*) only. For within these three, the entire eightfold path is succinctly included. Right speech, right livelihood, and right action are included in the "aggregate" of ethical conduct; right mindfulness and right concentration in the "aggregate" of meditational concentration; and right views, right intention, and right effort are included in the "aggregate" of insight.

The citation of *sūtra*s goes on for pages and pages, and in fact constitutes the bulk of the entire book. In these citations, Śamathadeva shows how all the basic categories used in Abhidharma are derived from the *Sūtrapiṭaka*, including even the controversial one of "seed" (p. 109,

1, 5 ff).

(p.109, 1, 2) defines "materiality" (*rūpaskandha*) as being perceptible by the senses of smell and taste, as well as touch. The author agrees with Vasubandhu (*Kośa* IV, *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*) that *rūpa* as an aggregate (the visible) is basically only color.

Śamathadeva shows how the root occupation of Abhidharma, to find and analyze basic moment-events, exists and is explicitly mentioned as such already in the *Sūtrapiṭaka* (p. 110, 1, 7 ff).

Śamathadeva admits the existence of awarenesses, which may even be accompanied by other mental associates, which are not accompanied by identification, and quotes *sūtra*s to this effect. In this, Śamathadeva seems to be implying that a careful reading of the *Sūtrapiṭaka* could have dispelled many of the controversies that arose in Abhidharma.

65.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (450?), *Bhavasaṁkrāntisūtra*

Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti give in Buddhist Studies Review 2.1, 1986, pp. 3-18 a complete account of what is known and conjectured about this work. The earliest Chinese translation (T.575) is by Bodhiruci between 508-537, closely followed by T.576, translated by Buddhaśānta in 525-539. The Tibetan translation is Toh. 226. An apparently different work known by the same title and attributed to Nāgārjuna consists of 16-21 stanzas. This is T.1574 = Toh. 3840, 4162, 4558. It contains five of the stanzas of T.575. There is a good-sized literature (under 238 in the Bibliography of this Encyclopedia). It has been translated several times by Aiyaswami Sastri (Journal of Oriental Research 5, 1931, 246-260 and Adyar Library Bulletin 1, 1937, i-iv, 1-60-2, 1938, 61-112, i-xxxvi) as well as by Tola and Dragonetti in the work cited above.

Paul Williams (Journal of Indian Philosophy 8, 1980, p. 26) points out that there are several related works (dates unknown), including a *Bhavasaṁkrāntiparikathā* which says "that *saṁsāra* is the product of *vikalpa*, which is in turn generated by mind (*citta*)" (p. 27), a *Madhyamabhavasaṁkrānti*, in which "the mind is said to arise from *vikalpa*" (p. 27), and a *Bhavasaṁkrāntiṭīkā*, which says that "*vikalpa* involves the conceiving of good and bad, and in dependence of this *saṁsāra* occurs" (p.28).

66.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Dharmadhātubuddhakasūtra* (453)

K.22 (8) = T.310 (8) = N. 23 (8) = Bagchi, p. 415 (2). Translated by Mandrasena in 503. For Mandrasena see Bagchi pp. 414-415.

67.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Ratnameghasūtra* (453)

Translated by Mandrasena in 503, this is K.134 = T.658 = N.152 = Bagchi, pp. 414-415 (1).

68.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Śraddhābālādhānāvatāramudrāsūtra* (454)

K.81 =T. 305 = N. 90 = Bagchi, pp. 246-247 (1). The work was translated by Dharmaruci, the date of the translation being given as 504. For Dharmaruci see Bagchi, pp. 246-247. The work comprises 5 fascicules. Nanjio renders the title as "*Sūtra* on the gate of the law of the seal for entering the power of faith".

69.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *(Sarvabuddhaviṣayāvatāra)Jñānālokālaṁkārasūtra* (457)

K.188 = N. 245 = T. 357 is the first translation, by Dharmaruci, of this frequently translated work, made in 501 in Pai-ma Monastery, Lo-yang. Nakamura says this work "is cited in the Ratnagotravibhāga...It exists in Tibetan, and fragments of its Sanskrit original and its Chinese version were found in Central Asia."[114]

70.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Aśokarājasūtra* (462)

K.1013 = T.2043 = N. 1343, translated by Saṁghapāla in 512. It is a work of 8 chapters. Nanjio comments: "This may be a translation of the *Aśokāvadāna.* For the Sanskrit text see the Catalogue of the Hodgson Mss. V. 23; VI. 12; VII.3."

71.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Dharmasaṁgītisūtra* (465)

Translated in 515 (=K.404 =T.761 = N. 426 = Bagchi, p. 254 (4)) by Bodhiruci. For information about this Bodhiruci cf. Bagchi, op. cit., pp. 252-260.

72.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Mañjuśrīpariprcchāsūtra* (468)

K.412 = N. 442 = T.468 = Bagchi p. 417 (3) is translated by a person whom Nanjio calls Saṁghapāla, which according to Bagchi is a confusion, the proper rendering of the name being Saṁghabhara. Cf. Bagchi, pp. 415-418 for his life and works.

73. *ŚUDDHAMATI (470?), *Vyākhyāṇa* on Nāgārjuna's *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdaya*

We know nothing about the author of Taisho 1651 and 1654 (=Tohoku 3537 and 4554), which was first translated by Bodhiruci between 508 and 537. The date given is only the usual estimate based on the translator's dates. The work has been thought by some to be Nāgārjuna's own; this has been controverted by Carmen Dragonetti with rebuttal by Christian Lindtner.[115]

74.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Saptaśatikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* (470)

This *sūtra* has been edited several times, and a translation of one version, T. 310, is available in Garma C. C. Chang, *A Treasury of Mahāyāna Sūtras* (University Park, Pennsylvania, 1983), pp. 100-114. For another translation see Edward Conze, "The Perfection of Wisdom in Seven Hundred Lines", Kalpa 1, 1963, nos. 2, 4-20, reprinted in Conze, *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies* (Oxford 1967). Full references to editions and partial translations are in Conze, *The Prajñāpāramitā Literature* (op. cit.), pp. 58-59, along with the following summary.

Summary by Edward Conze

"The Sūtra falls roughtly into five parts: 1. *Nidāna*, 1a-3a - 2. Dialogue, 3a-22b. The problems covered here are: The Suchness of the Tathāgata, development of perfect wisdom (6b-9a), reasons for not trembling (9a-13b), the non-existence of enlightenment, and of all the stages preceding it...3.Cosmic phenomena, and Ānanda's question, 22b-23a. This first half may originally have been entitled *puṇyakṣetranideśa* (2eb). 4. Discussion continued, 23b-412b: The unthinkable concentration and cognition (23b-26b), qualifications of the believers (27a-34a), the concentration on one single array (34a-36b), full enlightenment and its

conditions (37a-38b), qualities of the sermon and of the listerners worthy of it (38b-41b). 5.End. Śakra and miracles, 41b-43a."

75.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (470?),
**Samantamukhaparivartasūtra*
T. 310 (10), 315; P760.10; Toh. 54; Ligeti 801(5).

76.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Vajramaṇḍadhāraṇīsūtra* (475)
K.336 = N. 373 = T. 1344, first translated by Buddhaśānta in 525.

77.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Buddhanāmasūtra* (475)
K.390 = T.440 = N.404 = Bagchi pp. 253-254 (1) translated in 525 by Bodhiruci. A big work of 12 chapters, it is said to enumerate the Buddhas, Bodhisattvas and Pratyekabuddhas by name, some 11,093 of them. (cf. N., p. 99). Bagchi reports that it is said to have been made in the palace of Minister Hou.

78.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Kṣemāvativyākaraṇasūtra* (475)
K.492 = T.573 = N.461 = Bagchi, p. 255 (10). Translated by Bodhiruci in 525 in Lo-yang. Nanjio explains: "It is stated that when Buddha, together with Maitreya, went to Rājagṛha to beg alms, and arrived at the palace of Bimbisāra, the queen Kshamāvatī spread excellent clothes and asked Buddha to sit down on them. Then Buddha spoke with her on the meaning of the adornment of trees, and finally gave her the prophecy.."

79.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Siṁhanādikasūtra* (475)
K.242 = T.835 = N.262. Bagchi seems not to know this work. Translated by Buddhaśānta in 525 at Lo-yang.

80.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (475?), *Sārasamuccaya* on Skandhila's (?) *Abhidharmāvatāra*

Available in Chinese, T.1554, and Tibetan, Toh. 4097 = Peking 5598. Translated by Jinamitra, Dānaśīla et al ca. 800. Marek Mejor briefly summarizes its contents as follows:

"The treatise offers a concise smmary of the Sarvāstivāda teaching of the *dharma* theory. Firstly there is a classification schema of the conditioned elements (*saṁskṛta-dharma*) which are distributed into five aggregates (*skandha*); then follows a separate section on the operations of the causes (*hetu*) and conditions (*pratyaya*), and on their effects (*phala*); and finally an explanation is given of the three unconditioned elements (*asaṁskṛta-dharma*)."[116]

81.BUDDHAPĀLITA (480), *Vṛtti* on Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakasūtra*s

Summary by William L. Ames[117]

Buddhapālita is the earliest identifiable author whose commentary (*Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*) on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* (MMK) survives today. (The *Akutobhayā*,[118] #137 of Volume Eight of this Encyclopedia, may well be older, but its authorship is disputed. There is also a Chinese translation of a commentary ascribed to Asaṅga that deals only with the dedicatory verses of the MMK.[119]) Buddhapālita was active probably around 500 A.D.[120] Tāranātha[121] tells us that he was born in South India[122] and gives a very brief account of his life, but it is not clear how reliable his information is. Although both Tāranātha and the colophon[123] to the Tibetan translation say that he composed commentaries on many works, only his commentary on the MMK has come down to us. Aside from a few very brief quotations in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*, it exists only in an early ninth-century Tibetan translation by Jñānagarbha and Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan.

The first twelve chapters were edited by M. Walleser.[124] Chapter One has been translated by Judit Fehér.[125] A portion of Chapter Two has been translated and edited by Musashi Tachikawa.[126] Chapter Eighteen has been translated and edited by Christian Lindtner.[127] Akira Saito has edited the entire text and translated the first sixteen chapters in an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.[128]

It is a curious fact that Buddhapālita's commentary on the last five of the twenty-seven chapters of the MMK is nearly identical to the corresponding chapters of the *Akutobhayā*. (This is particularly true of the last four chapters.) The style and the brevity of these chapters much more resemble the first twenty-two chapters of the *Akutobhayā* than they do the first twenty-two chapters of Buddhapālita's commentary. Thus it seems likely that Buddhapālita, in fact, wrote only the first twenty-two chapters of the commentary ascribed to him. The remaining chapters were presumably taken from the *Akutobhayā* and added later. Hence I have summarized only the first twenty-two chapters here.

In his commentary, Buddhapālita stays close to the thought of Nāgārjuna as expressed in the MMK. To avoid simply resummarizing the MMK, I have tried to locate passages in which Buddhapālita sets forth central themes of the Madhyamaka in a manner at least partially independent of the text of the MMK. These passages have been organized according to subject. In the absence of a complete, published edition or translation, I have identified the passages by the chapter and verse of the MMK on which they comment. Sanskrit words in parentheses are reconstructed from the corresponding Tibetan terms. Where the Sanskrit original is uncertain, Tibetan may be given instead of or in addition to Sanskrit.

Reductio ad Absurdum Arguments

Buddhapālita is best known to modern students of Buddhism as the object of Bhāvaviveka's criticism and Candrakīrti's defense. The main subject of controversy was Buddhapālita's use of *reductio* arguments rather than independent (*svatantra*) syllogisms.[129] In a *reductio* argument, the thesis to be refuted is shown to have consequences (*prasaṅga*) which the opponent himself cannot accept. The followers of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti became known as Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas, while those who followed Bhāvaviveka were called Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas.

There are many examples of *reductio* arguments throughout Buddhapālita's commentary. Some of the most important occur in the following passage:

> (1) Here if any entity (*bhāva*) originated, that origination of that entity would be either from itself, from another, from both itself and another, or from no cause; but when one investigates, (origination) is not possible in any way...

To begin with, entities do not originate from their own selves,

because their origination would be pointless and because there would be no end to origination. For originating again would be useless for entities which (already) exist by their own selves. But if they originate (again) even though they exist (already), they would never not be originating...

Nor do they originate from others. Why? Because it would follow that everything would originate from everything. Nor do they originate from both themselves and others, because the faults of both (of the two previous alternatives) would follow. Nor do they originate from no cause, because it would follow that everything would always be originating from everything and because there would be the fault that all undertakings would be pointless. (fol. 1-1)

Here we might mention another controversial point in Buddhapālita's commentary. In his commentary on MMK 7-34, he implies that absence of intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) is taught even in the scriptures of the Hīnayāna schools. This idea was also criticized by Bhāvaviveka and defended by Candrakīrti, especially in the latter's *Madhyamakāvatāra*.

Dependent Origination and Its Implications

Throughout the MMK, Nāgārjuna lays great stress on the notion of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), a fundamental doctrine in early Buddhism. Buddhapālita also underlines the importance of dependent origination. Thus he refers to:

> (2) ...the teacher (Nāgārjuna), wishing to explain dependent origination, it really is the profundity of dependent origination...(prec. 1-A)

He speaks of:

> (3) ..the supremely profound ultimate truth (*pāramārthasatya*) called "dependent origination"... (fol. 1-B)

Since dependent origination is the truth, the knowledge of it sets one free:

> (4) The teacher (Nāgārjuna), having a compassionate nature and seeing that beings are afflicted by various sufferings, wished to teach the real state (*yāthātathya*) of entities in order to liberate them. Therefore he undertook the teaching of dependent origination, because it has been said, "One who sees the unreal is bound; one who sees the real is liberated." (fol. 1-B)

On the other hand, Buddhapālita feels that some have taken the teaching of dependent origination too literally:

> (5) It is true that the Tathāgata himself has explained and taught dependent origination. Nevertheless, he explained and taught it

according to worldly convention by means of expressions such as "origination." In that connection, even to this day, some whose minds are attached to mere verbal expressions do not understand the supremely profound dependent origination, but think that entities indeed exist because their origination and cessation and going and coming are spoken of...In order to teach them the intrinsic nature of dependent origination, the teacher (Nāgārjuna) has composed this (treatise), which is connected with (both) reasoning (*yukti*) and scripture (*āgama*). (fol. 1-B)

Here Buddhapālita probably has in mind non-Mahāyāna Buddhists in general and especially the Vaibhāṣikas. Buddhapālita reiterates the point that not all statements of the Buddha can be taken literally:

(6) Therefore the blessed Buddhas have said various things according to worldly convention. Therefore those who wish to see reality (*tattva*) should not be attached to what has been said according to worldlyconvention but should grasp just that which is reality. (fol. 18-8)

Applying this principle to a specific case, he says,

(7) The Blessed One has taught the three times (i.e., past, present, and future) according to worldly convention; but in reality the three times are not possible. (prec. 19-1)

How then is the teaching of dependent origination to be understood? Following Nāgārjuna (see, e.g., MMK 7-16ab, 15-1&2, 23-2, Chapter 24), Buddhapālita holds that dependent origination implies lack of intrinsic nature. For example, he says,

(8) Because action arises from the defilements[1] as (its) cause and the defilements arise from error as (their) cause, therefore (we) say that action and the defilements are without intrinsic nature. (fol.17-26)

In another passage, Buddhapālita explains these causal relationships in more detail:

(9) Those actions and defilements, moreover, arise from false conceptualization (*abhūtavikalpa*) but do not exist by intrinsic nature. A defilement arises from superficial conceptualization

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[1]The defilements (*kleśa*) are undesirable emotional states. The three most often mentioned are desire (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*), and confusion (*moha*). See quotation (9).

> (*ayoniśo vikalpa*), for even in regard to one single object, some will desire, some will hate, and some will be confused. Therefore, defilements arise from conceptualization. What the body, speech, and mind of one whose awareness is defiled perform is called "action"...Therefore action and defilements arise from false conceptualization as (their) cause. (fol. 18-5)

Action and the defilements are said to be the causes of the bodies in which one is reborn. With regard to bodies, Buddhapālita says:

> (10) We have shown that the causes of bodies, that action and those defilements, are empty of intrinsic nature because they are dependently originated. It must be held that an effect possesses the nature of the qualities of its cause. Therefore if the causes of a body, action and the defilements, are themselves empty, they being empty, how can one say that a body has intrinsic nature? (fol. 17-27)

The term "appropriation" (*upādāna*) is sometimes used to designate the five *skandha*s, the five psycho-physical aggregates which constitute an individual's body and mind. They are "appropriated" as the basis for imputing a self although, in fact, no permanent, unitary self exists. Once again, Buddhapālita infers their lack of intrinsic nature from the fact that they originate in dependence on causes and conditions:

> (11) Even that appropriation, which (you) suppose exists, does not exist (by) intrinsic nature because it is dependently originated. (fol. 22-9ab)

Thus Buddhapālita is critical of those who accept dependent origination without seeing that it implies that there is no intrinsic nature in things:

> (12) Do you not see the horse even though you are mounted on it? You say that entities are dependently originated, but you do not see their lack of intrinsic nature. (prec. 15-1ab)

Again, Buddhapālita is presumably thinking of the Vaibhāṣikas and other non-Mahāyāna Buddhists. And it is probably with them in mind that he says,

> (13) It is not possible for the proponents of dependent origination (to say) that that (which is called) "this action" has arisen from causal conditions; nor is it possible for the proponents of origination without a cause (to say) that that (which is called) "this action" has arisen without a cause. (fol. 17-29)

In the preceding passage, the "proponents of dependent origination"

are evidently those who accept the principle of dependent origination but not that of emptiness, the absence of intrinsic nature in things. Elsewhere Buddhapālita seems to equate the "proponents of dependent origination" with the Mādhyamikas themselves. Thus he says,

> (14) Therefore, for those who see entities and nonentities, bondage and liberation are not possible, because the views of permanence and annihilation follow (if there are entities and nonentities); but bondage and liberation are established only for the proponent of dependent origination. (fol. 16-10)

Likewise he says,

> (15) For the proponents of dependent origination, the entity which is originating does not exist; and the origination of the entity which is originating does not exist. (prec. 7-16ab)

Moreover, when Buddhapālita refers to dependent origination, he usually takes it for granted that it implies, indeed, is virtually identical with, absence of intrinsic nature. Thus he goes on to explain "does not exist" in quotation (15) as meaning "empty of intrinsic nature." And he also says,

> (16) ... all conceptual constructions (*rtog pa*, probably *kalpanā*) of entities and nonentities lead to the faults of permanence and annihilation; but dependent origination stands outside of views of entities and nonentities. Therefore it is free from the faults of the views of permanence and annihilation. (fol. 17-33).

And similarly,

> (17) Therefore we teach that because the aggregates, elements and sense-bases are dependently originated, they are free from the faults of existence and nonexistence, not annihilated and not eternal... (prec. 5-8)

Thus having said in quotation (5) that Nāgārjuna composed the MMK in order to explain dependent origination, Buddhapālita can also say without any inconsistency.

> (18) Therefore the teacher (Nāgārjuna) composed this (treatise) in order to explain entities' lack of intrinsic nature. (fol. 1-B)

And having said in quotation (4) that Nāgārjuna taught dependent origination because he wished to teach the real state of entities, Buddhapālita goes on to ask,

> (19) Question: What is the real state of entities?
>
> Answer: (Their) lack of intrinsic nature. (fol. 1-B)

Thus from Buddhapālita's Mādhyamika perspective, dependent origination

and absence of intrinsic nature are not two separate facts but are rather aspects of the same fact.

The connection between dependent origination and lack of intrinsic nature means that dependent origination is, in a sense, nonorigination:

> (20) Because action lacks intrinsic nature, therefore it does not originate. For if the intrinsic nature of action existed, (its) origination would also be possible (so that one could say) "This is the origination of action." But if the intrinsic nature of action does not exist, what would originate? But even if it originates, it would not originate as intrinsic nature. That which does not originate as intrinsic nature is not action, since it lacks the intrinsic nature of action. (fol. 17-21b)

If there is no origination, there is no cessation, either. In Chapter Seventeen of MMK, Nāgārjuna criticizes a Buddhist Abhidharma school which took the "nondisappearance" (*avipraṇāśa*) of action, of which the Buddha spoke, to be a distinct entity. Buddhapālita comments,

> (21) Therefore, not having understood reality, having become attached to the mere word "nondisappearance" as an entity, (you) have uttered so many numerous and varied and worthless (statements). For action is simply without intrinsic nature. Because it is without intrinsic nature, therefore it is unoriginated; and because it is unoriginated, therefore it does not disappear. (fol. 21-cd)

Buddhapālita reiterates that lack of intrinsic nature implies nonorigination and noncessation. He refers to:

> (22) ... one who sees that all entities are unoriginated and unceasing because they are empty of intrinsic nature...(fol. 18-7cd).

And conversely,

> (23) ... by saying that it is without beginning or end, the Blessed One taught that *saṁsāra* also is empty of intrinsic nature. For if any entity called "*saṁsāra*" existed, it would undoubtedly have both a beginning and an end...Therefore, because (the Buddha) said that it is without beginning or end, no entity called "rebirth" is possible. (fol. 11-1)

Nevertheless, Buddhapālita does not wish to abolish all talk of origination but to relegate it to the conventional level:

> (24) Thus because the origination of entities is not possible in any way, therefore, since origination does not exist, the expression "origination" is a mere conventional usage (*vyavahāra*), (fol. 1-1)

and

> (25) ... it is established that the expression "origination" is a mere conventional usage (fol. 1-14).

Intrinsic Nature

Though Buddhapālita almost always negates intrinsic nature, the reader may have noticed that in quotation (5) he says that Nāgārjuna wrote the MMK in order to teach the intrinsic nature of dependent origination. Moreover, he says,

> (26) Therefore one should understand that the defining characteristic of reality is the cognition of such an intrinsic nature, known by oneself, not learned from another. (fol. 18-9)

The idea seems to be that things' very lack of intrinsic nature is, in a sense, their intrinsic nature. Commenting on MMK 15-8, Buddhapālita says,

> (27) For the antidote of change is intrinsic nature. Therefore intrinsic nature must be unchanging, permanent; but alteration appears in entities. Therefore existence by intrinsic nature is not possible for them. (fol. 15-8cd)

On the other hand, entities' lack of intrinsic nature is a permanent, albeit negative, fact. Hence Buddhapālita can equate things' lack of intrinsic nature with reality (*tattva*):

> (28) If to see entities and nonentities were to see reality, there would be no one who would not see reality; therefore that is not the vision of reality. Therefore entities' lack of intrinsic nature is reality, and only by seeing that will one be liberated. (fol. 15-7)

And likewise he says,

> (29) Thus because the view of existence and nonexistence of entities will have many faults, therefore that "lack of intrinsic nature of entities" is the vision of reality; it is the middle path; and just that is the attainment of ultimate reality (fol. 15-11)

The Two Truths

We have already seen references to "convention" versus "reality" in quotations (5), (6), and (7). This distinction is based on the well-known Mādhyamika doctrine of the two truths, the truth of ultimate reality (*paramārthasatya*) and the truth of relative or superficial reality (*saṁvṛtisatya*). (See MMK 24-8,9,10)

As far as ultimate truth is concerned, the lack of intrinsic nature in

things is said to be reality in quotations (28) and (29) and the real state of entities in quotation (19). In quotation (3), dependent origination is said to be ultimate truth; but we have seen how dependent origination and absence of intrinsic nature are inseparable for the Mādhyamikas. Likewise, Buddhapālita says of emptiness

(30) Therefore emptiness is reality... (fol. 18-5)

On the other hand, ultimate reality is beyond the reach of conceptual formulation. As Buddhapālita said in quotation (26), it must be directly experienced for oneself. Paraphrasing MMK 22-11, he says,

(31) "Empty" should not be said; nor should "nonempty" be said; nor should "both empty and nonempty" and "neither empty nor nonempty" be said. (But) they are said for the sake of rejecting false conceptualizations (*abhūtasaṁkalpa*) and for the sake of designating (*prajñapti*) ultimate reality. (fol. 22-11)

Likewise, in a long commentary on MMK 13-8, Buddhapālita states that emptiness is a mere expression, a name for the cessation of views about entities, and that:

(32) ... there is not any entity called "emptiness." (fol. 13-8)

He concludes by saying,

(33) As for those who are attached to emptiness as an entity, that attachment cannot be removed by anything else. For example, if someone is told that there is nothing and says, "Give (me) that same nothing!" how can he be made to grasp the nonexistence (of any gift for him)?...Those who see that even emptiness is empty; reality, for them, emptiness is accomplished. (fol. 13-8)

As for conventional truth, Buddhapālita says,

(34) It is established that the appearance of entities is like a magical illusion, a mirage, a city of the Gandharvas, or a reflection. (fol. 11-8)

If one claims that the existence of real entities is established by direct perception, Buddhapālita replies,

(35) Even that which is called "apprehension by direct perception" (*pratyakṣopalabdhi*) or "apprehension of the immediately evident" is seeing, like seeing mirages and dreams due to the fault of one's own confused mind; but here there is nothing real at all. In order to remove the attachment, "this is real," the Blessed One has said ... (prec. 22-10)

Buddhapālita does not propose to abolish the conventional truth but to show that it is *merely* conventional. Discussing the concept of

"difference," he says,

> (36) Dependent origination has the following nature: To begin with, because (one thing) is called "different" in dependence on (something) different (from it), therefore, according to worldly convention, it is said to be "different"... Because a jar's "difference" in relation to a straw mat is relative to the straw mat, because it is dependent on the straw mat and not established by itself, (therefore) difference does not exist in the jar. Difference, being incompatible with nondifference, also does not exist in an isolated, "nondifferent" jar which is unrelated to a straw mat. Therefore, according to ultimate reality, it is said that difference does not exist. (prec. & fol. 14-7ab)

In his commentary on MMK 19-4, Buddhapālita considers a number of relative categories: past, present, and future; best, middling, and worst; beginning, middle, and end; far and near; former and later; oneness and separateness; identity and difference; cause and effect; long and short; small and large; self and nonself; conditioned and unconditioned; one and two and many. He concludes by saying,

> (37) Therefore all those, too, are not established by themselves in reality. They are stated according to worldly convention. (fol. 19-4)

While conventional reality cannot claim ultimate validity, it must be acknowledged on its own level. Buddhapālita remarks that:

> (38) ... all expressions are not possible. But they are also possible according to worldly convention. (fol. 19-6cd)

Therefore, as we saw in quotations (5), (6), and (7), the Buddha often teaches according to worldly convention. Buddhapālita also says,

> (39) ... the Blessed One, also, though he saw that entities are empty of intrinsic nature, said, "This is real; this is unreal; this is both real and unreal." (fol. 18-8ab)

For the Mādhyamika, the understanding of emptiness does not lead to a refusal to deal with conventional reality, but to nonattachment. Buddhapālita says,

> (40) For us, engaging in conventional activities without attachment to existence and nonexistence, it is not the case that (liberation) is impossible. (fol. 15-7)

While conventional truth has to be recognized in conventional matters, it is no criterion of ultimate truth. Thus Buddhapālita sometimes uses the phrase "when one examines how things really are" (*yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du brtags na*; fol. 11-8, prec. 14-7ab, prec. 14-8cd) to

indicate that the object of investigation is ultimate truth, not conventional validity. He also remarks,

(41) Because this is an investigation into reality (*de kho na bsam pa*, probably *tattvacintā*), what is the use of (arguing on the basis of) worldly expressions here...? (fol. 10-14)

The following passage also clarifies the distinction between the two levels of investigation, the conventional and the ultimate:

(42) According to that same worldly superficial truth by which it is said, "The jar exists; the grass hut exists," it is also said that they are impermanent: "The jar is broken; the grass hut is burned." When one investigates reality, then the jar and the grass hut are not possible since they are dependent designations. How would it be possible for them to be broken or burned? Moreover, the Tathāgata, also, is said to be impermanent according to worldly superficial reality: "The Tathāgata is old; the Tathāgata has passed into *nirvāṇa*." When one investigates according to ultimate reality, then the Tathāgata himself is not possible. How could his old age and *nirvāṇa* be possible? (fol. 22-16c)

VI. Dependent Designation

In MMK 24-18, Nāgārjuna equates emptiness not only with dependent origination but also with dependent designation (*upādāyaprajñapti*). "Dependent designation" refers to the principle that names and concepts are imposed on reality rather than simply correspond to it.

Buddhapālita often uses the idea of dependent designation instead of or in addition to dependent origination. As with dependent origination, dependent designation is incompatible with existence by intrinsic nature:

(43) If the Buddha is designated in dependence on (his) aggregates, doesn't that mean that the Buddha does not exist by intrinsic nature? For what use does something which already exists by intrinsic nature have for also being designated dependently? It would be designated by just that which is its intrinsic nature. Because that Buddha is without intrinsic nature, therefore he is designated by means of (his) appropriation. Therefore, the Tathāgata does not exist by intrinsic nature. (fol. 22-2ab)

This is true not just for the Buddha, but also for the whole world:

(44) Because the Tathāgata is designated in dependence on (his) aggregates but is not established by himself, therefore he has no

intrinsic nature. These worlds, also, are designated in dependence on this and that; but they are not established by themselves at all; therefore the world also, like the Tathāgata, is without intrinsic nature. (fol. 22-16cd)

The principle of dependent designation establishes things as valid conventionally but not ultimately. Buddhapālita asserts,

(45) Therefore, one should grasp that which we have thoroughly ascertained: An entity is a dependent designation. Thus the teachings about agent, action, result, experiencer (of the result), affliction, and body are possible; but the faults of permanence and annihilation will not follow; and also *saṁsāra* is established. (fol. 17-33)

In quotation (14), Buddhapālita made a similar statement about dependent origination.

Buddhapālita says of agent and action,

(46) The agent depends on the action, is based on the action, In relation to the action, (he) is designated as and said to be an agent. The action of that agent also arises in dependence on that same agent; and it is designated as and said to be the action of that (agent). Therefore those two are designated in relation (to each other); but they are not established or nonestablished by intrinsic nature. Therefore since, in that way, those two are not maintained to be existent or nonexistent, (this) is designated as the middle way. Apart from that designation, we see no other defining characteristic of the establishment of those two. (fol. 8-12)

The same analysis is applied to the "appropriator" and the "appropriation," that is, the self and the five aggregates:

(47) ... as the agent is designated in dependence on the action, so the appropriator, also, is designated in dependence on the appropriation. As the action is designated in dependence on that same agent, so the appropriation, also, is designated in dependence on that same appropriator. For those two (i.e., the appropriator and the appropriation), also, we see no defining characteristic of establishment apart from that. (fol. 8-13a)

Time, also, is dependently designated but does not exist as an independent entity. Buddhapālita says,

(48) If those, former and later and so on, are the marks (*liṅga*) of time, in that case, time is designated simply in dependence on an entity; but it is not established by itself. (fol. 19-6a)

He concludes his commentary on Chapter Nineteen, "Examination of Time," by saying,

(49) Therefore one should understand that there is not any entity called "time"; it is established as a dependent designation.(fol. 19-6)

Dependent designation does not establish the real existence of anything, but only its conventional, relative existence. Thus Buddhapālita says,

(50) When the Tathāgata is sought for in five ways[1] in that same appropriation by which he is designated, (one finds that) he does not exist in the appropriation, (since he is) inexpressible as being identical to or different (from it). (Then) how can it be said that the Tathâgata exists? Therefore it is not possible (to have both) dependent designation and existence. (fol. 22-8)

Here the argument is that real entities, possessing intrinsic nature, would have to be identical or different. As Buddhapālita puts it,

(51) Those two things which are not established as being identical or different, are not established, because establishment in a (manner) different from those two (alternatives) is not possible. (fol. 20-20)

On the other hand, something which is dependently designated cannot be held to be identical to or different from anything, since it has no intrinsic nature:

(52) For us, dependently designated entities, which are empty of intrinsic nature and are like magical illusions and mirages and reflections, have no identity or difference. To what would that entity belong? From what would it be different? (fol. 21-16)

It is inadmissible to say that things are not identical or different but yet exist as real entities:

(53) Objection: ... The appropriator and the appropriation are not said to be identical or different. To begin with, they are not said to be identical because the agent-noun is different (from the noun denoting the action or the object of the action). Nor are they said to be different, because they are not established separately.

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[1]The five ways in question are five possible relationships between two things: sameness, difference, the first possessing the second, the first existing in the second, and the second existing in the first. See MMK 10, 4.

> Therefore both exist, but they cannot be said to be identical or different.
>
> Answer: Do you call an enemy as a witness, with the idea (that he is) a friend? You undertake to establish the appropriator and the appropriation by means of that same (fact) due to which it is impossible to establish them! For if an appropriation and appropriator existed, they would undoubtedly be either identical or different. How could those which do not exist either as identical or as different exist in (some) other way? Therefore the appropriation does not exist, and the appropriator also does not exist. Even if one speaks of the appropriator and the appropriation according to convention, it must be said that they are neither identical nor different... (fol. 22-7)

Finally, it should be pointed out that in MMK 18-10 and Buddhapālita's commentary on it, an argument is made that some thing which arises in dependence on another thing is not identical to or different from it. Therefore, once again, parallel arguments are made concerning dependent origination and dependent designation.

VII. Nihilism and Mādhyamika

In his commentary following MMK 18-7, Buddhapālita has an opponent raise the issue of nihilism in classical Indian terms:

> (54) Objection: What difference is there between one who has the view that "this world does not exist; the other world does not exist; apparitionally born beings do not exist" and so on and one who has the view that all entities are unoriginated and unceasing? (fol. 18-7cd)

Buddhapālita replies that there is a great difference. The nihilist speaks without really having seen, without really having experienced any "nonexistence" of the world, etc. On the other hand, one who has seen, who has had a direct experience of the fact that things are unoriginated and unceasing because they are empty of intrinsic nature, speaks of what he knows. The nihilist is merely uttering words whereas the Mādhyamika's statements are based on actual knowledge. Buddhapālita gives the example of two witnesses in court. Both give the same testimony; but one actually saw the events in question, whereas the other testifies because he has been bribed or because he is partial to one side in the case. The second witness, though his words are correct, is considered to be a liar because he has no actual knowledge of the events

of which he speaks.

(55) We see that entities are nonexistent like the horns of a hare; but in order to avoid faults of speech, we do not say "neither existence nor nonexistence." For we speak according to seeing that existence and nonexistence are like reflections because they are dependently originated. (fol. 18-7cd)

Throughout his commentary, Buddhapālita makes the point that the fundamental Mādhyamika principles of dependent origination, dependent designation, and emptiness are not doctrines of nonexistence. With regard to dependent designation, we have the following exchange between Buddhapālita and a hypothetical opponent:

(56) Objection: If time does not exist and cause and effect and the group (of causes and conditions: *sāmagrī*) also do not exist, what other exists? Therefore that (view of yours) is just nihilism (*nāstivāda*).

Answer: It is not. Your conceptual construction that time and so on exist by intrinsic nature is simply not possible, but they are established as dependent designations. (fol. 20-24)

Elsewhere he says,

(57) Therefore the meaning of dependent designation is precisely that an entity which is dependently designated cannot be said to be existent or nonexistent because it is completely empty of intrinsic nature. (But) there is no fault in a conventional statement. (fol. 22-10)

In the following passage, Buddhapālita spells out in more detail why a dependently designated thing cannot be said to be either existent or nonexistent. This discussion is couched in terms of the Tathāgata and his aggregates or appropriation:

(58) How is it logically possible to say that the Tathāgata, who is dependently designated, either exists or does not exist? For if a Tathāgata existed, he would just exist, even without an appropriation; but he does not exist without an appropriation. How can one who does not exist without an appropriation be said to exist? How, too, can a Tathâgata who is dependently designated be said not to exist? For a nonexisting flower cannot be designated. (fol. 22-11)

With regard to an agent and his action, Buddhapālita says,

(59) We do not say that agent and action are nonexistent. We have rejected the conceptual construction that their activity is really

existent or really nonexistent. We maintain that agent and action are dependent designations...Those two are not maintained to be either existent or nonexistent... (prec. & fol. 8-12)

Likewise, with regard to a person and his six sense faculties (the five physical senses plus the mind), Buddhapālita says,

(60) No (person) who is established by himself (so that one could say) "He is this" exists when he is sought for in every way (whether he is supposed to exist) prior to the visual faculty, etc., or at the same time as the visual faculty, etc., or at a time later than the visual faculty, etc. The suppositions that he is designated as existent or as nonexistent by means of the visual faculty, etc., do not apply to that (person). To begin with, because he is not established by himself, how can it be said that he exists? Also, because he is made manifest by the visual faculty, etc., how can it be said that he does not exist? Therefore, in his case, the suppositions that he exists or does not exist are not possible. Therefore, like agent and action, that appropriation (i.e., the sense faculties and so on) is also simply designated; but apart from that, no other establishment of it is possible. (fol. 9-12)

Buddhapālita also discusses the question of existence and nonexistence as it relates to dependent origination, as well as dependent designation. Sometimes, in fact, he uses a formulation which combines elements of both:

(61) ... by this dependent origination, it is designated as an entity according to causes and conditions; but entities do not exist by intrinsic nature... (fol. 13-8)

And similarly in the following passage,

(62) The teaching of the blessed Buddhas is that an entity is simply designated due to causes and conditions, but it does not exist or not exist. (fol. 18-8)

Speaking purely in terms of dependent origination, Buddhapālita, in a passage quoted in part earlier, asserts that the Mādhyamikas propound neither existence nor nonexistence:

(63) We do not say the the aggregates, elements, and bases are nonexistent. Rather we reject the doctrine that they exist. Both existence and nonexistence have great faults...Therefore we teach that because (the aggregates, elements, and bases) are dependently originated, they are free from the faults of existence and nonexistence, not annihilated (and) not permanent; but we do

> not say that they are nonexistent. (fol. 5-7)

Likewise, he asks rhetorically,

> (64) How is it possible to say that the dependently originated exists or does not exist? (fol. 17-30)

Moreover, in his commentary on MMK 12-8, Buddhapālita denies that the Mādhyamikas hold that frustration is nonexistent; rather, they say that it is dependently originated.

Buddhapālita also holds that emptiness is different from both existence and nonexistence. Thus he says,

> (65) How can it be said that entities which are empty of intrinsic nature, which are like magical illusions and dreams and mirages and reflections and echoes, are real or unreal? Therefore that (i.e., "not real, not unreal") is the teaching of the blessed Buddhas, free from the faults of existence and nonexistence, not in common with any Tīrthakāras (i.e., founders of non-Buddhist sects), elucidating ultimate reality. (fol. 18-8cd)

Likewise he says,

> (66) Therefore, by saying "false" (*mṛṣā*) (the Buddha) did not teach that entities do not exist. That statement by the Blessed One ... that what is deceptive (*moṣadharma*) is false teaches entities' emptiness of intrinsic nature, which is not understood by any Tīrthakāras (and) is free from the faults of existence and nonexistence. (fol. 13-2)

Occasionally, Buddhapālita seems to say that emptiness implies or is equivalent to nonexistence. A case in point is his commentary on MMK 20-18, in which he argues that an empty result of a cause cannot be said to arise or cease:

> (67) How will that result, which is empty of intrinsic nature (and) not established by itself, arise? How will it cease? But if one supposes that that result, even though it is empty of intrinsic nature, arises and ceases, to that the following must be said: Does something else, apart from the nature of the result, arise and cease? But if something else, apart from the nature of the result, arises, what would that do for the result? For the "nonresult" which arises would not be the result. Therefore, even if one supposes that the result is empty, because it *does not exist* (my emphasis), it would also follow that it is unceasing and unoriginated; (but) that, also, is not accepted (by you). Therefore an empty result, also, will not arise; nor will it cease. (fol. 20-18)

In MMK 21-9ab and its commentary, an almost identical argument

is made, except that the terms used for origination and cessation are *sabhava* and *vibhava*, rather than *utpāda* and *nirodha*. Here, too, "empty" seems to imply "nonexistent"; but then "nonexistent" is immediately equated with "nonexistent by intrinsic nature." (Again, I have supplied the emphasis.)

> (68) To begin with, it is not possible for an entity which is empty of intrinsic nature to have origination and cessation. Why? Because it *does not exist*. For how could what *what does not exist by intrinsic nature* have those (i.e., origination and cessation)? How could it be said that "something arises, something ceases," in reference to that which lacks even the conventional designation "this," because it *does not exist by intrinsic nature*? Therefore origination and cessation are not possible for what is empty. (fol. 21-9ab)

VIII. Liberation According to the Madhyamaka School

Buddhapālita defines liberation as follows:

> (69) By the cessation of *saṁsāric* existence (*bhava*), (re)birth ceases; that is called "liberation." That one who thus sees (things) as they really are, understands reality. By understanding reality, one will be liberated. (fol. 18-4)

Moreover he says,

> (70) For one who sees reality, there is nothing (further) to be done. (fol. 18-7cd)

Thus Buddhapālita accepts the common Buddhist view that liberation is the cessation of rebirth in *saṁsāra* and that the cessation of rebirth is brought about by a direct experience of reality. The difficulty is that, from the Mādhyamika point of view, what reality can there be?

> (71) Objection: Here (you) have said that by seeing reality, one will be liberated. "Reality" (*de kho na, tattva*), moreover, is the nature of that (*de'i dngos po*, probably *tadbhāva* or *tadvastu*), thatness (*tattva*); the meaning is that it is the intrinsic nature of an entity (*dngos po'i ngo bo nyid, bhāvasvabhāva*). As to that, if the intrinsic nature of an entity simply does not exist, in that case won't the vision of reality be impossible for you? If there is no vision of reality, how can liberation be possible? Therefore that view that entities are without intrinsic nature is not good. (prec. 15-6)

Buddhapālita replies,

> (72) Those who thus see intrinsic nature and the nature of another

and nonexistence (or "a nonentity, *abhāva*) do not, even in that way, see the the reality in the supremely profound teaching of the Buddha. We see entities' lack of intrinsic nature as it really is, illuminated by the risen sun of dependent origination. Therefore, because just we have the vision of reality, only for us is liberation also possible. (fol. 15-6)

He continues, in a passage already quoted in part in quotations (28) and (40),

(73) Those who see entities as existent and nonexistent do not see reality. Therefore, for them, liberation is also not possible. For us, engaging in conventional activities without attachment to existence and nonexistence, it is not the case that (liberation) is impossible. If to see entities and nonentities were to see reality, there would be no one who would not see reality therefore that is not the vision of reality. Therefore entities' lack of intrinsic nature is reality; and only by seeing that will one be liberated. (fol. 15-7)

In the Indian context, any theory of liberation has to deal with the actions which bind one to *saṁsāra* and the passions - in Buddhist terminology, the defilements - which produce them. Buddhapālita says,

(74) Here, since action and the defilements are the cause of (re)birth, it is said (in MMK 18-5a) that liberation is due to the ending of action and the defilements. (fol.18-5)

What does seeing that things have no intrinsic nature have to do with putting an end to action and the afflictions? Buddhapālita explains,

(75) When the unwise, whose intellectual eye is obscured by the darkness of confusion, conceptually construct intrinsic nature in entities, desire and hatred are produced in them. When the light of the knowledge of dependent origination has dispelled the darkness of confusion and one sees with the eye of discernment (*prajñā*) entities' lack of intrinsic nature, then that (person's) desire and hatred do not arise in regard to (something) without a basis. (fol. 1-B)

Buddhapālita sums up his position on the question of liberation in a passage quoted in part earlier:

(76) Therefore emptiness is reality, and only by the meditative cultivation of emptiness will one comprehend reality. The comprehension of reality is called "liberation." (fol. 18-5)

The insight into reality which is essential for liberation shows that the self does not exist as a real entity. Buddhapālita says,

(77) In brief, seeing that a self and what belongs to a self do not exist externally or internally is the highest reality. By the meditative cultivation of the view of reality, one will comprehend reality. (prec. 18-1)

And

(78) Thus not to see a self and what belongs to a self externally or internally is the vision of reality. That yogi meditatively cultivates that and makes it firm. (fol.18-2ab)

To seek liberation in a way which perpetuates one's clinging to notions of "I" and "mine" is self-defeating. For liberation to occur, one must thoroughly understand that self and other are only conventional designations. Buddhapālita discusses this problem in his commentary on MMK 16-9:

(79) Here the complete cessation of appropriation is called "*nirvāṇa*"; but the root of all appropriation is the grasping of self and what belongs to a self. Therefore those who vainly imagine "I will enter final *nirvāṇa*" (*parinirvāṇa*) with no appropriation! May final *nirvāṇa* be mine!" continue to embrace a grasping of a self and what belongs to a self. Therefore, that very grasping of theirs, of a self and what belongs to a self, is an appropriation which is not well grasped. How would liberation be possible for one who has an appropriation? Who is that one who would enter final liberation with no appropriation? And of whom would there be a final liberation? All these are produced by the craving and ignorance of the one (who grasps in that way).

82. AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
Anakṣarendraka (vai) vocanagarbhasūtra (485)

K.213 = T.828 = N.221 = Bagchi, p. 256 (12) in 7 leaves, translated by Bodhiruci around 535. Nanjio's rendition of the title is somewhat different.

83.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Sarvabālapāladhāraṇīsūtra* (485)

Nanjio identifies this as "*Sūtra* spoken by Buddha on the Dhāraṇī-mantra for protecting boys or children." K.440 = N.488 = T. 1028a Bagchi, p. 256 (18), in 4 leaves. Translated by Bodhiruci by 535.

84.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Mañjuśrīparicaraṇasūtra* (485)

K.265 = T.470 = N. 286 = Bagchi, p. 257 (20). "Sūtra spoken by Buddha on Mañjuśrī's going (round to examine the Bhikshus' rooms)." Translated by Bodhiruci by 535.

85.AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
Maitreya(bodhisattva)paripṛcchāsūtra (485)

K.551 = T.1525 = N. 1203, translatred by Bodhiruci. A commentary in 7 fascicules on No. 23 of the Mahāratnakūṭa colection. The title is rendered by Lancaster as *Maitreyaparipṛcchopadeśa.*

86.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Saṁghātasūtra* (488)

K.398 =T. 423 = N. 449 = Bagchi, p. 266 (1), translated by Upaśūnya. On Upaśūnya's life and works cf. Bagchi, pp. 265-267.

87.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra* (489)

K.801 = T.721 = N.679 = Bagchi, p. 262 (1), translated at Yeh by Gautama Prajñārūci in 539. On the translator Gautama Prajñārūci see Nanjio, p. 428 and Bagchi, pp. 261-265. This is a vast work, comprising 70 fascicules in 7 chapters.

This work has been translated into French by Lin Li-Kouang (Paris 1949). It is divided into seven chapters. We provide below a rough translation of the titles comprising Li-Kouang's critical analysis which constitutes Chapter One of his book. It is an extensive commentary on 70 *kārikā*s, numbered in the outline below along with the pages of Li-Kouang's summary, abbreviated as "S".

I. 1-2 (S2-3) Ten Acts.

II.3-5 (S3) Birth and Death

III. 5-15 (S3-16) Hells. The usual eight: Saṁjīva, Kālasūtra, Saṁghāta, Raurava, Mahāraurava, Tāpana, Mahātāpana and Avīci. Their locations, length of life, temperatures, guardians, etc.

IV, 16-17 (S16-23) Ghosts. Some thirty-six species of ghosts are identified by name and their penances briefly described. Special attention to Yama and to Māra.

V. 18-21 (S23-29) Animals, classified in the usual way according to how they reproduce. Animals in hell and animal ghosts. Nāgas and Asuras are discussed, the latter being divided into ghosts and animals. Their length of life and location.

VI. 22-63 (S29ff.) Gods, specifically the four celestial kings Vaiśravaṇa, Dhṛtarāṣṭra, Virūḍhaka and Virūpākṣa in the four quarters of the universe (22-24), 33 deities (a list not found elsewhere, according to Li-Kouang), and the Yāmas (36-63).

VII. 64-70 Concerning the applications of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*) pertaining to the body.

88.BUDDHASENA (490?), *Yogācārabhūmi*

"Lamotte (*Histoire du bouddhisme ancienne*, p. 772) mentions...another *Yogācārabhūmi*, which is ascribed to Buddhasena, who appears to have taught in Kāśmīr toward the end of the 5th century A.D."[130] Presumably this is the same Buddhasena to whom David Seyfort Ruegg attributes T. 618, *Ta-mo-to-lo ch'an-cing (*Dharmatāla-dhyānasūtra?)*.[131]

89.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Marīcidhāraṇīsūtra* (490?)

K.311 = T.1256 = N.847, translated anonymously during the Lian dynasty (502-557). A small work, 2 leaves.

90.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Maitreya(mahā)siṁhanādasūtra* (491)

K.22 (23) = T.310 (23) = N.23 (23), translated by Upaśūnya or Ūrdhvaśūnya, who travelled to Ye in 538-541 and settled down in Nanking around 542-546.

91. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Vimala(nāna)upāsikāparipṛcchāsūtra* (492)

K.855 = T.578 = N.770 = Bagchi, pp. 262-263 (6), translated by Gautama Prajñāruci in 542.

92.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Kanakavarṇapūrvayogasūtra* (492)

K.370 = T.162 = N.390 in 11 leaves, translated by Gautama Prajñārūci in 542 at the Chin-hua Monastery in Yeh-tu.

93.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Maṅgalāṣṭakasūtra* (492)

K.493 = T.429 = N.410 = Bagchi, p. 262 (3) (where the title is given as *Aṣṭabuddhakasūtra).* Translation also by Gautama Prajñāruci. Nanjio reports that "In this Sūtra Buddha tells the *śreṣṭhin* or elder (rich merchant) Shan-tso (Sukara?) the names and good qualities of eight Buddhas of the eastern quarter."

94.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Niyatāniyatāvatāramudrāsūtra* (492)

K.138 = T.645 - N.132 Bagchi, p. 264 (17), translated by Gautama Prajñāruci in 542.

95.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Paramārthadharmavijayasūtra* (492)

K.202 = T.833 = N.210 = Bagchi, pp. 264-265 (19). "Sūtra spoken by Buddha on the excelling of the law of the first (or highest) meaning." Same translator as previous four works.

96.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *(Ṛṣi) Vyāsaparipṛcchāsūtra* (492)

K.55 = T.354 = N.60 = Bagchi, p. 264 (15). Same translator as above. The Chinese translation consists of 14,457 Chinese characters, according to a note at the beginning.

97.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Susthitamatiparipṛcchāsūtra* (492)

K.45 = T.341 = N.48 = Bagchi, p. 268 (6), translated by Vimokṣasena and Gautama Prajñāruci in 542. For Vimokṣasena cf. Nanjio, p. 429

98. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, "*Sūtra* on the highest reliance" (492)

Translated by Paramārtha (our #128 below) in 557. K.235 = T.669 - N.259. Bagchi, pp. 424-425, gives a lot of information about the date

and circumstances of its translation.

99. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Buddhagotraśāstra* (495)

Summary by Jikido Takasaki[132]

"The *Buddhagotraśāstra* is another work which, like the *Dharmadhātviśeṣaśāstra*, expounds the ten meanings of the *gotra* described in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, but with the same terminology and with explanations much similar to those of the *Dharmadhātviśeṣaśāstra*. It is translated into Chinese by Paramārtha, is attributed, according to the Chinese tradition, to Vasubandhu and is highly esteemed among Chinese Buddhists throughout the centuries as a representative work on the *garbha* theory. This attribution is rather doubtful..."

"The whole text consists of four chapters, of which the last one treats the subject of the ten meanings of the *gotra* under the title Analysis of the Characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) (of the *tathāgatagarbha*). Explanations under each *lakṣaṇa* are in most cases quite equivalent to those in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* even in their wording, but sometimes doctrines based upon the Vijñānavāda are interwoven among passages, and sometimes those passages which are in other chapters or other parts of Chap. I in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* are inserted between lines."

"...We are led to imagine that, as far as the *garbha* theory is concerned, this work was composed by borrowing many sentences from the *Ratnagotravibhāga* but arranging them more systematically by adding the author's own opinion. This author's opinion appears in descriptions of the five *doṣa*s and the five *guṇa*s in relation to the purpose of the teaching; of the five meanings of the *garbha* taken from the *Śrīmālādevīsūtra*; of the three natures of the *garbha* taught in (I) *svabhāva*; of the attainment of Buddhahood by the *icchantika*s (in (IV) *karman*); of the *āśrayaparivṛtti, dharmakāya,* and *nirvāṇa* (in (V) *yoga*; of the six meanings of *avikāra*, of the five *lakṣaṇa*s and five *guṇa*s of *dharmakāya* as one of *trikāya* (in (IX) *avikāra*, etc. These passages show the more developed doctrines, some of which are based upon the Vijñānavāda..."

100. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Kāraṇḍavyūhasūtra* (495)

There is an English translation in E.J.Thomas, *The Perfection of Wisdom* (London 1952, 1954), pp. 72-78, and a partial translation by Edward B. Cowell in Journal of Philology 6, 1876, 222-231; see also Indian Antiquary 8, 1879, pp. 250-252. P.L.Vaidya, who provides a text of this *sūtra* in *Mahāyānasūtrasaṁgraha* I (Darbhanga 1961), pp. 258-308, writes in his Introduction (p. xv): "...(M)ostly in prose. The text was published in Calcutta in 1873, edited by Satyabrata Samasrami, and my edition is based on it...It is...clear that there are two texts called Kāraṇḍavyūha, one in prose dealing with Avalokiteśvara, and the other in verse dealing with Mañjuśrī..."

Summary by Prabhas Chandra Majumdar[133]

"The *Kāraṇḍa-vyūha* is a Mahāyāna Sūtra mainly consecrated to the glorification of the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara and his exploits for the deliverance of beings. The work exists in two versions, one in prose[134] and the other in verse. The subject-matter of both the versions is more or less the same.

The prose text consists of two sections, each section containing in their turn several chapters. The first section...of the prose...is as follows: While the Blessed One was sojourning in the Jetavana with a large number of Bodhisattvas, Devas, Nāgas and others, a ray of divine light came and flooded the whole of the universe and made all the objects around distinctly visible. Then the Bodhisattva named Sarva-Nivaraṇa-Viṣkambhin requested the Blessed One to explain the causes of that divine illumination. The Lord said that the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara had entered into Avīci hell to deliver the beings and thence was coming the divine light. The Blessed One continuing his discourse narrated how the Avalokiteśvara was redeeming the down-faced creatures (*adhomukha-sattva*), liberating the demon-king Bali, removing poverty and affliction of the Brahmin Sukuṇḍala who was once a...god, saving the life of the mechant Siṁhala from the clutches of the Rākṣasīs, delivering innumerable worms and insects at Vāraṇasī and so on."

"...A large part in the later section of the prose text is occupied by the glorification of the well-known mystic knowledge (*Ṣaḍakṣarī vidyā*); and the rest consists of a small chapter on the Dhāraṇī or magic formula viz., *oṁ cūle cūe cūye svāhā* etc. which is said to have been recited by seven crores of perfectly enlightened Tathāgatas. Lastly while enumerating the

merits of the Kāraṇḍa Vyūha itself, the Blessed One made a prophecy regarding the future decay of the religions and he predicted that the *bhikṣusaṁgha* would fall into a degenerate state 300 years after his demise and the *bhikṣus* at that time would become demoralised and live like householders with wives and children, grossly deviated from the path of virtue."

The date of this writer is quite unknown. It can hardly predate 500, which we are estimating here; it probably is a century or two after.

101.AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
Aparāmitāyurjñānahṛdayadhāraṇīsūtra (500)

K.443 = T.370, which says it is the same as N. 485, although the title given of N. 485 in Nanjio is quite different. It was translated anonymously some time between 502 and 557. Assuming this is the same text, we give Nanjio's description of it: "Buddha is introduced as living in the great city of Campā, and telling Bhikshus the names of the parents, son, disciples and Māra of Amitābha; he also teaches a spiritual Mantra or Vidyā by the practice or recital of which for ten days a man would certainly be born in his country (Sukhāvatī)."

On the other hand, E.J.Thomas (*History of Buddhist Thought* (London, 1933, p. 188) reports that a text of this name was edited by Max Walleser at Heidelberg 1916. "It is a spell of 108 syllables for obtaining unlimited life".

102. AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
Mahāmaṇivipulyamānaviśvasupratiṣṭhitaguhyasūtra (500?)

K.430 = T.1007 = N.536; translator's name unknown.

103.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Saptabuddhakasūtra* (500?)

K.346 = T.1333 = N.368. The translator's name is unknown' he is said to have translated during the Liang dynasty (502-557).

104.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Pradīpanīyasūtra* (508)

K.408 = T.702 = N.428 = Bagchi, p. 271 (6), translated by Narendrayaśas in 558 in T'ien-P'ing Monastery.

105.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Sumerugarbhasūtra* (508)

Another of Narendrayaśas' translations. K.59 (where the title is given as *Tathāgataśrīsamayasūtra*) = N.66 = T.397 (16) = Bagchi, p. 271 (5). Bagchi gives the date of translation as 558, and cites authority for not identifying this with the 25th section of the *Mahāsaṁnipāta* collection.

106.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Lokaprajñaptyabhidharmasūtra* (509)

Nanjio gives the title as *Lokasthiti(?)-abhidharma-śāstra* under N. 1297 (= T. 1644 = K.967 = Bagchi, p. 428 (40)). It was translated by Paramārtha in 559. Nanjio reports: "The subject of the first chapter is the motion of the earth, and that of the nineteenth is that of the sun and moon. The latter chapter is the principal text for some Buddhist who make astronomical calculations for the almanacs."

DIGNĀGA (510)

The name of the native home of this important philosopher, the original "Buddhist Logician", is given to us as Siṁhavaktra near Kāñcī (modern Conjeveram). According to Tibetan tradition he lived in a cave on Bhoraśaila in Orissa and sojourned in Nalanda, but Hsüan-tsang is reported to have found a hill in Andhra near Vangi in the West Godavari district, and that Dignāga was born in Simhapura or Nellore.[135] K.S.Murty (*Amala Prajñā: Aspects of Buddhist Studies. Professor P.V.Bapat Felicitation Volume* (Delhi 1989, p. 356) says that Dignāga founded sixteen Mahāvihāras, and gives more historical information. He summarily states that Dignāga was born in "a suburb of Kañcipura, resided for some time in Orissa...mostly lived in Andhra...died in a forest in Orissa."

There is an extensive critical literature dealing with Dignāga's logic, epistemology and philosophy of language.

107.DIGNĀGA, *Marma(pra)dīpa* on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*

Summary by Mark Tatz

Dignāga's commentary (*Vṛtti*) on the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu is entitled *Marmadīpa* (var. *Marmapradīpa*)--that is to say, a presentation of crucial points. This commentary is known only from Tibetan sources, and survives in the Tibetan Sacred Canon (Bstan-'gyur). Toh. no. 4095, Derge Nyu 95b.1-214a.7 in a translation by the Indian pandit *Yogacandra (Rnal-'byor-zla-ba) in collaboration with the Tibetan translator 'Jam-dpal-gzhon-nu, entitled *Gnad-kyi-sgron-ma*. This data is borne out by the Zhwa-lu catalogue of Bu-ston (Collected Works, ed. L. Chandra, 26, 608.7).

Dignāga is a direct disciple of Vasubandhu, according to the Tibetan historians. This view is probably a deduction, at least in part, from the nature of the *Marmadīpa*, which is nothing but derivative of Vasubandhu's source work. (But the Jain scholar Siṁhasūri also recognizes their *guru*-disciple relationship.[136]) Dignāga has reduced the *Abhidharmakośa* to a handbook, reproducing word-for-word the main comments of Vasubandhu's *Bhāṣya* upon the *kārikā*s. (The Tibetan translations of the two works also correspond.) In effect, Dignāga presents the first sentences of each topic, deleting the derivative discussions and the accounts of how the various Abhidharmists and their followers differ on details. Hence there are no references to schools and authors by name save in the final appendix chapter, *Pudgalapratiṣedha*, where such references are crucial to the discussion. In connection with this last chapter, Hattori has noticed[137] that Dignāga omits some important arguments against the views of the Vātsīputrīya school, apparently contradicting the account of the Tibetan historians (Bu-ston, Tāranātha) that Dignāga once belonged to this school but found it seriously wanting.

Dignāga's division of chapters follows that of Vasubandhu--*dhātu*, *indriya*, *lokaprajñapti*, *karmaprajñapti*, *anuśaya*, *mārga*, *jñāna*, *samāpatti*, *pudgalapratiṣedha* The *Marmadīpa* presents the system of Vasubandhu's *abhidharma* for students whose main concern is to learn its essentials, rather than tangential controversies.

108.DIGNĀGA, *Ālambanaparīkṣā*

Translation by Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti

"E" references are to the edition provided by N. Aiyasvami Sastri in Adyar Library Series No. 32 (Madras 1942). The translation by Tola and Dragonetti is found in Journal of Indian Philosophy 10, 1982, 105-129, our "T". There are as well translations to be found into English by Aiyaswami Sastri, above, and by Alex Wayman (*kārikā*s only).[138] David J. Kalupahana has summarized the work.[139] There are also German translations by Frauwallner and Schott, and a French translation by Yamaguchi; for references see the Tola/Dragonetti article, pp. 106-107. Sanskrit terms are inserted as reconstructed by N.A.Sastri, op. cit. The translations of terms used in this Volume replace those provided by Tola and Dragonetti where appropriate.[140]

Those who postulate that the supporting object (*ālambana*) of the cognition (*jñāna*) through the eye etc. is an external thing, consider that either the atoms are (the cognition's supporting object) or that a molecule (*saṁghāta*) (of atoms) is (the cognition's supporting object), because there arises a cognition which bears the representation (*abhijñāna*) of that (molecule).

Concerning that (thesis, the author says):

1: Even if the atoms are the causes of the sense-cognition (*vijñapti*), since (the cognition) does not bear the representation of those (atoms), the atoms are not the content(s) (*viṣaya*) of that (cognition), just as the sense-organs (are not the cognition's object).

It is said (about something that it is) the cognition's object (when) its essential nature (*svarūpa*) is grasped by the cognition, because (the cognition) arises (provided) with the form of that (essential nature).

Concerning the atoms, even if they are the cause (of the cognition), they are not the cognition's object(s) any more than the sense-organs.

Therefore no atom is the (cognition's) supporting object.

Concerning the molecule, even if (the cognition) bears its representation,

2a: that (cognition) does not arise from that whose representation it bears (i.e. does not arise from a molecule).

It is right (to consider) that any thing, which produces a cognition which bears its representation (i.e. the representation of that thing), is, only it,

the cognition's supporting object, because it has been taught that in this way it is the determining condition of the birth (of the cognition).

Concerning the molecule as well it is not (the support of a cognition),

2b: because (the molecule) does not exist as something real, just as the second moon (does not exist).

As regards the vision of a second moon owing to some defect in the senses, even if (the cognition) bears its representation (i.e. the representation of a second moon), it (the second moon) is not the object of that (cognition). In the same way an aggregate is not the (condition's) support, because it is not the cause (of the cognition), since it does not exist as something real.

2cd: Thus, in both cases, (something) external cannot be the perception's object.

The external things that are called "atoms" and "molecules" are not the (cognition's) supporting object, as a part (of the requirements necessary to be a cognition's supporting object) is missing.

Concering this (matter)

3ab: some (masters) hold that the forms of the molecules are the efficient cause (of the cognition).

Some people hold that things, because they are possessed of several forms, are perceptible under one or another of these forms.

There exists also in the atoms the nature of (being the) cause, which produces a cognition that bears the representation of a molecule.

3cd: The atom's form is not an object of the (visual) cognition just a solidity (is not).

Just as solidity, etc., although they exist, are not the objects of the eye's perception, so also atomicity is like that (i.e., is not a perceptual object).

4ab: According to them (it would be the case that) the perceptions of a pot, a cup etc. would be all the same.

Among the atoms of a pot, a cup etc., although they are very numerous, there is not any difference.

4c: If (it is held that) the diversity (between the pot, the cup etc.) is due to the diversity of the forms (which they poss), (that is to say,) if some person thinks that, owing to the difference of the forms of the neck etc. (of the pot, the cup etc. as wholes), which comes forth as a difference in their perceptions, (then we must answer that) the difference (of the pot, the cup etc. as wholes) exists (only) in the pot, etc..

4d-5a: But it (i.e., the difference) does not exist in the atoms, which (according to the opponent are the only things that) exist as something real, because there is not in them any diversity of measure.

(Effectively) even if the atoms are real different matter, there is no difference (among them), because they are all of a spherical form.

5b: Therefore it (i.e. the difference between the pot, the cup etc. and in general between things) exists (only) in those (things) which do not really exist.

The pot etc. exist only by (human) convention,

5cd: because, if the atoms are eliminated, the cognition which bears its representation (i.e. the representation of the pot) ceases.

In relation to the things that really exist, even if one eliminates what is connected (with them), the perception which is (their) own is not eliminated.

Therefore, the objects of the perceptions through the senses do not exist externally.

6ac: The knowable interior form, which appears as external, is the object (of the cognition).

Even if an external object does not exist, what appears as (if it were) external, but exists only internally, (that) is the determining condition, the (cognition's) support,

6cd: because it (the knowable interior form) is the form of the cognition and (also) because it is also its (the cognition's) determining condition.

What exists only internally is the determining condition (of the cognition), the (cognition's) support, because it is provided with the two characteristics (indicated in paragraph 5), since the interior cognition bears the representation of that object (i.e. the knowable interior form) and comes forth through it.

If somebody asks: How can it be understood that, when (the interior cognition) happens to bear in the indicated way the representation (of the knowable interior form), (this knowable interior form which is only) a part of that (interior cognition and) which comes forth together (with that interior cognition) can be the determining condition (of that intererior cognition)?, we answer:

7a: Even if (the knowable interior form comes forth) together (with the interior cognition), it is the determining condition because of the necessary relation (between the knowable interior form and the

interior cognition.

Even if (the knowable interior form) comes forth together (with the interior cognition), it happens to be the determining condition of what comes forth out of another, because there exists a necessary relation (between the two). Then the logicians say that the concomitance of being and not being is the essential characteristic of cause and effect, even if they have been born successively.

7b: (Even if the knowable interior form and the cognition are born) successively (the knowable interior form) is (the determining condition of the cognition), because it leaves a trace.[141]

There is no contradiction even if (the knowable interior form and the interior cognition) come forth successively, because the representation of an object gives rise to a trace which (in its own turn) produces the birth of an effect (i.e. a new representation) similar to the representation (of the previous object) and which lies in the consciousness.

Now if it is asked: if only the (knowable) interior form is the determining condition, the (cognition's) support, how can the eye's cognition (i.e., the cognition through the eye) be born depending on that (knowable interior form) and on the eye? (We answer that) the senses do not exist as something constituted by elements, but taking into account their own effect one infers that they are the form (or aspect) of the trace.

8a: Neither is it contradictory that this (trace lie) in consciousness.

The trace either exists in consciousness or exists in its own indefinable form; (in both cases) there is no difference in relation to the production of the effect.

8b-d: So the form of the object and the trace function mutually caused beginninglessly.

The cognition, depending on the trace (that is) called "eye" and on the (knowable) interior form, comes forth bearing the representation of the object, (which is) not produced by an (external cognition's) support. These two (i.e. the form of the object or knowable interior form and the trace) are mutually caused beginninglessly. And the cognition comes forth from the trace fully matured under the form of an object and at its turn the trace (comes forth) from the form of that (object). Both (i.e. the form and the trace) must be considered, according to one's own will, either as different or as not different from the cognition.

So we can admit that an internal support is the object (of cognition), because it is endowed with the two characteristics (indicated in

paragraphs 2 and 5).

109.DIGNĀGA, *Hastavālanāmaprakaraṇavṛtti*

Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti have provided complete information on this work in their article in the Journal of Religious Studies (Patiala) 8.1, 1980, 18-31, which contains a Tibetan text and English translation. The work with its commentary is translated into Chinese by Paramārtha as T. 1620 and by I-tsing as T.1621. In Tibetan also we have two versions, Toh. 3844 translated by Śraddhākaravarman and Rin-chen bzan-po, and Toh. 3848, translated by Dānaśīla. The Tibetan translations attribute the work to Āryadeva, the Chinese to Dignāga. The Chinese translations are by Paramārtha, who was translating in the first part of the sixth century. The title's translation is something like "Treatise named 'the hair on the hand'", according to Tola/Dragonetti. It was also translated and restored to Sanskrit (our "ET") by F.W.Thomas and Hakuju Ui as "The Hand Treatise" in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1918, pp. 274-287.

The work consists of six *kārikā*s together with commentary. We provide below Tola/Dragonetti's translations of the six verses along with our (i.e., the editor's) summary of the commentary where called for.

Translated by Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti

(E275; T274) Since men take what is conventionally understood to be real this work is composed to provide them knowledge.

(E277; T276) 1. The cognition of a snake, in regard to a rope when the rope is seen, is without reality. When we see its parts, in regard to it also the cognition is illusory, like the snake.

(E279; T278) 2. All dependent things, if we examine their proper form, throughout the range of conventional cognition are dependent upon something other.

(E281; T280) 3. Since things without parts cannot be conceived the last (part) is equivalent to the non-existent. Therefore a wise man should not regard what is mere illusion as reality.

The first part of this verse is addressed against atomic theory, appealing to the standard criticism that if the alleged atom has no parts it cannot combine and if it does it isn't an atom.

(Objection:) Even if things like atoms don't exist, the perception and thought of them does, as does our thought of magical entities.

(E283; T282) 4. (Answer:) If illusion, that also, since it is not true, is not such as it appears; being appearance without reality, it is of like character with those.

How do we know this? In the world if a seed lies fallow we don't see any shoots.

(E285; T284) 5. Whoso with subtle intelligence conceives all things as merely dependent, that intelligent man easily abandons attachment, etc., like the fear of a snake.

Just as a man frightened by what he takes to be a snake loses his fear when he discovers it is a rope.

(E282; T281) 6. When considering worldly things one should think in the conventional way. When desiring entirely to abandon infirmities one must seek according to ultimate reality.

110. DIGNĀGA, *Hetucakra*

A brief work in which Dignāga considers the possible ways in which the examples in an inference can be related to the *hetu*. The work is only 12 verses long, even with the examples it provides for each of the ways, which number nine. See Bibliography, Third Edition, p. 211 for reference to the several translations. The summary given here is drawn from Karl Potter's *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (op. cit., pp. 69-71).[142]

According to Hajime Nakamura (*Indian Buddhism*, op. cit., p. 300) there are two distinct texts, both extant in Tibetan only: one is titled *Hetucakranirṇaya* and the other *Hetucakraḍamaru*.

There are nine possible ways in which the *sapakṣa* (*sp*) and *vipakṣa* (*vp*) can be related to the *hetu* (*h*). They are given below, with indication of which cases satisfy the requirements of validity (of course, there are many fallacies, besides the invalid one in this list, which will vitiate an inference if present).

(1) *h* completely includes *sp*, completely excludes *vp*. Valid

(2) *h* completely includes *sp*, includes some but not all *vp*. Invalid

(3) *h* completely includes *sp*, completely includes *vp*. Invalid

(4) *h* includes some but not all *sp*, completely excludes *vp*. Valid

(5) *h* includes some but not all *sp*, includes some but not all *vp*. invalid

(6) *h* includes some but not all *sp*, completely includes *vp*. Invalid

(7) *h* completely excludes *sp*, completely excludes *vp*. Invalid

(8) *h* completely excludes *sp*, includes some but not all *vp*. Invalid
(9) *h* completely excludes *sp*, completely includes *vp*. Invalid

111.DIGNĀGA, *Nyāyamukha*

The title is also sometimes restored as *Nyāyadvāra*. It is translated by Giuseppe Tucci (Materialen zur Kunde des Buddhismus 15 (Heidelberg 1930), from Hsüan-Tsang's Chinese translation. This is our "T". The summary is by the Editor on the basis of the translation. The text is arranged in standard fashion into *sūtra*s, numbered below, and commentary

1 (T1-2) A proving (*sādhana*) is giving one's own conclusion as shown by the *pakṣa* and the other terms. There must be no contradictory conclusion.

An argument is fallacious if one or more of the following faults is committed: (1) it contradicts itself (e.g., "all words are false"); (2) it contradicts one's own opinion (a Vaiśeṣika says "sound is eternal"); (3) it is opposed to a commonly accepted tenet and lacks a *sapakṣa*, being a unique entity (e.g., "*śāśi* is not the moon, because it exists" (where "*śāśi*" is a name of the moon); (4) what is predicated of the *p* is contradicted by perception or inference generally accepted (e.g., "sound cannot be heard" or "the pot is eternal").

Objection: Contradiction of the reason or the hypothesis (*pratijñāvirodha*) is another fallacy, as in, e.g., "sound is eternal because all (things) are noneternal."

Answer: This is a wrongly-formed inference, since in giving the reason one must give a proposition whose subject term is the same as that of the thesis.

2 (T11-18) The *h* has three features: it resides in the *p* and the *sp* and does not reside in the *vp*, where residence can be either complete or partial.

The *p* must be accepted by both parties in the discussion to exist; the same goes for the examples offered as *sp* and *vp*. And the existence of the *h* in the *p* (*pakṣadharmatā*) must likewise be agreed upon by both parties.

Objection: But suppose we are trying to prove that the *p*, say *prakṛti*, exists? Or suppose it does not exist?

3 (T19-21) Answer: A term, say *h*, cannot prove another term; e.g., smoke cannot prove fire. Rather it is the residence of *h* in *p* that constitutes *pakṣadharmatā*.

4 (T21-28) Explanation of the three features of *pakṣadharmatā*. The discussion recapitulates the gist of the nine cases reviewed in the *Hetucakra*.

5-9 (T29-36) Further exposition of the nine cases. As can be seen in the summary of the *Hetucakra* above, two cases (#s 1 and 4) are valid. Furthermore, another two cases (#s 5 and 9) are such that precisely the opposite of the thesis is proved, and the remaining five cases are inconclusive and lead to doubt.

10-11 (T36-38) Explanation of example--the third member of an argument--and of fallacious examples. He classes examples into two: homogeneous and heterogeneous, i.e., *sp* and *vp*.

12 (T38-44) If we wrongly assume that absence of *h* pervades absence of *s*, or that wherever *s* is present *h* must necessariliy be present, then by postive and negative concomitance we shall be able (wrongly) to prove a thesis other than and contrary to the thesis being argued for or we shall commit various fallacies.

13 (TT44-47) Dignāga rejects the ten-membered syllogism (mentioned e.g. by Vātsyāyana); no other members than those already referred to are necessary for a proper inference.

14 (T47-50) There are only two instruments of knowledge, perception and inference. By the first we grasp the *svalakṣaṇa*, by the latter the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. There is nothing else knowable by any instrument of knowledge.

15 (T50) Perception is free from conceptual construction (*kalpanāpoḍha*).

16 (T50-53) There is also mental awareness (*manobhūmi*), self-awareness (*svasaṁvedana*) and yogic perception as further types of perception. The instrument of knowledge is actually not different from the result of that instrument.

Inference can be of two kinds: that derived from perception, and that derived from inference or memory. For example, by remembering the validity of former inferences one comes to infer the validity of this one.

17-18 (T53) Since one object has many properties a sign (*nimitta*) cannot apply to more than one thing unless the dissimilar cases are excluded. And a characteristic mark (*lakṣaṇa*) comprises many factors; only if it stays within the limits of those applicable can it properly apply.

19 (T53-54) To refute an argument one shows that the fomulation of the argument is defective. The fallacies possible in refutation are called "futile rejoinders" (*jāti*).

20-29 (T54-72) Review of futile rejoinders: parity through similarity, through dissimilarity, through shuffling, through differentiating features, through awareness, through doubt, through presumption, through union, through nonunion, through lack of a *hetu*, through continued question, through eternality are discussed. Dignāga clearly has Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra*s in mind here, and refers to him at least once. Dignāga lists the remaining futile rejoinders in Gautama's list. (For explanations see Volume VI of this Encyclopedia, pp. 349-358.)

As for the ways of losing an argument, also discussed by Gautama, it is said that they are like quibbles and so will not be mentioned here. A number of other categories of a similar sort are referred to and set aside.

112.DIGNĀGA, *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha*

Giuseppe Tucci, ("Minor Sanskrit Texts on the Prajñā-pāramitā. I. The Prajñā-pāramitā-piṇḍārtha of Diṅnāga", Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1947, pp. 53-75), who provides our E and T, reports that he found a manuscript of this work in the monastery of Zalu in 1939. He characterizes it as an epitome of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*. The Chinese translation is by "She lu, who arrived in K'ai fung in the year A.D. 980." There is also a Tibetan translation by Tilakakalāśa and Blo ldan ses rab dating from the 11th century. The work is quoted at least five times in Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṁkārāloka*.

We provide below a rendering based on Tucci's translation, replacing his translations of technical terms by those in use in this Encyclopedia.

There is also a translation by Bhikkhu Pasadika in *The Wisdom Gone Beyond* (Bangkok 1966), pp. 91-106. Christian Lindtner edits and translates verses 26-29 (Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kund Südasiens 41, 1997, 176) to show that Dignāga accepted the three *svabhāva*s of Yogācāra.

(E56; T59-60) 1. *Prajñāpāramitā* is nondual knowledge; it is the Tathāgata, that which is to be proved; this word expresses the book in which this knowledge is expounded and the path to liberation as well, in so far as both are intended to this same end.

2. These are the topics dealt with in the text of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*: the

locus (*āśraya*), qualification (for instruction), the actions (of Bodhisattvas) with their spiritual cultivation, the (sixteen) different aspects of emptiness), logical arguing, the faults into which one may fall, the advantages (of knowledge).

3. The recorder, in order to state his own authority, indicates the factors that can lead believers to appropriate actions: he indicates who is the teacher, whose assembly listened to the teachings, and the time and the place where the teaching was held.

4. As a matter of fact, in this world the recorder, expounding things of which witnesses are known and that are definite as regards space and time, becomes an authority when he relates them.

5. All (these) references, viz. the fact that he (the recorder) heard the teaching as explicitly indicated by the adverb ("thus"), the pronoun ("I") and the verb ("have heard"), etc. are occasional (and thus not included among the thirty-two principal items to be discussed). The fundamental teachings of the knowledge are in fact thirty-two only.

6. The sixteen aspects of emptiness have been expounded progressively in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*: they must be understood as being explained for different hearers.

7. So this *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* results from these arguments, as many as have been enunciated, not one less; a summary of the book is needed and offered here.

The Sixteen Emptinesses

(E56-57; T60-61.) 8. The sage correctly said "I do not see a Bodhisattva." In this way he explained the emptiness of the enjoyer of (supposedly) real entities.

9. When it is said that visible, etc. objects are empty in so far as in them there is no such thing in them, this denies that there are external things to be enjoyed.

10. If a visible object and the like do not exist, it is implicit that the body in which they (are supposed to exist), the world which constitutes the support of this, and the (thirty-two) marks of the great man vanish; when one realizes this, individuality appears to that man unreal, as being a mere inner assumption.

11. If the inner experiences are empty the emptiness of *prakṛti* is implicit; in fact one's lineage consists of consciousness and is held to result in compassion and wisdom.

12. When he (the Buddha) says that beings are neither born nor

cease, etc. he is saying that individuals as well as rebirth are empty.

13. When it is stated that he does not see either the factors of the Buddha nor those of Bodhisattvas, he shows that the Buddha's powers, etc. are empty.

14. Since it is stated that factors are constructed he states that factors are not ultimately real.

15. Since by every means he (the Bodhisattva) uproots the view that there is a self, the Blessed one has declared that in no way does there exist a person.

16. So when he says that all factors are not born, the Buddha, who knows the truth, has implicitly declared that factors are without a self-nature.

17. By stating that there is neither growth nor diminution of pure and impure factors the existence of good factors, whether conditioned or unconditioned, is denied.

18. Good actions are empty; their conduciveness to liberation is constructed and empty.

The Ten Distractions of Awareness: 1. The Distraction of Nonexistence

(E57; T61-62) 19. When awareness is distracted from knowledge in ten ways then it is unfit, as happens with fools (*bāla*), for realization of nondual knowledge.

20. The Prajñāpāramitā is meant to eliminate reciprocally these distractions by having recourse to thesis and antidote. These distractions are taught thus:

21. When the teacher says "a Bodhisattva exists" he, showing that there are aggregates from the concealed (*saṁvṛta*) viewpoint, refutes the distraction involving the imputation of the absence (of things).

22. According to this same rule in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, as well as in other sources from beginning to end, the imputation of absence (of things) must be refuted.

23. These are not logical arguments (*hetuvākya*); rather suggestions are given here as regards what one must do. Inferences are to be learned elsewhere, as for instance in the *Brahmajālasūtra*.

2.The Distractions of Existence

(E57; T62) 24. When the Blessed One says "I do not see any Bodhisattva", etc. he refutes the bewilderment consisting in the conceptual construction of existence.

25. Insofar as he does not see in any way either a name or field of experience or action or the constituents of human personality, therefore he says that he does not see any Bodhisattva.

26. This is the refutation of all constructions, the synopsis of the teaching. All aspects taken to be contents of knowledge are constructions of thought.

27. This teaching based in the perfection of wisdom is based on the triple aspects: constructed, dependent, perfected.

28. Saying "nothing exists" all constructions are refuted, when by the example of illusory appearances the dependent is indicated,

29. By the fourfold purification the perfected is explained. In the perfection of wisdom there is no other teaching of the Buddha than this.

30. In the teachings of the antitheses of the ten imputations the three aspects of things are indicated both collectively and distributively.

31. So, for instance, in the introductory section of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, on the basis of these three aspects the Buddha refutes the distraction which consists in the imputation of absence.

32. When it is said "I do not see either an enlightened one or enlightenment", throughout the work the refutation of imputations is to be understood from this.

3. The Distraction Based on Superimposition (*adhyāropa*)

(E57; T62) 33. Since matter is empty, how and by whom can it be taken to be an essential nature? The same point is implied as to the other (nine) distractions

4. Distraction Based on Denial (*apavāda*)

(E57-58; T63) 34. When he (the Buddha) says that emptiness is empty he expresses a complete refutation of any denial.

35. Likewise in other expressions such as "the Buddha is like *māyā*" or "he is like a dream." Those who understand apply this same point in other contexts.

36. The Buddha is said to be like *māyā* through collocation with the speaker. "Like *māyā*" indicates the dependent nature.

37. That knowledge which, being natural, is present in ordinary beings is expressed by the word "*buddha*"; Bodhisattvas are likewise indicated.

38. This knowledge, its nature obstructed by ignorance, appears quite different from what it really is, like a magic show, just as (what is dreamt

in) a dream appears quite different (when one awakens).

39. This is a denial *(apavāda)* of the constructed denials of those who improperly understand either nondual knowledge or the result of having it.

5. Distraction Based on Assumed Identity

(E58; T63) 40. One should not say that matter is emptiness, for they are contradictory terms; emptiness is immaterial, while the psychophysical complex requires some form.

6. Distraction Based on Assumed Diversity

(E58; T63-641) 41. Thus the construction of manyness undermines the construction of unity. Matter is in no ways different from emptiness.

42. It is a creation of ignorance that something nonexistent appears as if existent. It is called "ignorance" just because it has the power to make something that does not exist appear to exist.

43. The same thing may be considered matter and the perfection of wisdom. Duality is really only identity. Thus both assumptions are refuted.

44. The Buddha explained the logical nature of this statement, inasmuch as things are essentially pure and nonexperienceable. He also considers manyness inadmissible since existence and nonexistence are contradictory.

7. Distraction Based on an Assumed Essential Nature

(E58; T4) 45. When it is said that matter is merely name, really without an essential nature, this does not allow any place for the imputation of a nature to it.

46. When it was said before that matter is empty of the nature of matter, this was meant to refute the false assumption that it has a nature.

8. Distraction Based on Assumed Diversity of Nature

(E58; T64) 47. When the Buddha says that he does not see either the arising or the destruction of things, he refutes the construction of an independent individuator (*viśeṣa*).

9. Distraction Based on the Assumption that Things Correspond to Names

(E58; T64) 48. A name is a constructed entity and speakable factors

are constructions. Thus the relation of word to object is not a natural (*svābhāvika*) one.

49. The attachment to external things as if they were real is proper to fools and is a consequence of error. It is a convention adopted in common life, but in reality there is nothing.

50. Therefore in this world a name is imputed but in fact there is no object expressed by it; it is therefore established that objects are imputed according to their names.

10. Distraction Based on the Assumption that Nothing Corresponds to Names

(E58-59; T64-65) 51. The Buddha also stated that the perfection of wisdom, the Buddha and the Bodhisattva are mere names and in this way he refuted the imputation that something really exists.

52. This refutes things being named, but it does not deny that there are objects. This point should be understood elsewhere the treatise.

53. The man who truly knows does not perceive anything corresponding to a name.. Therefore this refutation is made as regards the existence of objects connoted by names, but it does not deny that sounds have a conventional purpose.

54. But Subhūti said "I do not find any name for the Bodhisattva", denying both the language and things named.

55. There does not exist in the perfections of wisdom any expression which should not be understood according to this method of interpretation; its various meanings are to be grasped in this way by intelligent men.

56. The perfection of wisdom is called counterfeit when one disregards or misunderstands what is said here.

57. This, then, is the synopsis of the arguments contained in the perfection of wisdom; its meaning comes again and again in other books (of the Prajñāpāramitā).

58. If I have gained some merit by this summary may it help men to reach the supreme merit that transcends this existence.

113.DIGNĀGA, *Pramāṇasamuccaya*

See Bibliography, Volume 3, pp. 211-213, for a collection of titles of secondary books and articles on this important work, Dignāga's *magnum opus*.

113.1.Perception (*pratyakṣa*)

The verses of this Chapter have been restored into Sanskrit by H. R. Rangaswamy Iyengar (Mysore 1930), our "E", and both the verses and the commentary translated into English by Masaaki Hattori in *Dignāga, on Perception*. Harvard Oriental Series 47 (Cambridge 1968), our "T". Numbering of verses follows T.

Summary by Karl H. Potter

113.1.1: The Theory of Perception

1-3 (E1-8; T23-24) After a salutation[143] we are plunged immediately into the Buddhist theory that there are precisely two instruments of knowledge, perception and inference. This is because there are only two kinds of marks of such instruments, namely the "self-mark" or pure particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the general mark (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), that is, the particular and the universal.

Objection: How about the cognition of something momentary as colored, or successive awarenesses of the same object, (don't they require other instruments of knowledge)?

Answer: No. One grasps the particular and mentally relates colorness to momentariness, but no additional instrument is needed. As for the second part of the objection: to postulate a new instrument of knowledge for each in a series of successive awarenesses would lead to infinite regress, and furthermore one would have to allow such things as memory, etc. to be instruments of knowledge.

3-5 (E8-15; T24-27) Perception is free from conceptual construction (*kalpanāpoḍha*). Conceptual construction is association with a name, a universal property, a quality, an action, or a substance.

Why is the word "*pratyakṣa*" ("relating to the sense") used for the first mark, and not, say, "*prativiṣaya*" ("relating to the object")? Answer: Because the sense-organ is the specific cause: an object is the cause of various sorts of awareness, but the sense-organ is involved in perception specifically.

Objection: But Abhidharma texts tell us that the five senses have

aggregates (*saṁcita*) of atoms as their objects

Answer: What that passage means is that the sense grasps many atoms together, not that it conceptually constructs them into a whole. But a sense-organ cannot grasp the many properties making up a factor. A sense-content is a shape/color which is cognized as it is (*svasaṁvedya*) and is unspecifiable (*anirdeśya*).

6-10 (E17-26; T27-29) There are as well the following (kinds of) awareness: mental awareness of a thing, self-awareness of desire, etc.,[1] which are constructionfree, and the yogi's awareness of thing as it is unassociated with the teacher's instruction.

Even the awareness of constructions constitutes perception considered merely as awareness, but it is not perceptual considered as a grasping of an object.

The following are not perception: error (e.g., a mirage), empirical awareness (which superimposes properties on something conventional), inference and memory (because their content is something previously perceived), and desire.[2]

The instrument of cognition, since it includes the idea of an instrument (*vyāpāra*), is itself the result, though really there is no activity involved. Or one can say that self-awareness (i.e., an awareness's awareness of itself) is the result since the awareness of an object precedes it, but that when an object is the content we overlook the self-awareness to simplify matters. Thus the roles of instrument and object of awareness are metaphors, since there are no objects capable of function.

11-12 (E27-28; T29-31) An awareness has two forms (*dvirūpa*): as

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[1]Eli Franco, "Dharmakīrti's deviation from Dignāga", Journal of Indian Philosophy 14, 1986, 79-97, as well as in "Did Dignāga accept four types of perception?", Journal of Indian Philosophy 21, 1993, 294-299, argues, contrary to almost universal opinion, that "he (Dignāga) did not accept *svasaṁvedana* as a fourth type of perception." (p. 82).

[2]This passage concludes with the word "*sataimiram*". Eli Franco (op. cit.) argues, *contra* Masaaki Hattori and Alex Wayman, for instance, that their interpretation of this word as indicating an additional (fourth) kind of perceptual fallacy is mistaken, or at least that (following Lambert Schmithausen's suggestion) Dignāga changed his mind between the time of composing the *kārikā*s and composing the *vṛtti*.

awareness of a content and as the awareness of that awareness. Otherwise (if an awareness had only one form) the awareness of an object would be indistinguishable from the awareness of an awareness, and furthermore an object cognized by one awareness could not appear in a subsequent awareness. The fact of memory also demonstrates the two forms, and also supports our theory of self-awareness, since a memory is never of something not previously experienced, and an infinite regress would result if we did not postulate self-awareness.

113.1.2: The *Vādavidhi*'s Definition

1-4 (E31-37; T32-35) The *Vādavidhi* (VV) is not by Vasubandhu, or if it is it does not constitute his mature opinion, since things are explained differently in his *Vādavidhāna*.

The VV defines perception as "consciousness produced from that object." But if "from that object" means from the object-condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) the definition is incorrect, since authority (the *Abhidharmakośa*) says that awarenesses and mental concomitants cause all four conditions (and not just the object-condition). And if VV's definition instead means consciousness produced only from that object that supplies the name of the awareness, then the definition will wrongly include as perceptions awarenesses arising from memory, inference, covetousness, etc.

Does "supporting object" (*ālambana*) refer (1) to the content of an awareness or (2) to the actual entities causing the awareness? If (1) then it must be admitted that the five sensory awarenesses have aggregates of atoms as their content, i.e., they must take a merely empirical entity as the content (and they must then admit that perception is not valid). If (2) and it is, say, blue atoms that cause perception, though the content of the awareness produced is only a merely empirical entity, then substances, qualities, etc. would really exist (which they don't according to Buddhism). One might avoid this by assuming that the atoms are causes of the awareness but that they appear in a different form from their actual form since atoms do not have form as jars, etc. do. But if one adopts this stance it will contradict the VV's statement that an awareness with a content C is named after C, since no awareness grasps an atom. Each atom is, when operating together, a cause of awareness, but not as an aggregate, since the aggregate exists only in the conventional sense (and not in reality).

An awareness cannot be spoken of without referring to the nature of

its content. Since such a reference involves the universal form of a thing (and that is unreal), an actual object is unnameable.

113.1.3.The Nyāya Theory

(E39-47; T36-41) The Naiyāyikas say that perception is a judgment which is (1) produced from connection between sense organ and object, (2) is inexpressible (*avyapadeśya*), (3) does not wander and (4) is well-defined. But in this definition the qualifiers (1-4) are not correct, since what is produced by sense-object contact cannot be expressed. What is expressible is necessarily the content of inference. Thus (2) should be expunged. As for (3): it is not possible for a sense to wander; error is produced by the mind. Again, what does (4) "well-defined" mean? If it means "ascertained" (*niścita*), since ascertainment requires conceptual identification through association with universals, etc., perception cannot be well-defined. Every sensory awareness gasps its own content alone without predicating anything of it.

Naiyāyika: Perception in any case always involves sense-object contact.

Answer: Then one could not perceive colors and sounds at a distance or as larger than the sense-organ involved, since there can be no contact of the organ with such objects.

Naiyāyika: In those cases the organ goes out of the body to contact its object..

Answer: No, an organ can't go out. One treats medically each organ at its location in or on the physical body. And how could the sense get there if it were covered up?

Now if there are only five senses (as Nyāya avers) such things as satisfaction, etc. would not be contents of awareness, or else there are more instruments of knowledge than the Nyāya theory allows. Specifically, one would have to add the mind as an additional sense-organ.

Naiyāyika: All right. We do not deny it, and we say "if our school does not deny a theory it is all right to accept it."

Answer: Then lots of things the Nyāya avers are unnecessary because they are put forth by other schools!

If (as Nyāya holds) it is awareness itself that is the instrument of knowledge, that will conflict with the Nyāya theory that the result is different from the instrument, since the instrument is defined as (4) well-defined, which shows that the thing cognized is already contained in the

instrument itself.

Naiyāyika: The instrument is the awareness of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), and the result is the awareness of a qualified thing.

Answer: The instrument must have the same object as the result

Naiyāyika: Since the cause here is known as the cause of the qualified, knowledge of it must involve knowledge of the qualified.

Answer: Then there will be no difference between cause and effect in this case. Furthermore, there may not even be a resulting awareness, e.g., when we see a cow at dusk and cognize cowness but no particular cow. And since there is no result in such a case there is no instrument either.

Naiyāyika: The awareness of the qualifier has two aspects: an instrument and an object cognized, as when someone cognizes himself as both object and subject of the awareness.

Answer: Then the same goes for the awareness of the qualified thing. Only if you accept our theory of self-awareness (*svasaṃvitti*, see above), that an entity has a double aspect, do you avoid this regress.

Naiyāyika: The result of knowledge of an object is the cessation of ignorance, doubt and any false awareness.

Answer: No, since ignorance is not always present. Sometimes we merely decide to cognize something. And anyway cessation cannot be a result since it is an absence.

113.1.4.Vaiśeṣika

(E49-58; T42-51) In the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*s perception is defined as follows: an awareness produced from contact between a self, a sense-organ, the mind and an object. Some Vaiśeṣikas say sense-object contact is the instrument since it is the specific cause, but others of them say it is contact between the self and the internal organ that is the instrument since that is the predominant (*pradhāna*) cause. Now elsewhere the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*s remark that this definition explains (the stages of) doubt and ascertainment (*niścaya*). But ascertainment is not the same as awareness produced by the fourfold contact mentioned, since ascertainment also requires conceptual construction, whereas perception lacks that. The fourfold contact is the simple presentation of an object, not its ascertainment.

Vaiśeṣika: But sense-object contact does not involve conceptual construction.

Answer: Then even doubt and inference must be perception, since

they arise from sense-object contact.

Vaiśeṣika: But a sense-organ grasps the qualifiers that are actually in the thing and thus ascertainment naturally follows.

Answer: Then no doubt could ever arise or be removed!

Now the Vaiśeṣikas say in various places that perception grasps its content as depending on universals, individuators, and as substance, quality or motion, etc. But if an awareness is produced merely from sense-object contact then there is no possibility of it having any relation to any qualifier, since it is merely the object that is presented. In order to cognize a qualified entity one must cognize the qualifiers by conceptual construction and as prompted by the memory of one of the qualifiers.

Vaiśeṣika: Just because something is grasped by two awarenesses does not make it dual. For example, the same substance can be grasped by sight and touch.

Answer: If so it is not a single entity. Otherwise there would be no difference between colors and other objects.

Vaiśeṣika: Just as existence or qualityness, though grasped by different senses, are taken to be single entities, so it is here.

Answer: We do experience undifferentiated awarenesses of substances, but that awareness is not provided through the senses, since the difference between the sense-organs would vanish.

Vaiśeṣika: If a sense-organ could only cognize a single object it could not grasp the difference between entities.

Answer: A sense-organ, say vision, can grasp varieties of color, as well as number, etc., but colors cannot be grasped by other senses. Otherwise we should be able to smell colors, etc.

Vaiśeṣika: We do not subscribe to the view you ascribe to us. Each kind of sense-object, such as color, has its particular kind of property which is graspable by a certain sense but not by others.

Question: How do objects determine which organ they are grasped by?

Vaiśeṣika: Something which lacks colorness cannot be grasped by vision, etc.

Answer: Then one cannot see or touch substances, since a substance lacks colorness, etc.

Vaiśeṣika: We cognize that the substance seen is the same substance as touched. How could this be if there is no substance available to perception by all the five senses?

Answer: Such an awareness has as its content not substance but a

conceptual construction of aspects provided through memory. It is in a like manner that one comes to cognize existence and qualityness. We do not directly perceive existence or qualityness. If we could one substance could be grasped by all five sense-organs, whereas we know that each sense-organ has its particular kind of content (e.g., vision grasps color but not taste, etc.).

Vaiśeṣika: The existence resident in substances is different from the existence resident in qualities, and it is the latter sort alone that is perceptible.

Answer: Then there is not just one existence but two distinct entities. Moreover, in the awareness that this fire is hot, if the qualifier and the qualified are grasped by the same sense, one could see the hotness! A qualifier and the thing it qualifies are different from each other, since grasped by different senses.

Vaiśeṣika: Colors (red, blue, etc.) are different even though grasped by the same sense (vision). And even though they are grasped by the same sense the difference between them (red, blue, etc.) is because they are grasped as different. So difference between the senses by which x is grasped does not require difference between qualifier and qualified.

Answer: This misses our point. All we maintain is that what is grasped by different senses is many.

This reasoning also shows that qualities, etc. are not perceptible in the way the Vaiśeṣika says they are, i.e., through four-fold contact.

113.1.5.Sāṁkhya

(E64-85; T52-62) Kapila's followers define perception as the functioning of the auditory and other organs. But if so either there are an infinite number of sense-organs, since there must be an infinite number of organs corresponding to the infinitely diverse amounts of *guṇa*s such as sounds, etc., or else one sense-organ might grasp all objects, since all objects are composed of the three *guṇa*s.

Sāṁkhya: Though all things are composed of configurations (*saṁsthāna*) of the three *guṇa*s they are not composed in the same way. Thus sounds differ from shapes, etc., and each group is grasped by the appropriate organ.

Answer: But you admit that at least in the case of visual and tactual sensations the objects are grasped by both senses. Furthermore it is nonsense to speak of the "configuration" of an auditory, gustatory or olfactory content. Then again, things of the same configuration made of

different materials would be the same, which is not the case, and in short we would not comprehend the distinctive features of things such as their productivity of satisfaction, etc., and in fact be unable to tell the differences among many kinds of different things except those that differ in configuration. To avoid this one would have to assume the sense-organs were capable of conceptual construction.

These *guṇa*s you speak of -- are they cognized individually or together? Not individually, since those three are none of them objects of audition, sight, etc., or if they are the same as those objects the objects cannot be taken, as the Sāṁkhyas take them, as caused by those three. And if they are not seen as having qualities they cannot be apprehended by the senses.

Nor are the *guṇa*s cognized together, since in order to explain how we can cognize anything we'd have to suppose each functioning of a sense-organ has various aspects, and then different senses could not each have their own object.

Sāṁkhya: But we said before that what one cognizes is a class of things distinguished by their shapes.

Answer: You did say that, but from it would follow that there would have to be an infinite number of sense-organs to correspond with the infinite differences in shapes.

A certain Sāṁkhya (Mādhava "the destroyer of Sāṁkhya") says: *Guṇa*s comprise atoms; the differences among atoms is due to the differences in the arrangements of the *guṇa*s composing them.

Answer: Then there would have to be infinite sense-organs to grasp all such different arrangements. Since an atom (on Mādhava's view) is comprised of the three *guṇa*s how can an effect be of a single character (e.g., a sound as opposed to a satisfaction)?

Mādhava: We hold that though the cause be triple the result is a single sense-content is produced (say, of satisfaction in the case of a sound).

Answer: Then all sorts of objects can be grasped by the same sense-organ! Still, the part of Mādhava's theory that distinctions of kind results from the natures of the atoms constituting things is fine, though not the part about their producing one quality alone.

If perception is the functioning of a sense-organ the Sāṁkhya theory fails to include the functioning of the mind among the contents of awareness.

Sāṁkhya: But we of course allow that memory occurs, and that is a

functioning of the mind.

Answer: If the mind has not previously experienced a thing it can't very well remember it. And to answer this by saying that the sense-organ and mind function simultaneously, the mind will still not be viewed as a content of awareness. We do not have the same problem, for our doctrine of self-awareness (*svasaṁvitti*) allows us to say that we remember pleasures, etc.

Sāṁkhya: But even though the mind and the sense-organ operate simultaneously they do not operate on the same content.

Answer: Then the other sense-organs would be useless, for the mind alone could do all the work!

113.1.6.Mīmāṁsā

(E89-109; T63-70) *Mīmāṁsāsūtra* I.1.4's account of perception is that it is the awareness that arises when the sense-organs are connected with something existent. But if here "existent" (*sat*) excludes nonexistent (*asat*) things their definition is wrong because the term "something existent" is redundant.

Mīmāṁsā: "Something existent" merely indicates the counterpositives (*pratiyogin*) (of the relation of the senses, etc. to their objects).

Answer: Then those objects should be named. Anyway, connection can only be with what exists. A sense cannot be in contact with a mirage, which doesn't exist at all. If you mean that "something existent" designates just that kind of object to which the sense-organ is related, that is still wrong, since atoms (which are not perceptible) and ointments (which are not intended) are also related to sense-organs, so it would follow that perception should arise from contact with such entities.

Mīmāṁsā: Just as "*go*", meaning what goes, is a term for cows even though other things than cows go, so "exists" in our definition applies even if it applies to other things as well.

Answer: "*Go*" is commonly accepted to mean cow, but "*sat*" is not commonly accepted as a word for sense-objects only. And if the senses always came into contact with their objects one could not experience things far away nor large in size.

A commentator (*vṛttikāra*): Perception as the result of awareness is different from the instrument; now since the result of perception is just the awareness that arises when the sense-organs are connected with something existent the definition is correct. In fact, the only instrument that could fill these requirements is the joint contact of sense, object,

internal organ and self, accompanied by a trace.

Answer: If so, what is the point of the words "the awareness that arises" in the *sūtra*? And why should the word "*pratyakṣa*", which emphasizes the sense's (*akṣa*) role, be singled out in the words used?

The commentator: Perception is that by means of which an ascertainment of the form "this is a cow" (say) arises with regard to a perceived object.

Answer: The sense cannot associate the object with the universal cowness on your own view. So the relation between a qualifier and a qualified thing, or a name and its object, arise from conceptual construction, not from sense-perception, since the sense-object is a color (say) which is itself an aspect of awareness and inexpressible. Moreover, if one by perception cognizes all the properties of a thing than one would perceive universals such as qualityness and existence.

Mīmāṁsaka: Then perception is precisely the arising of awareness.

Answer: If so, there is no result of awareness different from the instrument of awareness, contrary to Mīmāṁsā belief. If the result is different from the awareness an awareness will inhere in its own cause, the self, but since inherence is eternal how could anything result? And if the result is not different from that awareness there's no point in speaking of its "arising".

When an awareness arises does the self change its state or remain the same? If it changes it must be noneternal, contrary to Mīmāṁsā contention. And if it remains the same it cannot become a cognizer.

113.2.Inference for Oneself (*svārthānumāna*)

References preceded by "K" are to folio numbers in the Tibetan translation by Kanakavarman (Text 5702 of the Peking Edition of the Tibetan TripiṬaka, Vol. 130). References preceded by "VP" are to folio numbers in the Tibetan translation by Vasudhararakṣita (Text 5701 of the Peking Edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Vol. 130); those by "VD" are to the Sde-dge ("Derge") edition (Text 4204) of this same translation. References preceded by "T" are to the page numbers of the English translation of the first 25 *kārikās* and their attendant *vṛtti* in R.P. Hayes, *Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs* (Dordrecht 1988).

Summary by Richard P. Hayes

Reasoning Distinguished from Sensation

1 (K109a; VP27b; VD27a; T231-232) There are two types of inference (*anumāna*): inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) and inference for others (*parārthānumāna*). Inference for oneself consists in discerning an object by means of an inferential sign that has three characteristics. (Inference for others is the subject matter of the following, third section of this work.) Inference differs from sensation in that it has as its subject matter a different kind of object.

2-3 (E248-250; T232-233) The subject matter of perception is the inexpressible particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), while the subject matter of inference is the universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), which has the nature of a concept that is expressible in language. The mind is capable of being aware of exactly two kinds of object: particulars and universals. The mind is engaged in inference only if it is aware of universals, and it is engaged in perception only if it is aware of particulars. There is no cognitive act in which the mind is aware of both universals and particulars at the same time.

3 (K109b; VP28b; VD27b; T233-236) An objection arises from the perspective of the Vaiśeṣika system. According to them, the assertion that there are exactly two kinds of awareness and that every cognitive act is an awareness of either a particular or a universal but never of both at once appears to be false if one considers that the element wind (*vāyu*) cannot be directly observed and so must be known through inference. But wind is a particular, not a universal, and so it must be a counterexample to the rule that inference deals only with universals. Dignāga replies that even in this case all that can be concluded through inference is that there must exist some substratum in which the quality of touch (*sparśa)* inheres, by which we putatively infer the existence of wind. It is the Vaiśeṣika contention that wind has a special kind of touch that is discernible from the quality of touch that inheres in any other element, but this contention is not commonly accepted and is derived only from their scriptural tradition (*āgama*).

4-5ab (K110-111a; VP29; VD28b-29a; T236-239) If the special quality of touch by which wind is inferred is known through scripture, then it seems in effect to be known through inference, since scriptural tradition is held by Dignāga to be merely a type of inference. So if scripture deals with such particulars as the element wind, then this still seems to be a counterexample to the rule that inference deals with only universals and never particulars. But this is not truly a counterexample,

since it is commonly accepted that there are slight differences between the testimony of tradition and the process of inference. What correct reasoning and reliable verbal testimony do have in common are the characteristics of (1) dealing with conceptual realities rather than sensible realities and (2) not being false. But scriptural tradition often deals with objects that are not observable and about the reality of which we cannot know. Examples of such unverifiable and unfalsifiable objects are heaven (*svarga*) and primordial matter (*pradhāna*). Insofar as scripture deals with such matters that are in principle beyond the range of experience, scripture fails to meet the canons of inference and so fails to yield genuine knowledge.

The Characteristics of Legitimate Evidence

5cd-7 (T239-240) An inferential mark (*liṅga*) has the three characteristics (*trirūpa*): (1) presence in the object being inferred (*anumeye sadbhāva*), (2) presence in what is similar (*tattulye sadbhāva*), and (3) absence in the absence of what is similar (*asati nāstitā*).

[144]"The object to be inferred is a locus (*dharmin*) qualified by a property (which one wishes to know) (*dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmy anumeyaḥ).*"

"After having known, either by perception or inference, (the presence of an inferential mark) there (i.e., in the object be inferred..), we also establish in a general manner (its) presence either in all or some members of the class similar to it (i.e., the object of inference)."

"(Question:) Why is it so (i.e., a valid inferential mark is present in all or in some members of the class, not in all members of the class)?"

"(Answer:) Because we restrict (*avadhāraṇa*) (the second characteristic) in the way that it is present only in what is similar to it (i.e., the object of inference) (*tattulya eva sadbhāvaḥ),* not in the way that it is necessarily present (in what is similar to the object of inference (*tattulye sadbhāva eva*)."

"(Objection:) If so, it will be useless to state (the third characteristic, i.e.,) absence in the absence (of the property to be inferred and/or what is similar to the object of inference) (*nāstitāsati*)."

"(Answer:) It is (stated) in order to determine that (the inferential mark is) absence in the absence (of the property to be inferred and/or of what is similar to the object of inference), not in what is other than or incompatible with (what is similar to the object of inference)."

"Thus we understand the marked (*liṅgin*, i.e., the property to be inferred) through the inferential mark (*liṅga*) which possesses the three

characteristics."

If any of these three characteristics is missing from a property used as an inferential sign, then the sign is not a reliable indicator of the property to be confirmed (*sādhyadharma*) through it.

6 (K111; VP30; VD29; T241) An inferential sign is a property that can be used to confirm the presence of a second property in the same locus. In order for the property *h* to serve as evidence for a property *s* in a locus *p*, *h* must have three characteristics. (1) *h* must be a property of *p*; if it is, it has the characteristic called *pakṣadharmatā* (being a property of the subject). (2) *h* must be a property of at least one object *q* such that *q* is not identical with *p* and *q* is similar to *p* in virtue of having the property *s*; if it is, then it has the characteristic called *anvaya* (association with the property to be confirmed). (3) *h* must not belong to any locus *r* such that it is not the case that *r* is similar to *p* in virtue of having the property *s*; if it does not belong to any such locus then it has the characteristic called *vyatireka* (dissociation from the absence of the property to be confirmed).

The Property-Bearer as the Inferable Object

8-11 (K112; VP30b-31a; VD29b-30a; T242-244)[145] There are various views as to what the inferable object (*anumeya*) is. Some say that it is the property to be confirmed, *s* (*sādhyadharma*). Some say that it is the relation between the locus *p* and the property *s*. But it is not the case that one gains through inference new knowledge of the confirmed property; when one infers the presence of fire through the observation of smoke, it is not the case that one learns for the first time that fire exists. Therefore, it is not the case that the inferable object is the property *s* that is indicated through the inferential sign. As for a relation, it cannot be the locus of either the inferential sign or the confirmable property, because relations are not the sort of thing in which properties occur; that relations have an ontological status different from that of concrete objects is shown by the fact that concrete objects are expressed by specific words, whereas relations are expressed only by means of case markers that are affixed to words that name concrete objects. The inferable object, therefore, is neither the confirmable property *s* nor the relation between the confirmable property and its locus. Rather, the inferable object is the *p*, that is, the locus *p* as a possessor of the property *s*.

Pervaded Properties and Errant Properties

12-15 (K112b-113a; VP31a-32a; VD30a-32a; T244-246). Any object has innumerable properties, only some of which can be confirmed through inference. If it were the case that inference made one aware of all the properties of an object, then our awareness of an object would be as vivid and complete through inference as it is through direct sensation. But in fact our awareness of an object learned through inference is much less vivid and much more indistinct than is our awareness of an object of direct sensation. The nature of the awareness of an object that we gain through inference is purely conceptual and propositional; that is, we do not experience a given property directly, but rather we know *that* a given property is not absent from a given locus.

16 (K113; VP32a; VD31a; T246) There can be no such thing as a universal that exists as an object independent of our experience. A universal is traditionally defined as a single object that occurs in a plurality of particulars without losing its integrity. But no such object can actually exist. For if it did exist, it would have to be either wholly resident in each particular or only partially resident in each particular. If wholly resident in each particular, then the universal could not be single but must be as numerous as the particulars in which it wholly occurs; or else it would occur wholly in just one particular and so would not be resident in a plurality of particulars. But if the universal were to exist only partially in each of a number of particulars, then it would be internally divided and so would lose its integrity. Therefore, a universal is merely a concept that is superimposed by the experiencing mind upon the discrete particulars of experience.

17-19 (K113b; VP32a; VD31a; T246-247) An inferential sign makes known the presence in its locus of only those properties to which the sign's presence is restricted. One property is restricted to a second property in case the first property occurs only where the second is present. A property that is restricted to a second property is said to be pervaded (*vyāpta*) by that property. If one property is not restricted to a second property it is said to be deviant (*vyabhicārin*) from the second property. An inferential sign cannot convey reliable information about the presence or absence of any property from which it is deviant. Since an inferential sign is a general property that is associated with more particulars than one, the sign is deviant with respect to characteristics in an individual that are unique to that individual. Therefore, inference cannot tell us anything about the particularities of an object. For this

reason, inferential knowledge is necessarily relatively vague and indistinct.

20-25 (K113b-114b; VP32b-33a; VD31b-32a; 247-249) Pervasion is a nonsymmetrical relation. That is, it is possible that A pervades B without B pervading A, but it is also possible that A and B do pervade one another. For example, the property of being horned pervades the property of being a cow, since all cows have horns, but the property of being a cow does not pervade the property of being horned, since not all horned animals are cows. On the other hand, the property of being perishable and the property of being complex are mutually pervasive, since all complex things are perishable and all perishable things are complex.

26-28 (K114b-115a; VP33; VD32) Criticisms of the definition of inference contained in the *Vādavidhi.*

29-31 (K115a-116a; VP33b-35a; VD32b-33b). Criticisms of the Naiyāyika theory of inference.

32-37 (K116a-119a; VP35a-37b; VD33b-36a). Criticisms of the Vaiśeṣika theory of inference.

38-47 (K119a-123a; VP37b-41a; VD36a-39a) Criticisms of the Sāṁkhya theory of inference.

48-53 (K123a-124b; VP41b-42b; VD39a-40b) Criticisms of the Mīmāṁsaka theory of inference.

113.3.Inference for Others (*parārthānumāna*)

Summary by Shoryu Katsura

For the first time in the history of Indian logic Dignāga called proof (*sādhana*) "inference for others" so that he could integrate the traditional system of argumentation (*vāda*) into his new system of epistemological logic. Inference for others consists of three members, viz. thesis (*pakṣa*), reason (*hetu*) and example (*dṛṣṭānta*). Chapter Three of this work deals with the first two members and Chapter Four with the last one.

Chapter Three consists of two sections, viz. one in which Dignāga mainly discusses his own theories of thesis and reason and the other in which he criticizes those of his rival schools, viz. the *Vādavidhi*, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṁkhya. The first section has been thoroughly studied by Hidenori Kitagawa in his annotated Japanese translation of this text (*Indo Koten Ronrigaku no Kenkyū, Jinna no Taikei* (Tokyo 1965), pp. 126-138.

Some portions (the Nyāya theory of the reason and the *Vādavidhi* theory of the fallacious reason) of the second section have been studied by Kitagawa (pp. 378-404) and the Vaiśeṣika portions have been put into Sanskrit by Muni Jambuvijaya in his *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda* (Baroda 1961), pp. 197-206.

Definition of Inference for Others

1ab (K124b; VP42b; VD40b) Inference for others is that which makes others realize what one has experienced. After having inferred for oneself the inferrable object (*liṅgin*) by means of an inferential sign (*liṅga*) which has three characteristics (*trirūpa*), one states such an inferential sign for others, so that they can infer the same object in a similar manner. The statement of an inferential sign can be called "inference" for others because the name of the resultant knowledge, "inference", can be metaphorically transferred (*upacāra*) to its cause, i.e., the statement.

Definitions of Thesis and Pseudo-Thesis

1cd-2. Of the three members of a proof the thesis does not really prove anything but it presents what is to be inferred or proved (*anumeya*). The thesis is that which is intended by the proponent himself as something to be presented in its proper form alone; and with regard to his own topic (*dharma*) it is not opposed by perceptible objects, by inference, by authority or by what is commonly recognized. (cf. *Nyāyamukha* verse 1).

Thus, Dignāga first of all admits the following four types of fallacious thesis (*pakṣābhāsa*): (1) "Speech is not audible" because opposed by perception, (2) "A pot is eternal" because opposed by inference, (3) "There are no instruments of knowledge which take cognizable objects as their objects" because opposed by authorities, and (4) "That which possesses a rabbit (*śaśin*)" because it is opposed by what is commonly recognized. These are cases where the property to be proved is itself opposed (*dharmasvarūpanirākaraṇa*). There are other cases: (5) a specific quality of the property to be proved is opposed (*dharmaviśeṣanirākaraṇa*), (6) the property-possessor itself is opposed (*dharmisvarūpanirākaraṇa*), (7) a specific quality of the topic under discussion is opposed (*dharmiviśeṣanirākaraṇa*), and (5) a specific quality of both is opposed (*ubhayaviśeṣanirākaraṇa*).

3-4 (K125b; VP43b; VD41a) Criticisms of the Nyāya Definiton of Thesis, viz., "The thesis is a presentation of that which is to be proved" (*Nyāyasūtra* I.1.33).

5 (K126a; VP44a; VD41b) Criticism of the *Vādavidhi* Definition of Thesis, viz., "The thesis is a statement of that which is to be proved."

6-7ab (k126b; VP44b; VD42a) Criticism of the Nyāya Definition of Fallacy of the Thesis, viz., "When thesis and reason are incompatible there is the point of defeat called 'incompatible thesis'" (*Nyāyasūtra* V.2.4). In this connection Dignāga discusses how to formulate a proof properly.

Definition of The Reason

8 (K127b; VP45b; VD42b) All proper reasons (*hetu*) and most fallacious reasons (*hetvābhāsa*) are properties (*dharma*) of that which is to be proved (*sādhya)*, i.e., those of the topic of a thesis (*pakṣa*). In other words, a proper reason should poseesss the first characteristic of legitimate evidence.

Nine Types of Reason

9 There are nine types of the reason in accordance with its being present in all, some or no members of the domain of similar examples (*sapakṣa*) and its being present in all, some or no members of the domain of dissimilar examples (*vipakṣa*). (Cf. *Nyāyamukha* k. 2)

Definition of Reason Examined

10 The expression "that which is to be proved" (*sādhya*) or "topic of a thesis" (*pakṣa*) can be used with three different meanings, viz. (1) a thesis which consists of a topic and a property to be proved as e.g. "there is fire on the mountain", (2) the topic of a thesis such as "the mountain", and (3) the property to be proved, such as "fire".. Strictly speaking it should be used with the first meaning only but it can be metaphorically used in the second and the third.

11-12 (K127b; VP46a; VD43a) A proper reason should be recognized by both the proponent and the opponent to be a property of the topic of the thesis (*pakṣadharma*), and the topic itself should be admitted to be real by both parties.

Dignāga seems to admit the following kinds of "unproved" (*asiddha*) reason: (1) that where the topic is unproved for both parties, (2) that where the topic is unproved for one of them, and (3) that where the

substratum of the thesis) is unproved for one or both of them.

In this connection, he argues, it should be accepted by both parties that a reason in a proper proof (*sādhana*) is a property of the topic and that a reason in a proof to be rejected (*dūṣaṇa*) is not a property of the topic. In other words, both parties should agree on whether the *p* of a legitimate reason is present or not.

13 (K128a; VP46a; VD43b) Again Dignāga stresses that a proper reason should be a property of the topic of the thesis (*pakṣadharma*) or that of what is to be proved (*sādhyadharma*). Only a proving property (*sādhanadharma*) proves another property which is to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) as well as that which possesses that property (*dharmin*). It is not the case that a property-possessor (*dharmin*) proves another property-possessor, nor that a property-possessor proves a property, nor that a property proves a property-possessor (cf. *Nyāyamukha* k. 3).

14-17 (K129a; VP47a; D44a) Criticisms of several arguments of other schools which Dignāga considers to be ill-formulated. He does not regard an argument by means of *reductio ad absurdum (prasaṅga*) as a proper proof *(sādhana*) but rather as a mere refutation (*parihāra*) or disproof (*dūṣaṇa*). A kind of indirect argument employed by the Sāṁkhya called *avīta* is considered to be a *reductio ad absurdum* and to be essentially not independent of a direct proof (*vīta*). In this connection Dignāga suggests how to reformulate an ill-formed argument.

18-20 (KK130a; VP48a; VD45a) The *sapakṣa* is defined as that which is similar (*samāna*) to the topic of the thesis (*pakṣa*) with respect to the universal (*sāmānya*) which is the property to be proved. Thus a *sapakṣa* should be differentiated from a *pakṣa*. The *vipakṣa* is that which is the absence (*nāstitā*) of the *sapakṣa*; it is not that which is either incompatible (*viruddha*) with or different (*anya*) from the *sapakṣa*,

Nine Types of Reason Explained

21-22 (K131a; VP48b; VD45b) The following nine formulations of a proof are under consideration:

(1) Speech is eternal because of its being grasped by a means of knowledge.
(2) Speech is not eternal because of its being produced.
(3) Speech is produced by human effort because of its being noneternal;
(4) Speech is eternal because of its being produced.
(5) Speech is eternal because of its being audible.

(6) Speech is eternal because of its being produced by human effort.

(7) Speech is not produced by human effort because of its being non-eternal.

(8) Speech is not eternal because of its being produced by human effort.

(9) Speech is eternal because of its being nontangible.

Of the nine reasons mentioned above the second and third ones are considered to be valid because they are present either in a part of or all members of the *sapakṣa* and absent from all members of the *vipakṣa*; in other words these reasons possess the second and third characteristics of a valid argument. In this connection it is to be noted that Dignāga regards absence from the *vipakṣa* itself to guarantee possession of the third characteristic.

The fourth and the sixth reasons are regarded as fallacies and called "contradictory" (*viruddha*) because they establish what is incompatible with the original thesis. The rest are other fallacious reasons called "equivocal" (*anaikāntika/aniścita*); the fifth is called "unique as well as equivocal" (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*), and the others are "common as well as equivocal" (*sādhāraṇānaikāntika*). (Cf. *Nyāyamukha* k. 7.)

23-24 (K132a; VP49b; VD46b) According to Dignāga, when we examine reasons as to whether they are valid or not, we should consider only one reason at a time, for two incompatible reasons may cause doubt.

25-26 (K133a; VP50b; VD47b) Two summarizing verses on fallacies. (Cf. *Nyāyamukha* ks. 8 and 10.)

Then Dignāga discusses the four kinds of "contradictory" reasons, viz. (1) one which proves the opposite of the property to be proved, (2) one which proves the oppposite of a specific quality of the property to be proved, (3) one which proves the opposite of the topic of a thesis itself, and (4) one which proves the opposite of a specific quality of the topic of a thesis.

27 (K134a; VP51a; VD48a) The verse summarizes the above discussion. (Cf. *Nyāyamukha* k. 9.) In this connection Dignāga refers to Vasubandhu's criticism of the Sāṁkhya proof of the eternal soul.

28-32 (K134b; VP51b; D48a) Further elucidation of the nine types of reason. In this connection, Dignāga briefly touches upon the theory of *apoha* within the context of the inferential process.

Criticisms of the Theories of Other Schools

33-38ab (K137a; VP53b; VD50b) Criticism of the *Vādavidhi* Theory of the Reason.

39-43 (K138b; VP55a; VD51b) Criticism of the Nyāya Definion of the Reason: "The reason is that which proves what is to be proved on the basis of similarity to examples" (*Nyāyasūtra* I.1.34).

44-45ab (K140b; VP56b; VD53a) Criticism of the Vaiśeṣika Theory of the Reason.

46-52ab (K141b; VP58b; VD54a) Criticism of the Sāṁkhya Theory of the Reason.

53-54 (K145a; VP61a; VD57a) Criticism of the *Vādavidhi* Theory of the Fallacious Reason.

55 (K145b; VP61a; VD57b) Criticism of the Nyāya Theory of the Fallacious Reason.

56ab (K147a; VP64b; VD59a4) Criticism of the Vaiśeṣika Theory of the Fallacious Reason.

113.4 Example (*dṛṣṭānta*) and Fallacies of the Example

Summary by Shoryu Katsura

Chapter Four consists of two sections, one in which Dignāga discusses his own theories of the example and of fallacies of the example, and the other in which he criticizes those of rival schools, viz. the *Vādavidhi*, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. The first section has been thoroughly studied by Kitagawa (*Indo Koten Ronrigaku no Kenkyū*, pp. 239-281) and the Vaiśeṣika portion has been put into Sanskrit by Muni Jambuvijaya (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda*, pp. 207-208).

It is also to be noted at the outset that Dignāga uses the term *dṛṣṭānta* (example) in two senses, namely, in the sense of the third member of a proof which consists of a general statement of pervasion (*vyāpti*) and its exemplification and in the sense of an actual example in our experience. As a matter of fact, the same is true with the term *hetu* (reason); it means the second member of a proof as well as an item or a property to which it refers.

1 (K148a; VP63b; VD60a) It has been stated that a proper reason possesses the three characteristic marks (*trirūpa*). The second member of a proof indicates that the reason possesses the first characteristic, i.e., its

being a property of the topic of a thesis (*pakṣadharmatā*). The third member of a proof indicates that the reason possesses the other two, i.e, its positive as well as negative concomitance (*anvayavyatireka*) with what is to be proved.

2 There are two formulations of examples, viz. similar (*sādharmya*) and dissimilar (*vaidharmya*). According to Dignāga the two kinds of examples should be formulated in the following manner: a reason (*h*) is followed by a property to be proved (*s*) (i.e., wherever there is *h* there is *s*) in a similar example and absence of the reason in the absence of a property to be proved (i.e., wherever there is no *s* there is no *h*) in a dissimilar example. (Cf. *Nyāyamukha* k. 11.)

For instance, "(Thesis:) Speech is not eternal, (Reason) because it is produced by human effort (*prayatnaja*); (Similar Example) It is observed (*dṛṣṭa*) that whatever is produced by human effort is not eternal, as e.g. a pot and others; (Dissimilar Example) It is observed that whatever is eternal is not produced by human effort, as e.g. space (*ākāśa*).

3 (K148b; VP64a; VD60a) Dignāga points out that the negative particle in a similar example ("*not* eternal") is used in the sense of an implicative negation (*paryudāsa*) which presupposes the presence of what is negated (noneternal things) and that the negative particle in a dissimilar example ("eternal" = *not* noneternal") is used in the sense of a simple negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*) which does not presuppose the presence of what is negated (eternal things). Thus the dissimilar example holds even for those who do not admit any eternal things.

4 Dignāga emphasizes that the two examples should be formulated in a proper way; namely, the orders of the two terms (*h* and *s*) should be reversed in the two examples: *h* > *s* in a similar example and *-s* > *-h* in a dissimilar example. (Cf. *Nyāyamukha* k. 13.)

5 (K149a; VP64b; VD60b) Thus the formulae of the two examples are logically equivalent because they are in the relation of contraposition. Dignāga is well aware that one of the two examples can imply the other but he strongly adheres to his position that both similar and dissimilar examples should be formulated in a proof, which suggests the inductive nature of his system of logic. If one or two examples were not formulated, he thinks, even fallacies could be counted as valid reasons.

6 (K150b; VP65b; VD61b) In inference for others, in order to produce for others the same knowledge as one has obtained, one states (1) a reason's being a property of the topic of a thesis, (2) its inseparable relation (*sambandha*) with what is to be proved, and (3) the thesis to be

proved. They are expressed respectively in "reason", "example" and "thesis", viz. the three members of a proof. It is not necessary to state other members, such as "application" and "concluson". (Cf. *Nyāyamukha* k. 13.)

7-8 (K151a; VP65b; VD62a) It is necessary to formulate "example" separately from "reason" but the formulations of the two should not be unrelated.

9-12 (K151a; VP66a; VD62a) Dignāga criticizes ill-formed proof formulae which are commonly used by his contemporaries who adopt the Nyāya definition of reason (*Nyāyasūtra* I.1.34-35). Further he points out that a mere statement of an actual example without reference to a general law of pervasion will require further examples *ad infinitum*. (Cf. *Nyāyamukha* k. 14.)

13-14 (K152a; VP67a; VD63a) Dignāga recognizes ten types of fallacies of the example. With reference to a similar example he cites (1) one which lacks a reason, (2) one which lacks a property to be proved, (3) one which lacks both, (4) one in which the positive concomitance (*anvaya*) is stated in a reverse way, and (5) one in which it is not stated at all. With reference to a dissimilar example he cites (1) one which lacks a reason, (2) one which lacks a property to be proved, (3) one which lacks both, (4) one in which the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) is stated in a reverse way, and (5) one in which it is not stated at all.

15-18ab (K152b; VP67a; VD63b) Criticism of the *Vādavidhi* Theories of Examples and Fallacies of Examples.

19-21 (K153b; VP68a; VD64a) Criticism of the Nyāya Definition of Example: "Exemplification (*udāharaṇa*) consists of an example which possesses a property of the object to be proved because of similarity with that object, or of that which is the opposite because it is opposite to that" (*Nyāyasūtra* I.1.36-37).

22-23ab (K155b; VP72b; VD66a) Criticism of the Vaiśeṣika Theories of Examples and Fallacious Examples.

113.5 *Apohaparīkṣā*

Summary by Richard P. Hayes

References preceded by "H" are to numbers of paragraphs in Hattori's (1982) critical edition of the Tibetan translations of

Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti Chapter Five by Kanakavarman and by Vasudhararakṣita, accompanied by Jinendrabuddhi's commentary translated into Tibetan by Blo gros brtan pa, all found in Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University No. 21 (Kyoto 1982). References preceded by "K" are to folio numbers in the Tibetan translation by Kanakavarman (Text 5702 of the Peking Edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Vol. 130). References preceded by "VP" are to folio numbers in the Tibetan translation by Vasudhararakṣita (Text 5701 of the Peking Edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Vol. 130); those by "VD" are to the Sde-dge ("Derge") edition (Text 4204) of this same translation. "T" refers to the translation by Richard Hayes, *Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs*. Studies of Classical India 9 (Dordrecht 1988).

What Verbal Signs Make Known

1 (H1; K156a; VP70a; VD66a; T252-255) A verbal sign (*śabda*) is no different from an inferential mark (*liṅga*) as a means of acquiring knowledge (*pramāṇa*), for both types of sign convey information by a process of excluding what is incompatible with what is signified. Some schools of thought accept scriptural tradition as a source of knowledge concerning matters beyond the range of both sensation and inference. But actually verbal signs function in exactly the same way and have the same limitations as ordinary inferential signs (the functions of which are outlined in 114.2, above). Therefore the authority of scripture cannot be regarded as a separate means of acquiring knowledge that transcends the limitations of sense experience and reasoning.

2-3 (H2-5; K156; VP70b-71a; VD66b; T255-260) General terms do not express particulars. But a general term also does not express a universal or the relation between a universal and a particular. Just as an inferential sign can give rise to knowledge only of that to which it is restricted (or, to say it in another way, by which it is pervaded), a verbal sign can express only that to which it is restricted. A general term such as "woman" can be applied to a wide variety of individual human beings, so it is not restricted to any one individual, so it cannot express any given individual. Linguistic evidence indicates that general terms do not express universals. The principal piece of evidence is the phenomenon of coreferentiality, whereby two words agree in grammatical case, gender and number on the grounds that both words refer to the same object. But if general terms were construed as expressing universals, it would be impossible to give a fair account of this grammatical phenomenon. For

example, in a phrase such as "real pot," there are two general terms, "real" and "pot." The terms can be coreferential only if both refer to the same object. But if "real" indicates the universal reality, and "pot" indicates the universal pothood, then it is not the case that both terms are referring to the same object, and therefore the two terms could not be coreferential, in which case we should expect them to appear in a sentence with different case markings and grammatical gender. Finally, a general term cannot express a relation, because relations are indicated not by separate words but by case endings that are applied to separate words in sentences. A relation is expressed only through the properties of its relata but never as an independent entity. Unless both relata in a relation are named, the reference to a relation is incomplete. For this reason, a relationship cannot be expressed by a single general term.

4 (H6-9; K156b-157a; VP71; VD67a; T261-265) It is not the case that a general term expresses an individual in its role as the instantiation of a universal, for if it did it would have to be grammatically subordinate. Moreover, if the general term is applied to the instantiation at all, the application is only figurative. And in fact there is no basis for figurative application, since there is no resemblance between the universal and the instantiation of the universal that would warrant figurative application of the term for one to the other. Grammatical subordination is a linguistic phenomenon whereby a word loses its own grammatical gender and number and acquires the gender and number of a head-word that it qualifies. In the expression "real pot," "real" is grammatically subordinate to "pot." But if the word "pot" is itself construed as expressing not the universal pothood but a particular that possesses the universal pothood, then "pot" would have to be translated as "pothood-possessing," in which case it would take on the form of an adjective that should be subordinate to some head-word either expressed or implied. The implications of this move would be that in an expression such as "real pot," "real" would no longer be grammatically subordinate to "pot" but rather would be subordinate to the word to which "pot" (= "pothood-possessing") is subordinate. In this case, "real" and "pot" would simply become two adjectives modifying the same head-word. But this runs counter to our linguistic intuitions. Therefore, a general word should not be construed as expressing an instantiation of a universal. Moreover, if the general term is applied to the instantiation at all, the application can only be figurative. The literal referent of a general term in the sense of a particular that possesses the universal can only be regarded as

figurative. But in fact there is not even a basis for the figurative application of a universal. Figurative application to an object B of a term that literally signifies an object A is possible only if A and B have some feature in common. But there is no feature that universals have in common with instantiations of universals. Therefore, no figurative usage of a term that literally expresses a universal to an object that is an instantiation of a universal is possible.

5 (H10-11; K157a; VP71b; VD67; T266-267) When two objects A and B have a feature F in common, then we can say "A has F and B has F." But there is no feature F that actually occurs in both a universal and an instantiation of a universal such that we can say "The universal has F and the instantiation of the universal has F." Nor is there any feature F that actually occurs in the universal but only apparently occurs in the instantiation of the universal (as the color red actually occurs in a rose but only apparently occurs in a crystal placed next to the rose) on account of which apparent resemblance between the universal and the instantiation of the universal one could figuratively construe the term expressing the universal as a term expressing the instantiation of a universal.

6-8 (H12-15; K157b; VP71b-72a; VD67b; T267-268) If instantiations of a universal apparently had the features of universals, then it would not be possible to distinguish instantiations of a universal from one another, for all things would apparently have the same features as all other things. Moreover, the instantiation of a universal is in the final analysis nothing other than a particular, and it has already been established (5:2) that relations cannot be expressed by general terms.

9 (H16; T269-272) One might think that a general term expresses the mere fact of possession, that is, the particular's possession of a given universal. But possession is just a type of relation, and it has already been shown (in 2 above) that relations cannot be expressed by general terms.

10-11 (H17-22; K158a-159a; VP72a-73a; VD68; T272-277) The only feature held in common by a plurality of particulars to which a given general term is applicable is the very fact that the general term is applicable to them. But the question now arises: what is the basis on which the same general term is applicable to a plurality of particulars that actually have nothing in common? It cannot be that the basis is a single universal that actually occurs in a plurality of particulars. (Dignāga raises this question and rules out answers that might be given, but he offers no account of his own as to the basis on which a general term can be

applicable to pluralities of particulars.)

12-13 (H22; K159a; VP73a; VD69a; T277) That to which a verbal sign is applied has many properties, only some of which are made known through the verbal sign. The verbal sign merely serves to isolate what it expresses from other properties; it also isolates the particular to which the word is applied from particulars that do not have the property isolated by the verbal sign. A verbal sign also has numerous properties, but it is significant only in virtue of those properties of the sign that are restricted to the object expressed.

The Relationships among Signs

14-16 (HT23-25; K159; VP73; VD69; T278-282) If it is accepted that verbal signs do not express real qualities or universals but serve only to isolate particulars from one another, it is still possible to account for the linguistic phenomena of grammatical agreement, also known as coreferentiality (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*), and the qualification of one term by another (*viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāva*). When a single verbal sign is applied to a situation, there is greater uncertainty concerning which particulars the sign is being applied to than when several signs are applied in juxtaposition. Insofar as "lotus" is less certain than "blue lotus," "blue" and "lotus" may be said to be qualifying one another. But in the expression "blue lotus" the sounds "blue" and "lotus" do not have any meaning of their own, any more than in the word "lotus" the syllables "lo" and "tus" have any meaning by themselves. Still, despite the fact that the individual words in a phrase or sentence do not have any meaning of their own, the phrase or sentence as a whole does express something, naming the fact that the state of affairs to which the phrase or sentence is correctly applied is isolable from other states of affairs, namely, those to which the phrase or sentence is not applicable.

17 (H26; T282-283) There can be no such thing as an object that is a single whole made up of parts that are different from one another. For if there were such a single simple object, it would follow that its putative parts are in fact identical to one another. If, for example, a blue lotus is construed as a simple object, then it must follow that the color blue is identical with the universal lotushood. If on the other hand the words "blue" and "lotus" are understood as expressing distinct real objects, it follows that there is no individual thing to which the expression "blue lotus" applies.

18. (H26(d)-27(a); K160a-161a; VP74; VD69b-70b; T283-286) One

might imagine that the word "blue" in the expression "blue lotus" expresses the color blue, while the word "lotus" expresses the universal lotushood. In that case there would be no basis for saying that "blue" and "lotus" are in grammatical agreement owing to their referring to the same object. Positing that "blue" does express lotushood would entail the unwelcome consequence that "blue" also expresses every blue substance; but it has already been shown (in 4 above) that a general term does not express the individuals that instantiate it. Furthermore, if the word "blue" did indeed express lotushood, there would be no need to utter the word "lotus"; "blue" by itself would express "blue lotus." Given all the problems pointed out in 17-18 it is untenable that the substratum of "blue" is identical to the substratum of "lotus." But it is equally untenable that the substratum of "blue" is different from the substratum of "lotus." It cannot be the case that the whole is an entity that is different from its parts, for there is no satisfactory account of the relation between whole and part. The whole cannot reside completely in each of its parts, nor can the whole reside only partially in each of its parts.

19-24 (H27b-35; K161a-163a; VP75a-76b; VD70b-72a; T286-287) Let it be granted then, for the sake of argument, that the whole is an entity distinct from its parts. Even if this is granted, it turns out to be impossible to account for the grammatical agreement of two or more different expressions. Suppose that there are two objects, a quality and a universal, that both occur in one locus. Suppose, for example, that there is a single locus in which the color blue and the universal lotushood both reside. If that is the case, the color blue and the universal lotushood are not related as qualifier and qualifiable object (*viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya)*, for the color blue is not a quality of lotushood, nor is lotushood a quality of the color blue. The color blue is neither a species nor a genus with respect to the universal lotushood. Alternatively, suppose that the possessor of the color blue is a part of the same whole as is the possessor of the universal lotushood. But if the whole is distinct from its parts and the parts are distinct from one another, it still follows that the blue-possessing part and the lotushood-possessing part are not related as qualifier and qualifiable object. And the part possessing the color blue is neither a species nor a genus with respect to the part possessing the universal lotushood. A parallel observation can be made with respect to the words that express the color blue and the universal lotushood. Since the words differ in what they express, it cannot be said that they are coreferential, and since the words are not related, they are not in a

relation of qualifying and qualifiable expression. In summary, the phenomenon of grammatical agreement between two expressions is putatively grounded on the fact that both expressions express the same object, but the fact that the two expressions in grammatical agreement are not synonymous indicates that they express different objects. Therefore, it is uncertain whether two expressions in a coreferential relationship express identical or different objects. Since insurmountable problems arise from making the assumption that words express real objects outside thought, it not being certain whether those objects are identical or different, one must abandon the assumption that verbal signs express objects outside thought. Verbal expressions, therefore, express only concepts the relations among which do not correspond to the relations among objects in the world outside thought.

25 (H36; T287-290) A verbal sign does not directly express anything; rather, it excludes the application of other signs to the object to which it is applied. But a sign does not exclude the application of all other signs. It does not, for example, exclude terms of wider extension, terms of narrower extension or terms of exactly the same extension as itself.

26-27 (H37; K163; VP77; VD72b; T290-291). A term does not exclude terms of narrower extension, because it engenders anticipation for them alone. For example, if the word "animal" is applied to an object, anticipation arises in the mind of the hearer as to whether certain other terms, such as "horse" or "cat" or "elephant," are also applicable to that same object. Since terms such as "horse," etc. apply only to those objects to which "animal" applies, these are terms of narrower extension than the term "animal." The wider term selects a set of narrower terms as possible candidates to apply to the same object to which the wider term is applied, but of course the wider term cannot select any particular narrower term. But in any case, the wider term does not exclude the application of narrower terms. The application of a narrower term to an object entails the applicability of several wider terms.

28-30 (H38-41; K163b-164a; VP77b-78a; VD72b-73b; T291-195) If two terms are both narrower than a given wider term, each narrower term excludes the other, and each narrower term also excludes whatever is excluded by terms wider than itself. For example, "cat" excludes "horse," since "cat" and "horse" are both narrower than "animal." But "cat" also excludes "plant," since "plant" is excluded by "animal," because "animal" and "plant" are both narrower than "lifeform." The sign "cat" does not exclude "plant" directly. A narrower term only indirectly excludes the

application of terms that are incompatible with its wider terms. Adjectives do not necessarily exclude one another, because several adjectives can be used to modify the same noun.

31-33 (H42-45; K164a-165a; VP78a-79a; VD73b-74a; T295-297) The phenomena of the compatibility and incompatibility of terms are often accounted for by an appeal to an underlying relationship among objects of various kinds, such as substances, qualities, actions and so on. But such explanations lead to numerous problems. Therefore, preferable to accounting for linguistic phenomena by an appeal to ontological hypotheses is simply observing them without trying to offer an explanation of what facts in the world underly the facts of language. For example, it is sufficient simply to note that in conventional usage the terms "cat" and "elephant" are not applied to the same objects, but "horse" and "animal" are. Similarly, it is sufficient to note that "horse" and "white" are sometimes applied to the same object; it is not necessary to posit that "horse" names a substance and "white" a quality that inheres in the substance and so forth, and indeed positing such things leads to a number of problems that have nothing to do with the linguistic signs that one is trying to interpret.

34-36 (H46-50; K165a; VP79; VD74-75a; T297-300) The theory that a verbal sign expresses only the exclusion of incompatible signs and properties is not subject to the same criticisms as the other theories criticized in 2-11 above. A sign that expresses only exclusion (*apoha*) does not apply to objects in the extension of the contrary term, and it does apply to members of its own extension. Therefore it has the characteristics of a good inferential sign. The wider a term, the greater the hearer's uncertainty concerning the nature of the object to which the speaker is applying the term; the narrower the term, the greater the certainty. This is so because narrower terms eliminate (*apohate*) more possibilities of what is being talked about than do wider terms. This means that for the purpose of giving an account of such linguistic features as principled grammatical agreement and qualification relations, exclusion functions in all important ways as a universal (*jāti*) functions. In the exclusion theory of meaning, words express greater and smaller exclusions in just the same way that in other theories of meaning words express narrower and wider universals. It is possible, therefore, to conceive of taxonomical hierarchies purely in terms of exclusion, without having to posit the existence of universals to account for such hierarchies. Moreover, an exclusion does not admit of internal divisions and so has

the simplicity and independence from individuals that universals are supposed to have. The distinction between a universal and an exclusion is that the former is believed to exist as a part of reality outside the intellect, whereas exclusion is purely an intellectual fiction that plays a role in analysis and understanding.

Anticipating Some Objections from Other Schools of Thought

37-38 (H51-54; K166a-167a; VP80a-81a; VD75; no T). A defender of the view that universals are real entities that exist outside the mind points out that the realistic position does not entail any of the difficulties that the *apohavādin* nominalist ascribes to it. What makes the word "color" apply to colors but not to tastes and other sensibilia is that there really is something that all colors have in common that is not had in common by tastes, smells and so forth. Dignāga replies that one should neither discard the ordinary speech of people altogether, nor should one take ordinary language to be giving a completely accurate representation of the way things are in the world. It is true that in ordinary speech people speak as if there were something that all colors have in common, and so when one listens to ordinary speech one should pay attention to the fact that when people say "color" they are expressing a belief in universals; but it should also be borne in mind that this common belief is not necessarily true. To see that there are problems in the commonly held belief that the universal color is a real entity that all particular colors have in common, one need only ask what the precise nature of this color is; one need, in other words, only try to define it. According to the ordinary users of language, for example, the definition of color is that which is cognizable through the eye. But such a definition is too wide, for it includes such categories as substance (*dravya*) and physical contact (*saṁyoga*). So we cannot place too much confidence in the intuitions of meaning that we get from ordinary language as ordinarily used. According to the Sanskrit grammatical tradition, the meaning of a word or morphological feature is ascertained by the joint observations of association (*anvaya*) and dissociation (*vyatireka*); for example, one ascertains that the sixth case endings are a sign for possession by observing that when possession is present the sixth case markers are used, but when possession is not present the sixth case markers are not used. Now if universals do not exist, it would *apparently* follow that all ascertainment of the signification of a general term is based exclusively on dissociation (the word "cow" is not applied when the universal

cowhood is not present), not on association (the word "cow" is applied when the universal cowhood is present). But one should not be deceived by this apparent consequence, for all that the exclusion theory of meaning states is that when a term is applied to an object, it excludes the applicability to that object of certain other words. The denial of universals as real entities does not imply anything positive or negative about how it is that we learn what linguistic features signify.

Points of Dispute with the Sāṁkhya School

39-43 (H55-58; K167a-168a; VP81a-82a; VD75b-76b) According to the Sāṁkhya philosophers, every particular is the transformation of some basic stuff that is the true essence of all things. Now if it is said that words signify nothing but exclusion, which is an absence, it would apparently follow that all particulars therefore have absence or nothingness as their essence. Such a consequence would indeed follow from accepting both the exclusion theory of meaning and the Sāṁkhya view that all particulars have fundamentally the same essence. But there is no need to accept the view that all particulars have fundamentally the same essence. For if one were to hold that a particular piece of pottery is in no essential way different from the clay of which the pot is made, then it would follow that one could not tell one piece of pottery from another. In fact, though, one can tell one piece of pottery from another. What this fact of being able to distinguish among particulars is due to is just the capacity that words have to evoke certain images in the minds of hearers. This capacity is itself the result of a beginningless history of linguistic convention, but the convention itself is not necessarily grounded in reality.

44-45 (H59; K164a; VP82a; VD76b) If the grounds for applying a term (*śabdapravṛttinimitta*) is an absence, as the exclusion theory of meaning holds, then it is difficult to see what the basis can be of such grammatical features as number. But the same criticism can be made of any theory by which the grounds for applying a term is a real universal; for, given the fact that the universal can only be one, only the singular number would really make any sense. One could argue, as the Sāṁkhyas do, that although the universal is one basic stuff, each particular evolves out of it owing to some potentiality (*śakti*). But it must be asked whether there is one potentiality in the basic stuff that generates all the particularities or whether each particular has its own potentiality. If the former is the case, then the several particulars would be indiscernible; if

the latter is the case, then the basic stuff is in fact not one simple stuff but a complex.

46 (H60; K168; VP182b; VD77a) An individual word has no meaning in isolation from a sentence; like conjugational and declensional endings, a word has no application to any object except in the context of a complete sentence. The sentence is the primary unit of speech, and the object that it makes known is the intuition (*pratibhā*) of the speaker. Just as the sentence is an undivided whole, an intuition is an undivided whole. But both sentences and the intuitions they express can be artificially divided into parts for heuristic purposes. The meanings of words and of morphological suffixes within sentences can be learned by a process of systematically comparing the similarities and differences in the overall meanings of sentences that differ from each other. Unsophisticated people form the mistaken impression that the words abstracted from sentences for heuristic purposes actually refer to real external objects, but in fact they refer only to conceptual fictions.

47-49 (H61-62; K168b; VP82b; VD77a) Although there are no external objects, people form definite concepts and mental images when they hear sentences spoken. For example, the concepts that someone forms are the result of the history of his personal experiences and the habits of thinking that he has developed. A passionate man on hearing an erotic verse is liable to become sexually aroused, whereas a dispassionate man on hearing the same verse will develop a feeling of distaste. The "meaning" that a sentence conveys, being private, is therefore variable with the individuals who hear the sentence spoken. In this privacy and variability, the intuitions evoked by a sentence are similar to the impressions of a state of affairs that different individuals may get upon seeing an inferential sign. In this respect, then, interpreting the meaning of a sentence is similar to interpreting the meaning of an inferential sign (*liṅga*). But from the perspective of the individual who hears a sentence, the intuition that arises in his mind is immediate and simple, and in this respect it is like an object of sensation. But no matter how one looks at verbal communication, it is in no way outside the range of sensation and inference.

50 (H63-65; K169; VP83a-84a; VD77b-78a) All of the above observations that have been made about linguistic meaning are true of general terms, but it may not be so obvious that they are also true of singular terms that apply to and name unique individuals. But in fact a so-called "individual" is in fact a collection (*samudāya*) of parts in much

the same way that a class is a collection of individuals. There is no difference at all in principle between a general term (*jātiśabda*) and a term for a collection (*samudāyaśabda*). There are, then, no parts of speech to which the observations about general terms do not also apply. All parts of speech signify concepts rather than realities that exist independent of thought. In this respect, the interpretation of verbal signs is indistinguishable in principle from the interpretation of any other kind of inferential sign. Therefore, the Brahmanical contention, that speech is a means of acquiring knowledge that is independent of and superior to both perception and inference, is false. Rather, the Buddhist contention, that the only two means of acquiring knowledge are sensation and inference, is true.

113.6.Futile Rejoinder (*jāti*)

Summary by Shoryu Katsura

Chapter Six consists of two sections, one in which Dignāga expounds his own theory of futile rejoinders, and the other in which he criticizes the theory of the *Vādavidhi*. The former has been thoroughly studied by Kitagawa (*Indo Koten Ronrigaku no Kenkyū*, pp. 282-351). The latter has been analyzed by Erich Frauwallner in his article "Vasubandhu's Vādavidhiḥ", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 1, 1957, pp. 104-146.

According to Dignāga there are two kinds of *pramāṇa*s (viz. perception and inference) and two kinds of fallacies (*pramāṇābhāsa*), viz. fallacious perception and fallacious inference. Inference for others (*parārthānumāna*) is traditionally called "proof" (*sādhana*) and consists of three members, viz. thesis (*pakṣa*), reason (*hetu*) and example (*dṛṣṭānta*); there is also a fallacious proof (*sādhanābhāsa*) which contains such fallacies as fallacious thesis, fallacy of the reason and fallacious example.

1-2 (K169b; VP84a; VD78b) There is a disproof (*dūṣaṇa*) which points out such fallacies (e.g., the lack (*nyūnatā*) of any of the three characteristics (*trairūpya*) of a valid reason;[146] in short, fallacy of the reason) in a proof of the opponent, so that the latter should be rejected as a fallacious proof. There is also a fallacious disproof (*dūṣaṇābhāsa*) which wrongly points out such a fallacy in a proof of the opponent.

Fallacious disproof is called "futile rejoinder" (*jāti*).

Dignāga examines the following fourteen types of futile rejoinders; 1. *prāpty-aprāpti-sama*, 2. *ahetusama*, 3. *nityasama*, 4. **anuktisama*, 5. *anutpattisama*, 6. *kāryasama*, 7. *sādharmyasama*, 8. *vaidharmyasama*, 9. *vikalpasama*, 10. *aviśeṣasama*, 11. *upalabdhisama*, 12. *saṁśayasama*, 13. *arthāpattisama* and 14. *prasaṅgasama*.[147]

3-4a (K170a; VP84b; VD78b) Futile rejoinders called *prāptyaprāptisama* and *ahetusama* are fallacious disproofs which wrongly claim that a proper reason is missing in the opponent's proof. For example, when one argues that speech (*śabda*) is not eternal because it is produced by a human effort like so-and-so the opponent criticizes the given reason by claiming that it cannot prove what is to be proved whether or not it reaches the latter. If the reason reaches what is to be proved, it will become indistinguishable from the latter just like the river flows into the ocean, and if it does not reach what is to be proved, it will become indistinguishable from what is not the reason. Such an objection is a futile rejoinder called *prāptyaprātisama*.

Dignāga identifies such an objection as a fallacious disproof which wrongly finds a fallacy of incomplete reason where there is none. According to him, it is also self-destructive because the same argument applied to the proof by the above disproof, though unreasonable, can be equally applied to the disproof itself. It may be interpreted as a fallacious disproof which wrongly claims there to be a fallacy of an unproved (*asiddha*) reason.

4bd (K170b; VP85a; VD79a) The futile rejoinder called *nityasama* is a fallacious disproof which wrongly finds a fallacy of the thesis (*pakṣadoṣa*).

5 (K171a; VP85b; VD79b) The futile rejoinder called **anuktisama* is that which wrongly imputes fallacies of unproved reason, incomplete reason and/or incomplete example.

6 (K171b; VP86a; VD79b) The futile rejoinder called *anutpattisama* is that which wrongly claims to discover a fallacy of unproved reason or equivocal reason (*anaikāntika*).

7 (K171bl VP86a; VD80a) The futile rejoinder called *kāryasama* is that which wrongly points to a fallacy of unproved reason, contradictory reason (*viruddha*) or doubtful reason as well as a fallacy of an example (*dṛṣṭāntadoṣa*).

8-11 (K mising; VP86a; VD80a) Futile rejoinders called *sādharmyasama* and *vaidharmyasama* are those which wrongly interpret

the similar example and the dissimilar example respectively. They both wrongly identify the fallacy of a common-and-equivocal-reason (*sādhāraṇānaikāntika*) or an incompatible-but-nonequivocal-reason (*viruddhānaikāntika*) as well as the fallacy of an example. In order to avoid those futile rejoinders one should state the pervasion in one's proof.

12-13a_1 (K171b; VP87a; VD81a) The futile rejoinder called *vikalpasama* is one which incorrectly finds a fallacy of equivocal reason.

13a_2-14 (K172a; VP87b; VD81a) The futile rejoinder called *aviśeṣasama* is one which wrongly discovers a fallacy of doubtful reason, unproved reason or contradictory reason.

15 (K172b; VP88b; VD82a) The last four types of futile rejoinders can become proper proofs or disproofs provided that the arguments they criticize contain real logical fallacies.

16-17 (K173a; VP89a; VD82a) The futile rejoinder called *upalabdhisama* is one which incorrectly alleges the fallacy of a doubtful reason or of unproved reason.

18 (K173b; VP89b; VD82b) The futile rejoinder called *arthāpattisama* is one which wrongly points out the fallacy of a doubtful reason.

19 (K174a; VP90a; VD83a) The futile rejoinder caled *prasaṅgasama* is one which wrongly identifies the fallacy in a fallacious example.

20a-c (K174b; VP90b; VD83b) Those are only a part of innumerable types of futile rejoinders. In this connection Dignāga refers to *utkarṣasama* and *apakarṣasama* which are included in the list of twenty-four types of futile rejoinders in the *Nyāyasūtra*s.

21 (K174b; VP90b; VD83b) Criticism of the *Vādavidhi* theory of Futile Rejoinders.

22 (K176b; VP92b; VD85a) Final words on futile rejoinders of other schools.

23-25 (K176b; VP92b; VD85a) Concluding Remarks to the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*,

114.DIGNĀGA, *Upādāyaprajñaptiprakaraṇa*

Hidenori Kitagawa, whose article on this work we use as the basis for our summary, identifies this work only by its Chinese title, *Ch'ü-yin-chia-she-lun*. It is available in I-tsing's translation (T. 1622). The article also contains as an Appendix a full translation of the commentary on Verse 10, not reproduced here.

Summary by Hidenori Kitagawa[148]

"The *Ch'ü-yin-chia-she-lun* is...a very brief work--a work consisting of only 13 stanzas--but fortunately it has been translated into Chinese together with a commentary (probably by Dignāga, according to Kitagawa) with the help of which the meaning of the stanzas may be better understood....

Two problems are discussed in the *Ch'ü-yin-chia-she-lun*. One concerns the structure of the world as conceived by religiously unenlightened people, and the other the peculiar mannerisms of the Buddha's preaching. But these two problems are so closely interrelated that they should not be discussed separately. The introductory part of the commentary placed in front of the first stanza explains the relation between these problems. The following is an abridged translation of that part of the commentary:--

When the Buddha outlined the Religious Truth, he assumed the existence of matter for the sake of convenience and referred to it. He needed material on which to demonstrate that one-sided definitions in terms of identity, non-identity, or non-existence are inadequate when one is not concerned with real entities such as the elements of the universe. This is the Buddha's method when preaching to unenlightened people. Those entia, whose existence is assumed by the Buddha for the sake of convenience not just fictitiously but in dependence on realities, are classifed in three categories: wholes, continuants and aspects. An example of a whole is a body, which is a conglomeration of hands, feet, etc. An example of a continuant is the life of a human being, which is a series of physical and psychical developments from the very earliest stage of the embryo onwards. In other words, a continuant is a unity conceived in terms of time while a whole is a unity conceived in terms of space. As against these two kinds of entia, aspects are explained as stages or characteristics of a thing conceived either in terms of time or space. For example, the states arising into existence, holding it, and falling off it, and characteristics such as non-durability, perceptibility, impenetrability, being the outgrowth of past deeds etc. are aspects of the material elements. The Buddha assumed the existence of these three kinds of entia because his preaching had to conform with the structure of the world as conceived by unenlightened people. However, since the existence of these entia is assumed--though unenlightened people are not aware of that fact--they cannot be spoken of in terms of identity and nonidentity. Neither can

their existence be denied completely; for, although it is true that their existence is only an assumed one, it is assumed not just wrongly but in dependence on realities. The Buddha, knowing these conditons, never talked of the three kinds of entia in terms of identity, non-identity or absolute non-existence; he referred to them when he preached to unenlightened people by pedagogical devices, i.e. without setting forth his ultimate point of view.

Then the question may arise: "What is wrong in speaking of those entia in terms of identity, non-identity or non-existence?" Stanzas 1-8 answer the first two alternatives. Stanzas 1-4 are concerned with the logical contradictions that will result from speaking of a whole and its parts in terms of identity and non-identity. Stanza 5 deals with a supplementary question, the question of the atoms; thus the possibility of assuming the existence of atoms as real entities is denied. The contradictions that will arise from speaking of a continuant and its successive members in terms of identity and non-identity are discussed in Stanzas 6-7. Stanza 8 points out the logical errors which will take place when we speak of aspects and their substratum in terms of identity and non-identity. However, the arguments employed in these stanzas are not very original. They are of a kind of conventional Mādhyamika dialectics. Examples are shown below:

Stanza 1: "If (a whole) were identical (with its parts, each of the component parts) would be of the same entity (as the whole, and, therefore,) a part would be identical with another part (of the same whole. For example, a hand would be a foot). Or, (if you say, 'Indeed, a whole is nothing more than its parts, but each of the component parts must be allowed to) be of different entity than the whole,' (another contradiction) will result in that a (single) whole has many *svabhāva*s (independent natures)."

Or,

Stanzas 6-7, line 2: "If a continuant were identical with (each of its successive members, a person--who is one example of a continuant--) would have lost his whole being and existence when he left his babyhood behind and, after gradual growth, achieved boyhood; (therefore, a continuant) cannot be identical with (its successive members). If you say that he should not have lost (his whole being and existence even when he achieved boyhood,) then (you must concede the complete) mixing (of babyhood and boyhood). If, (on the contrary,) a continuant (and its successive members) were not identical, (a person whose) body (at the

present moment) is suffering (from a disease,) would make medical efforts in vain...."

Or, one more example:

Stanza 8: "Through the aspects such as 'being the outgrowth (of past deeds)', etc. we grasp their substratum and give it a name. (Therefore,) the substratum would have no existence if it were not identical with the aspects. The contradictions, (on the other hand) that result from the identity (of the aspects and their substratum can easily) be pointed out in the same way as in the previous (stanzas, where the contradictions of the identity of a whole with its parts etc. were dealt with)."

Throughout these arguments it is presumed that the existing matter in the strict sense of the word is capable of being spoken of in terms of identity or non-identity. Therefore, the contradictions pointed out by these arguments actually imply the non-existence of the three kinds of entia--wholes, continuants and aspects. The denial of the existence of these entia, however, is not the ultimate intention of the *Ch'ü-yin-chia-she-lun*: for Stanza 9, which is concerned with the criticism of the last alternative in question, namely the criticism of speaking of these entia in terms of absolute nonexistence, runs as follows:

Stanza 9: "If you do not admit of the existence of a body, (the following will be concluded: Buddha,) the holder of the right view, should have preached (for example, the four methods of contemplation) in vain: moreover, there should be no person accused of holding nihilistic views of the universe and there should no distinctions in our deeds (with regard to their religious merits)."

Thus, the denial of the existence of three kinds of entia, which is implied by the contradictions pointed out in Stanzas 1-8, is protested against by Stanza 9. The reconciliation of these two opposite claims, however, is proposed in Stanza 10 by the theory of *vijñaptimātratā,* i.e. the theory that the world of the unenlightened people is nothing but a construction of their mind. It may easily be understood that such an idealistic theory as the theory of *vijñaptimātratā* can offer the ground on which to base the unreality of the three kinds of entia; but how can it be the basis for their reality as well? The point is as follows:

That the whole world is a construction of the mind does not necessarily mean the absolute non-existence of all entia in all senses. For, to say that the world is a construction of the mind is only to say that everything is of assumed existence; but by no means does it nullify the distinctions between the two groups of entia, those whose existence is

assumed just wrongly and those whose existence is assumed in dependence on realities. Since the three kinds of entia with which we are concerned belong to the latter group, they should be allowed to have some kind of reality while those belonging to the former group can never have reality. Thus by the theory of *vijñaptimātratā* the ground is prepared for the reconciliation of the seemingly incompatible claims; accordingly, the three kinds of entia which are unreal in that their existence is assumed by the mind, these same entia are real in that their existence is assumed in dependence on realities.

Then what are the realities on which the existence of these entia is based? The analysis of the statements of the commentary on Stanza 10 will lead to the conclusion that the realities are the elements of the universe. In other words, the elements of the visible, the audible etc., as traditionally accepted in Buddhist scholasticism, are the realities on which the existence of the three kinds of entia is based. The manner of the argument of Stanza 11 gives support to this conclusion. Stanza 11 supplements Stanza 10 in that it denies the idea of true reality to the three kinds of entia although it grants them relative reality. The argument it employs for the denial of the true reality of the three kinds of entia is based on the ground that none of these entia can properly be placed either in the category of the *saṁskṛta* nor in that of the *asaṁskṛta*. Since it is the tradition of Buddhist scholasticism to classify all the elements of the universe into these two categories, the true reality of the elements of the universe has been presumed in order that the true reality of the three kinds of entia can be denied on such grounds. Thus the conclusion which we have reached from the analysis of the statements of the commentary on Stanza 10, namely that the elements of the universe such as the element of the visible, the audible etc. are the realities on which the existence of the three kinds of entities are assumed, is backed by the fact that the true reality of the elements of the universe is presumed in the argument of Stanza 11.

By the support of Stanza 11 the reconciliation proposed by Stanza 10 is now confirmed. As to the structure of the unenlightened people's world, the ultimate intention of the *Chü-yin-cha-she-lun* seems to be to propound a theory that may be interpreted as follows:

The elements of the universe are something like the thing-in-itself (Ding-an-sich) in Kantian philosophy, and the classification of the assumed existence into three kinds of entia like his theory of the twelve categories of understanding. Thus, the world of the unenlightened people

which is the equivalent to the phenomenal world of Kant, is constructed on the elements of the universe, taking the forms of the whole, the continuant and the aspect. But here the analogy ends. For, according to Kant, the Ding-an-sich is utterly beyond the faculty of our cognition and, therefore, nothing can be said about it pro or con, while, according to the *Ch'ü-yin-cha-she-lun* the elements of the universe are truly capable of being the objects of designation and, therefore, can be spoken of in terms of identity and non-identity. Why is it then that only the elements of the universe are truly capable of being the objects of designation? The reason is that they are real in the strict sense of the word and, therefore, are in possession of the real *svabhāva*s (=independent natures). Those entia, on the other hand, whose existence is merely assumed by mind through the categories of the three kinds of entia, have no real *svabhāva*s, and therefore cannot be spoken of either in terms of identity or non-identity.

The structure of the religiously unenlightened people's world having been thus explained, Stanza 12 proceeds to the problem of the peculiar mannerisms of the Buddha's preaching. It reads as follows:

Stanza 12: "Since (Buddha,) the Holy One, wanted to root out the spiritual defilemements (of the ordinary people who were not familiar with metaphysical thinking), he adapted himself to (the situation and referred only to) those entia that existed within the ranges of their (meagre) understanding; therefore, he never talked of those entia in terms of identity and non-identity. It was thus that he preached by pedagogical devices and converted the people (into the pathway of the Religious Truth)."

...Stanza 13, the last Stanza, is written only to encourage the people to practise religious discipline."

115.DIGNĀGA, *Traikālyaparīkṣā*

Translated into German by Frauwallner in Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunder Süd und Ostasiens 3, pp. 109-113. It is a report or translation of a section of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya.*

116.DIGNĀGA, *Sāmānyalakṣaṇaparīkṣā*

This work is apparently lost.

117.DIGNĀGA, *Nyāyaparīkṣā*

Also lost.

118. AUTHOR UNKNOWN (ascribed to Nāgārjuna) *Rājaparikathāratnamālāsūtra* (510)[149]

K.617 = T.1656 = N.1253, translated by Paramārtha at Chih-chih Monastery around 557-559 (not noted in Bagchi). It is available in English translation in The Wisdom of Tibet Series Nos. 1-2 (London 1975), pp. 111-187. The translation, from Tibetan, is by Jeffrey Hopkins "based on an oral tranmission and explanation of the text received from His Holiness Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, in Dharamsala, India in May of 1972." There is also a "guide" to the work by Gyel-tsap, a disciple of Tsong-ka-pa, translated in the same volume with the translation, pp. 188-203. Since the translation doesn't indicate which Buddhist terms (in any Buddhist language) are being translated by which English terms we refrain from attempting to summarize the work on the basis provided there.

119. TRIRATNADĀSA, *Vivaraṇa* on Dignāga's *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha* (510?)

Guiseppe Tucci writes: "Triratnadāsa is well known to the Tibetan tradition: according to Tāranātha he was a pupil of Vasubandhu and a friend of Diṅnāga, who commented on one of his works. Some Tibetan authorities were inclined to identify him with Āryaśūra, though there is no support for such a view.[150] His commentary exists in Chinese (Taisho, no. 1517) as well as in Tibetan (mDo agrel, xiv, no. 3."[151] T.1517 = K.1459 = N.1310; the translation is by Dānapāla in 1011.

120.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Vidyānirdeśaśāstra* (515)

K.611 = N.1217 = T.1587 = Bagchi, p. 426 (28), translated by Paramārtha in 557-569. 15 leaves.

121.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Vidyāpravartanaśāstra* (515)

N.1214, translated by Paramārtha in 557-569. 8 leaves.

122.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Vidyāmātṛsiddhi* (515)

Another of Paramārtha's later translations, being N.1239.

123.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Tryalakṣaṇaśāstra* (515)

K.622 = T.1617 = N.1219, translated by Paramārtha in 557-569.

124.JINA, *Anākaracintārajas* (?) (515)

Another work translated by Paramārtha, this is N. 1172. We know nothing about the author Jina. The work is characterized by Nanjio as "*Śāstra* on the dust of shapeless thought".

125.JINA (?), *Muṣṭiprakaraṇaśāstra* (515)

A work in three chapters, comprising N. 1255 translated by Paramārtha and attributed to the mysterious Jina.

126.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, "Life of Vasubandhu" (515)

K.1038 = T.2049 = N.1463 = Bagchi, p. 428 (43), translation by Paramārtha. This has been translated into English by M. Takakusu in T'oung Pao 1904, pp. 269-296.

127.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Buddhābhidharmasūtra* (515)

K.938 = T.1482 = N.1107 = Bagchi, p. 437 (36), translated by Paramārtha.

128.VASUVARMAN, *Catursatyaśāstra* (515)

K.974 = T.1647 = N.1261, translated by Paramārtha. We know nothing of Vasuvarman, and this is the only work attributed to him.

129. MAHĀNĀMA, *Saddhammappakāsinī* on the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (520)

The author mentions his name as "Mahānāma..who lived in the Mahāvihāra in a *pariuveṇa* donated by a minister", and gives his date as

"when king Moggalāna was dead for three years".[152]

"The commentary begins with the statement that Sāriputta explained the *Dhammacakkapavattanasutta* by composing the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, thus indicating the main theme of the attainment of enlightenment by understanding the four truths. It continues by seeking to present the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* as a systematic and orderly exposition of the way to *arahant*-ship, with each topic leading necessarily to the next. This is done by supplying lengthy expositions in the commentary to smooth out the rough statements and extend them with elaborations."[153]

130. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Pītaputrasamāgamasūtra* (?) (520)

This work is translated by Narendrayaśas in 568, and is identified in K.22 (16) = T.310 (16) = N.23 (16). However, Bagchi, p. 270 (1) reports that at least one Chinese authority denies that what Narendrayaśas has translated is T.310 (16).

131. VIṆĪTABHADRA, *Bhāṣya* on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośakārikās* (520?)

Summary by Christian Lindtner

The original Sanskrit is lost; what survives is the Tibetan translation (Peking/Tokyo Tibetan Tripitaka text no. 5592), volume 115, p. 282 to Volume 116, p. 43. This is a simple rehash of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, which shortens Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika objections to the Vaibhāṣika system, and, aside from the invocatory verses, adds absolutely nothing new.[1]

132. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Mahāyānābhisamayasūtra* (520)

K.151 = T.673 = N.195 = Bagchi, p. 274 (2). The translator is

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1. Marek Mejor, op. cit., pp. 29-38 discusses the attribution of this work to Saṁghabhadra in the Tibetan tradition, and concludes that it may indeed perhaps be a version of Saṁghabhadra's *Samayapradīpikā*.

Jinayaśas, on whom see Bagchi, pp. 274-275, who rejects the translation of this author's name by Nanjio as "Jñānayaśas". He was the teacher of Yaśogupta and Jñānagupta, and translated six works during 564-572.

ASVABHĀVA (520?)

Asvabhāva's commentary on the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra* seems to have been known to Sthiramati, a sixth century author (see below), and his commentary on the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* was known to Dharmapāla of about the same period.

133.ASVABHĀVA, *Upanibandha* on Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* (520?)

Volume One (Bibliography) of this Encyclopedia, Third Edition, p. 215, wrongly indicates this work has been translated by Lamotte. It has not been translated at all to the best of our knowledge.

134.ASVABHĀVA, *Ṭīkā* on Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra* (520?)

Noriaki Hakamaya has studied this work in two articles.[154] It exists only in Tibetan (Peking 5530). Hakamaya is mainly interested in the relation of this work, and its author's date, to Sthiramati's commentary on the MSA, and his study is confined to only a few verses (viz., IX.56-76 and XIV.34-35).

135.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Ekādaśamukhahṛdayasūtra* (525)

K.309 =T.1070 = N.327 = Bagchi, p. 276 (3) was translated by Yaśogupta into Chinese for the first time some time between 561 and 578. See Bagchi for information about Yaśogupta.

KAMBALA (525)

Christian Lindtner has discussed the dating of this author (in *Miscellanea Buddhica* (Indiske Studier 5) (Copenhagen 1985), pp. 114-115. He comes to the conclusion that Kambala flourished in the period

between 450 and 525 A.D. Sukumar Dutt (*Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India*, London 1962, p. 291) reports that Kambala is said by Hsüan-tsang to be a man of South India who settled finally at Valabhī with Sthiramati.

136. KAMBALA, *Ālokmālā* (525)

Summary by Christian Lindtner

This is a didactic poem on mind-only (*cittamātratā*) in 282 verses, composed by Kambala (ca. 450-525 A.D.). It may well have been the last *śāstra* of its kind to have been written in India before Mahāyāna philosophy was "officially" split into two "schools": Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. For Kambala, the old masters Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, etc., simply represent Mahāyāna. A few decades after the *Ālokamālā* was composed Bhavya (ca. 490-570) launched his critique of Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, etc., and thus created a schism which subsequent generations did their best either to enhance, or, more frequently, to "resynthesize."

We can trace the influence of Kambala in Bhavya, Dharmakīrti and many later authors, especially some of those belonging to a Tantric tradition.

There is an old Indian commentary (*Ṭīkā*) ascribed to *Asvabhāva who may have been almost a contemporary of Kambala. From a philosophical point of view it hardly has more to offer than AM itself and does, therefore, not call for a separate summary.[155] The summary of AM is based on the first edition of the text (with the Tibetan translation) published by me with an annotated English version in *Miscellanea Buddhica* (Copenhagen 1985), pp. 109-221.

1-3. The Buddha is to be praised for having taught that everything is but mind, a fact that can only be realized by development of the three natures, the abolition of ignorance. If one realizes the expanded world (*prapañca*) to be mere mind one is not reborn any more and therefore an intelligent person will meditate on the three natures so as to obtain the liberating insight.

4-9. *Saṁsāra* is a mind beset by defilements. These defilements are due to conceptual thought and therefore a sensible person will avoid any

kind of conceptual thinking. It is not really *what* we think, but the fact *that* we think that prevents us from becoming free. Conceptual thinking creates the world, which is, therefore, an error.

10-14. It is extremely difficult to achieve that state of mind, or liberation, where subject and object have vanished. Only the Buddhas know it from personal experience. Though, in a way, it is all quite simple, the rest of us can only try our best to come that far.

15-17. Nevertheless phenomena such as dreams and illusions are very helpful analogies for getting an idea of what everything is really like.

18-26. It all comes about as a result of ignorance. The sun, the moon, the sky - all are manifestations of mind and as long as our karmic traces are still active, duality will prevail.

27. In the perfected state there is no subject inside, no object outside.

28-35. This means that emotions and all other psychological phenomena are as unreal as the external ones, and therefore one can say, somewhat paradoxically, that absence of pleasure is really not much better than pleasure.

36-43. Obviously, therefore, there is no such thing as "objective truth." Consequently, the ultimate criterion of truth is (psychological) usefulness, and nothing is as useful for what really matters, namely freedom from ignorance, as the teachings of Mahāyāna.

44-52. We all agree that liberation is the ultimate goal and that this can only be achieved by understanding the true nature of things. According to Mahāyāna everything arises from the trace-seeds stocked in the storehouse consciousness. One cannot rationally explain how duality comes about, but it does, in the same way as a sound and its echo.

53-55. As said, only the Buddha really understands the nature of mind.

56-60. What we can do is to practise spiritual cultivation which has the power of transforming e.g. poison into elixir of life.

61-76. The practice of cultivation, however, presupposes a rationally founded philosophy of the world. Therefore the author provides a long list of arguments to the effect that we can only explain everyday phenomena on the assumption that they are really only mind. For instance, the power of a magnet to attract metal is due to its mental power.

77-96. The truth is, to be sure, that the organs and objects of our senses are created by the traces stocked in the storehouse consciousness.

The duality is unreal, due to ignorance. The doctrine of mind-only is an excellent hypothesis for explaining numerous phenomena that would otherwise be difficult to account for. Another positive effect of this doctrine is that when one sees that the world is but a reflection of mind, one will develop a laudable moral behaviour, for "When mind takes the form of a woman, which bashful lover will by himself love himself!".

97-103. The Mahāyāna doctrine of mind-only also explains why different beings experience different things even under the same circumstances. This is due to the variety of their karma. In a strange way "the variety of the sense objects at the same time in various ways follows a conceptual scheme, just like the symphony of an orchestra."

104-111. One cannot argue that the external world must be real because it "works" in a purposeful and efficient manner. It is a matter of common experience that ideas are often no less powerful than "things." "Objects" are no more than wrongly interpreted experiences, sheer ignorance.

112-116. When a yogi understands--and this is a wonderful experience--that the triple world is simply a creation of karma, he has abandoned fear and all kinds of defilements.

117-125. "But what is the point of wasting many a word? If one practises cultivation one may even see horns growing on the head of a dog, a rabbit, or a horse!" After all these arguments to the effect that everything is only mind the important thing is now to change one's entire personality by getting used to the idea. It is spiritual cultivation that accounts for how we experience things and what we take to be real. Half an hour's separation from the woman you love seems to last a hundred years.

126. An enlightened person does not discard the world of Buddhist practise, he just looks upon it as an illusion.

126-142ab. In order to enter a state of freedom, tantamount to emptiness or undivided consciousness, one must contemplate the three natures by means of practice, which thus serves as a sort of meditative self-psychotherapy based on knowledge and rational understanding of Buddhist tradition. - The three natures are, we would say, but three different degrees, or modes, of understanding of the same "thing", they are neither absolutely the same, nor absolutely different. Things are usually understood in terms of language, names, etc. This is the dual constructed nature. This is, as arguments have demonstrated, unreal. Things are not what they first appear to be. Since, however, the

constructed has its basis in mind, i.e., in the dependent nature, our task is clearly to see the absence of the former in the latter. The former is unreal, the latter real. This is emptiness or the perfected nature. One can, therefore, only enter emptiness, which is simply absence of the constructed nature in the dependent nature, through a personal experience of the three natures. The presence of construction is due to the activity of traces and can only be overcome by cognition. "The dependent nature shines clearly when the constructed (imagined) object is in a state of cessation," and "When (the dependent nature) has gradually eliminated the appearance of (the constructed nature), emptiness shines anew in one's mind, sustaining, so to speak, the (dependent nature)." From time without beginning there is a strong tendency to duality that can only be abolished when emptiness is finally established, i.e., in Buddhahood.

142cd-165. The concept of emptiness has nothing to do with nihilism, because negation and affirmation, existence and nonexistence, are interdependent conceptual constructions only operating on a relative level of truth. The same goes for language and the "objects" referred to. They are mutually dependent, which means that language has no bearing upon absolute reality. Language is, so to say, talking to itself. Perception and inference are valid in a relative sense, the former provides direct knowledge, the latter indirect. But they have nothing to do with reality beyond duality.

166-169. Philosophers must understand the (three) natures, viz., the constructed, etc., in due order: The object "elephant," its appearance and its absence based on one single elephant created by a magician (are respectively) being empty of objective status, having objective appearance and being the basis of belief in an external thing which is false. To a yogi considering the three natures thus together, the belief in an external object is the first to cease while mind appears before him having that image of the dependent nature. Later on, in the eighth stage, the impurity of the dependent image, being without residues, disappears by seeing the nonexistence of that thing (i.e., of a dependent essence).

170-200. In the perfected state one "is unmanifest, desireless and motionless like a portrait." From the ultimate point of view all the Buddhist teachings belong to the realm of conventional reality. Those who have lapsed into conceptual constructions are under the law of karma and rebirth. The world of common experience is abolished in emptiness. "When the yogi thus sees the triple world consumed by the fire of emptiness he does not desire anything, even if he traverses *saṁsāra*.

When he abides in emptiness he is not subject to the slightest application, behaviour, discrimination or sphere of action." The yogi who has realized emptiness is beyond suffering and desire.

201-202. When he has taken up position in the immovable he is in possession of unlimited power. We should all strive to reach this state without fear.

203-245ab. Meditation is extremely important and even a householder is advised to meditate "on the three natures of phenomena whenever he has a moment's leisure." He should become familiar with the idea that things are not what they appear to be. The constructed nature is like a dream. Gradually the dependent nature becomes free from conceptual constructions and the practitioner abides in the perfected nature. When he understands that the constructed is unreal he should be careful not to think that it does not exist, emptiness being beyond duality. "A yogi enters (the state of pure) mind without touching the two 'flanks', just as a demon (enters his) abode through a door besmeared with magic plaster." He then has a vivid experience of the illusory nature of the world. The experience of the absence of the unreal in the real, i.e., in the dependent nature which is his own mind, is at the same time a "mystical" experience of the perfected nature as being "without parts, without beginning and end, without appearance and without apprehension; without agitation, without labour, neither long nor round, spotless like space where darkness has been dispelled by the sun."

245cd. Again the author is careful to underscore that "The visible world is only acceptable in a conventional sense, not in the absolute sense."

246-250. Speaking of the two truths means the presence of construction, the dependent nature the absence of constructions. The absolute is beyond words, but words are nevertheless indispensable for teaching and converting those who are generally attached to the world and their conceptual ideas about it.

251-282. Kambala concludes his work by extolling all the marvellous benefits and merits to be derived from adhering to Mahāyāna and finally realizing emptiness, omniscience, etc. "I have composed the *Ālokamālā* to dispel the darkness of ignorance for those who are heading the wrong way. It abolishes the belief in the reality (of object and subject); it destroys the desire for sense objects; it engenders the light (of cognition) in the mind (of a Bodhisattva) as clearly as a big lamp. By creating the light of cognition the absolute truth even rests in one's hand, so to speak.

Placed in (one's mental) continuum the perfection of wisdom (incorporated in this treatise) always (fulfills every wish), like a magical thought-gem."[1]

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[1]Considered from a somewhat modern point of view we can distinguish the following main formative elements in Kambala's exposition of Mahāyāna. The *religious* element is the first and also the most basic. One starts by accepting, with faith and devotion, the corpus of Buddhist tradition, probably from one's personal *guru* and as a member of the order. This is *āgama*. Reason may have some role to play, but the decision to follow one religion rather than another is based largely on factors beyond reason, such as environment, etc. Then *philosophy* comes in as the handmaiden of religion. One's knowledge of tradition is worthless if not supported by arguments. Epistemology, logic, and dialectics serve to clarify and defend one's own beliefs. When one has come that far a *psychological* element plays the major role. In Sanskrit it can be expressed in one word, "(spiritual) practice" (*bhāvanā*). There is no single word in any western language to cover all the shades of meaning of this term, for the simple reason that it is a "make-become" of what tradition and reason have persuaded us to believe to be true and real, though we ourselves are still far from experiencing it as such. It has to do with meditation, sure, but also with creating a new world infinitely more real and rewarding than the one(s) we are used to. If we are to follow Kambala and his fellow Buddhists, *bhāvanā* has the wonderful power to bring us into a state where the old world is experienced as an illusion and a new one unfolds itself as omnipotence, omniscience and ineffable satisfaction. We are, in other words, dealing neither with philosophy nor even religion, but with phenomena belonging to that branch of modern psychology which deals with "altered states of consciousness." It can hardly be denied that the description of the accomplished yogi and the methods employed to attain fulfilment coincide with observations made by modern psychology in the study of dreams, hypnosis and the effects of various intoxicants (hallucination, psychedelic experiences, etc.).

137.KAMBALA, *Navaśloka* or *Piṇḍārtha* on the *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* (525)

Summary by Christian Lindtner

This text consists of nine verses ascribed to Kambala. There is no reason to doubt that it is by the same author as *Ālokamālā* when one compares the two texts carefully. Being a summary of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* recension of the *Prajñāpāramitā* it belongs to the same literary genre as the *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha* of Dignāga, a work to which *Ālokamālā* has some allusions. Indeed the *nava*, "nine" or "new", in the title not only refers to the rather odd number of verses (really 10) but may well allude to Dignāga's summary. The Sanskrit text is edited with two Tibetan and one Chinese version by G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts* (Roma 1956), pp. 209-231, and translated there (our "T"). There is also a commentary (*Ṭīkā*) to our text. It is quite elementary and contains nothing of independent philosophical interest. I incorporate it occasionally in the summary of the verses, in themselves quite condensed.

1 (T226) Rebirth, or individual existence, can, from a relative point of view, be defined as the six internal, or personal *āyatana*s, i.e., the five senses and mind. They are all created by the power of karma and can, from the absolute point of view, be compared to a reflected image.

2 (T226) To the six internal senses correspond the six external ones, i.e., material form and the remaining objects of sense. The material world is also created by the power of karma and therefore, from the absolute point of view, comparable to a town created by the power of magic.

3 (T227) The second external sense, sound, is similar to an echo. This applies even to the words that communicate the Dharma.

4 (T227) Also, the other objects of sense, viz., smell, taste, and touch, can be compared to a dream.

5 (T227) Since, as said, the internal as well as the external senses do not exist from the absolute point of view, one can compare the individual body that acts without a soul "inside" to a puppet moved by the magic contrivance of karma.

6 (T227) What about the objects of mind, the factors? From a relative point of view, it is true, they are momentary, but from the absolute point of view they are deprived of individual nature, like a

mirage.

7 (T228).What is cognized or grasped, then, is not an external object, but only a reflection of mind. Since time without beginning mind has been appearing as a duality of grasping subject and grasped objects, the two constantly reflecting and mutually influencing one another.

8-9 (T228-229) Even the experience in deep meditation as well as a yogi's cognition of the mind of other beings (see *Ālokamālā* 110) cannot be said to have something real as its object. This, then, means that all the acts and "objects" of cognition are empty like space..

A person who considers things in this way and in addition has a strong wish to obtain realization will finally (i.e., by means of spiritual cultivation (see the preceding summary of *Ālokamālā*) experience the highest knowledge, i.e., a nondual cognition, or *prajñāpāramitā*.

138.KAMBALA, *Abhisamayapañjikā* (525)[156]

139.KAMBALA, *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* (525)[157]

140.KAMBALA, *Saptaślokībhagavatīprajñāpāramitāsūtra* (525)[158]

141.KAMBALA, *Tattvaprabhāṣākaraṇadīpa* (525)[159]

142.DHARMADĀSA (530)

A Vijñānavādin, he taught Dharmapāla, according to Tāranātha. Candrakīrti in his *Catuḥśatakavṛtti* speaks of examples set forth by Dharmadāsa, suggesting Dharmadāsa may have commented on or at least studied Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka*.

143. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Suvikrāntavikrāmiparipṛcchāsūtra* (530?)

Suvikrāntavikrāmiparipṛcchāsūtra

This *sūtra* is quoted by Bhavya as well as by Candrakīrti.

Bibliographical information will be found in Volume One, Part One of the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, the *Bibliography*, pp. 237-238.

GUṆAMATI (530)

"Guṇamati originated from South India. In the beginning of the sixth century he moved from Nālandā to Valabhī and was a founder of the school in Valabhī. He was a teacher of Sthiramati. Tāranātha informs us that Guṇamati, having acquired many-sided knowledge, composed a commentary on the *Abhidharmakośa* and a commentary on the *Mūlamadhyamaka(-kārikā)*, in which he followed Sthiramati and refuted the arguments of Bhavya. Saṁpradūta, Bhavya's disciple, was defeated in a dispute by Guṇamati in the town Balapuri in the East."[160] The contradiction in the above passage, which speaks of Guṇamati as both teaching and following Sthiramati, is noted by Tom Tillemans (*Materials...*, op. cit., p. 57, note 123), who reports that Kajiyama and Ruegg take Guṇamati as Sthiramati's teacher, an opinion which leads us to the placement of him at this place in the chronology.

144. GUṆAMATI, *Lakṣānusāriṇīṭīkā* (530)

Summary by Stefan Anacker

This work is known only from a fragment, extant in Chinese translation (Taisho 1641), and by four references by Yaśomitra.

Taisho 1641 is an examination of the sixteen aspects (*ākāra*) of the Four Noble Truths, and corresponds to *Abhidharmakośa* VII, 13 ff. Guṇamati here says: The Vaibhāṣikas claim that there are actually sixteen aspects: four for the Truth of Frustration: "impermanent," "suffering," "empty," and "without a self"; four for the Truth of the Origination of Frustration: "cause," "origin," "successive causation" (*prabhava*) in the sense of forming a series, and "condition" in the sense of supplying a conditional complex (*sāmagrī*); four for the Truth of the Cessation of Frustration: "cessation," "calm," "excellent," and "leading to liberation" (*niḥsaraṇa*); four for the Truth of the Path: "the Path," "conformable to logic" (*nyāya*), "practise" (*pratipad*), and "relating to liberation" (*nairyāṇika*). But the *sūtra-upadeśa* teachers say there are only seven real aspects involved: the four the Vaibhāṣikas accept for the Truth of

Frustration are acknowledged by them, but they say that each of the others has only one real aspect. Vasubandhu follows the *sūtropadeśa* teachers, Guṇamati says.

Conditioned factors are without an intrinsic nature, Guṇamati says, because they do not arise of themselves. Having arising and destruction, they are impermanent.

The citations of Yaśomitra (in #190 below):

(1) Introductory verse. Guṇamati is simply mentioned, along with his pupil Vasumitra. His *Kośa* commentary has not survived.

(2) Introductory verse. Yaśomitra says that Guṇamati's interpretation of Vasubandhu's homage to the Buddha isn't correct (!).

(3) is the passage cited in the summary of Yaśomitra on I, 4, where Guṇamati claims that all factors may be taken as objects of consciousness for afflictions.

(4) occurs at III, 11: In commenting on the passage where Vasubandhu states that an intermediary existence between two lives does not really exist,[1] because the series retakes its course immediately after death in a new existence without any discontinuity, Yaśomitra states that Guṇamati and his pupil Vasumitra object to this passage "because their opinions have been influenced by their attachment to their own school of thought," but gives no details on what this difference of opinion actually is.

145.GUṆAMATI, *Ṭīkā* on Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti*

This is available in Tibetan as Tohoku 4061.

146.GUṆAMATI, *Ṭīkā* on Vasubandhu's *Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅganirdeśa*

This is available in Tibetan as Tohoku 3996.

[1]This undermines the rationale underlying the *Tibetan Book of the Dead*!

147.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Padmamukha-* or *Puṇḍarīkamukha- sūtra* (534)

Translated by Narendrayaśas in 584. K.420 = T.386 = N. 465, which describes its contents thus: "Buddha spoke this Sūtra just before he entered Nirvāṇa, in which he foretold that Lotus-face would in a future time break the bowl of Buddha."

148. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, "*Sūtra* on the good qualities of rare comparison" (536)

K.249 = T.690 = N. 268 = Bagchi, p. 454 (21), translation is by Jñānagupta.

149.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Dvādaśabuddhakasūtra* (537)

K.301 = N.335 = T.1348 = Bagchi, p. 454 (25), translated by Jñānagupta in 587. Nanjio describes the work as "*Sūtra* of the spiritual Mantra of the names of twelve Buddhas, which recounts their good qualities, removes obstacles, and destroys sin."

150.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Amoghapāśahṛdayasūtra* (537)

K.288 = T.1093 = N.312 = Bagchi, p. 454 (24). Translated by Jñānagupta in 587.

151. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Candrottarādhikārikāvyākaraṇasūtra* (540)

The work is translated into Chinese by Jñānagupta in 591. K.415 = T. 480 = N.441 = Bagchi, p. 452 (12). There is also a Tibetan translation. See *Encyclopedia of Buddhism* 3.4, 1977, 660-662 for an extended summary by Ratna Handurakande.

152. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Bhadrapālaśreṣṭhiparipṛcchāsūtra* (541)

K.22 (39) = T. 310 (39) = N. 23 (39) = Bagchi, p. 452 (14). Translated by Jñānagupta and others in 591.

153.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Mahādharmolkādhāraṇīsūtra* (544)

K.388 = T.1340 = N.422 = Bagchi, pp. 449-450 (2) in 20 fascicules. Translated by Jñānagupta in 594 (or 596) in collaboration with others. Cf. Bagchi, pp. 449-450 for details.

154.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Acintyaguṇasarvabuddhaparigrahasūtra* (544)

N. 412 = Bagchi, p. 450 (4). Translated by Jñānagupta and others in 594. See Bagchi, p. 450. It comprises 8 chapters.

155.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Pañcasahasrapañcaśatabuddhanāmasūtra* (544)

K.394 = T.443 = N. 408 Bagchi, p. 450 (5), translated by Jñānagupta and others in 594.

156. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Sarvadharmāvacārasūtra* (545)

K.405 =T.649 = N.424 = Bagchi, p. 451 (8), translated by Jñānagupta and others in 595.

157.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Mahāsannipātāvadānarājasūtra* (545)

K.73 = T.422 = N.78 = Bagchi, p. 452 (15), translated by Jñānagupta and others in 595.

158.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Mahābaladharmikadhāraṇīsūtra* (546)

K.389 = T. 1341 = N. 423 = Bagchi, p. 450 (3), translated by Jñānagupta and others in 596. A work of 20 chapters.

159.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, *Agrapradīpadhāraṇīvidyārājasūtra* (546)

K.350 = T.1354 = N.366 = Bagchi, pp. 456-457 (36), translated by Jinagupta around 596. Nanjio's description: "*Sūtra* on the spiritual *mantra*s of the Tathāgata Anuttaradīparāja who helps, protects and holds the world."

160.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, "*Sūtra* on the Bodhisattva Akiñcana" (546)

K.409 = T.485 = N.439 = Bagchi, p. 457 (37), translated by Jñānagupta around 596. Lancaster gives the Chinese title as *Wu so yu p'u sa ching*.

BHĀVAVIVEKA or BHAVYA (550)

J. Sitaramamma (in Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society 79, 1988, 385) has investigated traditions about this author's life. He finds that Bhavya was "born in a Kshatriya family of Malayagiri about 20 miles from Dhānyakaṭika," which was Maṅgalagiri. He "resorted to Madhyadeśa where he became a disciple of Saṃgharakṣita and studied with him." There are several stories repeated about him; cf. e.g. Malcolm Eckel, *To See the Buddha* (Princeton 1994), p. 12. Also the Tibetan tradition ascribes a number of works (other than those summarized below) to him. For example, Nettier and Prebish, "Mahāsāṅghika origins...", History of Religions 16, 1977, p. 320, report that a work titled *Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna* is attributed to Bhavya by Andre Bareau at *Les sectes bouddhiques du Pétit Véhicule* (Paris 1955), p. 20; Bareau translates this work into French in Journal Asiatique 244, 1956, pp. 167-171. Von Rospatt (*The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness* (Stuttgart 1995), p. 29, says that the Tibetan Tanjur ascribes to Bhavya a work titled *Śramaṇapañcāśatkārikādābhismaraṇa*. Sitarammama reports that the Tibetans ascribe to Bhavya a *Pañcakramapañjikā*.

161. BHAVYA, **Karatalaratna* (550)

Nanjio 1237 is a work translated into Chinese under the title *Chang-Cheng-lun*, which has something to do with a hand and a jewel. It has been (re-?)translated into Sanskrit (our "E") and summarized in English by N. Aiyasvami Sastri in Visva-Bharati Annals 2, Santiniketan 1949, and reprinted as Visvabharati Series 9 of the same date. Aiyaswami Sastri has published a briefer (10 pp.) summary as well in the Proceedings of the Tenth All-India Oriental Conference (Madras 1941), pp. 286-295. Prior o this Louis de la Vallée Poussin had published a French translation in Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques 2, 1932-33, pp. 68-138. This translation is signified by "F" below. The summary that is provided here is based on Poussin's translation.

Summary by Karl H. Potter

CHAPTER ONE

(E33-36; F68-72) The work begins with an introductory section that explains that the purpose of the text is to help readers understand the truth about emptiness. The author provides a proof of emptiness of conditioned elements and puts it into the form of an argument as follows:

(I) Thesis: Conditioned (*saṁskṛta*) elements are empty.
Reason: Because they are originated through causes and conditions.
Example: Like things magically created (*māyāvat*).

(II) Thesis: Unconditioned elements are nonexistent things (*asadbhūta*).
Reason: Because they are not products.
Example: Like a flower in the sky.

All cognizable objects are either conditioned or unconditioned. Those who do not understand the natures of these two kinds of objects think they have essential natures and develop false judgments about them, like a painter who imagines his creations to be real. But those who understand the precise nature of conditioned and unconditioned things admit only things that actually exist, and rejecting false views, enter into constructionfree wisdom.

What the world unanimously believes exists we admit to exist conventionally (*saṁvṛtisat*). On the basis of conventional perception the conditions on which those things depend also really exist, comprising the eye, etc. Thatness (*tattva*), which is to say the truly essential nature, is the highest truth (*paramārthasatya*), and it is from that point of view that the author intends his thesis that conditioned things are empty, not from the conventional standpoint. To be "conditioned" is to arise from causes and conditions: the twelve organs it comprises excluding the factor-organ (*dharmāyatana*), i.e., space, calculated and uncalculated cessation and thusness. Also excluded from the class of conditioned things are false appearances such as magical apparitions. And all conditioned factors, which opponents take to be actual entities, we hold to be actually empty from the highest standpoint. "Empty" is a synonym for "without essential nature", "falsely appearing".

(E36-39; F2-74) Something that has both the *s*-quality and the *h*-quality constitutes the *sp*, here "things magically created". Not that the *sp* has all the qualities of the *h* and the *s*--people say, e.g., "the lady's face

is like the moon (in beauty)" but one should not suppose they mean that all the moon's properties exist in her face, rather that her face is like the moon in certain respects.

The *vp* should be something which is absent from the actual case.

How does one establish an inference? Truly the eye is empty, devoid of essential nature, since it is dependently originated. Everything that is dependently originated is empty. This is commonly recognized among cowherds, etc. Since this is the case for various magically appearing things such as men, women, elephants, horses, palaces, forests, water, fire, etc., which are all born from causally conditioned wood, earth, etc., if these magically appearing entities had their actual nature it would not be an error to call them erroneous appearances.

(E40-43; F75-79) Objection: If one could prove that all conditioned things are empty, then there would be no colors, etc. Now one cannot logically suppose that evidence for the existence of a hare's horn is known; likewise one cannot have evidence for absence of color, since such awareness is immediately evident. So your thesis denies the nature of the eye, etc. that are generally known all ordinary people, and a wise man will consequently reject your thesis. Thus your claim contradicts the evidence of both one's own and others' experience.

Answer: What is called "evidence" is, from the highest standpoint, empty of essential nature, because it is born from conditions. So my claim does not contradict the evidence of one's own nature. And men with clear vision (*vitimira*) do not experience the unreal horses, moons, etc. which are seen by those suffering from eye trouble. So my thesis does not contradict the experiences of others. We do not deny out of hand, as deluded men do, the things shown on the evidence of experience, since they are experienced. Rather, we reject "evidence" on the grounds of reasons.

Objection: Your thesis contradicts common experience

Answer: That is not right. We do not contradict our position when properly understood, and even if we did, we would not therefore contradict common experience. That our thesis contradicts what is generally understood in other theories is no objection, since all theses have as their purpose to undermine what is generally thought to be the position of others.

Furthermore, according to disciples of the Buddha conditioned things perish at the same moment (they arise). So all factors are without a self; there are not living beings (*sattva*). According to the Vaiśeṣikas material

rūpas are a kind of substance (*dravya*), and substances a species of existents (*bhāva*). According to Sāṁkhyas the *buddhi* is unconscious; things that are destroyed and what is still to be born are real things. These sorts of positions that are developed in the schools must be admitted to contradict what is commonly understood.

Thus the point of view of the highest truth is to examine factors and not merely accept what is commonly supposed by ordinary folk. Now we claim that our position represents the true point of view. Thus the attributions of contradictions are without reason, since our position is confirmed by experience. So we do not contradict common experience.

Objection: Proponents of the emptiness of essential nature claim that actually the eye-faculty is empty. This thesis is faulty since the subject (*dharmin*) is unproved, and the *h* is also faulty since no locus is specified.

Answer: Ordinary folk know well eyes, etc. which constitutes our subject, and the emptiness of those same eyes, etc. is our *h*. So there is no fault.

Bad logicians object: If eyes, etc. are empty, how can they cognize conditions? And if they do cognize how can they be empty? If to remedy this one offers an argument it will commit the fallacy of unproven (*asiddha*). E.g., if one says "Sound is eternal, because everything is noneternal," this commits the fallacy of unproved, since sound is included within everything.

Answer: But we offer as our *h* "because of being dependently originated" and as our example "like something magically created", which are generally understood (unlike your alleged counterexample).

Defenders of essential nature argue: You must admit the visual sense as something having an essential nature, because it functions (*sakāritratvāt*). What is without an essential nature cannot function, like the son of a barren woman. The eye has a function, which is to produce visual awareness.

Answer: If you are arguing that conditioned things such as the eye, etc. have an essential nature from the conventional standpoint as understood by ordinary folk you are merely proving what we already admit. But your *sp* is objectionable if understood from the highest standpoint (as there are no sons of barren women). Furthermore, you cannot say that an argument (without an *sp*) with only a *vp* is sufficient to establish a conclusion, for then one could say that from "Sound is eternal because it is audible. A pot is neither eternal nor audible" the conclusion that sound is eternal follows.

(E44-47; T79-82) Another objection: The argument and the example given for "all conditioned things are empty" are themselves conditioned things. This constitutes a fallacy.

Answer: But since both parties accept that "all conditioned things" is the *p* there is no problem. If we had said "The eye is empty, because its nature is empty of essential nature" then the fallacy of unproved *h* certainly would be committed. Again, if we were to include magical things within our *p* this would constitute a fallacy of proving what is already accepted.

Some persons of little understanding object: If you claim that all conditioned things are empty, your argument, being conditioned, is itself empty, and so your *h* is unproved.

Answer: The unprovenness is only apparent. Followers of the Buddha hold that all conditioned things are selfless since causeless. One might object that this argument itself, being among the conditioned things, is selfless, and that thus the argument is unproved. But likewise the Sāṁkhyas hold that manifest things have as their nature *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* because they are different from consciousness. One might object that this argument itself, being among the manifest things, has those three as its nature, and so the argument is unproved. Or a Vaiśeṣika, who argues that language (*śabda*) is noneternal because it is a product, can be objected to by saying that since his argument is linguistic it is unproved. This sort of argument cannot establish a fault in a theory, for if it could, no one could establish anything by inference.

Objection: The argument "because it is causally conditioned" is incapable of establishing what you intend it to establish, for it is empty of intrinsic nature, like the sounds of the voice of the son of a barren woman.

Answer: Your reason "because it is empty of intrinsic nature" is something you yourself reject, so it can't be a reason for you.

Objector: But it is the argument of my opponent!

Answer: No. The meaning of your phrase "for it is empty of intrinsic nature" is unclear. Does it mean "because it doesn't exist"? Then we don't admit it, since we don't say that our argument doesn't exist. Does your phrase mean "because it falsely appears"? Then the voice of the son of a barren woman is not a proper example. In other words, it is wrong that an argument admitted by only one adversary is sufficient to establish a thesis if it is not admitted by the other adversary, whether it is countered by an opposing argument or rejected as leading to absurdity. (Buddhist

examples are provided.)

There are bad logicians who in order to show the defects in our thesis say: If (conditioned things) are empty of intrinsic nature then the *s* and the *h* are unproved quite as much as the sound of a son of a barren woman's voice. But this argument applies against their contention as much as ours, and so cannot be used to hide the defects in their system..

(E47-51; T82-87) Objection: Your thesis "truly all conditioned things are empty" is unclear. If it means "actually, all conditioned things are without reality" that very statement, being a conditioned thing, is unreal like the other conditioned things, so the statement contradicts itself, like saying "this very statement is false." But if your thesis is that "really all conditioned things are absolutely absent" then everything is denied and your thesis as well.

Answer: From the conventional standpoint the existence of a conscious self is taken as true; from the ultimate standpoint there is no self. So there is no contradiction. As for the second claim, we have already pointed out that "empty" does not mean absolute absence.

Objection: If conditioned things are, like magical creations, empty and without an essential nature, then they don't exist, so your view is after all nihilism.

Answer: You value positive injunctions; we value negative ones. Though you view a negation as implying some contrasting positive statement, our negation is complete; e.g., for us "there is no white cloth" indicates the absence of white cloth alone, and does not imply the presence of a cloth of another color. Our view is intended to avoid the extremes of both eternalism and nihilism.

(E51-54; T87-91) The reason (that things arise from causes) is unproved from both the standpoint of one's own system or from that of others.

Answer: A reason should be something admitted in general by both parties, even if they differ over its specific properties. For example, Vaiśeṣikas seek to prove that sound is noneternal because it is a product, and their opponent attempts to disprove the reason by questioning whether sound is caused by the throat or a stick, etc. And Sāṁkhyas argue that the five sense-organs are not material products because they are organs like the mental organ, and their opponent questions whether an organ is produced from the five great elements or from the three *guṇa*s, etc. But such criticisms are futile and constitute a false disproof of reasons (since both parties agree in admitting the reason offered in its

general sense).

Other teachers who have a high opinion of their position and are incapable of properly assessing it say: Different actual objects, having a certain nature, manifest themselves as colored signs (*rūpanimitta*) of other varied actual things. We do not admit that these manifestations are empty of essential nature, and so we reject your example of magical apparitions. If you say that these objects and signs are empty inasmuch as they are unreal, then your thesis merely proves what has already been accepted.

Answer: Then you admit that the things that appear are other than they really are, and so you accept my thesis!

(E54-62; T91-99) Sāṁkhya: Manifest things are evolutes, so your reason is unproved. And since the sense-organs pervade everything even a magical being must be pervaded by them, so that your example does not establish emptiness.

Answer: Awarenesses are not manifestations of, but are caused by their contents which are their conditions. So your charge that our reason is unproved is mistaken. Secondly, your claim that the sense-organs pervade everything is untenable, since different things would be manifested and thus appear in the same place. And it is patent that each sense-organ is confined to is proper place and range and that they do not pervade everything.

Yogācāra: We agree with your argument. Still, it is rightly said "That of which a thing is empty doesn't exist, but what is empty exists". That is to say, the constructed (*parikalpita*) nature is absent from the dependent (*paratantra*) nature; it is unreal, and so empty. But the dependent nature exists. If it didn't, that would be nihilism. (For more on this cf. my (162.3) *Tattvāmṛtāvatāra*.)

Answer: If you are saying that conditioned things like the eye are empty because in the dependent nature there is nothing that is not dependently originated, then your are merely proving what is already accepted. The Sāṁkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas accept similar theories. But your position is more specifically that conditioned things are empty through their lacking the essential nature of nonarising (*anutpattiniḥsvabhāvatas*), not through their lacking the nature of arising. If when arising things really have the nature of arising than how could they lack the nature of arising? If things do not really arise then, since they lack an essential nature, you should not say that there is consciousness-only (*vijñaptimātratā*). However, if you clarify you position thus, then since the dependent nature lacks the essential nature of arising and so is

nonoccurrent it is empty, and that merely proves what is already accepted. Furthermore what is dependently originated is empty for you, and thus you do not believe in emptiness. But my position is not yours, and so you do not agree with my argument.

You say your dependent nature is unreal to avoid eternalism and that it is real in order to avoid nihilism. I also accept this kind of reality, and indeed hold that things ordinarily taken to be real are indeed real in this sense. So my position is not nihilism.

Objection: But if magically created things are indescribable (as either only real or only unreal) then, since they cannot function as the example, my thesis will not be proved.

Answer: Why should it be thought to be of an indescribable nature? If you accept that you'll be unable to refute the logicians, etc. And if you accept things of dependent nature as real even magically created things will be real. It is unnecessary to point out that nothing real corresponds to the words of our language.

Objection: Many defilements arise from attachments born of language.

Answer: Animals do not have language. The cause of defilement is failure to correctly grasp the natures of things. There are many views and teachings; among them the teaching of the dependent nature is partly applicable, not completely That is why I only speak to you of emptiness.

(E62-66; T100-104) Objection: If the eye is real it defeats your thesis and your *h* is inconclusive. But if it is actually lacking in essential nature your conclusion is unproved.

Answer: No. The Buddha says there is nothing true and nothing false, and I cannot prove anything true or false. Since there is nothing to deny you have denied nothing.

Objection: If there is nothing to be illuminated there are no illuminators.

Answer: In my view an *s*, an *h*, a thing denied and a denial and the rest of logic all exist on the conventional level. So my reasoning is not defective.

The reason "because they are dependently originated" is not the only one proving emptiness; one could also argue from perishability, from the difference in causes, etc.

Objection: The eye really has an essential nature since its properties, causes, and results clearly exist, and what has real properties is real.

Answer: This cannot be established from the highest standpoint. On

the conventional level affirming it is proving what is already accepted. And the same argument applies to all the other senses. A yogi should meditate on all of them and penetrate their insubstantiality, and then repeat the process for all other factors and worldly concepts. Having done so, he should continue to repeat this meditation. As soon as he achieves the sixth stage of a Bodhisattva he will feel great joy and acquire great virtue and wisdom, helping others on a grand scale. Only a person who is free from any wrong ideas is capable of walking the Bodhisattva path. And realizing that what is unborn is not bound by the limitations of time past, present or future he attains the highest enlightenment (*mahābodhi*).

CHAPTER TWO

(E67-70; T105-108) As regards

II.Thesis: Unconditioned things are nonexistent (*asadbhūta*),

Reason: Because they do not arise (*anutpāda*),

Example: Like a sky-flower.

Again this is not the only *h* that can be adduced for the thesis: failure to function, etc. can also be used. And (again) this argument is offered from the highest standpoint, not the conventional level. Unconditioned things include space, calculated and uncalculated cessation, and thatness: it is that part of the factor-organ (*dharmāyatana*) to which thesis (I) does not apply.

The word "space" (*ākāśa*) suggests what is empty, that which is without resistance and substantiality. Thus we argue that space, which is familiar to the world, is actually empty, unreal. Both systems (Mādhyamikas and Sautrāntikas, suggests Poussin) agree on this.

Vaibhāṣika: If your thesis is that unconditioned things are nonexistent, i.e. absences, then the meditation on space is without a supporting object. So how can it occur? Actually, space is that existent which is free from any obstruction.

Answer: If your argument is that the meditation on space has a supporting object because it is a meditation, then your argument necessarily lacks an *sp*, since all meditative objects are empty, and is thus defective.

Objection by some of our own followers as well as by others: If you are correct then what is produced really exists: this is known by presumption (*arthāpatti*). Do you want to say that whatever is produced does not exist? Then the reason "because they do not arise" does not

apply to all that is nonexistent, and your argument commits the fallacy of unproved reason.

Answer: This is only a futile rejoinder through presumption. What is contended is that all nonproduced things are unreal, not that all unreal things are nonproducts. E.g., existing following effort can be a good *h* even if it is not present in every *sp*.

Objection: The sky has an essential nature since it is unanimously admitted. Flowers are also generally seen. So neither are without essential nature, and thus their combination, a sky-flower, can't be without essential nature either. So the example is defective.

Answer: The Sanskrit compound being translated as "sky-flower" is actually a genitive compound which can be rendered as "a flower in the sky" (not "flower and sky"!). Since that flower is nonexistent it can properly function as example.

(E70-73; T108-112) Vaibhāṣika: The Buddha has said that there is an unconditioned entity called calculated cessation which is an antidote to conditioned things. If you deny this you deny the Buddha's words' validity.

Answer: Buddha teaches this to instil disgust for composite things and a desire for deliverance and peace. From the highest standpoint he denies such a thing exists. There is no contradiction in this: the same holds for all talk of liberation, peace, etc. These are all metaphors: from the highest standpoint there is no thing with an essential nature called "*nirvāṇa*."

Objection: Since noncomposite things are unreal, your thesis lacks a *p*. And because there are no sky-flowers you have no *sp*. So your argument is defective.

Answer: There is no fault since all these things are commonly referred to.

Vaibhāṣika: Calculated cessation is real since it provides the supporting object for (our idea of) the path and acts as an antidote to defilements. An unreal thing couldn't act thus.

Answer: This argument, having no *vp*, has already been refuted.

Sautrāntika: (II) merely proves what is already accepted, since we do not hold unconditioned factors to exist.

Answer: My thesis not only affirms that, but also negates unconditioned factors' nonexistence as well.

Tāmraśāṭīya: What is termed "space" is actually the color of empty holes. For us space is conditioned; we deny unconditioned space. So your

argument proves what is already accepted.

Answer: We have already shown that conditioned things are without essential nature.

Since the Vaibhāṣika theories are the same as those of the Vātsīputrīyas, refuting the one refutes the other.

(E73-76; T112-116) Yogācāra: There is no higher truth than the highest truth. Thusness is the highest truth about factors, so one can say that thusness is truly empty. But it is wrong to add that it is without essential nature. How can it be that transcendent and constructionfree knowledge is about an unconditioned content? It can't. Just as it is wrong to say that awareness has what is unconditioned as the supporting object of its content, so one cannot confirm that thusness really exists, since the nature of reality is impossible to establish. If one could know that thusness is truly transcendent and constructionfree it would be a supporting object and so conditioned. In other words thusness is not really the highest thing, because it is an object like matter/color.

Answer: If a thing is termed "empty" because it is not found in that thing, then everyone knows that. But emptiness is put forth to refute wrong views, not right ones. The view that inside the truth there is another truth is a wrong view. And to say that thusness is not real contradicts the following correct argument: the Tathāgata (i.e., the Buddha) does not see *saṁsāra* or *nirvāṇa*. He knows that there are no defilements produced by errors, that passions are really unborn. Being "thus-gone" (*tathāgata*, i.e., realized, a Buddha) is to be absolutely free from conceptual constructions.

If you argue that thusness, although beyond language, has an essential nature (i.e., is real), then what you call "thusness" is just the self of the Tīrthikas (non-Buddhist philosophers), for they say the same things about the self you are saying about thusness--e.g., that it is beyond language, beyond conceptual construction, beyond categorization. It is wrong to equate thusness with the self of the non-Buddhists.

(E77-78; T116-117) Hīnayāna: Conditioned and unconditioned factors belonging among the twelve senses (*āyatana*) certainly have essential natures, comprising as they do the twelve starting with frustration, etc. which comprise the four noble truths. One who understands the four truths and follows the paths of vision and cultivation destroys the fires of their defilements and terminates the frustrations of the three spheres.

Answer: Since all factors are empty who is it that will avoid these faults, who will cultivate the spiritual qualities?

Hīnayāna: Though the three vehicles (seekers, those self-enlightened and Bodhisattvas) differ about the equipment, the senses and in resolve they see eye to eye on what constitutes full understading and the noble path.

Answer: All we Buddhists believe these. But in trying to avoid the defilements by taking the standpoint of conventional truth, the path (of each vehicle) seems different. But it is impossible to cover over the contents of awareness without entering into the selflessnes of all factors.

Hīnayāna: In that case the Buddha should have taught a partial deliverance, rather than (as he did) asserting the nondifference in the liberation gained through all the paths.

Answer: He spoke correctly, and did not intend to assert nondifference from all standpoints. Both a hair on one's head and the universe are alike empty, but the difference between them remains. If it were otherwise there would be no distinction between better and worse results.

(E78-80; T117-120) So a yogi should penetrate not only Buddhist categories but those of other ("Hindu" and Jain) systems as well.

Sāṁkhya: Our system holds that the three elements (the *guṇa*s) transform themselves into a flower in the sky, so a sky-flower is not unreal. So your example is defective inasmuch as it contradicts the thesis.

Answer: Are these three elements the sky-flower or not? If so it contradicts both your system and common sense. And if not, there being no sky-flower, our example is acceptable and your position is undermined.

Sāṁkhya: I do not attempt to prove the reality of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* directly, but rather point to the common experience of evolved things to establish their reality. On the one hand, manifest things have existence as their cause, for they are that sort of thing. On the other hand, manifest things have enjoyers since they are enjoyed, like food and drink for Brahmins.

Answer: This argument either proves what is already accepted or, if it is understood in only a general way, is unproved, since not everyone accepts the Sāṁkhya categories. Or else it lacks an acceptable *sp* since e.g. delusion, a *guṇa*, is found nowhere among the aggregates. As for the argument about enjoyers and enjoyed, it is not commonly admitted that the enjoyer, food and drink have substantial essences. So your argument fails.

(E81-83 T120-122) Vaiśeṣika: Breathing, opening and closing the

eyes, mental occurrences, changes in one's organs -- all these are marks of something that is marked (viz., a self).

Answer: Again, if this argument is understood generally it merely proves what is already accepted. But if it is supposed to prove an eternal, all-pervading self it fails for want of an *sp.* In the same fashion we refute the reality of time, space, etc.

Vaiśeṣika: Atoms and internal organs are unconditioned entities. Your argument for their emptiness, viz., "because they are not produced" is unproved both for you and for your opponent (since it doesn't apply to unconditioned entities).

Answer: It is only conventionally that the internal organ and atoms are unconditioned entities. The internal organ is not actually unconditioned, since it is the cause of the occurrences of awareness, just as color, etc. are such causes. Atoms are not really unconditioned since they are material causes of the arising of things, like a thread (which is the material cause of a cloth). Other arguments defeat further aspects of (the Vaiśeṣika) view. For example, gross things constituted by double-atoms do not have causes that are eternal (as Vaiśeṣikas claim atoms are), since they are produced things like pots. These arguments show that atoms and internal organs are empty of essential nature.

(E83-88; T123-127) Having dealt with all these objections the yogi understands through correct reasoning the nature of emptiness. It remains for him to master the cultivation through meditation by which the obstructions are finally overcome.

"When...the image of conditioned and unconditioned things appears as one aspect before the mind's eye of the yogin, he should suppress it by looking upon it as empty of essential nature, and thus he enters into its original emptiness on the plea that all elements of existence are aloof from any nature; and then he gradually enters into the principle of nonduality by dwelling upon things as bereft of any aspect. By this process of meditation he is able to suppress the image of either conditioned or unconditioned things in such a way as they will never arise again."

"Though the yogin does not dwell on it, he is not yet absolutely free from the flow of consciousness which is stained with a tendency to have a content since the discriminative thought of selflessness is still operating. As he is not yet in the possession of unshakable knowledge, he is removed from transcendent constructionfree knowledge through this persistence of discriminative thought. In order to remove this handicap he

should reason thus: when things are empty of essential nature, a discriminative thought of emptiness is also not a real entity, as it has been conditioned by causes like magically created things. Meditating in this manner he suppresses the thought which discriminates emptiness, etc. By suppressing it he avoids the two-extremes of emptiness and nonemptiness, and no more looks at things in the aspect of either." (A long passage from the *Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* is cited in support of this.)

"...This path is termed "formless" as it is free from the grasp of conditioned and unconditioned things; "matchless" as there is nothing that may be compared with it; "supportless" because there is neither supporter nor supported; "imageless" because there persists no image whatever of either conditioned or unconditioned things; and it is named also "consciousnessless" since no consciousness of any kind is at work there..."[161]

(E88-99; T128-138) Yogācārins say "the highest constructionfree awareness is free from all notions of grasper and grasped." Others respond that that awareness should not be termed "constructionfree" since it involves the construction of an essential nature and is produced by causes, being the supporting object of the Yogācārin's knowledge. These arguments show the defects in the Yogācāra definitions. From the highest standpoint transcendent constructionfree awareness is not real, since it is causally conditioned, like a magic show.

When all grasping has ceased no further ideas are entertained. (Scriptural passages cited.) That is correct vision, that is comprehension..

The remainder of the text extols the character of the realized state, its lack of movement, its quietude, its wisdom, its knowledge Finally, the results of achieving this state are succinctly summarized.

162. BHAVYA, *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* and *Tarkajvālā* (550) thereon

Christian Lindtner has discussed the evidence that favors the identification of the author of both the *kārikā*s and the *Tarkajvālā* as the same person, a view that was once questioned.[162] He finds sufficient reasons to accept their identity. Lindtner points out that the Sanskrit text of the *kārikā*s is extant, that it was handcopied by Rahula Sankrtyayana and the manuscript photographed by Giuseppe Tucci in Tibet.
The *kārikā*s are available in Chinese as T.5255, and the *Tarkajvālā* as T.5256. Lindtner notes that "much work has been done, above all in

Japan; see H. Nakamura, 'A survey of Mahāyāna Buddhism with biographical notes (II)', Journal of Intercultural Studies 4, 1977, 126-128."

It is likely that the original name of this work was *Tattvāmṛtāvatāra* and that it first existed in the form of the first three chapters below.

162.1 *Bodhicittāparityāga*

"ET" references are to the edition and translation found in V.V.Gokhale, ""Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā Tarkajvālā", *Miscellanea Buddhica* (ed. Chrs. Lindtner). Indiske Studier 5 (Copenhagen 1985), pp. 76-108. Gokhale provides the Sanskrit text and an English translation of the *kārikās* together with an English translation from the Tibetan of the commentary (TJ). For the most part the commentary fleshes out what is given in the verse.

Summary by Karl H. Potter

I.1-3 (ET81-82) Reverence is paid to the instructor whose speech is without error, who reveals the truth beyond language, inference and comprehension, which truth is without characterizing marks, which is inconceivable, which has neither beginning nor end, which is constructionfree, peaceful and beyond thought.

TJ: The "truth" (*tattva*) is "beyond language" since words do not name actual entities. Its synonyms are suchness, the *dharmadhātu*, and emptiness. It is "beyond inference" since it has no form to serve as content.

I.4 (ET85) To help others to attain enlightenment what I can understand is being explained here.

I.5 (ET86) The road (*caryā*) to the attainment of all ends involves the nonabandonment of the awareness of enlightenment (*bodhicittāparityāga*) and a quest for correct awareness (*tattvajñānaiṣaṇā*).

I.6 (ET87) Awareness of enlightenment is the seed of the Buddha who has great loving kindness, great compassion and great knowledge, which leads a wise man to seek its nonabandonment.

TJ: Great knowledge is of two sorts, knowledge of means and of wisdom.

I.7-8 (ET88-89) It is appropriate that one who cannot stand the frustrations of others should, after having rescued himself, seek to rescue the whole world from the lower realm of rebirth.

I.9-11 (ET90) If one who is liberated should not rescue the others

who are in the depths of despair, what use would his achievements be?

I.12-14 (ET91-92) A stingy person is reproved by wise men for enjoying himself alone; how much more the realized one who has the means to end all kinds of frustrations.

I.15-16 (ET94) Before, when I was beset with defilements I inflicted frustrations on those already suffering. But to those who in another birth would repay me with love, respect and kindness how can I respond except by leading them to release from their frustrations?

I.17-19 (ET96-97) Wise men are not bound by their various existences; they are gladdened by the joy of helping others, having blocked the doors of bad courses, having seen emptiness and destroyed the defilements. Because of their merit these wise men see the six courses as a festival and are not scared by rebirth.

I.20-21 (ET98-99) Having seen into faults they abide neither in the world nor in liberation, since they are touched with mercy, continuing to dwell here having seen that both *saṁsāra* and *nirvāṇa* are neither the same nor different.

I.22-25 (ET99-100) Having attaned the seven factors of enlightenment to which gods and devils pay homage, having filled the ten quarters with the light of their glory, having preserved the lineage of the three jewels through their spiritual sons, they who have attained liberation through working both for their own and others' liberation are truly completed (*nirvṛta*); even those whose aggregates are not yet cut off can be called so.

I.26-28 (ET102) One with low ideals hardly yearns for Buddhahood. Who then will not desire to achieve such an immeasurable state?

I.29-32 (ET103-106) Who, engaged in heroic acts for others' benefit, would not live in *saṁsāra*, however long, as if it were only for a day? What wise man will not follow the path of a teacher and become a legend? Who would not turn frail body into one having the strength of Mt. Sumeru by making it into an instrument for others' welfare? Out of compassion he makes his body into a source of emerging happiness for others.

I.33 (ET106) That moment (of birth) when the eight kinds of bad moments are excluded provides the illumination of the true *dharma*, and should be made to bring about its result through the road of a great man.

162.2 *Munivratasamāśraya*

"ET" refers to V.V.Gokhale, "The second chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamakahṛdaya (Taking the Vow of an Ascetic)", Indo-Iranian Journal 24, 1972, 40-45. Since the Chapter is short we provide Gokhale's translation of the *kārikā*s in its entirety.

Translation by V.V. Gokhale

II.1 (ET42) Having thus gone in for a resolute acceptance of the (vow, in respect of the) Great Wisdom for the sake of the good of the world, and having established himself in the Right Path, he is covered with glory.

II.2 (ET42-43) With his love (*maitrī*), which (always protects and) never injures, and the development in him of a feeling of compassion (*kāruṇya*), he is insatiable in his greed for knowledge of the Good Law, and is far from sparing in his religious gifts.

II.3 (ET43) With a mind straightforward and devoid of self-conceit, he visualises the Absolute Truth, and while turning a blind eye towards the sins of others, he is anxious about himself falling into (the merest) error.

II.4 (ET43) He turns his back on (all kinds of) disputations, on social contagion and on those confounding sophists belonging to the Lokāyata cult, and his faith in the continuous generation (*pratati*) of virtue in (the minds of) even those who are devoid of all virtue, is unswerving (*aśraṁsita*).

II.5 (ET43) While practising charity out of (sheer) commiseration (*kṛpā*), he creates in himself a desire for omniscience (only) for the sake of pacifying all the miseries of the entire world of living beings.

II.6 (ET43) He takes his (holy) bath as it were in the pure waters of Morality (*śīla*); Patience (*kṣamā*) is as it were the white ring of hemp on his finger (*pravitraka*); he has tied up his matted hair, representing as it were his Fortitude (*vīrya*); and he has dedicated himself to contemplation (*dhyāna*) and knowledge.

II.7 (ET43-44) With his eye of intelligence wide opened and his skill in theoretical as well as practical matters, he puts on his garments of modesty and bashfulness as it were, and he wears a girdle as it were of dignified softness (*sauratya*) around his waist.

II.8 (ET44) Wearing the dark deerskin as (a symbol of) Commiseration (*kṛpā*) and having a spotlessly clean water-jug

(*kamaṇḍalu*) in the form of Faith (*śraddhā*), and with the gates of his senses guarded as it were by constant awareness *(smṛti*), he has his seat on the reed-mat of Endurance (*dhṛti*).

II.9 (ET44) He has his dwelling in the luxurious forest-hermitage of Mahāyāna, where he nourishes himself upon the fruits of happiness, born of meditation; and the sphere of his actions is represented by the location of (the four kinds of) mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*).

II.10 (ET44) He has destroyed all his sins by giving oral instruction in the Sūtrānta-texts, which are profound and extensive, while chanting to himself as it were the Hymn to the Sun (*Sāvitrī*) in the form of the chain of causation, founded upon the twofold aspect of truth.

II.11 (ET44) And day after day he worships the sun, who is the perfectly enlightened one (the Buddha), with flowers in the form of his achievements, which waft their fragrance in all directions and are rich with (colorful) praise.

II.12 (ET44) Having sacrificed all undesirable notions in the fire of reflection (*pratisaṁkhyāna*), one has to live an ascetic life of this type for reaching the summit, where there is nothing beyond.

162.3 *Tattvāmṛtāvatāra*

"ET" references are to the edition and translation of the first 136 verses by Shotaro Iida, *Reason and Emptiness. A Study in Logic and Mysticism* (Tokyo 1980), pp. 52-242.

Summary by Karl H. Potter

III.1-3 (ET55-57) One who has the eye consisting of knowledge has the (real) eye of one in quest of knowledge. Even a blind man, if wise, sees distant, subtle and concealed objects if he wishes, whereas one who has a thousand ordinary eyes is eyeless since he doesn't see the path to heaven and to liberation.

III.4-6 (ET57-60) One whose eye is opened by insight does not go on performing actions such as giving, etc., like a poisonous thorn consisting of desires for future life. Out of compassion and for omniscience he seeks the threefold purity, though his mind is not fixed there. Wisdom is like ambrosia, an unblocked light, the stairs to liberation, the fire that burns defilements.

TJ explains "threefold purity" in several alternative ways. "Not fixed",

i.e., the Bodhisattva has few wishes: he does not even wish for enlightenment.

III.7-9 (ET61-63) Two kinds of thought correspond to two kinds of reals. When the equipment of giving, etc., of knowledge and or merit is realized, one ascertains the marks and relation to the results of that cause. Through repetition of kindness and compassion comes about conventional wisdom concering the twelve sense-bases.

III.10-15 (ET65-71) That highest wisdom involves the complete negation of the net of conceptual constructions, penetration into it free from identity and difference, clear as space, beyond language, this quiescence is what is to be realized. Without it ascent to ultimate reality is not attained. That is why the conventional truth must be distinguished first, and then the general characteristics of factors needs to be investiaged. The wise man should concentrate on the awareness provided by what has been heard, which is the cause of the other (i.e., higher) knowledge. As one does not see a face in rippling water, so reality is not discerned by the mind covered by obstructions.

TJ: The "obstructions" are desire, hatred, stupidity, regret and doubt.

III.16-22 (ET72-77) The meditator should proceed gradually to insight. Antidotes to worry and depression, vagueness and fear, lack of control, greed, hatred and delusion are specified. One who has mastered these obstructions should remain concentrated and, reviewing factors, should inquire whether they are acceptable from the highest standpoint. If they are not, then one can conclude that those other than these are the *paramārthatattva*s.

III.23cd-24 (ET79-80) Factors conditioned and unconditioned include aggregates, senses and elements (*dhātu*).[163]

III.25-26 (ET81-82) The Great Elements (*mahābhūta*). Earth, etc. do not have essential natures from the ultimate standpoint, because they are products and because they have causes, like awarenesses.

TJ: The great elements are examined first since they are gross (*audārika*). "Do not have essential natures from the ultimate standpoint": the "not" is a *prasajya*, not a *paryudāsa* negation (i.e., to say that they do not have essential natures does not imply that there is something else that has an essential nature).

Objection: Everyone knows there are objects in the world, and that they are smooth, wet, etc.

Answer: That is from the conventional standpoint; that is why we said "from the ultimate standpoint" things have no essential natures.

Objection: Since you have no thesis your rejection of another's thesis is cavil.

Answer: No. Our thesis is that emptiness is the essential nature of all things.

III.27-30 (ET90-93) Earth is not essentially solid, etc., because it exists (*bhūtatvāt*), like wind. It does not hold things because it is a product, like water.

Objection: Though there are no essential natures earth is actually solid.

Answer: Then yogis cannot go down and up through earth. Earth cannot be fluid, since essential nature is unchangeable. Likewise water, air and fire are not essentially fluid, nor does earth have the functions of those three, viz., sticking things together, making room for things, and ripening things.

TJ: Since the function of each great element is present in each of the others none have an intrinsic nature of solidity, etc. An atom is an agglomeration of eight, viz., earth, water, fire, air, color/form, smell, taste and touch. So no atom has an intrinsic nature. If they did yogis could not, e.g. make a fiery forest cool.

Objection: A yogi can move freely through things that are impenetrable for us. If things did not have an intrinsic nature of being anywhere, of a certain size, etc., then earthly beings could move around at will like yogis. And even a yogi can bump his head in the dark!

Answer: Moving around like that only happens in a yogi's meditations, not actually.

III.31-35 (ET97-100) We admit that these (four great) elements have qualities from the conventional standpoint, since they are experienceable by the sense-organs and since they exist. But earth, etc. are not actual entities (*dravyasat*) since they are not experienced when the constituents sufficient to constitute them are not experienced, as e.g. a forest is an unreal entity. Likewise an awareness of earth, etc. is not an ultimately real entity, since it has a cause and is destructible, like a forest.

Objection: Well at least the sound of the word "earth" is an actual entity!

Answer: No, since it is heard, like a sound indicating an army.

III.36-39 (ET101-104) And we do not say that the trees produce a forest, for the trees themselves have causes, e.g., their roots. A forest, which has parts, is not formed by trees, since the trees do not complete it. So the Vaiśeṣika charge of our inference having a faulty example is

unsubstantiated. Nor does the Sāṁkhya charge along the same lines hold: the word "forest" does not name a group of different entities, since it is caused by a qualified awareness, just like the word "pot".

III.40-43 (ET106-110) Matter/form is not really grasped by the visual sense-organ, because it is resistant (*pratighāta*) and elemental (*bhautika*) like sound. That is, since the eye's form/matter is produced from elements what it grasps cannot also be produced from those elements. But matter/form is not actually even elemental since it is produced and because it has a cause. Matter/form is a construction from shapes and colors.

III.44-49 (ET111-119) The visual organ cannot see matter/form any more than the organ of taste can, since these organs are of a different nature from awareness and mental associates, and where no awareness occurs there is no vision. A sense-organ cannot grasp its own form, but without an organ no vision, etc. takes place.

III.51-55 (ET121-127) Objection: But a cognizer has awareness eternally

Answer: No, since what is experienced is many awarenesses, not one.

Objection: The visual organ (the eye) is the cause *par excellence* of the experience of matter/color/form.

Answer: No, since separate from the internal organ the organ is not a seer any more than the ear a hearer, etc.

Sāṁkhya: The *puruṣa* is the seer, hearer, etc.

Answer: No, since like the internal organ this *puruṣa* can only see, etc. because of the operation of the sense-organ. How can the eye be a seer like the internal organ, since it cannot be seen? The internal organ doesn't really see colors any more than a self does. There is no substantial entity to be seen. It is awareness that is conventionally said to see, just as we say "a bell rings" while actually there is merely an awareness of ringing.

III.56-60 (ET128-134) Objection: But the eye has rays of light which reach out to objects seen. Light is the very nature of vision (not something that the eye has).

Answer: No, for an animal in the night can see, and since the eye is not found to be bright. Nor does the eye have satisfaction, etc., since it is a thing, and not all things experience satisfaction, etc.--e.g., your *puruṣa*. Nor does the visual organ go out (as the Vaiśeṣikas claim), any more than the eyeball can. And (to Sāṁkhya) the eye cannot move around anywhere since it is confined to the body associated with a

specific *puruṣa* (according to you). Nor is the eye in contact with fire (and thus able to move about as fire does), since it is an organ, just as skin, which is not thus movable, is the organ of touch. And the eye, the nature of which is subtle and caused by the four great elements, does not have fire as its dominant part. Anyway, the visual organ does not reach out to a content because it is an organ like the internal organ. Rather, vision itself is caused just as matter/form is.

III.61 (ET134) We do not agree that the sense-organ (e.g., the nose) actually comes into contact with its object where it is reached, since the nose does not perceive past and future objects any more than the eye can see them.

III.66 (ET137) Feeling. It is wrong to define "feeling" (*vedanā*) as experiencing (*anubhava*) from the highest standpoint, since it is associated with consciousness and so different from experiencing, just like mental associates.

III.67-68ab (ET139-140) Satisfaction is not the experiencing of something beneficial (*anugrāhika*), since it is produced by touch like pain. And we do not admit feelings which are neither satisfying nor frustrating, since the result of feeling is desire.

III.68cd-69 (ET140-141) Identification and Traces. Later we shall show that consciousness is without an essential nature, and this will constitute our comment on identification and traces as well.

III.70 (ET142) Consciousness. Consciousness is not an actual awareness of a real entity, since it has a supporting object like an identification. And it is destroyed, like a lamp.

III.71 (ET143) The Senses and Realms. Now that we have shown the nature of the five aggregates (to be conventional only), the natures of the senses and realms are to be understood (likewise, as conventional only).

III.72-74 (ET148-150) Objection: The essential nature of any entity is to arise, persist and perish, since it is a conditioned entity.

Answer: No, since arising, persisting and perishing are themselves conditioned.

Objection: But still they exist, since they have actual defining properties (*lakṣaṇa*). For example, the mark of earth is solidity, since solidity is the cause of our awareness of a thing as bodily.

Answer: No, for how can solidity characterize fiery things?

III.77-80 (ET155-159) Conditioned Factors. Objection: Really, what is going has not gone (yet).

Answer: This is not correct from the highest standpoint, since there

is really no going at all. No one sees going apart from what has gone and what has not gone. Going is a process (and so cannot be spoken of as a thing), and since it is unproved (since unspeakable) one cannot confirm the existence of a goer, or for that matter of a nongoer

III.81-84 (ET161-165) Objection: One perceives a goer in relation with an object other than the one going, just as we observe a person holding a stick.

Answer: No. There is no positive concomitance relating the person and the stick. It is like the wheel of fire, which conventionally is spoken of as turning but does not actually turn.

Sāṁkhya: An agglomeration, even though not a substance, really moves.

Answer: No, since an agglomeration is not ultimately real.

Sāṁkhya: The entity is real, since it is grasped even when the agglomeration is not grasped.

Answer: No, it is unreal.

III.85-89 (ET168-172) Objection: If there are no essential natures then how can bondage and release be attained?

Answer: Bondage and release are admitted like a magical being or a dream object, and acquire a self-nature thereby. But ultimately rebirth of the psychophysical complex is just as nonoccurrent as the rebirth of the earth, etc. Really there can be no liberation of the psychophysical complex, since it has already arisen.

III.90-93 (ET173-175) Really no person (*pudgala*) is reborn nor is liberated; he is only nominally conceived, like a house, and is linguistically referred to, like perfume. Again, the traces do not constitute a person, since they are caused, like a jar, since they arise and cease, and since they are knowable things like a lump of clay.

Objection: The person is real even though indescribable.

Answer: Not all indescribable things are real; take the color of a barren woman's child.

So traces are without an essential nature

III.94-98 (ET176-181) The collection of body with organs is selfless, since it is caused, like a pillar, and since it is accumulated like an anthill.

Objection: The existence of a self is proved by there being memory and recognition and from the arising of awareness having to take place somewhere.

Answer: No.

Objection: A body having a sense-organ must have a self.

Answer: No, for there is no *sp*, and since there is no concomitance.

Objection: The word "self" must have a direct meaning since it is used metaphorically.

Answer: You cannot prove the existence of a self that way, since all that is proved is something which is a content of consciousness, and not something that is permanent, omnipresent, etc.

III.100-108 (ET185-195) When one has achieved the destruction of consciousness, who is it that is attached? Who is it that desires that destruction? If you say that attachment is that which is about to arise, we wonder what it is, since it is without a locus and unborn. A nonattached awareness doesn't exist, since what is unspeakable is unspeakable.

Objection: An awareness is called "attached" when it is produced by that aspect of energy, just as a crystal is colored red by the red thing behind it.

Answer: Then how can there be the attachment of awareness to that? So the attachment-notion is a conceptual construction, since there is no such thing as an attacher. Since a thing has a substantial locus it is inseparable from that locus; it is wrong to distinguish between desire and the desirer, and if they are separated one has to do with something else entirely, e.g. attachedness. Consciousness is not an actual entity that is affected by something else, attachment, for that (attachment) is the supporting object, and there is another cause. So what we ordinarily call an aggregate's (desire, say) is dependent on the arising of desire according to its own nature in a single aggregated nature, just as we say "the tree is blossoming" when the flowers on the tree are blossoming.

III.109-116 (ET195-204) To speak of attaining liberation is wrong, for if liberation exists it must be a conditioned thing. Also, liberation cannot be an antidote, because an antidote is conditioned, like a conditioned thing which has ceased to function. But if liberation is an absence then, because of its nature of being a nonexistence, it depends on other things, like any other thing that has become absent. Liberation is not unconditioned either, as we've already shown. Thus what is the difference between our notion and Sāṁkhya's idea of (the liberation of *puruṣa* from) consciousness? Defilements arise from conceptual constructions and die naturally. Since there is nothing accumulated, from what and because of what does your liberation constitute deliverance? Since nothing is born constructions also do not exist, so both (bondage and liberation) are the same, since there is no one to be liberated and nothing to be liberated from. Having realized the emptiness of essential

nature the knowledge of it itself ceases. So those who do not attain anything attain the nature *(dharmatva)* of the nonextinction of nonextinction! Thus, those who investigate (factors) as they really are for their own benefit do not address the wrong views of those of bad vision.

III.117-124 (ET206-215) One should not suppose that (desire) must actually exist since the perverted views actually exist, for perversions are like desire; they too are merely conventionally existent.

"Earth is real (lit., 'not other than itself')" is not correct from the highest standpoint, since it has a cause, like wind, or because it is an actual entity, like consciousness. And "water is other than earth" is not ultimately true either, since both water and earth arise and since both have the same essential nature that are not different.

Objection: But earth and the other elements differ since the words for them are different, our ideas of them differ, and they have different properties.

Answer: This is fallacious, for the *h* fails to share the same properties with the *s*, since all ascriptions are merely verbal.

III.125-129ab (ET215-220) It is wrong to hold (as the Jains do) that things are really both similar and dissimilar to other things, for that is contradictory, just as ascribing cold and heat to the same thing is.

Objection: No. What is meant is that the ascription to a thing of a feature is always relative to the denial of another feature.

Answer: But what establishes the ascription of a feature relative to another feature? If one of the two features is not established, the other isn't either. So this is mind-games.

Now by this very sort of method the thesis of things' having essential natures is refuted.

III.129cd-136 (ET220-232) Vaibhāṣika: Unconditioned factors are four: the two cessations, space and suchness.

Answer: Calculated cessation is not ultimately real, since its form is eternally malformed, like the figure of a child of a barren woman, and because unconditioned factors are unborn, causeless, effectless, neither a collection of conditions nor a generator of cessation. A thing without a cause cannot be an effect, since it has not been born. The wise man realizes there are really no unconditioned factors.

A self is conceptually constructed by the believers of both others' and our own schools. But having understood the selflessness of things, may the wise enjoy knowledge of the nature of things.

(Here ends ET. Shotaro Iida, the editor and translator of the first part of III, has provided a brief table of contents of the rest of III, without edition or translation. Shikafumi Watanabe[164] likewise gives an outline. What follows is a summary of the remainder of III provided for this volume by Christian Lindtner on the basis of his Sanskrit edition of the entire work published as Adyar Library Series 123 (Adyar 2001), which is our "E".

Summary by Christian Lindtner

III.137-193 (E23-29) Actually nothing has itself or anything else as its cause. Also the traditional four causes maintained by Buddhists are shown to be empty. Nor can causality be established on the basis of common experience and the like. A cause cannot be defined as something that manifests someting.

III.194-214 (E29-31) Surely, the concept of causality has a conventional and practical validity. Everything in this world is determined by the laws of cause and effect. Our present karma is responsible for our future destiny. Karma is bound to our mind and our will. Rebirth is a fact, the continuity of consciousness is only discontinued by ultimate release.

III.215-223 (E32) There is, therefore, no room for God as a creator of the world. The only "God" is one's own karma. Refutation of God as a creator. (See also 9.95-113 below.)

III.224-229 (E33) The continuity of life is a fact,

III.230-233 (E33-34) Life is characterized by suffering. Suffering, however, only exists conventionally.

III.234-246 (E34-35) The Buddha is beyond suffering, but even a Buddha can be seen in the light of the two truths, i.e. in two different ways, both of which are rational.

III.247-265 (E35-37) One must awaken to the highest reality. Using his intelligence a scholar must see that everyting lacks independent being, that is, is empty. Even emptiness--as a concept--is empty.

III.266-291 (E37-40) Bhavya concludes with a description of the Buddha who cannot really be described. According to Buddhist tradition, supported by the means of logic, the Buddha is identical with thatness, *tattva*; he is unborn, etc. But just as one must distinguish between two kinds of truth and, accordingly, between two kinds of reason, thus one must also distinguish between the two (or even three) bodies of a

Buddha. With numerous allusions to the *sūtra*s Bhavya now maintains that the Buddha's *dharmakāya* is the same as emptiness, the absolute truth--and even Brahman.

III.292-345 (E40-46) Then follows a description of the *bodhisattva*, the *yogin,* the sage, and his compassion, his virtues, his omnipotence and magical powers, and his superknowledge.

III.346-360 (E46-48) Finally, the *bodhisattva* himself becomes a *buddha*, which is, in fact, the ultimate purpose, as already stated, of following the Mahāyāna path, the *mahāpuruṣacaryā.*

162.4 *Śrāvakatattvaniścayāvatāra*[165]

"E" references are to the Lindtner edition cited above.

Summary by Christian Lindtner

IV.1-14 (E49-50) Objection: One obtains *bodhi* as the Buddha, whose virtues are extraordinary, but still quite human, by following the eightfold noble (*ārya*) path. In this way one may destroy all emotional and intellectual obstructions. Mahāyāna is partly unorthodox. Several of its contentions are contradicted by perception and common sense. It is absurd to maintain that things are unborn in reality; nor is it true to claim that everything is consciousness-only (*vijñaptimātratā*).

IV.15-74 (E50-57) Answer: The *bodhi* of the Buddha consists in the cognition--without any object at all--of the emptiness of all factors. It is only in a relative sense, not in the ultimate sense, that the noble truths are valid. The path of Hīnayāna does not lead to *bodhi*. Mahāyāna *is*, in fact, orthodox, for it can afford a good explanation of each of the four noble truths. The important thing is to realize emptiness through personal experience and meditation. One does not deny that there are reasonable ideas to be found e.g. in Vedānta, and in a relative sense Madhyamaka of course accepts that there exists a natural relationship between cause and effect. In Madhyamaka it is exactly because one sees everything in the perspective of two truths that one does *not* come into conflict with perception and common sense. Because of ignorance most people never see the absolute truth. Finally, Madhyamaka does not accept that everything is consciousness-only in an absolute sense of that term. True reality cannot be described; it can only be experienced as such by

advanced and competent yogis.[166]

162.5 *Yogācāratattvaniścaya*

In what follows, a summary contributed by Christian Lindtner has been supplemented with translations of selected passages found in an article by Jay Hirabayashi and Shotaro Iida titled "Another look at the Mādhyamika vs. Yogācāra controversy concerning existence and non-existence", *Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems. Studies in Honor of Edward Conze* (ed. Lewis Lancaster) (Berkeley 1977), pp. 341-360. TJ indicates translations of selected passages of the *Tarkajvālā* by Hirabayashi and Iida. Their translations of technical terms has been replaced by ours. Page references in parentheses are to the Hirabayashi/Iida article. "E" references are to the Lindtner edition previously cited.

Summary by Christian Lindtner, Jay Hirabayashi and Shotaro Iida

V.1-5 (E59) Objection (by a Yogācāra, presumably Dharmapāla): Reality can, in fact, be the content of a cognition without images. The highest truth is described in Yogācāra works (*Madhyāntavibhāga*, etc.) in various terms such as absence of the constructed nature in the dependent nature, etc. It is only by penetrating the three natures that one achieves true understanding of the perfection of wisdom.

(Yogācāra objection continued:) 6. The designation (*prajñapti*) as *ātma-dharma* is accompanied by material causes, otherwise the two (i.e., *grāhya-grāhaka*) are nullified. Defilement is perceived, therefore the existence of the *paratantra-svabhāva* is maintainted (p. 349).

TJ (explaining Dharmapāla): (It is inferred from the following three reasons that the *paratantra-svabhāva*) is a real existence.) The first reason is that what indicates the existence of mind and mental associates is a representation accompanied by the material cause of a perverted view (*viparyāsa*). The second is that if the dependent nature (*paratantra*) does not exist, it would become a fallacy that the two,...the constructed and the perfected, are existent, because those two are dependent upon the dependent (nature). The third and last reason is that when the dependent nature does not exist, defilement (*saṁkleśa*) cannot be perceived. But in actuality, defilement is perceived. Defilement is dependent upon the mind

and mental associates. The separateness from it is emancipation (*vimokṣa*). Thus, out of these three reasons, it is evident that the dependent nature (*paratantra*) is really existent.

Because this dependent nature is comprehended by the purified knowledge which is acquired after the non-conceptual knowledge (*pṛṣṭhalabdhaśuddhilaukikajñāna*), it is an object of supramundane, non-conceptual knowledge, and as such is pereived by experiencing the absolute truth (pp. 349-350).

(Dharmapāla continuing) 7. This guiding principle of the *prajñāpāramitā* leads to the attainment of omniscience (*sarvajñā*), but the method which aims at negation of arising, ceasing, etc. does not. (p. 352)

TJ: (It can be proved from the following six textual testimonies that our exposition of *prajñāpāramitā* doctrine is the means to obtain omniscience.)

> (1) "All *dharma*s are nourished, fulfilled, manifest, and agitated by these *dharma*s. Nothing to be made *ātman* or *ātmya* exists here."

These passages indicate conceptual constructions in the form of "I" and "mine" (*ātma-ātmiya-ākāra-grāha*), and that by the (condition of) non-clingingness to them, the *ālayavijñāna* transforms itself.

> (2) "The mind is not mind."

This includes the non-existence of object and subject (*grāhya-grāhaka*).

> (3) "The no-mindedness (*acittatva*) is beyond comprehension."

This indicates consciousness-only (*vijñaptimātratā*).

> (4) "Thus *rūpa* is a material cause. Up to *bodhi* also, all things are material causes."

This shows the constructed nature (*parikalpita*), for it is represented by name and mark (*nāma-saṁketa*).

(5) Further, by showing the surmounted (*apodita*), the perceived (*upalabdha*), the represented *dharma*, and the parts of the *dharma*s which are conducive to enlightenment (*bodhipakṣadharma*), the dependent nature is indicated.

> (6) "Suchness (*tathatā*), the end of ultimate reality (*bhūtakoṭi*), the separatedness (*vivikta*), result (*phala*), knowledge of all forms."

The perfected nature (*pariniṣpanna*) is indicated by these words.

Thus, the *prajñāpāramitā* guiding principle expounded by is an expedient for obaining omniscience (*sarvajñatā*). But the Mādhyamika doctrine, infatuated with the refutation of origination and annihilation,

being identical with a nihilist's view, is not expedient for obtaining omniscience.

This is a summary of the Yogācāra doctrine (pp. 352-353).

V.8-15 (E59) (Bhavya's answer to Yogācāra) Before an interpretation of the holy scripture can be considered trustworthy it must be rational and consistent. This, however, is hardly the case with the interpretation (*naya*) offered by Yogācāra. Their interpretation of reality is not sound. The same applies to their interpretation of Buddha's words about everything being consciousness-only.

16 (E60) If essential nature is objectified the insight (*bodhi*) (of the Tathāgata) would be conceptual construction, would not be free from the bifurcation of subject and object (*sālambanā*), and would not become conceptionfree knowledge (*nirivkalpakadhī*) (p. 347).

TJ: Question: What makes the three turnings (*parivarta*) (of the wheel of *dharma*) differ regarding their depths?

Answer: There are two interpretations. The first is Bhāvaviveka's and other (Mādhyamikas') who maintain the following: The first turning of the wheel of doctrine concerned with the teaching of the four noble truths is meant for the *śrāvaka*s (disciples). It teaches only the non-substantiality of persons (*pudgalanairātmya*) and does not teach that of *dharma*s (*dharmanairātmya*). It is therefore not a deep teaching but a shallow one. The second, the Mahāyāna teaching concerned with (the perception) of marks, and based on the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*, still talks about the perception of entities. Therefore, it is not deep either. The third, the Mahāyāna teaching concerned with the markless, and based on the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*s, is the deepest, for it teaches the emptiness of all the factors.

As for the second (interpretation), Dharmapāla and others maintain the following on the basis of (their) *āgama*s: (The Buddha) taught the four noble truths in the first turning of the wheel the teaching of the markless in the second turing, and the teaching of the ultimate meaning in the third turning. The meaning of the first turning has already been explained in this commentary.

The last two turnings deal with the markless, wherein no distinction of depth exists regarding their guiding principle. The only reason for which a distinction of *neya-* and *nītārtha* is made between these two *sūtra*s (i.e., the *Saṁdhinirmocana* and the *Prajñāpāramitā sūtra*s) is that the nonsubstantiality of entities (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) also has the three aspects which are well explained in the *nītārthasūtra*, for it clearly shows the

logical reasoning which discerns existence and nonexistence. (Although the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*) teaches the *niḥsvabhāvatā* of all *dharmas*, it still has an aspect of concealment, hence, it is said to be a *sūtra* of provisional meaning.

Question: Which of the three natures is to be removed before (this doctrine) may be called (the teaching of) the markless?

Answer: There are two accounts for that. According to Dharmapāla, only the constructed nature is to be removed. According to Bhāvaviveka, on the other hand, the dependent nature should also be removed (pp. 347-348).

V.17-54 (E60-65) Without success Dignāga, in various ways, tries to explain everything as the projection of one's own mind without assuming the existence of any external object. Consciousness, he thinks, has a double aspect, a subjective and an objective one, the distinction begin purely subjective, determined by one's personal karma. On the basis of the distinction between two truths, Bhavya points out the contradictions to be found in Dignāga's position.

V.55-92 (E65-68) Then he goes on to show the emptiness of the three natures, first the constructed, including Dignāga's curious theories about language and meaning (*apoha*), then the dependent nature and finally the perfected nature.

71-72 (E66). For those who talk about the existence of the dependent nature and say that the dependent nature does exist, (the following fallacies would occur: From the point of view of phenomenal truth,) establishing what is already well-known in the world; from the point of view of ultimate reality, they would have no example and thus the reason becomes contradictory.

If (the dependent nature) has the nature of no essential nature because, by being produced, it is not produced as a real existence, certainly, the negation of origination and annihilation will be possible (p. 348).

TJ: With regard to this theory of the Vijñānavāda that the dependent nature is devoid of any essential nature in its origination, if this is what the Yogācāra really means, then the theory of our Mādhyamika school will be established, because it is admitted in our Mādhyamika school also that the things which originate from the reality of homogeneous direct and indirect causes do not originate from themselves, are devoid of any independent existence, and therefore there is no origination and annihilation, etc. (pp. 348-349).

Bhāvaviveka: If the *paratantra-svabhāva* exists absolutely, then it will contradict the following statement of a *sūtra*: The factors are born from causes and conditions; they, therefore, do not exist absolutely. He who knows this well is said to be an adept of dependent origination. If any factor is born from a condition, then that factor is totally devoid of intrinsic nature. If a factor is devoid of intrinsic nature, then that factor is not produced from a condition at all.

76. (E66) If you think that (its) origination is from other forces, because of this nature of arising out of (other) causes, this is blindness, like illusion. This view is established (p. 353).

TJ: Dharmapāla: The *paratantra* has an independent existence which comes into being through the arising of causes and conditions--this is the dependent nature. Since it originates from other forces, it is not the ultimate reality.

Bhāvaviveka: If this is the opponent's view, we, the Mādhyamika, say as follows: If you admit that this (*paratantra*) arises out of other forces, why do you find it substantial existence when (at the same time) it is unreal like an illusion? If it is like this (i.e., unreal), our theory is therefore proved by your statement (pp. 353-354).

77 (E66) (Bhāvaviveka:) Also, the *paratantra*, as absolute perception, does not exist. Therefore, it is maintained that (the *paratantra*) is not born as far as an intrinsic nature is concerned. As far as origination at the highest level (*paramārtha*) is concerned, illusory phenomena are not feasible (p. 354).

TJ: That is to say that because it is maintained by you that the *paratantra* is devoid of an essential nature (involving) grasped and grasper, you therefore maintain that there is no perception. If by means of an essential nature, i.e. if it is being generated by an essential nature, then to talk about the arising of erroneous appearance does not make senses because an essential nature is indeed not being generated. Because no essential nature is being generated, then, that is why these erroneous appearances occur (p. 354).

Dharmapāla: Granted that these *sūtra*s teach the nonessential nature of factors, still it does not conflict with our former assertion, for there are two kinds of factors of dependent origination, i.e., the constructed and the dependent natures. Here, the purported meaning is that the essencelessness (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) of the former is taught, but that of the latter is not referred to at all. If the latter is devoid of essential nature from the beginning, then it negates the substratum of defilement and

impurity. That is nothing but an ill-conceived notion of emptiness. This view is harmful to both self and others.

Bhāvaviveka: Who would (waste time) by refuting this wrong view? (No one,) but when the correct view is attained, it will be clear by itself.

Dharmapāla: If awareness (*citta*) and mental associates (*caitta*) which are born from causes and conditions do not have any substratum at all, then, similar to the constructed nature, they (awareness and associates) will be like a flower in the sky. How could they constitute a consciousness which is subject to *saṁsāric* existence?

Therefore, the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) cannot be other than some kind of substratum. The primary intention of the *śāstra* writer should undoubtedly be something of that nature. Otherwise, how could he maintain "the bondage of the dependent nature is broken by the realization of emptiness"? Does anyone on earth see that the hairs of a turtle do constitute something and a hare's horn is something that can be seen and removed? From the foregoing, you should know that while awarenesses and mental associates do exist, those external objects which are grasped apart from the mind do not (pp. 354-355).

V.93-114 (E68-71) Other errors in the Yogācāra exegesis are also pointed out. Only Madhyamaka exhibits the proper rational explanation of the Buddha's teachings. The highest cognition is real, but it has no content. It can be experienced, but cannot be described in words, only suggested.

162.6 *Sāṁkhyatattvāvatāra*

"E" references are to Lindtner's edition cited previously.

Summary by Christian Lindtner

VI.1-4 (E72) Objection by a Sāṁkhya (the *Sāṁkhyakārikā*s are quoted): *Prakṛti* is unconscious, it consistes of the three *guṇa*s, and it is productive (*prasavātmikā*). The *puruṣa* is exactly the opposite of *prakṛti*, viz., conscious, etc. By seeing itself as different from *prakṛti* it becomes free. Some authorities, however, opine that it is *prakṛti* that, once her task has been fulfilled, makes herself free by withdrawing from association with the *puruṣa*.

VI.5-46 (E72-77) Answer: The self cannot be identified with

consciousness (*caitanya*). A closer examination shows that there is no such thing as a permanent or omnipresent consciousness. A permanent self cannot change or reflect its image in *prakṛti*. Nor can it "enjoy" *prakṛti* as an object. The principles of Sāṁkhya are in conflict with one another.

162.7 *Vaiśeṣikatattvaniścaya*

"E" refers to the Lindtner edition cited above.

Summary by Christian Lindtner

VII.1-28 (27-28 edited E78) According to the Vaiśeṣika school, the self is a substance that has intelligence (*buddhi*) and other qualities. These qualities imply that the self is subject to change. Therefore it cannot be permanent, and so it cannot become free. As Bhavya points out, an extensive refutation of the self as an entity has already been provided above. Vaiśeṣika is irrational and not worthy of serious consideration. (The entire chapter consists of merely 28 stanzas of which only the final two are available in Sanskrit.)

162.8 *Vedāntatattvaniścaya*

This section comprises some 103 verses, of which the first sixteen, stating the Vedānta position, are given in Sanskrit and translated in V.V.Gokhale, "The Vedānta-philosophy described by Bhavya in his *Madhyamakahṛdaya*", Indo-Iranian Journal 2, 1958, pp. 165-180. Hajime Nakamura supplies the subsequent section giving the Buddhist answer in Adyar Library Bulletin 39, 1975, 300-329. The entire text is edited in Sanskrit and translated into English by Olle Qvarnström, *Hindu Philosophy in Buddhist Perspective*. Lund Studies in African and Asian Religions Vol. 4 (Lund 1989). This is our "E" and "T". Qvarnstrom provides an "analytical survey" on pp. 51-61, which we reproduce here minus a number of the Sanskrit terms and with some stylistic changes to suit the style of this Volume.

Summary by Olle Qvarnström

The Vedāntin

1 (E28; T620) Liberation arises out of the knowledge of the Self (*ātman*) or Person (*puruṣa*). The Buddhists, who deny the notion of a Self and maintain that all traces are empty, without an essential nature or "self", therefore cannot obtain liberation.

2 (E28; T62-63) The liberating knowledge results from the perception of the Self, the Person or the great Lord (*maheśvara*) located beyond the three-realm universe, which results from cause and effect.

3 (E28; T63) When one perceives the person and is consequently in union with him, one realizes that he is the agent and the Lord (*īśvara*) of the three-realm universe.

4 (E28; T63-64) This three-realm universe is completely pervaded by this Person in time and in space.

5 (E28; T64) The person remains unchanged and unspent while creating the three-realm universe, just like a spider which remains unchanged and unspent while producing threads. The one who, through the practice of meditation, perceives the Person and therefore is dissolved into Him, is not reborn into another existence.

6 (E28; T64-65) The one who does not perceive the immortal Person and accordingly is not awakened to become absorbed into Him, does not attain immortality, since the entire world--of which he is a part--is mortal by nature.

7 (E29; T65) There does not exist anything superior, more excellent or subtler than this Person who is the upholder of the entire empirical reality.

8 (E29; T65) The one who perceives the Person is endowed with perfections or supernatural powers (*siddhi*), since the Person has the nature of epitomizing all the aggregates of the three-realm universe.

9 (E29; T65-66) The experiencer of Him realizes that all entities as well as the very Self of the three-realm universe are comprehended within that Person. All beings, such as the ignorant and the learned, the outcaste and the brahmin, are therefore intrinsically identical from the perspective of the experiencer of the Self or the person.

10 (E29; T66) The Self does not have the same nature as bodies, etc., just as space does not have the same nature as pots.

11 (E29; T66) The Self is one and not many, although it exists in different embodied beings, just as space is one and not differentiated, though occupying different pots.

12 (E30; T67) The Self is one, even though bodies created out of that Self are different, just as clay is one, even though pots, etc. created out

of that clay are different.

13 (E30; T67) Just as when dust, smoke, etc. cover the space in a single pot, all other pots are not similarly covered, so when one person is happy or suffers, all other persons are not similarly happy or suffering.

14 (E30; T67) Happiness and suffering arise only within the person who does not know the Self and who is not awakened to become absorbed into the Self. Happiness and suffering therefore do not belong to the Self, just as dust, smoke, etc. do not belong to space. That person who is ignorant of the Self and not awakened to become absorbed into it thinks of his experiences as real, just as the person who dreams imagines himself to have waking experiences. In effect, impressions are accumulated from activity, and depending on their good and bad results, happiness or suffering is experienced.

15 (E30; T68) The very Self, however, is not defiled as the agent and the enjoyer of the three-realm universe, since It is nonattached.

16 (E30; T68) The Self (*Brahman*) is one due to its supremacy over the whole body; all-pervasive due to the fact that it pervades the whole world; eternal, due to its indestructibility; and it is the immortal state due to the fact that it is without beginning or end. When through meditation one knows the Self, one is free from rebirth.

17 (E31; T68) The Self is also eternal, because it is capable of being objectified by the yogi at all times. It is nonconceptual (*avikalpa*) because it is different from the senses and consciousness; and it is beyond the realm of speech because it is not within the reach of the mind. Words like *ātman, puruṣa, īśvara, sarvatraga, nitya*, etc. are, however, applied to it by those whose minds are led astray by difference because they have not experienced the Self.

162.9 *Mīmāṁsātattvanirṇayāvatāra*

"E" references are to Lindtner's edition referred to above.

Summary by Christian Lindtner[167]

IX.1-17 (E92-94) Objection: According to Mīmāṁsā liberation is to be obtained not by *dhyāna* or meditation but by the performance of various rituals alone (*kriyāmātra*). These rituals are prescribed by the authority of scripture, the three Vedas. This scripture derives its authority

from the fact that it consists of words that are permanent, i.e. not created by a fallible human author. As scripture it is reliable because it has been handed down without interruption. As an instrument of knowledge scripture informs us of our ritual duties (*apūrva=dharma*), and as such it is quite different from inference. The Bhagavat of the Buddhists (and Jains) is not omniscient and his words are therefore unreliable.

IX.18-23 (E94) Answer: If a tradition is to be considered scripture it must be true and logical. The highest goal, liberation, can only be achieved by knowledge (*jñāna*), not by action (*kriyā*). Sometimes the words of human beings *are* reliable.

IX.24-42 (E94-96) The three Vedas do, in fact, have a human author, even an evil one. This is because the Vedas prescribe violence (*hiṁsā*), etc., which is the cause of frustration. It is impossible to protect oneself and others against the frustration of violence by incantations (*mantra*) and such things. Even if done for some holy purpose or in some sacred place violence is to be rejected. The same goes for drink (*madyapāna*).

IX.43-49 (E97) The reasons for claiming that the words of the Vedas (the Word) are permanent, and thus authoritative, are not valid. Thus the Word cannot have a permanent relation to any thing. On the contrary, understanding (*pratipatti*) is based on convention (*saṁketa*).

IX.50-54 (E97-98) As an instrument of knowledge scripture is not essentially different from inference, which also has a manifold (abstract) object. Both are, in the end, based on perception.

IX.55-58 (E98) Since rituals are impermanent their results must also be impermanent. So the Vedas are obviously wrong in saying that they lead to immortality (*apavarga*), etc.

IX.59-73 (E98-100) Since the main teachers of the three Vedas, i.e. Brahmā, Viṣṇu (Kṛṣṇa) and Śiva--as seen by many examples in the *Mahābhārata*, etc.--lack knowledge (*jñāna*) and are full of faults (*kleśa*), they should not serve as authorities. Their immoral behavior cannot be justified by referring to the necessity of protecting the law (*dharmagupti*). Moreover, they lack compassion and are full of hatred, desire etc.

IX.74-86 (E100-101) Also, the idea that Viṣṇu has *two* bodies is absurd, and has only been introduced for the purpose of protecting one's wishes (*vyasanagupti*). So there is no point in meditating, in terms of yoga, on the body of Hari.

IX.87-94 (E101-102) Since the gods are ignorant of causality (in the Buddhist sense) and full of passions, etc., they cannot serve the cause of protecting the law, be it by teaching or by their personal behavior. So

again the three Vedas should be rejected.

IX.95-119 (E102-105) God, as the creator of the world, has already been refuted in Chapter III. If it is now asked *what* he, hypothetically, has created, some possibilities are examined--and excluded. Nor can God be considered single, permanent, etc. In fact, God seems to be cruel and unjust, so it is safer to say that karma, not God, is responsible for the emanation (*sṛṣṭi*) of the world. Again, meditation on God will not bring an end to suffering.

IX.120-147 (E105-108) Moreover, the Vedas are wrong when claiming that bad karma can be removed by means of water, for karma is bound to consciousness (*citta*) with which water obviously cannot get in touch. There are other silly doctrines in the Vedas, e.g. that it is good to throw oneself into fire, and to abstain from food and drinking. It is, under certain circumstances, all right to eat meat, it mostly depends on one's motive. The Vedas are also mistaken in claiming that trees are sentient beings endowed with a soul. Again, it is karma that is responsible for "life".

IX148-167 (148 at E108) Finally, one cannot argue that the Vedas must be authoritative because they are endorsed by various "authorities," for these authorities are obviously not always reliable. Some of their statements are true, others false. As said, scripture should only be followed to the extent that it satisfies the demands of logic and inference. The Buddha, on the other hand, is reliable and omniscient in the sense that he knows and preaches the path to heaven and liberation. It is quite true that the Jains also refute the three Vedas, but of course this does not mean that the Buddhists are also Jains.

162.10 *Sarvajñasiddhinirdeśa*

"E" references are to the Lindtner edition.

Summary by Christian Lindtner

X.1-14 (13-14 only provided at E109) The Nirgranthas point out various passages in the Buddhist scriptures that apparently show the Buddha to have been very human indeed. Many of his actions can only be accounted for by assuming his deep ignorance of the motives of other human beings.

Bhavya argues that this is a misunderstanding. The Buddha merely *pretended* to be ignorant, the reason being that he was motivated by the desire to help ignorant human beings overcome their passions. So he had to play along their lines (*upāyakauśalya*). The Buddha always had a good reason to *appear* not to be omniscient. For reasons already given above, the Buddha is, in fact, omniscient (*sarvajña*).

162.11 *Śtutilakṣaṇanirdeśa*

Summary by Christian Lindtner

XI.1-4 (E110) Here Bhavya summarizes his position. The Buddha is praised for having preached the two truths. The true relative truth is a means of achieving the absolute truth. It is Bhavya's hope as author of this text to be able to help intelligent students in obtaining enlightenment (*bodhi*). The text itself is described as a *śāstra* that serves as a mirror in which one can see the contents of numerous *sūtra*s reflected in brief form.

163.BHAVYA, *Prajñāpradīpa* on Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakakārikā*s (550)

This work is not extant in Sanskrit, except for a few lines quoted in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*. The Tibetan translation by Jñānagarbha and Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan was made in the early ninth century. (This Jñānagarbha is not the same person as the author of *Satyadvayavibhāṅga*.) A Chinese translation by Prabhākaramitra dates from around 630, but is, according to Yuichi Kajiyama and Christian Lindtner, very bad.

Summary by Karl H. Potter

CHAPTER I: Investigation of the Four Conditions[168]

3-4 (T21.214-220) Defence of Nāgārjuna's understanding of dependent origination against grammatical complaints about his understanding of the compound "*pratītyasamutpāda*".

Each of the terms in the eight negative predications of verses 1-2 is explained. Dependent origination is the quiescence of discursiveness, since attachment to language is pacified.

A number of objections are considered and refuted, of which the following is a sample: Objection: Your thesis is that dependent origination is nonoriginated; but if so, your own statement is nonoriginated, just as if you had said "All language is false".

Answer: We do not say that all dependent origination is nonoriginated. We agree that, conventionally, dependent origination is originated, and that includes our statement.

Objection: Dependent origination is viewed by other Buddhists as an unconditioned entity. Now you are a Buddhist, and you do not agree with that, so you shouldn't be offering your argument as a defence of Buddhism.

Answer: Our view of dependent origination is different from that of the *śrāvaka*s, since we deal with dependent origination negatively (not postulating it as an entity), and also because there is no reason to suppose an unconditioned dependent origination exists. After all, dependent origination has a cause like the (supposed) existence of things, so it doesn't exist any more than they do. Dependent origination has nonorigination as its essential nature.

(T21.220-223) There are four possible ways in which things are supposed to arise and the author denies them all, as follows: (1) Dependently originated things do not arise from themselves, (2) nor from another, (3) nor from both, (4) nor from no cause at all. The denial must be understood as a *prasajya-*, not a *paryudāsa-* negation. which is to say, e.g., that (1) does not mean that a dependently originated thing arises from something else.

Objection: You have not showed that your *h* is absent from a *vp*, so your argument fails.

Answer: Because there are no *vp*s the *h* cannot be faulted for not being absent from them!

Sāṁkhya: When you say that things do not arise from themselves do you mean they don't arise from the the result or from the cause? If the former you merely prove what is already accepted, but if the latter you contradict yourself (since a "cause" is precisely what a thing arises from).

Answer: What we deny is that things arise from themselves

Buddhapālita: Things do not arise from themselves since the origination would be pointless and it would lead to infinite regress.

Answer: Then the opponent could say that things originate from another because origination has a result and an end, and this would

contradict Buddhapālita's own belief.

Objection: Nobody claims that things arise from themselves, so your argument is irrelevant.

Answer: But you yourself hold that a thing manifests its own potentiality, which is a way of saying things arise from themselves.

(T21.223-226) As for (2) things do not arise from another, here is our argument: Things like organs do not arise from causes that are different from those things, because they are different, as the conditions making up a jar are different from the jar.

Objection: The reason is defective since it just restates part of the thesis.

Answer: Valid arguments sometimes feature such a reason: consider "the sound of Vedic hymns is impermanent, because it is sound, like the sound of a drum."

Vaiśeṣika: Since "because they are different" means "because of having the *guṇa* difference", and since you do not accept our categories, your argument is fallacious.

Answer: We are not referring to a Vaiśeṣika category, but merely speaking generally. Anyway, the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas is mistaken, as the following argument proves: Earth-atoms do not actually produce earth, because they are atoms, like fire-atoms (and likewise, fire-atoms do not produce fire, because they are atoms like earth-atoms, etc.).

Ābhidharmika: If (your *h*) "difference" in the Vaiśeṣika argument refers to things which do not have causal power then your *h* is unproved. And if it refers to things which do have that power then your *sp* fails.

Answer: This is a futile rejoinder, since we just answered it (we were merely speaking generally).

Nyāya: Since you do not accept organs your *p* is unproved (*āśrayāsiddha*), and this is a fallacy.

Answer: But we do accept organs and difference conventionally. So the argument is proper.

Buddhapālita (according to Avalokitavrata): Things do not arise from something else; if they did, then anything could originate from anything.

Answer: That contradicts your earlier argument, and is incoherent anyway, since there is no connection between your reason and conclusion.

Sāṁkhya: A sprout arises both from factors which are different from it (e.g., soil) and from factors that are the same as it (e.g., the seed).

(T21.226-234) Answer: (3) "not from both"; i.e., the arguments against (1) and (2) refute (3), since (3) is just the sum of (1) and (2). This

also refutes the Jains, who likewise hold such a position.

(4) "Nor from no cause at all", for there is nothing to show that things arise without a cause, and to suppose so would contradict inference as well as common sense. An alternative reading of (4) is "nor from bad causes," that is, from essential nature, God, *puruṣa*, *prakṛti*, time, etc. These are bad causes since they don't exist and thus can't cause.

A believer in essential natures (*svabhāvavādin*): Inner organs arise from their essential natures, because things arise, like color, shapes, etc.

Answer: If this is said conventionally we agree. If it is intended from the highest standpoint and is intended to show that actually everything arises from no cause at all, then your *h* commits the fallacy of contradiction, since it is presumably something that has actually arisen (if not, no proof has occurred).

Svabhāvavādin: We cannot argue that causes don't exist to someone who believes they do without giving a reason. Likewise one cannot argue with a foreigner without speaking his language.

Answer: But by using his language we can establish an *h* for him, so this excuse won't wash.

Nor is God the cause of the world.

Objection: Karma, the cause of the varieties of things in the world, is called "God", because it produces arising, maintaining and destruction, satisfaction and frustration, etc.

Answer: All right conventionally, but not ultimately, since we do not accept that there is actually any arising, etc. This also negates the theory that the self (*puruṣa*) is the cause of the world.

Nor is *prakṛti* the cause of the world. Sāṁkhya arguments for it fail systematically because they require examples and we deny that any examples that may be offered are actual entities.

Sāṁkhya: We agree that nothing originates. But nevertheless things are manifested (*vyakta*).

Answer: How can an unoriginated lamp make unoriginated jars manifest? A hare's horn can never be made manifest.

2 (T22.93-end) Causal condition (*hetupratyaya*) includes what is standardly termed the simultaneous (*sahabhū*), homogeneous (*sabhāga*), connected (*samprayukta*), pervasive (*sarvatraga*) and maturation (*vipāka*) conditions. Supporting object (*ālambana*) conditions comprise all factors. The proximate (*samanantara*) condition consists of all awarenesses and mental associates that have arisen except for the last (consciousness and mental factors of an *arhat*). The dominant factor (*adhipati*) condition is

the nonobstructing or instrumental cause (*kāraṇahetu*).

Nāgārjuna says (3) "The intrinsic nature of things does not exist in their conditions. If an essential nature does not exist, an other-nature (*parabhāva*) does not exist either."

The meaning is that from the highest standpoint things do not arise from themselves or from others; they do not arise at all.

Objection (by Guṇamati, according to Avalokitavrata): When (in I.4) Nāgārjuna denies that actions have causes what he is denying is that awarenesses occur.

Answer: Nāgārjuna does not deny that there are awarenesses conventionally, only from the highest standpoint.

Sāṁkhya: The absence of a hare's horn exists, because it is a qualified thing, like matter/form and like a blue lotus

Answer: We deny that matter/form and a blue lotus exist; we do not affirm that they are absences.

Sautrāntika: We hold that the causal nexus of conditions that occurs precisely at the time the effect occurs (and not earlier) are the causal conditions.

Answer: No. In actuality, a seed is not a cause at the time the sprout arises, because it is neither the same nor different from the sprout, like the seed at a previous moment.

Sautrāntika: We agree that there can be no cause for either something that already exists or for something that does not exist. The reason is this: at the time the causal nexus assembles it is not the case that the result does not exist, since it is arising, but it is not the case that it does exist, because it has not yet arisen.

Answer: But we have shown that each of these two claims is wrong, so that the conjunction of them, being falsely imputed, cannot justify the attribution of causes to things.

CHAPTER TWO: Investigation of Motion[169]

1-7 (T300-336) Nāgārjuna provides this chapter to show that dependent origination is actually empty of either coming or going, and to refute the position contrary to ours (in Chapter 1) that nothing arises. By first refuting the conventional notion that there are things to be done he removes the thorn of attachment (that ordinary folk are pricked by).

Objection: Things (such as the six senses) really have arisen, because

they are the purpose of practical activities, unlike the activities of the son of a barren woman.

Answer: If this is intended as a matter of conventional truth, fine, but if it is intended to describe an aspect of the highest reality your *h* is unproved, since there is no practical activity ("going" or "passing") and your *h* only occurs in cases of the *vp*.

The Chapter explains in the form of argument and counterargument each step in Nāgārjuna's rejection of motion.

CHAPTER THREE: Investigation of the Sense-Bases[170]

From the highest standpoint the eye does not see matter/form, because it does not see itself, like the ear. Again, from the highest standpoint matter/form is not seen by the eye, because it is a collection, like the eye itself.

Can an eye grasp an object with which it is in contact, or one with which it is not? Neither, since an eye cannot see itself, just as the nose cannot smell itself, etc. How can it see other things, whether it is in contact with them or not, especially since we have already shown that other things do not exist from the ultimate standpoint?

Objection: You say that the eye does not see itself, and therefore cannot see another either. But the eye can see itself, just as fire can burn itself, and thus it can see another as well.

Answer: Even conventionally it is not the case that the essential nature of fire is to burn. Burning is a transformation of the fuel that is produced by fire, not the essential nature of fire. Again, parallel to the argument in the previous Chapter (Chapter 2) it can be proved that fire does not burn fuel that has been burned, that has not been burned, or that is being burned. Thus the eye does not see forms which have been seen, which have not been seen, or which are being seen. Indeed the eye does not see at all, being a lump of earth

Objection: The eye first exists without seeing anything and is called "eye" figuratively because of the power it will eventually exercise in seeing.

Answer: That is all right as regards conventional truth, but fails to make a case for the eye's seeing from the highest standpoint.

Sāṁkhya, Vaiśeṣika: The eye is the instrument; it is instead the self that sees.

Answer: Our foregoing arguments refute this as readily as the thesis

that the eye is the seer, and for the same reasons. E.g., the self is really a seer, because it does see itself, like the ear.

Does this seer of yours have the essential nature of being a seer or not? If so, as Sāṁkhya for example says, then a seer would see even without any visual organs. If not, as the Vaiśeṣikas say, then a seer is just a group of things different from the visual organ that is conventionally termed "the seer Devadatta", e.g., and is other than the visual organ and so is not a seer.

Objection: From the highest standpoint awareness and the eye etc. really do exist, since appropriation (*upādāna*), etc. exist.

Answer: But appropriations, like desires, views, morality, etc., do not exist ultimately, but only conventionally.

CHAPTER FOUR: Investigation of the Five Aggregates[171]

1-7. Matter/form does not ultimately exist, because awareness of matter/form requires awareness of its cause, like an army (which does not exist since it has no cause). Or the awareness of matter/form does not have an actual object as its content, because it is an awareness, like the awareness of a forest. Or, the word "matter" does not denote a real thing, because it is a word, like the word "army". These arguments refute the existence of secondary matter (*upādāya*- or *bhautika-rūpa*).

Objection: But elemental matter (*bhūtarūpa*) does really exist, because secondary matter must have a cause, like earth and unlike a sky-flower.

In answer Nāgārjuna adds that the cause of matter is not seen apart from matter, i.e., that "matter" is a conventional designation or construction, indeed, empty as stated in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (quoted).

In denying the existence of matter/form we are not, like Sāṁkhya, affirming that it is something else, say, visible form.

Vaiśeṣika: Your reason is inconclusive, because even though the form of a thing's parts is not seen it may still be apprehended in some way, just as a jar unlit by a lamp may be lit by sunlight, etc.

Answer: No, since there is no way other than by awareness of it that matter is going to be known.

Objection: You indicate that an army is unreal. But an army is really composed of parts.

Answer: No, any more than the collection of roots, trunk and branches constitutes a tree.

Materialist: We hold that all things originate from no cause at all.

Answer: That is why Nāgārjuna adds that things not originated from causes do not exist either. Anyway, if something could be a cause of matter and there be no matter that thing would be a cause without an effect--but there can't be a cause without an effect! And if matter already exists nothing can cause it.

Materialist: What I am trying to say is that there are no causes for matter.

Answer: That is surely not possible in the conventional world.

Ābhidharmika: The effect is in some cases like the cause, and in others unlike it.

Answer: We have shown that the effect cannot be like its cause; it is also the case that it cannot be unlike it either.

8-9. To attempt to answer these arguments (and the others in the entire work) by denying them is to aver that they are empty, which thus admits the very position we are advocating! Scriptural quotations are provided in support.

CHAPTER FIVE: Investigation of the Six Elements[172]

1-7. The six elements (*dhātu*) in question are the four great elements plus space and consciousness.

Objection: The Buddha taught that these six had defining characteristics respectively of solidity, cohesion, heat, motion, making room and cognizing. Nonexistent things like sky-flowers cannot cause these things. So Nāgārjuna is contradicting himself.

Answer: But, for example, there is no space without a mark of it, here making room; indeed the two are the same thing. Thus the Vaibhāṣikas and Vaiśeṣikas who distinguish space from its marks are wrong. Space is not a real thing because it is unoriginated, like a hare's horn. If space and its mark were different one should occur without the other. And if the mark could occur before the thing it marks, it wouldn't be that thing's mark. Furthermore, nothing can exist without a mark.

Jain: A mark applies to a thing that has it in one mode and doesn't have it in another mode.

Answer: That is contradictory and will be refuted further in Chapter 10 (of the text). In any case both of the two "modes" has been refuted previously.

Buddhapālita: What verse 3ab says is that a mark does not apply to a thing which has no mark, since without a mark a thing does not exist,

nor does a mark apply to a thing which has a mark, since it is not needed.

Answer: That is not right, since you implicitly admit that its mark exists while denying the thing marked, which is a contradiction.

Vaibhāṣika: Space is a positive entity because it is unconditioned like *nirvāṇa*.

Answer: *Nirvāṇa* isn't an entity.

Sautrāntika: Space is not an entity, but it is the absence of a resisting substance.

Answer: But space is a meditative object for one who meditates on the infinity of space. And how can there be an absence of something which is not a positive entity?

Vaibhāṣika: Matter/form, etc. are positive entities, because their absences exist in relation (to their counterpositives), like the absence of flavor, and unlike a horse's horn. And you have previously asserted that the aggregates, senses and elements do not essentially exist, i.e. do not exist as essential natures. So, since their absences exist in relation to their presences, they must exist.

Answer: Since we do not admit that absences exist, your example "like the absence of flavor" is fallacious.

Objection: Both presences and absences exist since their cognizer exists.

Answer: The cognizer must either exist or not exist, and since we have shown that neither is the case your argument fails. So space is neither a positive thing, an absence, a marked thing or a mark. The same goes for the other five elements.

Saṅghabhadra: Your negation (*apavāda*) of all things from the ultimate standpoint constitutes an extreme view, as the Buddha himself noted. Your position is like the materialists'.

8. Answer: We denied things have an essential nature; we did not assert that they are absent altogether. It is a *prasajya*, not a *paryudāsa* absence that we claim. The Buddha said that when one says "it is not black" he does not necessarily mean "it is white". Both extreme views, that things exist or that they do not, are bad views because they provide an obstacle to the wise who desire the quiescence of every discursive development. If things had an essential or intrinsic nature then effort to produce or avoid them would be vain, and people would not be able to avoid frustrations or increase satisfactions. The same pointlessness of things would accrue if the absence of things had an essential nature. The

weak-minded who do not understand this do conceive the possibility of quiescence of visible things, which is felicity.

Quotations from *sūtras* to confirm this.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Investigation of Reality[173]

1 (T113-116) Two *sūtras* in which the Buddha stated that everything is false are quoted, one attributed to Śrāvakayāna and the other to Mahāyāna. The Buddha's argument is given thus:

All conditioned entities are false (unreal),
Because they are deceptive (*moṣa*),
Like the body of an illusory woman projected by a magician.

Objection: You've left out the other two members of an inference, the application and the conclusion.

Answer: We do not consider these members, but we can generate them from what is provided in the three we specify. Three members are considered sufficient by the authors of *śāstras*.

4 (T118-119) The *sūtra* says: "Change is the...true nature of emptiness."

Objection: No. The argument is that conditioned entities are false, i.e., without essential natures, but it does not conclude the nonexistence or emptiness of things. The body of an illusory woman projected by a magician is without essential nature, but it exists.

Answer: But emptiness just is being without an essential nature, so your distinction is groundless. The example of the illusory woman's body serves to illustrate that being deceptive would not occur unless there were emptiness. When a rope is seen as a snake the essential nature of the rope is not lost. So deception is the result of being wrongly judged to involve a self; it is not that the nature of anything changes, rather that things have no self-natures.

6 (T120-121) Objection: Fresh milk changes into curdled but is still milk!

Answer: Then the same milk is both sweet and curdled! "Nothing can change..."

Objection: Entities are not empty since their opposites exist. A sky-flower, which has no opposite, is nonexistent, but the opposite of nonemptiness (i.e. emptiness) exists (according to you). So nonemptiness must as well.

7 (T121-124) Answer: "...there is nothing nonempty (i.e., permanent

and substantial), and one cannot talk of an alternative called empty." "Empty" and "nonempty" are conceptual constructions, based on convention.

Some yogis (i.e., Yogācāra) think that because the constructed (*parikalpita*) nature is empty entities have a real unconstructed nature. But both emptiness and nonemptiness are conceptual constructions

Objection: Scripture says e.g. "those who cognize emptiness see reality", etc., so emptiness must exist.

Answer: But other passages say e.g. "one should not suppose 'form is empty' and one should not suppose 'it is nonempty'." The view of emptiness removes grasping, but it too must be abandoned, since all conceptual constructions must be abandoned..

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: Investigation of Karma and Its Fruits[174]

1-11.Objection (by a Śrāvaka-Vaibhāṣika according to Avalokitavraṭa): You argued (in Chapter 16) that rebirth does not occur to traces because that would lead to the faults of eternalism or nihilism. We agree that those faults do not occur, but we will prove that rebirth exists for traces because actions have results and vice versa, unlike for the traces belonging to a barren woman's son. Actions, e.g., volitions, result in good, bad or neutral bodily or vocal traces. "Seven divisions" of bodily, mental and vocal actions are: language, movement, good and bad unmanifest karma, merit and demerit and volition. These seven have pure particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*). From these seven kinds of acts result the five aggregates in the five courses. Thus rebirth really does occur.

Answer: If that were so karma, once having been laid down, would either (1) persist until it bears fruit or (2) cease immediately. So if it persists at all it will persist forever.

Objection: Like a plant the trace ceases after its fruit matures.

Answer: No, since bearing fruit happens only conventionally, not from the highest standpoint: also, a thing's nature (*svalakṣaṇa*) cannot change, so a thing that is permanent by nature must remain so. But (2) if it ceases immediately how can the karma produce any result?

Objection: The series that we call the "sprout" arises from the series called "seed". The seed-series is still there when the sprout-series begins to arise, but is gone when the sprout has arisen. Thus the seed (or the sprout) is neither gone before the sprout arises, nor does it last eternally. In the same way, the series of mental actions of consciousness arises

from the series called "volition", and is still there when the volition begins to arise, but is gone when the volition has arisen. Thus the ten paths of action result from the five kinds of sensory maturations.

12-20. Another objection: If what you hold were true a human could not be reborn as a god, and generally one sort of being could not be reborn or meditate in different species or realms, since the results of action would be fixed forever. Karma is like a debt that will come due on a certain date.

21-33. Answer (to both objections): Karma does not originate at all, since it lacks an essential nature.

Objection: But the Buddha specifically said that karma does not disappear.

Answer: What he meant is that since action never occurs it never disappears.

Objection: Actions must actually occur since they are caused to occur by the defilements. If the defilements are not real how could action be produced by them?

Answer: All are empty; they do not actually occur.[175]

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN: Investigation of the Self and Factors

8. (summary by Shotaro Iida) Here Bhavya divides the world into conventional reality and ultimate reality, and further divides conventional reality into real (*tathya*) and false (*mithyā*). He also separates ultimate reality into two kinds: supramundane (*aparyāya*)--uncognizable by others --and mundane (*paryāya*), available to discrimination.[176]

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE: Investigation of *Nirvāṇa*

Appendix

The following summary is based on the translation and analysis by Malcolm David Eckel in *Miscellanea Buddhica* (Indiske Studier 5: Copenhagen 1985), pp. 25-75. Eckel tells us that this Appendix occupies 19 folio sides in the Tibetan Tripiṭaka. The Tibetan text itself is edited by Christian Lindtner, Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica 29/2, pp. 77-97; "E" references below are to this, while "T" refers to the pages in Eckel's translation.

(E1; T45-46) Yogācāra: If as verse 24 of this Chapter says "There is

no Buddha who has preached anything to anyone," and since we are told (by Asaṅga) that the three natures are empty with regard to their definition, origin and reality, then the dependent nature cannot be denied reality, though it is not noticed (*na samanupaśyati*) since it is not grasped as having the mark (of the constructed nature).

(E2; T49-52) The constructed nature involves conceptual constructions of essential natures of factors, the notion that there are things such as matter/form, feeling, etc., and that they have qualities such as visibility, etc. This constructed nature is empty, not corresponding to any of the five kinds of factors. But defilements arise from language; people become attached to the constructed natures through words.

Mādhyamika: To be sure, a constructed object is not what it is taken to be, but it it is something conventionally--a coiled snake is a snake--to say otherwise would contradict common sense. Otherwise you could not even cite it as an example. A reason (in inference) must be accepted conventionally by both parties (to the debate). If your argument is: the constructed nature does not exist, because it is false", it is unproved, since names are instances of matter/form and traces, conceptual constructions are among the aggregates of consciousness and traces. Furthermore, if things have no natures and no qualities no one could be defiled. It is not the name that causes attachment to a thing; rather what that involves is careless attention (*ayoniśomanasikāra).*

(E3; T52-54) What is this "dependent nature"?

Yogācāra: It is the nature of factors that arise dependently and is the locus of defilement and purification. A dependent nature exists, because (1) ideas have causes, since (2) otherwise defilement and purification could not occur, and (3) because defilements are apprehended.

Mādhyamika: If this dependent nature is just being said to be conventionally real (*vyavahārasat*) there is no problem. If it were ultimately real, however, it could not arise dependently. As for your three reasons,

(1) "Because ideas have causes" cannot be a statement of a reason, since it does not state a property of the *p* (viz., dependent nature). What it appears to provide is an *sp*.

Yogācāra: The inference is as follows: Ultimately the meaning of each word (e.g. "matter") has a cause, because it is an idea."

Mādhyamika: But since for you everything is an idea, you haven't given an *sp* (i.e., something other than the *p,* i.e., a non-idea). And in any case nothing is a reason "ultimately".

(E4; T54-56) (2) "Because otherwise defilement and purification could not occur." But it is not a denial of defilement and purification to say that ultimately nothing arises.

Yogācāra: A *Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra* says: There is an element (*dhātu*) that is the basis of all seeds (i.e., factors), and because it exists the various courses of life exist as well as the attainment of liberation.

Mādhyamika: This passage concerns conventional reality only. The "element" being referred to is consciousness, which indeed does contain all seeds, i.e., traces.

(E5; T56-57) The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* affirms that something dependent exists.

Mādhyamika: Again, you misconstrue the passage: all it means is that what is dependent exists only conventionally (quoting another passage from the *Laṅkāvatāra* to support that interpretation).

(E6; T57-59) (3) "Because defilements are apprehended."

Yogācāra: The *dharmadhātu* is neither defiled nor undefiled, and defilements are adventitious. So the *Madhyāntavibhāga* says that emptiness can be considered pure like water, gold or space. And it goes on to say that it is neither afflicted nor unafflicted, neither clear nor unclear, since afflictions are adventitious.[177]

Mādhyamika: But then those who believe in a self argue that there is a self that is eternal and pure and yet that there is also transmigration and liberation. That position is as self-contradictory as your own.

Purity in water, etc. arises from causes and conditions; likewise, consciousness can arise involved with defilements or as purified from them. But the *dharmadhātu* doesn't arise at all, and so cannot be pure or impure in that way.

Yogācāra: So likewise space, a real entity, can be stained when there is smoke and clear when there is not.

Mādhyamika: Space is not a real entity. Even if it were it does not arise or cease; thus it is like the *dharmadhātu*, which as you yourself have said is neither defiled nor undefiled.

(E7; T59-60) You said that (the three natures, and thus) the dependent nature is empty with regard to origin. But if that means that it really is so, since nothing can arise at all, then (cf. Chapter One) you are wrong about that. And if you merely mean that it is conventionally taken to be so that is uncontroversial.

(E8-9; T60-64) If you said that it (the dependent nature) is not noticed because it does not exist as it appears, we agree. If you say that

it is not noticed because external objects don't exist, then what are we speaking of when we refer to external objects?

You argue that consciousness is empty for various reasons and on the basis of scripture, specifically the *Laṅkāvatāra* again. But to repeat, do you mean that it is empty ultimately or conventionally? In the former case you can provide no example, and in the latter there is no disagreement with us. As for scripture, the passage from the *Laṅkāvatāra* in question, which concludes by asserting consciousness-only, means that there is no agent or enjoyer other than consciousness. But we accept this; indeed, it is what the Bodhisattva realizes at the sixth stage.

(E10; T64-65) Yogācāra: Material things are by nature awareness, because they are contents of awareness.

Mādhyamika: Your reason is equivocal, since mental associates (*caitta*) are contents of awareness but are different from consciousness (*citta*).

(E11; T65-67) Yogācāra: Is the content of an awareness an atom or a combination of atoms? Not the former since an atom is invisible, and not the latter, since a combination of atoms is not a real thing, any more than a double-moon (seen in error) is.

Mādhyamika: By saying "atoms are invisible" do you mean to imply that something else is the object of sight? But this denies your earlier position. Or do you mean that awareness has no content at all? But you haven't proved that. Furthermore, the form of a single atom can be the content of an awareness when it is combined with the forms of other atoms. Indeed, the *Abhidharmakośa* (I.35d) says that the ten organs (*āyatana*) are combinations (*saṁcita*).

But you have just now argued that a combination of atoms is not the object of awareness because it is not a real thing, being like the double moon. We agree that double moon is not an object of awareness; there is no such object. But if you are saying the double moon is cognized even though it is not a real thing your example fails to instantiate your *h*. And if you say that an awareness of matter does not have matter as it content, then your example fails to instantiate the *s*.

(E12; T68-69) To deny that supporting-object conditions (*ālambanapratyaya*) even exist conventionally is contradictory.

(Yogācāra: There are no supporting-object conditions. Rather, it is the store-consciousness which appears as the object .)

Mādhyamika: Since the store-consciousness remains the same, if it were the cause of a particular cognition the awareness of it woujld be

permanent.

Asaṅga (in *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.6): "Apprehending this, nonapprehension arises; based on this nonapprehension, nonapprehension arises."

Mādhyamika: But only if we accept consciousness-only (*vijñaptimātratā*), which we don't. Or if you are saying that external objects are not cognized because there are no objects at all, that is precisely our position!

(E13; T70) You advocate meditating first on the selflessness of objects and subsequently on consciousness and awareness. But why not meditate on both of them from the start?!

(E14; T70-71) And what is the perfected (*pariniṣpanna*) nature for you? You say it is the suchness (*tathatā*) of factors, but how can factors have a nature if they are unestablished? If you say that factors only exist conventionally you agree with us Madhyamakas.

Is your "absence of two things" (in *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.14ab: "the absence of two things, and the existence of this absence, is the defining characteristic of emptiness") a *prasajya* absence or a *paryudāsa* absence? If the former it doesn't follow that there is "the existence of this absence", and if the latter it would amount to asserting the existence of absences, which is an extreme view, viz. nihilism.

(E15; T72-74) Anyway, how can grasping this perfected nature be termed "pure"? It can't be conceptionfree, since there is an appearance (*ābhāsa*) of an object. So how is it pure?

Yogācāra: Just as one's fear of a snake is laid to rest when he comes to know it is only a rope, so when someone sees thusness defilements cease--and this is the grasping of the *dharmadhātu*,

Mādhyamika: When one has a correct awareness it causes no fear. Grasping thusness is like that. The reality of things is that they are completely unestablished, and since this is in no way present as a content of awareness it is not grasped.

Yogācāra: If a Tathāgata does not grasp the *dharmadhātu* what is it that makes him a Buddha?

Mādhyamika: There are no factors. The awareness of thusness does not have an ultimately real object, for it is conditioned. So if it grasps some thing that thing must be false.

Yogācāra: Then it cannot be reasoned about.

Mādhyamika: No. Inference following scripture negates all concepts and brings about conceptfree awareness. The perfected nature is not a

content of inference, but there is no other way of coming to know it.

(E16; T74) Consult the *Madhyamakahṛdayatattvāvatāra* (presumably now lost) for a more extensive inquiry into the Yogācāra position.

The section concludes by quoting a number of *sūtra*s.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN: Investigation of Dogmatic View

An Appendix to this Chapter has been translated by Christian Lindtner in "Bhavya, the logician", Visva-Bharati Annals n.s. 2, 1990, pp. 30-50. We provide here Lindtner's summary from pp. 37-38 of this Appendix, with the usual translations replacing Sanskrit technical terms.

Summary by Christian Lindtner

1. The opponent claims that the fact that Bhavya throughout his commentary has availed himself of *sādhana* and *dūṣaṇa* as instrument of knowledge either implies that they, like all other entities, lack intrinsic natures--and so they cannot establish anything--or, if alternatively they do possess intrinsic natures it implies that all his arguments are inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) or antinomic (*viruddhavyabhicārin*).

2. First Bhavya launches a *paroktadoṣaparihāra* from the level of common experience. When the opponent supports his objection with the *hetu* that the instruments of knowledge lack intrinsic natures there are, hypothetically, two possibilities: Either the opponent accepts the reality of the thing referred to by the *hetu*--but that is obviously not the case--or he does not accept it--but in that case he cannot advance it against the Mādhyamika (because a *hetu* has to be admitted by both proponent and opponent, otherwise it is *anyatarāsiddha*).

Again, if the opponent, as he seems to, refutes the *pramāṇa*s from the highest standpoint, this is a case of proving what is already accepted (a fallacy). If he refutes them on the level of common sense, it is a case of (the *pakṣābhāsa* called) *abhyupagatabādhā*, i.e., sublating what everyone accepts.

3. Then Bhavya provides a general example of an *h* to prove his thesis that the instruments of knowledge lack essential natures. Many reasons may be given, but the fundamental *reason* is, as shown previously, that there is no origination or action (see *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* I, etc.)

4. After this general refutation specific independent arguments

(*svatantrānumānas*) are given to prove Bhavya's fundamental thesis.

5. Having thus refuted *sādhana-pramāṇa* as a whole each of the three members of the syllogism are refuted. Now a thesis is defined as a *pakṣa* which is desired to be proved (*sādhyatvenepsita*) and free from contradiction (*viruddhārthādyanirākṛta*)[178] (cf. *Nyāyamukha* 1; *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III.2). In the ultimate sense it can be proved that the notion of *sādhya* is untenable and various objections to the contrary can easily be discarded. Similarly the thesis, the reason and the example can be disposed of in the ultimate sense whether taken one by one or as a "whole".

6. The *dūṣaṇapramāṇa* can be refuted similarly.

7. Since it has thus been proved that there are no instruments of knowledge in the ultimate sense, there are, of course, also no objects known by such instruments. Hence it cannot, as initially claimed by the opponent, be said that Bhavya's arguments for *nonarising* are inconclusive. Strictly speaking all arguments, etc. are like illusions, but since the opponent believes in their value they are quite useful to the extent that they refute all *vipakṣas* to dependent origination.

In the Tibetan translations of this whole work (but not in the Chinese) one finds an Appendix. This has been translated by Christian Lindtner,[179] and since it serves as a summary of the entire work and is relatively brief, we provide here the first part (with our translations of technical terms as usual).

Translation by Christian Lindtner

Thus it has been shown (by us above) that all entities lack an intrinsic nature. Nevertheless charlatans (*kuvādika*) whose understanding is impaired by their innate clinging to the (assumed) substantial existence of things and who, as it were, suffering from *timira* see (things which do) not really exist, try to refute (us) in order to establish their own opinion:

(Objection:) Here you have metaphorically demonstrated your own thesis (namely) that all entities are empty of intrinsic nature) by means of proof and refutation as instruments of knowledge. But if proof and refutation as instruments of knowledge lack intrinsic nature

> They (instruments of knowledge) are unable to comprehend what the truth is about a thing one wants to investigate really is,

Because they lack intrinsic nature,
As, for instance, the son of a barren woman.

If, alternatively, (you claim) that they do in fact possess intrinsic natures, *all* entities, including these two, must exist, but in that case the inferences adduced in the entire *śāstra* are also quite unconvincing (*anaikāntika*).

(Answer:) To this (we reply): If you maintain that the logical reason (viz.) "because they lack intrinsic nature" does not carry any meaning, because (the *h* also) has no intrinsic nature, then (you are forgetting that) the meaning of the logical reason is certainly not established for *you* (*a priori* in your own system). If the opposite were the case (then the lack of intrinsic nature would only be established) for the opponent (viz. the Mādhyamika).

In the ultimate sense the instruments of knowledge, etc. do not have any intrinsic nature. So when (you) deny their power (to comprehend etc. as above) this is (a quite superfluous attempt) to prove what has already been proven (by us) (*siddhasādhana*). (On the other hand, to deny them pragmatically (*vyavahārataḥ*) would bring you into conflict with what (you) generally accept as true.

Well,

In the ultimate sense the instruments of knowledge have no power (respectively) to apprehend what should be apprehended and to show what is worth relying on,
Because they are conditioned (*saṁskṛta*)
Like a lump of earth.

In the same way, (to prove that the instruments of knowledge have no power etc.) one should extensively advance inferences supported by logical reasons such as "because they possess origination", "because they change due to varius conditions," "because they perish," "because they may be experienced," "because they may be spoken of," etc. This is because origination (*utpāda*) has already been negated in the manner shown above in a general way, and because activity (*kriyā*) has also already been negated.

Let us now refute (the instruments of knowledge) in particular:

In the ultimate sense perception does not possess the intrinsic nature of perception,
Because it depends on the senses,
As, for instance, erroneous cognition (*bhrāntijñāna*).

Similarly,

> In the ultimate sense inference does not possess the intrinsic nature of inference
> Because it is an instrument of knowledge,
> As, for instance, perception.

Or again,

> In the ultimate sense inference is not an instrument of knowledge,
> Because it is conceptual construction,
> As, for instance, the (erroneous) idea of a man instead of a post.

The same applies to the (three) members of proof, the thesis, etc. (Our opponent claims that) a demonstration of *s* by these (three) is an ascertainment (*avadhāraṇa*). A thesis is something which its proponent wants to prove and which is not excluded by something contradictory etc....

> In the ultimate sense a thesis does not establish anything,
> Because a thesis is a thing which (itself) remains to be demonstrated,
> As, for instance, a promise made by one merely making an assertion....

(A series of arguments are reviewed.)

The purpose of this treatise is to show the emptiness of (all) views by expressly refuting the tenets propounded by various heretics. Therefore it is said (in the *Suvikrāntavikrāmiparipṛcchā*) for instance: "Suvikrāntavikrāmin, matter/form is not a type of view, nor is it an abandonment of a type of view. Similarly feelings, identifications, traces and consciousness are not a type of view, nor are they an abandonment of a type of view. The fact that matter/form, feelings, identifications, traces and consciousness are neither a type of view nor an abandonment of a type of view, *that* is the perfection of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*)."

And so it has been established that the purpose of the (*Madhyamaka)śāstra* is to show that dependent origination by being distinguished by nonorigination etc. is the ambrosial truth of contentless consciousness; namely, the ultimate truth of contentless consciousness, comparable to the clear autumnal sky: all manifestations (*prapañca*) are totally extinguished, it is free from duality and unity, it is peaceful and must be known through personal experience.

Even though Bhagavat's law (of dependent origination) is absolutely true, bad logicians do not place faith in it. Therefore this (principle of dependent origination) should mainly be secured through inference.

164. BHAVYA, *Madhyamakārthasaṁgraha* (550)

Translation by Christian Lindtner

This translation is provided by Lindtner in "Atiśa's introduction to the two truths," Journal of Indian Philosophy 9, 1981, p. 200. It is based on the Tibetan version published by Yasunori Ejima, *Chūgan-shisō no tenkai-Bhāvaviveka kenkyū: Development of Mādhyamika Pilosophy in India: Studies in Bhāvaviveka* (Tokyo 1980), pp. 18-21. The work is also edited and translated by N. Aiyasvami Sastri, Journal of Oriental Researech 5, 1931, 41-49. There is also a translation by Daniel Ferrer in The Tibet Journal 17.2, 1992, pp. 52-55. As noted in the Introduction to the next entry (#165 the ascription to this Bhavya is doubtful.

1 Initial stanza.

2 I have composed this brief text in order to make the actual meaning (*yathārtha*) of the two truths intelligible.

3 The teaching of the Buddhas is consolidated in the two truths, viz. the absolute and the relative.

4 The absolute is devoid of the principle of language (*prapañca*), and it is of two kinds, viz., the absolute which can be rendered into words (*paryāyaparamārtha*) and the absolute which cannot be rendered into words (*aparyāyaparamārtha*).

5 Again, the first is of two kinds, viz. the absolute which is expressed in terms of logic (*yuktiparyāyaparamārtha*) and the absolute expressing negation of origination (*utpādapratiṣedha*).

6 The absolute which is expressed in terms of logic (*yukti* or *nyāya*) is concerned with the four logical reasons (*hetu*) refuting origination, destruction, etc. of the quadrilemma (*catuṣkoṭi*) (viz. being, nonbeing, etc.). Again the absolute expressing negation of origination is every apparent thing (*ābhāsabhava*).

7 That which is devoid of all empirical status (*prapañcaśūnya*) must be known as the absolute which cannot be rendered into words.

8 The absolute is approximately like this: totally devoid of both extremes, i.e. the extreme of being and the extreme of nonbeing.

9 Relativity (*saṁvṛti*) as it appears (*yathābhāsa*) must be known also to have two forms, viz. false (*mithyā*) relativity and genuine (*tathya*) relativity.

10 A thing capable of efficiency (*arthakriyāsamartha*) is called *tathyasaṁvṛti*, but one which appears incapable of efficiency is *mithyāsaṁvṛti*.

11 This again has two forms: one with discursive thinking (*savikalpa*), and one without discursive thinking (*nirvikalpa*). *Savikalpa* is e.g. to take a rope for a snake, *nirvikalpa* is e.g. to "perceive" two moons.

12 Thus it must be taught that everything consists in the two truths. By taking the meaning of this to heart full perfection (*sampad*) is achieved."

13 Concluding stanza.

165. BHAVYA, *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (550)

On the ascription of this work (as well as of its predecessor) to the author of #s 161-163, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, "On the authorship of some works ascribed to Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya" in *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka: Panels of the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference Volume II* (ed. D. Seyfort Ruegg and Lambert Schmithausen) (Leiden 1990), pp. 59-71. Ruegg is cautiously inclined to favor the distinctness of the two authors. Many scholars have publicly questioned Lindtner's ascription of these two works #s164-165 to this Bhavya, and there is even question about #161 by those, like Ruegg, who suspect that all three works are by a later Bhavya about whom we know nothing. However, since Dr. Lindtner is our summarizer here, we retain his ascriptions, which he has cogently argued for in several places.[180]

Summary by Christian Lindtner

The *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (MRP) consists of nine chapters, the titles and contents of which are related below. Chapter I provides an introduction to the system of two truths, a theme developed further in

Chapter V. Then follows a critique of various heretical philosophies (Chapter II), and the two major rival Buddhist schools, Śrāvaka (Chapter III) and Yogācāra (Chapter IV). II-IV thus relate to the two kinds of conventional truth, the mistaken, and the two kinds of correct, both of which are only preliminary. Madhyamaka alone represents the two kinds of highest truth, be it effable (*saprapañca*) (V) or ineffable (*prapañcaśūnya* (VI). Whereas Chapters II-VI correspond to insight (*prajñā*) based on knowledge of tradition (*śrutamayī*) and rational understanding (*cintāmayī*), Chapter VII naturally deals with insight based on spiritual cultivation (*bhāvanā*). The concluding chapters extol the grandeur of Nāgārjuna (VIII) and the merits and purpose of his philosophy (IX).

CHAPTER I: The Two Truths

The MRP opens with an exposition of the basic concept of Madhyamaka, the theory of two truths.[181] The distinction between two truths (or two kinds of reality) is, according to Buddhist tradition, not valid at the absolute level of *dharmadhātu*, but only as long as one's insight is obscured by the cataract of ignorance.

Though conventional truth is thus really false and delusive one may nevertheless, with "the old masters," distinguish between a mistaken relative truth, which is sheer appearance, and a correct (*tathya*) relative truth, at the level of which all external and internal factors are characterized by being acceptable when not analysed, born from causes, and useful for practical purposes.

The highest truth is simply emptiness, of which there are eighteen kinds. according to scripture.

The conventional truth is a knowledge of the specific and common characteristics of all knowable objects. It is an indispensable prerequisite for the attainment of the absolute truth, because it provides the necessary basis on which reason (i.e., *cintāmayī prajñā*) is enabled to unveil the inherent emptiness of each and every factor The "relationship" between the two truths, then, is, to quote Candrakīrti, one of means and ends.

Now Bhavya is exposed to various objections: (i) First of all, he cannot, as he seems to, claim that all factors exist and at the same time claim that they do not exist. But according to Bhavya there is no question of contradicting his own claims, because the former is only made from a conventional point of view, the latter only from the highest point of

view.

(ii) Secondly, he is accused of being in conflict with the evidence of perception. But Bhavya admits no sublation by perception, because it can be demonstrated by four basic arguments that all the "facts" of perception are really neutral contents of mind. So there is nothing "evident," no perception, with which he can be in conflict.

(iii) Thirdly, he is accused of doing violence to common opinion. But what happens to be common opinion solely depends on the eyes that see. The mental eye of common people is covered by the film of ignorance whereas the vision of emptiness enjoyed by sages is a pure insight free from blemishes. From their point of view, and this is what really counts, there is no conflict with common opinion.

(iv) Finally, the grim charge is levelled against the Mādhyamika that he is a nihilist denying the existence of a world to come. - Not at all! At the level of the absolute the world is like an illusion. Here, of course, there is really nothing to affirm or deny.

The author intends to revert to all this subsequently (Chapter V).

CHAPTER II: Wrong Understanding of the Relative Truth

Here is given a survey of erroneous views held by debaters (*tārkika*) (Buddhists and non-Buddhists) who like blind people resort to inference as their main instrument of awareness. These people are only in possession of a wrong understanding.

First of all, there is a series of 363 views held by a large number of heretical schools or teachers. Of these dogmas 110 may be regarded as fundamental. A comparable list, we may observe, is also known from various Jaina sources, but apparently from no other Buddhist source (apart from 162.*Tarkajvālā*).

Moreover, there are seven groups each of which comprises respectively 62, 20, 12, 12, 5, 3 and 2 dogmas. Among these, all of which are known from other sources, only 62 views - those of the *Brahmajālasūtra* - receive a brief separate critique in the light of Āryadeva's *Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi*.

Then follows a brief account - based on 162.*Tarkajvālā* - of the 25 principles of Sāṁkhya, the six categories of Vaiśeṣika, the nine (!) of the *nirgranthas*, and finally a summary of the tenets of Kālavāda, Puruṣavāda (including the Vātsīputrīya!), Karmavāda, Brahmavāda as well as those of the adherents of Śiva and Viṣṇu.

It falls outside the scope of MRP to give a detailed account and

refutation of this endless series of vain speculations. They may all, however, be refuted in a general way by means of four basic arguments proving, respectively, (i) that nothing can arise from anything (viz. itself, something else, etc.); (ii) that neither that which exists, nor that which does not exist, etc., can possibly arise; (iii) that nothing can be conceived as one or many; and (iv) that all things are dependently co-originated. All this has already, the author recalls, been amply demonstrated in Nāgārjuna's *Vaidalyasūtra*, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*, *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, *Śūnyatāsaptati*, *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*, etc. - Therefore one can safely conclude that origination only exists from a conventional point of view.

CHAPTER III: Right Understanding of the Preliminary Understanding of the Truths, Part One

This is the first of three chapters dealing with a gradually more profound and orthodox system of Buddhism (*tathyasaṁvṛtivāda*). It refutes the Vaibhāṣika conception of the ultimate existence of the composite factors, viz., the aggregates, the bases and the elements.

These factors are only to be understood in a preliminary sense (*neyārtha*), not in a final or definite sense (*nītārtha*). In other words, the system of Abhidharma only serves as a preamble to that of Madhyamaka in the sense that as a lower form of true relative truth it is a "ladder" to the definitive conventional wisdom (see Chapter V) and the highest wisdom (see Chapter VI). As such it is certainly indispensable.

In the ultimate sense matter/form, etc. do not exist, because the atom, assumed to be their first cause, is in fact an impossible notion (see *Viṁśatikā* 12). Hence all the material factors supposed to be derived from these "atoms," as well as all our ideas based upon them, must obviously be unreal (*avastuka*). Incidentally, how could one otherwise account for the fact that accomplished yogis can rush unhindered through mountains, walls, etc.? These magic powers can, of course, only be accounted for on the assumption that all these things are without "hard" substance. These incontestable *siddhi*s cannot simply be discarded as a matter of wishful thinking (*adhimukti*) on the part of the *yogi*s as insinuated by the "rationalistic" Vaibhāṣikas. - For further arguments to the effect that the four elements and the aggregates, etc., derived from them only exist conventionally, the reader is advised to consult Candrakīrti's *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* and the author's 162. *Tarkajvālā* (especially

Chapter III).

In the second part of this chapter it is argued that the system of the Śrāvakas can only be taken as having a preliminary meaning, because it fails to abolish the obstructions to the knowables as it lacks perfection in wisdom.

As far as the unconditioned factors are concerned, the notion of the Sautrāntika, Tāmraśāṭīya and Vātsīputrīya of *nirvāṇa* as some sort of nonexistence can only be taken in a preliminary sense also.

The following quotation from Nāgārjuna's *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* not only sums up the foregoing and introduces the following, but also reveals one of Bhavya's basic authorities for the hierarchical tripartition of the Buddhist schools given in MRP, Chapters III-V: "The (Buddha's) instruction about the aggregates, elements, etc. (merely) aims at dispelling the belief in an ego. By establishing themselves in pure consciousness the greatly blessed (Bodhisattvas) also abandon that (instruction)."

CHAPTER IV: Right Understanding of the Preliminary Relative Truth, Part 2[182]

This deals with a recurrent theme of particular philosophical and historical interest, namely, Bhavya's critique of the major rival Mahāyāna school, Yogācāra, as represented by Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, etc. Their arrogant ingenuity cannot be questioned, but their orthodoxy, as *yukti* based on *āgama* shows, certainly can.

1 (T247) It is, of course, true that several *sūtra*s such as *Laṅkāvatāra*, *Daśabhūmikā*, etc., contain several pronouncements to the effect that the universe is but mind (*cittamātra*). But these *āgama*s, also accepted by Bhavya, should not be taken, as the Yogācāra takes them, to convey *nītārtha*, but only, with the Madhyamaka, *neyārtha*. What they want to tell us is merely that no agent or enjoyer exists.

2. (T248) Nevertheless, there are two groups of Yogācāra taking the term "*cittamātra*" at its face value. Consequently, they are merely in possession of a conventional truth of the *neyārtha* kind.

3 (T248) Now, those claiming that (cognition in itself) is invested with (a true objective) image (*sākāra*) argue as follows:

(i) The entire triple world and *nirvāṇa* are also simply mind (*cittamātra*), because (cognition) is void of objects such as material form etc., as, for instance, (cognition in) a dream-state.

(ii) They also claim that consciousness (*vijñāna*) itself appears as two (*dvābhāsa*), because it is both an instrument of knowledge

(*pramāṇa*) and a result (*phala*) (of cognition). here (it is to be noted) that an instrument of knowledge is so-called because (awareness) infers (the result) by means of it. Cognitive consciousness appears as itself. The result is its understanding of the content, i.e., cognition appearing as content. The instrument and the result of cognition appertain to consciousness appearing as object alone.

(iii) And moreover (they claim) that all external and internal factors are (only) awareness (*citta*), because they are contents (*viṣaya*) (consisting) of awareness-only, as, for instance, the immediately preceding condition (*samanantarapratyaya).*

Therefore they say that the apprehension to be realized is the "nature of things" (*dharmatārūpa*) which can only be understood by the direct self-cognition of a Buddha, i.e., in the original state of the nature of one's mind when it is free from the impurity of grasper and grasped.

4.(T248-250) Now we shall refute these arguments in due order:

(i) As far as the first is concerned the thesis (*pratijñā*) and the logical reason (*hetu*) (cannot be) established as valid (*siddha*) in this case. As far as the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) is concerned, viz., like a dream, this analogy must in fact (illustrate an awareness) which is either empty, its object being constructed (*kalpitārthaśūnya*) (i.e., unreal), or empty, its object not being constructed (*akalpitārthaśūnya*) (but really existent). In the first case awareness and the content of that awareness cannot be established and must be false (*mithyā*). Hence your basic thesis is not valid. If the example illustrates an awareness that is empty, its object being constructed, it cannot exclude that (remaining) part of the object which is not imagined (but real), and for that reason also (the theory) of *cittamātra* is illogical. The other example is not established as valid either, because it is only the dreaming awareness (not the external object as such) which is false, because it perceives the nature of things (and believes in their presence). So it cannot serve as an example.

(ii) With regard to the statement about consciousness appearing as content, Dignāga maintains that consciousness does not apprehend a content as long as it is only arising (*utpadyamāna).* Hence the awareness which is still merely arising is (not yet objectified as result, but it is only) an instrument of knowledge. But when consciousness has arisen, a content is perceived (by it) and therefore one's awareness is definitely and fully established. This, therefore, is maintained to be the instrument of knowledge and the result of the very awareness which, as a result, appears as content. It is, by way of illustration, like when you

cleave a log with an axe: first you are about to do it, then you hit it, and, *voilà*, you have got two pieces!

To this we reply: (According to your theory of perception) an immediately evident perceptual awareness perceives the pure particular and is devoid of the dichotomies of construction and memory. Accordingly the manifold perceptual contents such as matter, etc. have blue, etc. as their inexpressible nature (*anirdeśyarūpa* = *svalakṣaṇa*). Similarly it (i.e., perceptual awareness), in the form of self-awareness (*svasaṁvedanākāra*), apprehends (a perceptual object which is) just as inexpressible in its nature. Since, therefore, the instrument of knowledge and the result only belong to one single awareness appearing as content, the logical reason (viz., "because it is both instrument of knowledge and result") is not proved. Consequently the assumption that one awareness appears as two (i.e., as instrument and result) must be erroneous.

(iii) The third argument is also not correct. In fact the thesis, the logical reason and the example (consist of) a *pakṣa* (in this case, an external object (*bāhyārtha*)) and a *hetu* logically establishing it (in this case, its mental nature (*cittasvabhāva*)). However, your thesis (that all external and internal factors are only awareness) is not established for you (by the *h* "because they are contents (consisting) of awareness only". Now, in this case, awareness must either be the content existing outside, or it must be the content located inside (mental phenomena (*caitta*) such as) feeling, etc. But if an external awareness is the content, then, when one proposes the thesis that everything external and internal is only awareness, there cannot possibly be a content nor a content-possessor. Nor can an internal awareness be the content of awareness: that is a fallacy. (Hence awareness cannot be a content and, consequently, your thesis remains unproved.)

5.But there are also faults such as this: If everything is only awareness, then, for instance, when one sees a jar, one would also have to perceive the series of awarenesses (*cittasaṁtāna*) of all other living beings. By perceiving this (everybody) in the five destinies would automatically have the higher faculty (*abhijñā*) cognizing the awarenesses of others (*paracitta*) (which is, of course, quite absurd).

And again, if everything were awareness, an image (*ākāra*) would, like awareness, be immaterial, or else awareness, like something appearing (*ākāravat*), would be material. But then awareness would also, like the image, be inert matter, or the image would understand and cognize (which is, of course, absurd).

6. Again, you cannot possibly attain liberation "by freeing (mind) from the impurity of grasper and grasped." But (a Mādhyamika) who maintains the existence of external objects (on the conventional (*saṁvṛti*) level), and apprehends, through yoga, the unsubstantial nature of that content (on the higher, *pāramārthika* level) can certainly generate the higher constructionfree awareness by eliminating grasper and grasped.

According to you, (Dignāga,) who assert that there is no supporting object (*ālambana*), there has never been an external object in the first place. Nevertheless (you claim that one can) penetrate the essential nature of grasper and grasped later on. But by what can one really eliminate it later on (when it never was there in the first place)? You have no means whatsoever of getting a higher constructionfree awareness. So when you say that "when a supporting object such as matter, etc. do not appear outside awareness, then awareness, definitely located in the original state of one's mind, is called 'nondual awareness' (and that) truth, reality, immortality, the highest level of all Buddhas constitutes (the nature of) the three bodies (*trikāya*)"[183]--we must be aware that this is based on a misunderstanding.

7. Nor do those who claim that (awareness) does not have (a real) image (*nirākāravādin*) possess an awareness of the higher truth. Their basic text (Vasubandhu's *Viṁśatikā*) begins as follows:

"The entire universe is only a mental act,
Because the "object" which appears is unreal,
As, for example, when a person suffering from amblyopia
Sees (unreal tings) such as hair or moons."

With a whole lot of arguments they try to prove that to take an image as an object is wrong, and maintain that ultimately only awareness exists. But this is not at all reasonable. According to logic as well as scripture, the fact is that when an external image is false the subjective awareness of it is also false, and to the extent that an awareness is correct the image must also exist.

8. Moreover, granting your opinion that there is such a thing as self-cognition (*svasaṁvedana*), it must be possible to examine it critically. As what kind of entity can it be cognized by you among the three (possibilities of) cognizable (*vedya*), cognizer (*vedaka*) or cognition (*vedana*)? How can the cognizer be such an entity? What can a cognition independent of those two (viz., cognizable and cognizer) cognize so that it is "self-cognition"? Consequently, you have not (got the faintest idea of) the meaning of the term "cognition knowing all

aspects" (*sarvākārajhajhāna*), so how can you (even dream of) getting the cognition of a Buddha! Please point out, without professional jealousy (*mātsarya*), those things determined by your logic!

If you say that (*svasaṁvedana*) cannot be expressed to others because it is a matter of self-cognition, then it is not different from the *ātman* maintained by nonBuddhists. But which sensible person can consider taking seriously their statements that a self is eternal, one, omnipresent, incorporeal and rigmarole not even congruous with their own (notion of a self)! The idea about "*svasaṁvedana*" and that of a "self" are in fact sheer subjective discriminations (*prativikalpamātra*). The Yogācāras do not understand the selflessness of persons (*pudgalanairātmya*) and they do not understand the selflessness of factors (*dharmanairātmya*) either, because this is such a tremendous clinging to egoity (*ahaṁkāra*).

Apart from that there are many more mistakes, but let this suffice for now.

9. Here (the adherents of) *nirākāravāda* (interrupt and) attempt to refute, saying: (perhaps the adherents of *sākāravāda* do not have it but) we do understand the ultimate wisdom! In fact, it is said in a Prajñāpāramitā text which imparts definite sense (*nītārtha*): "Maitreya, a Bodhisattva must understand the concept of various types of material form from three points of view, which are identified (here) as *parikalpita, vikalpita,* and *dharmatārūpa*", and so on. Therefore an awareness which has as its content the actual nature of factors (*dharmatārūpaviṣaya*) conveys ultimate wisdom (*paramārthaprajñā)*!

(No!) This has been stated by Bhagavat in a provisional sense (*neyārtha*), so (you Yogācāras) do not yet attain the highest wisdom.

10. But these mediocre minds interrupt us once again, saying: What must be established, viz., enlightenment, is also possible in our system, for Bhagavat has declared:

> In order to abandon traces totally
> They should not be said to have essential natures.
> This wisdom consists in self-awareness
> In that state one may speak of "*tathāgata*".

Therefore (we Yogācāras say[184]):

> By revolution at the basis (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*)
> One gets the transcendental awareness
> This is the pure element (*anāsravo dhātUḥ):*
> The great Muni's *dharmakāya*.

When one's consciousnes does not
Any more apprehend a supporting object
Then it abides in consciousness-only (*vijñaptimātratā*)
As there is no object it cannot be grasped.

By revolution at the basis
One gets the *pañcajñāna* and the *trikāya*.
As long as he is in the world, for the sake of the world,
He (as Bodhisattva) remains in *apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*....

11. We (Madhyamakas) must object to this! The statement "by revolution at the basis..." is not true. The argument for this has been expressed by Nāgārjuna (in *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 31):

Since the past does not exist
Therefore the future does not exist either.
The present occurrence of the basis transformed--
In which (period) can it take place?

According to this argument the (notion of) revolution at the basis cannot be proved. Therefore the five cognitions and the triple body cannot be established either. Hence you do not have "what must be established, viz. enlightenment".

12. To conclude this refutation of the Yogācāra interpretation of scripture we may again, says Bhavya, quote Nāgārjuna's *Bodhicittavivaraṇa*: "The *Muni*'s doctrine that the entire world is only mind, is intended to remove the fear of fools. It has nothing to do with reality."

CHAPTER V: Right Understanding of the Relative Truth in a Final Sense

This meets the promise of a further discussion of the Madhyamaka theory of two truths made in Chapter I. Accordingly it affords a succinct restatement of his basic philosophical and religious persuasions.

The main exponents of the Madhyamaka system are Nāgārjuna and his successor Āryadeva. It is to be considered the most orthodox school of Buddhism because its founder, Nāgārjuna, was predicted by the Buddha himself in various *sūtra*s (cf. Chapter VIII).

To be sure, from the point of view of *dharmadhātu* there is neither conventional nor ultimate truth. The distinction between two truths is only valid as long as one's mind's-eye is obscured by the cataract of

ignorance and all that this entails. Mankind is bound by the four kinds of traces, like a silk-worm swathed in its own cocoon.

Concerning conventional truth Nāgārjuna is quoted to the effect that all empirical phenomena are like illusions.

Now the correct (*tathya*) relative truth, i.e., dependent origination, has an external as well as an internal aspect. For an account of the former one must consult the *Śālistambasūtra* and its commentary by Nāgārjuna. The internal twelvefold chain of dependent origination should in accordance with Nāgārjuna's *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikās* be divided into three phases. Thus ignorance, desire and clinging constitute the defilement-phase whereas traces and existence constitute the karma-phase. The remaining seven factors amount to frustration. This is the causal wheel of life wherein karma originates from defilements and frustrations from karma, etc. Thus all the factors of the external and internal aspect of conventional truth are, in the final analysis, founded on ignorance from time without beginning. They are in fact no more real than illusions and phantoms.

The real truth, then, is the highest. It is not accessible through inference but by means of cultivation (cf. Chapter VII) it proves to be *svasaṁvedya*. A Mādhyamika who realizes the eighteen kinds of emptiness through the three doors of liberation is absorbed in the *dharmadhātu*. This is the culmination of the perfection in wisdom where there is neither object, subject nor activity.

Here the Mādhyamika is accused of incriminating himself with eight logical mistakes. In general, according to Bhavya, these objections are based on sheer ignorance and a deplorable failure to recognize that the Madhyamaka theory of two truths conveys the *nītārtha* of the *sūtra*s. Here, then, are the objections and Bhavya's replies:

(i) First of all, the Mādhyamikas are said to be simple cheaters as they merely refute others without affirming an opinion of their own. - But according to scripture *tattva* consists in not seeing anything as real, so how can one affirm or deny the existence of anything at all, everything being unoriginated!

(ii) Secondly, the Mādhyamika is accused of identifying nonorigination with nonexistence. - But actually, since nothing exists, there is no existence to deny, hence no nonexistence. The Mādhyamikas steer a middle course "between" being and nonbeing.

(iii) Thirdly, the Mādhyamikas are once again accused of being nihilists rejecting the fundamental factors of Buddhism such as causality,

truth, jewels, etc. But here the (Buddhist) opponent forgets the Madhyamaka theory of two truths. On the relative level they certainly accept dependent origination, etc., and the sublime moral ideals of compassion, etc. Nor can they be regarded as nihilists from the absolute point of view, because nihilists affirm the nonexistence of something previously existing, whereas for the Madhyamaka there is nothing that exists *a priori* Hence true nonexistence is precluded. It is only in a very limited sense that one can identify nonorigination and nonexistence on the relative level.

(iv) The Mādhyamika is then charged with being in conflict with Buddhist scriptures. - But this charge is merely due to the failure of Śrāvakas and Yogācāras to recognize that their own scripture should be taken *neyārtha*, whereas that of Mādhyamika should be taken *nītārtha*. Hence the alleged conflict is only apparent.

(v-viii) Finally, Bhavya is accused of being in conflict with perception, inference, common opinion and what he himself otherwise accepts. But, as already pointed out in Chapter I, the fault lies with those who believe in the ultimate reality of the relative truth. From the ultimate point of view there is no empirical world with which the Mādhyamika enters in conflict.

From the above we may conclude that the Madhyamaka philosophy is consistent with reason as well as with scripture, as the theory of two truths saves it from being in conflict with anything.

CHAPTER VI: Understanding of the Highest Truth

This chapter consists of five verses purporting to describe that highest wisdom of which there are two kinds, one with conceptual constructions (cf. Chapter V as a whole), and one without such constructions. At the level of *dharmadhātu*, however, both kinds are extinguished.

These two kinds of highest wisdom, as may be recalled, were already adumbrated in 162. *Tarkajvālā* III, 10-11, and in III, 26 a distinction was introduced between highest truth without discursive development and highest truth with discursive development. To the same effect the 164. *Madhyamakārthasaṁgraha* speaks of two kinds of ultimate truth, one with modes *(paryāya)* and one without modes. The sole distinguishing factor is discursive development, language. At the level of *dharmadhātu* there is none.

In retrospect this brief chapter clearly shows the fundamental

philosophical agreement between MRP and Bhavya's earlier works.

The following chapter, on the other hand, is more explicit on the topic of meditative spiritual cultivation than any of his previous works.

CHAPTER VII: Progress in Meditation

Now that the "theoretical" aspects of the highest truth have been discussed in detail, the "practical" question arises: What kind of person is able to enter such a profound and great path as described above? - Various authorities are quoted to the effect that Madhyamaka addresses itself to "great beings" of extraordinary moral and intellectual capacity.

At the level of conventional truth a Bodhisattva must first, in general, practise the five perfections, the four foundations of social solidarity, etc., and then exert meditation at the ultimate level.

But no matter how much merit one may gain by worshiping all the Buddhas it is of no avail unless one generates the awareness of enlightenment. This one is motivated to do when one listens to the doctrine of emptiness with joy and enthusiasm.

Then one should go in search of a teacher in the lineage of Nāgārjuna. Thus motivated one should seek the three jewels and generate the awareness of unsurpassed enlightenment.. For a novice numerous additional rules are prescribed in the works of Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, etc.

If a Bodhisattva is of inferior intellect he should confess his sins in the words of the *Caturdharmakasūtra*, the *Triskandhaka*, the *Karmāvaraṇapratiśrabdhisūtra* and the *Upālipariprcchā*. If his intellect is quite keen sins must be confessed in the words of the *Ākāśagarbhasūtra*, the *Bhaiṣajyagurusūtra* and the *Dhāraṇīsūtra*. If his intellect is superior he should do so in the words of such *sūtra*s as the *Mahāyānopadeśa*, the *Prajñāpāramitā*, the *Sarvadharmapravṛttinirdeśa*, the *Sāgaranāgarapariprcchā*, the *Tathāgataguhya*, the *Karmāvaraṇaviśuddhi*, etc.

Having thus purified the three stages of the resolved path he is prepared to engender the higher path by practising tranquility and insight. As the activities of conceptual construction are based on one's breath it must be controlled. There are six ways to do so, by counting, following, fixing, observing, modifying and purifying it.

One should then sit cross-legged on a comfortable mat and generate a compassionate awareness of enlightenment, expressing the desire to liberate all living beings.

Having thus attained tranquility one should by means of insight

recognize that all material and immaterial factors are incorporated in mind, and that mind is incorporated in one's body, and that the body may thus, being merely mind, be analyzed away into *dharmadhātu* where nothing remains. This form of yoga is said to be gross. There is, however, also a subtle form of yoga, a procedure which derives its authority from the celebrated passage in *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* X, 256-257. First one assumes that external objects are only mind. Then one forgets about them. Since mind, then, has no object one can also forget all about mind. Then one abides in a blank state without subject or object.

This, then, implies that on the level of relative truth there are two ways a Mādhyamika may consider the factors when he argues and meditates, either as existing (thus the *śrāvaka*s) or as consisting of mind only (thus Yogācāra). The gross way is called "external" or "official" Madhyamaka, the subtle, "internal" or "private" Madhyamaka. All the logical works of the Madhyamaka school are concerned with the "gross" and thus serve a purely eristic purpose. When one pursues reality (*tattvārtha*) one must cultivate the "subtle" yoga.

To sum up: At the level of conventional truth mind falsely assumes the illusory appearances of the various factors, but at the level of ultimate truth, as shown by reason, mind is just as unoriginated and empty as any other factor.

Having thus armed himself with wisdom and means the Bodhisattva arises from his mat. He should observe the rituals by reciting such texts as the *Triskandhaka*, the *Prajñāpāramitā*, the *Bhadracaryāpraṇidhāna*, the *Praṇidhānaviṁśikā* and the *Praṇidhānasaptati* at regular intervals so as to keep up good spirits.

Then follows a brief survey of the nine aspects of the three stages of the resolved path. Upon further subdivision the number of proper (*anulomikī*) kinds of patience amounts to 24. The nonorigination patience, however, which belongs to the level of *śuddhāśraya*, occurs only on the highest path.

Bhavya, accordingly, discusses the ten stages stressing that after the attainment of the thunderbolt concentration there is no more any kind of awareness, even constructionfree awareness.

Finally, there is a long account of the three bodies of Buddha, especially the *dharma* body (with numerous quotations from Nāgārjuna's *Dharmadhātustava*). It is summarized in the following words: "The *dharmakāya* comprises the *buddhaguṇa*s, viz. the ten powers, the confidences, the unique factors, etc. It is *prajñāpāramitā*, nondual,

without difference. The *sambhogakāya* is based upon its support. The *nirmāṇakāya* is determined by the support of the *saṁbhogakāya* so as to comply with the interests of those to be converted."

CHAPTER VIII: Grandeur of the Teacher

Here it is emphasized that there is only one authority upon whose exegesis we can rely for a correct understanding of scripture. This is, of course, Nāgārjuna, for he was predicted by the Buddha e.g. in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, *Mahāmañjuśrītantra*, and, above all, in the *Mahāmeghasūtra*, from which a long (and most interesting) extract is given.

Nevertheless, there is no reason to make a secret of the fact that extraordinary moral and intellectual achievements are required before the final attainment of Buddhahood.

CHAPTER IX: The Value of Buddhism

Still, there is no reason for despair! By following these instructions one is relieved of the fear of *saṁsāra* and finally overcomes any kind of suffering, even death.

166. CĪTTALAI CĀTTANĀR, *Maṇimekhalai* (550)

Summary by Paula Richman

Maṇimekhalai contains intriguing philosophical materials in its final chapters, although it is not a philosophical text *per se*. Instead, *Maṇimekhalai* is a literary narrative, taking as its main theme the spiritual maturation of a courtesan's daughter who renounces her hereditary occupation to become a Buddhist nun.[185] The text first depicts Maṇimekhalai's successful attempts to overcome societal obstacles to her renunciation and then portrays her religious progress under the direction of her mentor, Aravaṇa Aṭika. The Buddhist sage Aravaṇar enjoins Maṇimekhalai to journey to Vañci, where religious specialists representing a variety of viewpoints gather to expound their beliefs. As a result, Chapter Twenty-seven of *Maṇimekhalai* contains brief accounts of the main assumptions of a number of contemporary philosophical systems which Maṇimekhalai encounters in Vañci. After Maṇimekhalai determines that none of these systems is entirely satisfactory, Aravaṇar

deems her ready to learn the principles of Buddhist logic. Therefore, Chapter Twenty-nine contains a lengthy and detailed description of the instruments of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and types of fallacious statements. When she understands these concepts, Aravaṇar reveals to her essential Buddhist philosophical concepts. For this reason, the epic culminates with Chapter Thirty, a summary of selected Buddhist doctrines.

These three philosophical Chapters deserve special scrutiny because of *Maṇimekhalai*'s unusual history and unique status. It seems likely that it was composed sometime during the sixth century, though the issue remains controversial.[186] Of *Maṇimekhalai*'s author, Cīttalai Cāttanār, we know precious little--sources tell us only that he was a prosperous grain merchant and wrote in excellent Tamil.[187] After the Buddhist community in Tamilnadu dies out (ca. the eleventh century?) no other Tamil Buddhist texts remained.[188] Why, then, did *Maṇimekhalai* survive? Perhaps its status as "twin-epic" to *Cilapattikāram* accounts for its preservation. While the two texts share some of the same character and hence were regarded as "twins", *Cilapattikāram* was not tied to the fate of any one religious community.[189] At any rate, both texts continued to be recopied over the centuries but were not considered approriate reading for orthodox Hindus. Not until the late eighteen hundreds, when U. Ve. Cāminātaiyar rediscovered, edited, and published *Maṇimekhalai*, did the text become available for scholarly study.[190] As the only extant Tamil Buddhist text, it alone can reveal how members of the South Indian Buddhist community translated their philosophical terms and concepts into Tamil.

Whether or not one can read Tamil, there are several ways to gain access to *Maṇimekhalai*'s philosophical chapters. U. Ve. Cāminātaiyar's 1921 edition will be helpful, particularly because of his glosses on Chapter Twenty-seven and his references to similar passages in other Tamil texts. The best edition for philosophers, however, is the one by Na. Mu. Veṅkaṭacāmi Nāṭṭār and Auvai Cu. Taraicāmi Pillai because of its copious notes on the sections concerning Buddhist logic and religious formulations (Chapters Twenty-nine and Thirty).[191] All verse references in the summary below are to this edition. For those who do not read Tamil, however, S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar has provided a slightly abridged translation of *Maṇimekhalai*, preceded by an extended essay which discusses in detail the material in Chapters 27, 29 and 30.[192] Pandit Hisselle Dharmaratara Mahathera has reprinted Krishnaswami Aiyangar's translation of Chapter Thirty in his article "Buddhism in South

Aiyangar's translation of Chapter Thirty in his article "Buddhism in South India." In it, he has slightly altered the terminology and provided references to places in the *Viśuddhimagga* where such material is also discussed.[193] Also note that S. Suryanarayana's article provides his own translation of the account of Sāṁkhya philosophy found in verses 201-204 of Chapter 27.[194]

Several noteworthy secondary sources on the philosophical materials in *Maṇimekhalai* also exist. Kandaswamy's *Buddhism as Expounded in Maṇimekhalai* contains two chapters of great interest to Buddhologists: Chapter Five discusses Cāttanār's presentation of Buddhist logic in great detail, while Chapter Six analyzes the contents of *Maṇimekhalai's* Chapter 30 in insightful ways. Several scholars have also written on the presentation of Buddhist logic in helpful fashion (see note 133 above). Finally, asham discusses *Maṇimekhalai*'s presentation of Ājīvika philosphy in his history of the Ājīvikas.[195]

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

Chapter 27 (verses 1-289) contains a curious survey of nonBuddhist religious systems. Maṇimekhalai listens to representatives of ten philosophical schools summarize their main tenets. These religious summaries vary greatly in length, with the first comprising eighty verses and others as short as one or two lines:

5-85. The Account of the Speaker about Instruments of Knowledge.

The speaker begins by listing, defining, and sometimes giving examples of ten instruments of knowledge. In addition to an English translation of the Tamil, the Sanskrit equivalent: is provided.

1. direct perception (*pratyakṣa*)
2. inference (*anumāna*)
3. comparison (*upamā*)
4. authority (*āgama*)
5. presumption (*arthāpatti*)
6. appropriateness (*svabhāva*)
7. tradition (*aitihya*)
8. non-existence (*abhāva*)
9. inference by elimination or correlation (*pariśeṣa*)
10. occurrence (*sambhava*)

The speaker then lists more briefly eight things which are sometimes thought incorrectly to be instruments of knowledge. Next he

mentions six philosophical systems based on *pramāṇas* and lists one teacher for each system. He concludes his discourse with the comment that only six instruments of knowledge are presently accepted as valid: 1-6 as listed above.

86-95: The account of the Śaivite speaker. He briefly discusses the constituents of the universe, the nature of Śiva, creation as an act of play, and the destruction of creatures.

96-97: The account of the speaker about Brahmā. He discusses how Brahmā created the universe by means of a cosmic egg.

98-99: The account of the Vaiṣṇavite speaker. The speaker, described as one who eagerly studies the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, states that Viṣṇu protects creatures.

100-105: The account of the Vedic specialist. He describes the Vedas as the unborn and eternal source of knowledge and then lists the six limbs of the Vedas: 1.ritual (*kalpa*), 2.prosody (*chandas*), 3.astronomy (*jyotiṣa*), 4.etymology (*nirukta),* 5.pronunciation (*śikṣā*), 6.grammar (*vyākaraṇa*).

110-170: The account of the Ājīvikan speaker. He discourses at length about life and the four elements which compose the universe. Particular attention is paid to atoms and the ways in which they combine. These atoms are said to be of six different colors and it is claimed that if one is born pure white, religious liberation (*mokṣa*) can be attained. He ends his talk by describing what is said in Markali's treatise.[196]

171-179: The account of the Nirgranthan[197] speaker. He begins by listing and explicating six entities: 1) the principle of movement (*dharmāstikāya*), 2) the principle of stationariness (*adharmāstikāya*), 3) time (*kāla*), 4) ether (*ākāśa*), 5) life (*jīva*), 6) irreducible atoms (*paramāṇu*). Then he describes how the *jīva* is connected with good or bad deeds through the body. He concludes by explaining how to break out of life's bondage to attain religious liberation.

201-240. The account of Sāṁkhya. He explains at length the nature of *prakṛti*, describing how it forms the matrix of all things, how elements such as water and mind arise from it, and how the process of involution and evolution takes place. Then he explains the nature of *puruṣa* and lists the 25 entities (*tattva*).

241-263: The account of the Vaiśeṣikas. He lists the six categories: substance, quality, motion, universal, individuator, and inherence. He then proceeds to discuss the substances and qualities of matter at some length. He concludes with some statements on what is common to all

matter and a statement about how death and existence are the essence of matter.

264-276: The account of the Bhūtavādin. He tells of how consciousness comes into being when elements combine, and how it will disappear when the elements break up. The speaker then comments that the details of his teachings are the same as those of the Lokāyatas (i.e., the Cārvākas). He also rejects all *pramāṇas* except direct perception. He ends by declaring that both the idea that there is another life and the idea that that life is the result of deeds in this life are false.

Chapter 27 ends with a list of the ten systems which were discussed.

CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

This Chapter beings by discussing instruments of knowledge, but soon moves on to the main subject matter of the chapter: valid and invalid propositions, reasons, and examples. S.N.Kandaswamy (op. cit., pp. 257-258, 270), who discusses this chapter in great detail, identifies Cāttanār as following the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school of logic in his account. Buddhologists will want to consult Chapter Five of his *Buddhism as Expounded in Maṇimekhalai* for a comparison of Cāttanār's discussion of logical fallacies with those of other major Buddhist logicians. Also helpful is Kandaswamy's section by section comparison between this Chapter and relevant portions of the *Nyāyapraveśa*. More than half of *Maṇimekhalai*'s Chapter 29 consists of list of different kinds of logical fallacies. This material is both highly technical and familiar to scholars of Dignāga. Therefore it is summarized only very briefly below.

47-56: The instruments of knowledge, concluding that the only valid ones are perception and inference.

57-67: The five-membered syllogism. Cāttanār later indicates that only three members are necessary.

68-110: The analytical reason, the logical reason, and the negative form of the syllogism.

112-120: Valid propositions.

121-135: Valid reason.

136-142: Valid example.

148-153 lists nine types of fallacious propositions.

154-190 defines and gives brief examples of each type.

191-192 lists three kinds of fallacious reason. The first of these fallacious reaons is called "unproved" (*asiddha*), and Cāttanār lists its

four types in verses 193-210. The second fallacious reason is called "uncertain" (*anaikāntika*) (or one which is only recognized as truthful by one group among debators) and Cāttanār lists its six kinds in verses 211-274. The third kind of fallacious reason is "contradictory" (*viruddha*), and Cāttanār lists its varieties in verses 275-325.

325-339 explain that fallacious examples are of two types, homogeneous (*sādharmya*) and heterogeneous (*vaidharmya*) and lists five types of each.

340-401 give examples of the five types of homogeneous ones, while

402-468 give examples of the five types of heterogeneous ones.

CHAPTER THIRTY

Kandaswamy labels Chapter Thirty a Buddhist "manual" because Cāttanār presents his material in a concise and formulaic way.[198] Cāttanār devotes more than half the Chapter to an exposition and analysis of the twelve links (*nidāna*) in the chain of causation (*pratītyasamutpāda*). The remainder of the Chapter deals very briefly with a number of other Buddhist fomulations in relationship to the twelve links.

17-44: A general discussion of the links.

45-50 lists each of the twelve links.

51-103 gives a definition of each link.[199]

104-118 discuss how these links arise and lead to suffering.

119-133 describe how suffering ends through the cessation of the links.

138-147 divide the links into four divisions.

148-154 discusses the three junctions or connections of the links.

160-168 analyzes the links in terms of past, present, and future.

169-188 relates the links to the four noble truths.

189-249 discuss modes of rhetoric, including an analysis of four different kinds of questions and answers.

250-259 discuss the three flaws (desire, hatred, and delusion), the four characteristics (impermanence, suffering, no self, and impurity), the three attitudes (friendliness, kindliness, and joy), and the four ways to eliminate darkness: (hearing, thinking, meditation and envisioning).

167. ŚAMKARASVĀMIN, *Nyāyapraveśa* (555)

Summary by Douglas Daye, Musashi Tachikawa and Karl H. Potter

This brief text on inference is attributed to Dignāga in Chinese tradition and to Śaṁkarasvāmin, a pupil of Dignāga's, in Tibetan tradition. A lively discussion occupied Western scholars in the early part of the twentieth century, with Hakuju Ui, Giuseppe Tucci and others backing the Chinese interpretation, Satischandra Vidyabhusana and Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya the Tibetan.[200] The text was edited by A. B. Dhruva in 1930[201] and by N. D. Mironov in 1931.[202] Musashi Tachikawa[203] provides a complete translation together with the Sanskrit text as found in Dhruva. This is the basis of our E and T. A number of articles have contributed to better understanding of certain sections; these are identified in footnotes. We are also in possession of a summary of this text by Douglas D. Daye which was submitted for the present Volume. The summary that follows is the work of the Editor of this Volume based on Tachikawa's translation and Daye's summary but using the translations of technical terms chosen for this and the preceding Volume of this Encyclopedia on Buddhism.

Giuseppe Tucci translated the work in 1930, and published notes on the text in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of 1931, pp. 381-413, reprinted in Guiseppe Tucci, *Opera Minore* (Rome, 1971-72), pp. 277-304. We have indicated by GT the passages on which he comments and the pages in the reprinted version.

(E140; T120; GT279-283) 1. Summary. Means of proof (*sādhana*) and refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) together with their fallacies (*ābhāsa*) are pertinent for bringing understanding to others. Perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) together with their fallacies are pertinent for one's own understanding. This is a summary of the doctrine.

(E140; T120) 2. Means of Proof. Of these two branches of our doctrine, the means of proof is the statement of the *pakṣa* and the other members of an inference, because a matter unknown to questioners is transmitted by statements of the thesis, the reason,, and the example.

(E140; T120-121) 2.1.The Thesis. The *pakṣa* is a recognized property-possessor which the arguer wishes to prove to be qualified by a recognized qualifier. It is tacitly implied that no thesis is contradicted

by perception, etc. Thus, for instance: "Sound is permanent", or "Sound is impermanent."

(E140; T121; GT283-286) 2.2.The *Reason*. The *h* has three aspects. What are its three aspects? They are (1) that *h* be a property of *p*, (2) that *h* be present in the *sp*, (3) that *h* not be present in *vp*. What is the *sp* and what is the *vp*? The *sp* is whatever is similar to the *p* by the common possession of the *s*, i.e., the property to be proved. For instance, when sound is to be proved impermanent, a pot, which is impermanent, is an *sp*. The *vp* is that which lacks the *s*-property. Now we know that whatever is permanent is unproduced, like space. In this case, the property of being produced, or the property of ensuing upon human effort, is present only in the *sp*, never in the *vp*. Therefore, these are the marks for an *h*'s proving something to be impermanent.

(E140-141; T121; GT286-289) 2.3.The Examples. There are two examples according to whether they are given through similarity (*sp*) or through dissimilarity (*vp*). Of these, that where the *h* is present alone (*eva*, that is, is never found to be absent) is an *sp*. For example, "Whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, like a pot." The *vp* is that in which the *h* is said to be absent wherever the *s* is always (*eva)* absent. For instance, "whatever is permanent is seen to be unproduced, like space". By the word "permanent" is here meant the absence of impermanence. Likewise, by the word "unproduced" is meant the absence of producedness, just as the absence of an absence is a presence. We have now explained the *p*, (the *h*, and the examples).

(E141; T121-122) 2.4.Statements of the Thesis, the Reason, and the Examples. Statements of these factors, are the means of proof when one would convince others. For instance, "Sound is impermanent" is a statement of the thesis that the *p* has s. "Because it is produced" is a statement that the *p* has the *h*". "Whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, like a pot, etc." is a statement of positive concomitance with the *sp*. "Whatever is impermanent is seen to be unproduced, like space" is a statement of negative concomitance with the *vp*. We say that these three statements make the members of the argument, and no more.

(E141; T122-123; GT289-296) 3.1. Fallacious Theses. A fallacious thesis is one which the arguer wishes to prove but which is contradicted by perception or other factors. Thus:

(1) a thesis that is contradicted by perception, e.g., "sound is inaudible",

(2) a thesis that is contradicted by inference, e.g., "a pot is

permanent",

(3) a thesis that is contradicted by traditional doctrine, e.g., when a Vaiśeṣika would prove that sound is permanent,

(4) a thesis that is contradicted by common knowledge, e.g., "A human skull is pure, because it is a part of a living being, like a conch or an oystershell",

(5) a thesis that is contradicted by one's own statement, e.g., "My mother was barren",

(6) a thesis in which the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) is not admitted to exist is seen when a Buddhist says to a Sāṁkhya that sound is perishable,

(7) a thesis in which the qualificand (*viśeṣya*) is not admitted to exist is seen when a Sāṁkhya says to a Buddhist that the self is sentient,

(8) a thesis in which the qualifier and the qualificand are not admitted to exist is seen when a Vaiśeṣika says to a Buddhist that the self is the inherence cause of happiness, etc.,

(9) a thesis in which the relation between the qualifier and the qualificand is well established and not in need of demonstration, e.g., "sound is audible".

Statements of these nine sorts are faults of the thesis (*pratijñādoṣa*), because they reject the *s* itself that one is proving to exist in the *p*, as in the first five sorts, or because they cannot convince the opponent, as in the next three sorts, or because the means of proof would be useless as in the last sort. We have now explained the fallacious thesis.

(E141; T123; GT293)) 3.2. Fallacious Reasons. There are three kinds of fallacious reasons: unproved (*asiddha*), equivocal (*anaikāntika*), and contradictory (*viruddha*).

(E141-142; T123-124; GT293-294) Unproved reasons. Of these three fallacious reasons the unproved reason is of four varieties:

(1) a reason that is unrecognized by both the proponent and the opponent;

(2) a reason that is unrecognized by either the proponent or the opponent,

(3) a reason that is unrecognized because its existence is in doubt,

(4) a reason that is unrecognized because its substratum is not admitted to exist.

Of these,

An instance of (1) would be if one should give as his reason "because sound is visible" in trying to prove that sound is impermanent.

An instance of (2) would be if one gives as his reason "because

sound is produced" in trying to prove sound's impermanence to someone who holds that a sound is (only) a manifestation (*abhivyakti*).

An instance of (3) would be if one should try to prove fire by pointing not at smoke but at something suspected of being mist,

An instance of (4) would be if one should try to prove that space is a substance to someone who denies the existence of space.

(E142; T124-125; GT296-298) Equivocal Reasons. There are six kinds of equivocal reason: (1) too general, (2) too specific, (3) occurring in only a part of the *sp* and in all of the *vp*, (4) occurring in part of the *vp* and in all of the *sp*, (5) occurring in parts of both the *sp* and the *vp*, (6) nondeviating from what is contradictory.

A case of (1) too general is "Sound is permanent, because it is object of knowledge". This reason is equivocal because being an object of knowledge is common to both permanent and impermanent things. The question remains: is sound impermanent because it is an object of knowledge, like a pot, or is sound permanent because it is an object of knowledge, like space?

A case of (2) too specific is "Sound is permanent because it is audible", for the reason, i.e., audibility, is a cause of doubt, since it is excluded from both permanent and impermanent things other than sound, and because it is impossible that there should be anything that is neither permanent nor impermanent. The question remains: To what sorts of things (--permanent or impermanent--) does the audibility of sound belong?

A case of (3) is "Sound does not ensue upon human effort, because it is impermanent". The thesis is that sound does not ensue upon human effort. *Sp*s comprise lightning, space etc. Impermanence i.e., the *h* resides in some *sp*, e.g., in lightning, etc., but not in space. The *vp*s comprise pots, etc. Impermanence resides in all such things. But this reason is equivocal because impermanence is common to both lightning and pots. The question remains: Does sound ensue upon human effort because it is impermanent like a pot, or does sound not ensue upon human effort because it is impermanent like lightning, etc.?

A case of (4) is "Sound ensues upon human effort because it is impermanent." Here the thesis is that sound ensues upon human effort. *Sp*s comprise pots, etc. Impermanence resides in all such things as pots. *Vp*s comprise things such as lightning, space, etc. Here impermanence resides in some *vp*, namely lighnng, etc., but not in space, etc. Therefore, this reason is also inconclusive, as in the previous case, because it is a

quality common to both lightning and pots.

A case of (5) is "Sound is permanent, because it is incorporeal". The thesis is that sound is permanent. The *sp* consists of space, atoms, etc. Incorporeality resides in some *sp*s such as space, etc. but not in other *sp*s such as atoms. The *vp* consists of pots, happiness, etc. Incorporeality reside in some of those, e.g., in happiness, but not in others, e.g., pots. Therefore, this reason is also inconclusive, because it appeals to a property common to both happiness and space.

A case of (6) is "Sound is impermanent, because it is produced, like a pot; sound is permanent, because it is audible, like soundness." As these two marks lead us to doubt, the two taken together constitute a single equivocal reason.

(E142-143; T125-126; GT298-299) Contradictory Reasons. There are four varieties of contradictory reasons, (1) a reason involving an *h* that actually proves the opposite of the *s*; (2) a reason involving as *h* something that proves the opposite of some attribute of the *s*; (3) a reason involving an *h* that proves the opposite of the nature of the *p*; (4) a reason involving an *h* that proves the opposite of some attribute of the *p*. Examples:

(1) An example of (1) is "Sound is permanent, because it is produced, or because it ensues upon human effort." Here the *h* is contradictory, because it exists only in the *vp*.

(2) An example of (2) is "The eyes and the other senses are for the sake of some entity other than themselves, because they are aggregates, like the individual parts of a bed or a chair." Just as this *h* aggregateness proves of the eyes their property of being for the sake of some other entity, so also it proves of the other entity, namely the self, its property of being an aggregate, because aggregateness definitely leads us to both (conclusions).

(3) An example of (3) is is "Existence is neither a substance nor an action nor a quality, because it possesses one substance as its locus and because it reside in qualities and actions like lower universals". Just as this *h* proves that existence is not a substance, etc., so also it proves that existence is not existence, because the *h* leads to both conclusions.

(4) An example of (4) is provided in a (Vaiśeṣika's) argument that an individuator (*viśeṣa*) exists, which also occasions our idea that that individuator does not exist (as per the previous argument).

(E143, T126) There are two kinds of fallacious examples according to whether they are *sp* or *vp* .

(E143; T126-127; GT299-300) Fallacious *sp*s. There are five varieties of fallacious *sp*s: (1) one in which the *h* is not found, (2) one in which the *s* is not found, (3) one in which neither the *h* nor the *s* is found; (4) one that lacks the statement of pervasion; (5) one where the pervasion is reversed.

(1) An example in which the *h* is not found is: "Sound is permanent, because it is incorporeal, like an atom". Here the *s*, permanence, resides in an atom, but the *h*, incorporeality, does not, because atoms are corporeal.

(2) An example in which the *s* is not found is: "Sound is permanent, because it is incorporeal, like the intellect (*buddhi*). Whatever is incorporeal is seen to be impermanent, like the intellect." Here the *h*, incorporeality, resides in the intellect, but the *s*, permanence, does not, because the intellect is impermanent.

(3) There are two kinds of examples in which neither the *h* nor the *s* is found: existent examples and nonexistent examples. In the last argument if we substitute the example "like a pot," we have an existent example in which neither is found, because in a pot there are both impermanence and corporeality. "Like space" is a nonexistent example when one argues against a man who denies the existence of space.

(4) An example that lacks the statement of positive concomitance is one where the coexistence of the *h* and the *s* is given with no statement of positive concomitance. Thus: "Impermanence and the property of being produced are seen to reside in a pot."

(5) An example where positive concomitance is expressed in the reverse order is this: "Whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent."

(E143-144; T127-128) Fallacious *vp*s. There are five varieties of fallacious *vp*s, (1) an example from which the *s* is not excluded, (2) an example from which the *h* is not excluded, (3) an example from which neither the *s* nor the *h* are excluded, (4) an example that lacks the statement of negative concomitance; (5) an example where negative concomitance is expressed in the reverse order.

Of these, (1) an example from which the *s* is not excluded is: "Sound is permanent, because it is incorporeal, like an atom. Whatever is impermanent is seen to be corporeal, like an atom." Here the *h*, incorporeality, is excluded from an atom, for an atom is corporeal, but the *s*, permanence, is not excluded, for an atom is permanent.

(2) An example from which the *h* is not excluded is: "Sound is permanent, because it is incorporeal. Whatever is impermanent is seen to

be corporeal, like an action." Here the *s*, permanence, is excluded from an action, for an action is impermanent; but the *h*, incorporeality, is not excluded, for an action is incorporeal.

(3) An example from which neither the *s* nor the *h* is excluded is: "Sound is permanent, because it is incorporeal. Whatever is impermanent is seen to be corporeal, like space" as said to one who holds space to be existent. Here neither permanence nor incorporeality is excluded from space, because space is permanent and incorporeal.

(4) An example that lacks the statement of negative concomitance is one where the fact that the given example is a thing dissimilar to the *p* is shown without any expression of negative concomitance between the *h* and the *s*. Thus: "Corporeality and impermanence are seen to reside in a pot."

(5) An example where negative concomitance is expressed in the reverse order: one says, "Whatever is corporeal is seen to be impermanent" when he should say, "Whatever is impermanent is corporeal."

(E144; T128) Fallacious Instruments of Knowledge. Statements containing the above fallacious *p*s, *hs* and examples are fallacious instruments of knowledge.

(E144; T128; GT300-302) Perception and Inference. On the other hand, for one's own understanding the only instruments of knowledge are these two: perception and inference. Of these, perception is devoid of conceptual construction. It is that kind of cognition which does not construct any notion of name, universal, etc., upon a sense-object such as color, etc. It is called perception *(pratyakṣa)* because it occurs to each (*prati*) sense (*akṣa*). Inference is the understanding of an object through its mark. We have explained that a mark has three aspects. Accordingly, the cognition of an inferential object in the form "here is fire," or "sound is impermanent," is also called inference. In both cases (perception and inference) the cognition itself is the result, for the nature of cognition is comprehension of the object. They are called instruments of knowledge because they appear to involve an activity.

(E144; T128-129) A cognition in the form of a mental construction of something other than a particular is a fallacious perception. The cognition "a pot", "cloth", which arises in one who is building mental constructs, is fallacious perception because its object is not the particular. Fallacious inference is a cognition based on a fallacious reason. We have explained many varieties of the fallacious reasons. Accordingly, the

cognition of an inferential object that arises in a person untrained in these rules of inference will be fallacious inference.

(E144; T129; GT302-303) A refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) is the pointing out of faults in an argument. An argument is faulty when it lacks one of its members. The thesis is faulty when it is contradicted by perception, etc. The reason is faulty when it is unproved, equivocal or contradictory. The example is faulty when the *h* or the *s* is not found in it. To point out such a fault, to make one's questioner recognize it, is refutation.

(E144; T129) A fallacious refutation is that which points out nonexistent faults in the instrument of knowledge. E.g., stating that the instrument is incomplete when it is complete; stating that the thesis is faulty when it is not faulty; stating that the reason is unestablished when it is established; stating that the reason is inconclusive when it is conclusive; stating that the mark is contradicted when it is not contradicted; stating that there is the fault of faulty example when the example is faultless. These are fallacious refutations, for the opponent's viewpoint is not refuted by them, being without fault.

At the outset i.e., in this introduction only the meanings of the terms have been explained, so as to show the general direction that further research should take. The arguments for and against them are examined elsewhere.

168. (ĀRYA) VIMUKTISENA, *Vṛtti* on Asaṅga's *Abhisamayālaṁkāra* (555)

David Seyfort Ruegg has reviewed the information the literature provides concerning this author.[204] "The colophon of the *Vṛtti* contained in the Nepalese manuscript as well as in Tibetan translation...merely states that Ārya-Vimuktisena was the nephew of a certain Buddhadāsa, a master of many Vihāras of the Kaurukulla-Āryasammatīya school." Bu ston believed he was a pupil of Vasubandhu. Tāranātha agrees, but calls him also a younger contemporary of Buddhapālita as well as a contemporary of Bhavya, and a pupil of Dignāga. As Ruegg remarks, "These statements are difficult for us to evaluate".

The first part of the work has been edited by Corrado Pensa as Serie Orientale Roma 37, 1967, with an introduction in Italian. Ruegg in the article just cited studies a short section (I. 37-39). The book by Hirofusa Amano, incorrectly listed in Volume I, *Bibliography*, of this Encyclopedia, Third Edition, p. 224 under this author, actually deals with Haribhadra's later commentary on the *Abhisamayālaṁkāra*.)[205]

Edward Conze remarks "This is a commentary to both the P(*Pañcaviṁśatī-)* and AA(*Abhisamayālaṁkāra*), side by side, and it is chiefly concerned with showing, point by point, the correspondence which exists between the division and verses of AA...and the text of P.."[206]

DHARMAPĀLA (560)

Hsüan-tsang, a Chinese who was in India during the sixth century, gives us what must be considered fairly solid information about this author. We are told by him that Dharmapāla "was born in Kāñcī (modern Conjeeveram) in South India as the eldest son of a high official; subsequently, fearing that he was to be forced to marry a daughter of the king, he fled to a monastery and later became a famous Vijñānavādin teacher in the monastic university of Nalandā in the North. In 559 A.D. at the age of twenty-nine he retired from Nalandā to meditate in Bodh Gaya, where he remained until his death in 561 A.D."[207]

Dharmapāla seems to have written a work on Vyākaraṇa (or Grammar). Aiyaswami Sastri identifies it as the *Śabdavidyāsaṁyuktaśāstra* in 25,000 *śloka*s. The Chinese title is *Sheng ming za lun*, and Tillemans finds Sastri's reconstruction "rather improbable".[208]

None of Dharmapāla's works survives in Sanskrit, and they are also unavailable in Tibetan. Bhavya criticized Dharmapāla in Chapter Five of his *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā-Tarkajvālā*; see the summary above of that Chapter for a representation of Dharmapāla's view on the three-natures theory.

169. DHARMAPĀLA, *Vyākhyā* on Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā* (560)

Dharmapāla's commentary on the *Alambanaparīkṣā* is not available in its entirety. The Chinese translation is T. 1625; it was translated by I Ching. The translation extends only up to the seventh verse. It is reconstructed into Sanskrit and translated into English by N. Aiyaswami Sastri in his edition and translation of the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* itself; this is our "E and T".

Summary by Karl H. Potter

(E21-23; T56-60) The Vaiśeṣikas say: "The five sense-organs cause to be constructed five sensory awarenesses of real external objects. The mental consciousness does not do so, for it concerns objects which though real are not actually confronted and which do not have a form matching the one grasped."

But the truth so realized, although it appears perceptible, is actually only realized through meditation; it is not the object of reasoning (*tarka*). There can be no real object grasped by mental consciousness.

Vaiśeṣika objection: The contents of mental perception are what is first grasped by sensory awarenesses.

Answer: That is not possible. It cannot do so at the first moment, since the sense is grasping then; and at the next moment since the object which constitutes its content has vanished.

Objection: Then mental consciousness naturally grasps external objects.

Answer: Then nobody can be blind or deaf!

In fact there is no actual supporting object at all. The supposed content is just the joint product of the force that is the sense together with consciousness. This cause is not itself a substance, though it concerns a substance.

The Vaiśeṣikas conceptually construct atoms as the supporting objects. But an atom is imperceptible, so they think the double-atom (*dvyaṇuka*) is actually the supporting object, since it is capable of existing at the time of perception and is caused by atoms.

(E23-30; T61-73) So, others (Vaibhāṣikas) say that aggregates of atoms are the objects of awareness, since our awareness is in the shape of the aggregate.

Answer: This inference lacks an *sp*. Further, we do not recognize the *h*, since we do not believe there is any external thing called an "aggregate"

Atoms by themselves cannot constitute the supporting-object-cause of awareness any more than the sense-organs by themselves can, since neither one has the form (*ākāra*) of consciousness So it is consciousness itself that both has that form and grasps it. It arises in a form which resembles the mind (or internal organ, *manas*) when there is coordination (*sārūpya*) between consciousness and the content-condition (*viṣayapratyaya*) Really there is no object apart from consciousness, yet there is in the preceding moment something having the form of the content, and when it becomes reflected in consciousness we say that

consciousness has grasped it as its object. A double-atom does not represent a form reflected in consciousness, and so cannot be the supporting object

Objection: Whatever is the cause, that is the object.

Answer: Then the sense-organ can be the object!.

So we must conclude that the mind is not only the cause but appears as well as both sense-organ and in the form of the supporting object. How could an atom be both the cause and the object? Atoms are not contents of consciousness, because they do not manifest a form in which they are cognized, like the visual organ.

Objection: Your reason (in the just-formulated inference) is inconclusive, since your *h* has nothing to do with your *s*. Atoms have an indeterminate (*anirdhāraṇa*) nature, are neither by nature form-manifesting nor non-form-manifesting. Various causes conspire to produce consciousness.

Answer: Though an atom functions as a cause it is not the content of consciousness.

Objection: Then let the aggregate of atoms be the content.

Answer: Though the aggregate has the form of consciousness it is not its cause, since an aggregate is not an actual thing, any more than the vision of a double moon seen by one with a diseased eye is a vision of two real moons. Indeed, such an error is a mental consciousness.

A mental consciousness does not arise immediately following the occurrence of visual awareness and its supporting object, but the combined form of those two arises depending on the images of those two.

A supporting object has two parts: the reflection of its own form and the causality of the consciousness of it. The atom is not what is reflected in form, and the aggregate is not what causes the consciousness.

(E31-39; T73-86) Sautrāntika: It is the combined form of atoms that causes the consciousness and is the content as well. That is, each atom has a combined form (of the four great elements) as well as an atomie form (single), just all things are commonsensically seen to be constituted of parts and yet single entities themselves.

Answer: Then, since all atoms are composed of the same four great elements there would be no difference between them!

Objection: Atoms may differ in other ways.

Answer: Well, atoms have no parts, are very subtle, have precisely the same size, so how could they differ? But since aggregates have parts they must be unreal anyway, since they cannot grow or diminish in size,

etc. So our ideas of the differences between pots, cups, etc. are as empty of real objects as are our feelings of satisfaction and frustration. That they are empty is shown by the following: One sees a pot; atoms of the pot are removed gradually; the result is we do not see a pot any more. Likewise, an army disappears when its component soldiers leave or are killed.

Question: So what is it that we see?

Answer: A form internal to consciousness itself that appears as if it were external. There are no external things. That part of an object which appears to exist externally is actually a part of consciousness itself, the part we speak of as "grasped" part. Consciousness has two parts, then.

Objection: How can that part of consciousness, arising simultaneously with it, be itself a condition for consciousness.

Answer: The knowable aspect of one awareness gives rise to another awareness.

170. DHARMAPĀLA, *Vṛtti* on Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka* (560)

The Chinese title of this work is *Guang bai lun shi lun*; translated by Hsüan-tsang, it constitutes T. 1571 and is not available in either Sanskrit or Tibetan. It is actually a commentary on the last eight chapters of the *Catuḥśataka*. There is a Japanese translation by N. Endo published in *Kokuyaku Issaikyo.*

Tom J. F. Tillemans has translated two chapters of this work corresponding to Chapters 12 and 13 of our summary of Āryadeva's work published in Volume 8 of this Encyclopedia. We provide below a summary of those two Chapters, made entirely on the basis of the translation, referred to as "T".[209] A few sentences are translated by Giuseppe Tucci[210] and Louis de la Vallée Poussin[211] Several passages in which Dharmapāla criticizes Bhavya are translated and studied in Yuichi Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla", Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens 12-13, 1968-69, pp. 200-203.

Summary by Karl H. Potter

CHAPTER FOUR (on Chapter Twelve of the *Catuḥśataka*

(T87-90) 1-4. A person needs three qualities to be a vessel for the *dharma*: unbiassed gentleness, untiring application, and natural intelligence. If he lacks these he will not achieve understanding even with

the help of a teacher. Outsiders[1] understand nothing even if they should happen to hear the truth. This is not the Buddha's fault.

The outsiders agree that liberation is a state where only the self remains free from bondage, inactive and indifferent. For us, though, liberation is not just the elimination of possessions but the very emptiness of the self itself, whereas you say that the self remains existent in liberation. This emptiness never ceases. Thus the outsiders will never realize liberation,

(T90-93) 5. though they may say a few things that are true.

Objection: The *Tripiṭaka* contains a number of incorrect claims, such as concern miracles, the Buddha's remarkable magical abilities, and that despite being free of desire he is still reborn, e.g., as a householder.

Answer: If factors really occurred there might arise such doubts. But the Buddha teaches one thing only: emptiness. Factors are all either contents of thought or meant by words. But one object can produce at the same time many different thoughts, so factors do not correspond to one external object. As for words, they indicate universal properties, and universals are shared by many different factors, so are just nominal designations. The emptiness of factors is their characterlessness; thus emptiness is a characteristic, but not a distinct entity.

(T93-101) 6-10. Since outsiders are wrong about things in this world, they are likely to be wrong about the next. E.g., Vaiśeṣikas believe that there are an infinite number of limited universals (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*) which are perceptible by the senses. But cowness, horseness, etc. are actually nominal designations comprised of colors and the like. Since they are entirely present in each of their loci it is like inherence itself, which is entirely present in each of *its* loci and is imperceptible to the senses; thus cowness, horeseness, etc. must also be imperceptible to the senses. Likewise, substances are conceptual constructions from factors like color and so are not directly perceptible, despite what the Vaiśeṣika claims, because awarenesses of substances arise from what are classed as their

[1]Tillemans uses this term to identify what Lang in her summary of Āryadeva's work calls "hypocritical philosophers". Tillemans says these outsiders include Pūrṇa Kāśyapa, Maskarin Gośālīputra, Ajita Keśakambalin, Kakuda Kātyāyana, Nirgrantha Jñātiputra and Saṁjayin Vairaṭīputra. But it is evident below that Dharmapāla uses the word to cover nonBuddhist philosophers as well.

qualities (or motions) such as blue, etc. Awareness of things belonging to the other Vaiśeṣika categories are also not directly perceptible, for the same reason.

The Sāṁkhyas say that there are real things comprised of the three *guṇa*s and that they are perceptible. But again they can only be nominal designations; they cannot really exist, since *sattva*, say, is found in many things. Also, since each *guṇa* has a distinct essential nature different from the others' how could they combine?

Objection: Each of the three *guṇa*s has the properties of all three, so we perceive them as constituting one thing.

Answer: Then how could we ever know that the three are different from each other? And why should a combination of them produce anything else, say, a single thing, different from all three?

(T101-102) 11. A *sūtra* says: "It is better to break moral discipline than to destroy the correct view." By moral discipline one gets a good rebirth; by the correct view one gains liberation.

(T102-104) 12. Objection: If people hear that selflessness is the nature of all factors they will be led to nihilism, anticausality, etc.

Answer: That's because their views are at fault; it is not a defect in the doctrine of selflessness.

Objection: If the Buddha teaches emptiness to dispel erroneous grasping it will lead people to grasp all factors as empty.

Answer: True. So the Buddha also teaches that factors exist.

Objection: So which is true?

Answer: Neither; it is beyond conceptualization.

Objection: Then the Buddha should not teach emptiness for the most part, since both emptiness and nonemptiness are equivalently true or false.

Answer: It is because people most often grasp at existence that the Buddha for the most part preaches emptiness. All language is metaphorical.

(T108-111) 18-22. The shrewd ancient Brahmins invented the Vedas and passed them off as beginningless. But the Vedas are language and thus not natural entities, and the Brahmin caste is not worth venerating, since Brahmins beg for alms just as lepers do. Jain outsiders (= the "naked ascetics" of the summary of Āryadeva's text) are just bewildered. They are respected because they know a little about astronomy and can interpret birds, dreams and fortunes. People pity the Jains because they inflict suffering on themselves, but suffering is karmic

retribution like caste status and is not a cause of liberation.

CHAPTER FIVE (Chapter Thirteen of *Catuḥśataka*)

(T135-138) 1-4. The argument is directed at Sāṁkhya. Since its tradition holds that each sense organ grasps only one kind of content, one cannot directly perceive e.g. a pot.

(T145-147) 8-9. Vaiśeṣika: One can only see substances when they have the qualities of large size and color.

Answer: But shapes (such as "large size") don't exist when divided and colors cannot be seen. What is the cause of color? Perhaps you say: a substance. Then you should be able to see substances separately, but you cannot. Perhaps you say: colorness. But since colorness is a universal everything would be visible. Perhaps you say: colorness is a limited universal. We have refuted this previously. Colorness cannot be seen with the eyes since it is all-pervasive. One cannot see two different things, a color and its colorness.

(T148-149) 10. Tillemans explains Dharmapāla's interpretation of this verse (which is different from the interpretation found in our summary of *Catuḥśataka*): "If substances existed we would have to be able to see that they undergo change, but in fact we see nothing of the sort."

Outsiders and other Buddhist schools can be refuted simply thus: Objects must either be resistant or not. If they are resistant they are divisible, and thus not substantially existent. If they are not resistant they are not existent either, like flowers in the sky.

(T150-155) 11. Since the five sense organs are said by other Buddhists to have the same constituents, viz., subtle matter derived from the four great elements, how is it that only the eyes, say, can see and not the nose?

Objector: It is because people have different karma. One karmic trace has many powers.

Answer: Then why not just say that one act produces many different sense organs!

Objection: Action (karma) produces traces (*vāsanā*) which later produce different kinds of awarenesses.

Answer: Then that should happen in the immaterial realm too.

Objection: No. In the immaterial realm one is without desire for material things, so visual, etc. consciousness doesn't arise there.

Answer: But though one has become desireless the seeds of sense-

consciousnesses are not necessarily destroyed. Actually, sense-organs are themselves the transformations (*pariṇāma*) of karmic traces, and consciousness conforms to these transformations: it is these transformations which are mistaken for manifest existent entities in the world. Of course, this itself is not the highest truth. The highest truth about karma is inconceivable; only the Buddha understands it. This is proved in the following way: The eye does not see, nor the ear hear, etc., because they are themselves elemental and the effects of karma.

(T155-156) 12 is directed at Sāṁkhya, which teaches that the mind understands what the senses apprehend. But does the sensory act precede the mental one or are they simultaneous? Neither is possible, as the verse says.

(T160-162) 17. Vaiśeṣika: Verses 13-16, addressed to Sāṁkhya, accost them because for them the sense organs are made of the same stuff *(prakṛti)* as their objects. But we differentiate organs from objects--each sense is composed of a distinct substance, and sees things made of certain specific substances.

Answer: Still, your sense organs and your objects are both substances, so they can't very well see substances--they see qualities, according to you. You say that perception involves fourfold contact between the organ, the form/color/matter/object, the internal organ and the self. But (as the verse states) these things, lacking the necessary functions, cannot produce perception, since even when in contact they are no different than when apart.

Ābhidharmika: How so? When in contact they constitute sight.

Answer: Do you mean that when together they are no longer what they were? Then they are not organ, form, and self by nature as you yourself hold they are. Two things cannot both be the same and different.

(T162-164) 18. (Dharmapāla's understanding here seems to be different from the reading adopted in our summary of *Catuḥśataka*.) If linguistic sounds do not refer how can they produce awareness?

Objection: It is because a mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) arises whose content is a universal property.

Answer: But by the time this mental consciousness arises the sound and the auditory awareness have ceased.

Objector: Still, one remembers those previous events.

Answer: But then the memory has as its content those events, Āryadeva's universal property. Anyway, a memory(-event) cannot recall more than one thing, e.g., it cannot recall both a sound and an auditory

awareness.

(T167-168) 21. If the mind lacks sense organs its going to the object would be useless. Also, if the mind goes out to the object the self must remain mindless, which is absurd.

(T171-172) 23-24. Objection: Illusions are real, not false.

Answer: What we mean by saying that things are illusory is that when one analyzes them properly one finds that factors are nonexistent, empty. Lots of things about the world are difficult to understand: how one mental act can produce endless different results, how a plant can grow, why a woman's body should cause arousal, etc. (ten things in all that are difficult to understand).

171. DHARMAPĀLA, *Vṛtti* on Āryadeva's *Śataśāstra*[212] (560)

Title in Chinese by Hsuan-tsang as *Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih lun* this work is found as T. 1571 (our "E"). John P. Keenan has translated Chapter Ten of the work as *Dharmapāla's Yogācā*ra *Critique of Bhāvaviveka's Mādhyamika Explanation of Emptiness* (Studies in Asian Thought and Religion 20: Lewiston 1997), pp. 67-126, and introduced the translation with a helpful Introductory study. The translation is our "T". Since Chapter Ten of the *Śataka* is the same as Chapter Sixteen of Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka*, translated by Karen Lang and summarized by her on pp. 213-215 of Volume Seven of this Encyclopedia, we provide the numbering of the passages in that work for easy reference

The summary that follows is made entirely and solely on the basis of the translation (T).

Summary by Karl H. Potter

1 (E242c21-243b16; T67-72) Objection: If all things are empty, how can we even speak about them?

Answer: That is so from the standpoint of highest truth (*paramārthasatya*); still we can speak about them from the lower standpoint.

2 Objection: If the speaker and what he is speaking about exist then emptiness cannot be the case.

Answer: Since everything is causally conditioned neither the speaker, his words or their meanings exist. Or on another (the Yogācāra)

interpretation[1] the speaker, words and meanings are only consciousness and established conventionally, so do not exist ultimately. To be dependent on other things is what we mean by "empty",

3 Now we have already refuted nonemptiness (in preceding Chapters), so you can't prove nonemptiness merely by refuting emptiness.

4 In order to disprove the theses of others one must prove one's own view.

Objection: Then "emptiness" and "no self" do not mean anything!

Answer: Precisely!

5 (E243b21-243c24; T72-76) Thus our "theses" are merely provisional. In order to refute the positions of others we establish a thesis; once that is done, however, our own thesis has to be given up.

Indeed, we shape our theses by basing ourselves on the opinions of others.

6 Objection: Even so, your thesis that all things are empty is clearly wrong, since pots, etc. are clearly perceived to exist in the world.

Answer: No. We do not accept that standard view that inference depends on perception, since pots, etc. are not directly perceived, as we have shown in preceding sections of this work.

7 Objection: If nonemptiness does not exist, what is the argument for emptiness? It doesn't exist either!

Answer: (7b) If you do not establish emptiness nonemptiness cannot be proved either.

But the emptiness of which we speak serves only to dispel wrong notions, not to establish an alternative to it. Contrasts are found in things in the world, not in emptiness. In parallel fashion, for example, we argue for momentariness (impermanence) in order to refute eternalism, not to establish momentariness.

8 (E244a5-15; T76-77) If there is no thesis of nonexistence then the thesis of existence cannot be proved.

Objection: Then how can the things we perceive have different qualities, e.g., as fire has heat?

9 Both fire and heat are conventional., not ultimately real.

10 (E244a15-244b14; T77-80) Objection: If things really have no being what does emptiness refute? Emptiness is the opposite of being, so

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[1]T identifies this alternative interpretation in parentheses as that of Yogācāra .

things must exist.

If so, each of the four incompatible alternatives of the *catuṣkoṭi* must be true! You cannot seriously affirm that what is refuted actually exists; if it were so, there would be no error, only truth!

11 Objection: If everything is nonexistent nothing is born and nothing dies.

Answer: When have the Buddhas said that things do not really exist?

Indeed, the Buddha explicitly said (In the *Kāśyapaparivarta*) that what lies between being and nonbeing cannot be asserted or denied. Talk of things is only conventional.

12 (244b15-246a9) (T81-93) Objection: If nothing either exists or fails to exist why do you talk of conventional existence?

Answer: Since you yourself believe it, why do you ask?

13 Objection: If nothing exists then differences wouldn't exist either.

Answer: It is clinging to existence that causes you to differentiate things.

14 Objection: If things don't exist, an argument for that doesn't exist either!

Answer: We've given the argument above.

15 Objection: Refutation is easy; proof is hard.

Answer: Just the reverse: establishing emptiness is easy, refuting it hard.

16-17 Objection: The fact that we have the term "being" shows that things cannot actually be nonexistent.

Answer: By the same reasoing, the fact that we have the word "nothing" shows that things cannot be existent.

18 Everything we can speak of is only conventional.

19 Objection: That is nihilism.

Answer: No, we are merely removing false opinions.

20 Objection: If you reject the nonbeing of reality you must accept the being of reality.

Since both being and nonbeing do not really exist, reality is neither.

The following objection to what has just been said ("reality is neither") has two possible interpretations.

Interpretation One: What is under discussion is only conventional nonbeing, not something else, real nonbeing.

Answer: No. Nobody claims that a real nonbeing exists. That would be an affirmation.[1]

Interpretation Two: After one has achieved insight he never sees the conventional again, and that is what "reality is neither" intends.

Answer: What is it that is realized upon insight? Not "reality", since that is already "realized" in language and thought. And if what is referred to is an independent reality (the "Absolute?!") then it should not be held that everything is only constructions. Furthermore, scriptures tell us that to see reality is not to see anything.

21 Objection: If one proves emptiness through an argument about being, then (since that argument itself is not empty) emptiness cannot be established.

Answer: Since both a thesis and an argument are empty our argument has no basis in what exists. They are conventional.

22 Objection: Moreover, an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) must either exist or not exist. If it exists then something exists, and if it does not exist it cannot prove anything, e.g., that all things are empty.

Answer: The example is conventional too.

23[2] (246a15-247a3) (T94-101) Objection: Even if it is so, that everything is empty, what value is there in knowing that?

Answer: Meditating on emptiness can get one rid of his constructing of what was not (*abhūtaparikalpa*).

Objection: What is this constructing of what was not?

Answer: All awarenesses (*citta*) and associated mental factors (*caitta*). Though all such are empty, yet through imagining what is actually unreal we engender the appearances of defilements or purifications in beings as in dreams.

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[1]With some trepidation we provide Keenan's attempt to interpret this at T, p. 89, note 31: "Here the point seems to be that, even though one makes conventional and independently reasoned statements, and refutes naive affirmations of being, this does not entail another affirmation within that same naive context of being. Rather it entails an awareness of the disappearance of the entire horizon in which conventional affirmations and negations occur."

[2]Keenan in T considers this the beginning of "Part II: The Yogācāra Perspective".

Objection: Activity requires a real agent. If it were not so, a hare's horn could function! So, since passions and good roots are nonexistent (according to you) and beings are still defiled and purified, people could have been liberated from their passions and still be subject to rebirth, and those without good roots could be liberated!

Answer (by a Svātantrika, according to T): Conventional things are not nonexistent.

Objection to the Svātantrika: It is contradictory to say that something both exists and does not exist.

Svātantrika: The same factor can be real qua relating to no object and conventional qua relating to an object. Likewise, for example, one and the same giving can be bad because contaminated and good because associated with the good roots.

Objection to the Svātantrika: But the two truths do not differ in their object. Rather, they differ as to the time of their functioning.

Svātantrika: Though occurring at the same time a thing can have one function and not another So (consciousness) is spoken of as "self" conventionally because of our attachment, but as "no self" from the ultimate standpoint. Any thing exists as itself ("the highest standpoint") but does "not exist" being dependent on others ("the conventional standpoint").

Answer to the Svātantrika: Nevertheless it is the same thing that is both conventional and real. The two truths were taught because of two different ways of cognizing, one through language and the other free from language.

(247a6-248b25) (T101-114) Dharmapāla[1]: But direct perceptions as dependently originated cannot be described in language, so are not conventional truths, being nonlinguistic.

(Bhavya)[2]: So there must be a third "truth" (the dependent

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[1]Identification of the participants in the following debate are provisional: we take our cue from Keenan, but without much conviction. (Keenan himself appears a bit unsure here: note 54, p. 103 begins "If I have interpreted the flow of the argumentation correctly...)!

[2]Keenan points out that the text never identifies the opponent in what follow, but gives copious evidence that it is in fact Bhavya's views which are being considered.

(*paratantra* truth) neither conventional (since nonlinguistic) nor ultimate (since dependently originated).

Dharmapāla: If your position is that this "third truth" of perceptions is a variety of the conventional we are ready to accept that, since it is only on such a basis that the statements (alluded to above) about defilement and purification can have meaning.

(Bhavya): If that means that these things do not exist at all then, since nonconstructive wisdom could never arise at all, we object. Although the dependently originated perceptions are not themselves real, still they do manifest real things, even though ultimately those things do not exist.[1]

Dharmapāla: Then you must know what ultimate truth is! But one cannot conceive the highest truth, since its content is undifferentiated and cannot be analyzed. So words cannot refer to ultimately real things.

(Bhavya): But if so how can language engender the activities of defilement and purification?

Dharmapāla: That is why we take the position that the construction of what was not is able to bind beings to the world, and that by suppressing it one can practic a path to realize emptiness. If it were nothing at all it couldn't bind anything to defilement, etc. That is, our position is that the dependent nature, by which we refer not to names (that is the constructed nature) but to things, does actually exist.

Bhavya: That is wrong. If names like objects arise from conditions they too must exist. Why do you say that one exists and the other doesn't?

Dharmarāja: The *Bhavasaṁkrāntisūtra* (quoted) reads as follows:

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[1]Here is Keenan's explanation of this obscure passage: "Bhāvaviveka is trying to draw from Dharmapāla's contention that what is directlly perceived is not included in worldly convention the implication that it must then be included in the truth of ultimate meaning, which is impossible, he argues, because then it would have no activity whatsoever saince the ultimate wisdom of awakening is beyond conventional objects. Bhāvaviveka would by contrast hold that since the conventional does exist as it appears, his position does not entail such a logical conundrum." (T, p. 103, note 54).

"We describe various things through the various names we establish. But the nature of things is such that those (names) essentially do not exist." You read the last line as "...that those objects do not exist". But you are wrong: names can only indicate common characteristics of things, not their individuating features. Common characteristics do not exist, while individuating features do. That is why this passage can only be read in the way we have given, not in your way.

Bhavya: The Buddha himself says that there are no essential natures.

Dharmarāja: The underlying meaning (*neyārtha*) of his words denies only dependent nature; they do not mean that everything is nonexistent.

Quotations from Buddhist literature are appealed to by both sides.

(248c7-249a7) (T114-118) Objection: What kind of wisdom has dependence as its pattern?

Answer: It is worldly wisdom purified by conceptfree (*nirvikalpaka*) wisdom. Otherwise it could not have any effect in reality. If it could per impossiblile do so because its object is constructed, then false judgments would lead to successful activity.

Objection: Anyway, your position is inconsistent with your own (Yogācāra) texts. They say that both ordinary folk and sages can have dependent awareness, not just the latter.

Answer: What happens is that awarenesses and mental concomitants arise from causes and conditions--the evolutions of consciousness--and we become aware of ourselves (*svasaṁvitti*) and of factors such as names, etc. as if they were external objects. But those objects are totally imagined and cannot be the supporting conditions (*ālambanapratyaya*) of our awarenesses. So they are not the contents of dependent awarenesses.

Objection: If the awarenesses and mental concomitant arising from causal conditions are merely imagined and everything is without an essential nature, how can they bind beings into transmigration?

Answer: Āryadeva surely supports our interpretation. Otherwise he would not have said that insight gained through realizing emptiness can terminate the bondage through construction of what was not. We can't actually see horns on a hare, but we can imagine them and come to reject the image. So, awareness and mental concomitants exist, but objects external to the mind do not.

(249a11-249c6) (T118-123) More quotations from scripture are offered to support this interpretation. The position defended here is

summarily stated (249b28)

Wise men say there are three kinds of mental contents: those that can be spoken of and have features, those that are ineffable but have features, and those ineffable and without features. The first involves language, the second has a propensity toward language but no cognizance of language, and the third involves neither awareness of language not any propensity toward it.

24-25 (249c13-250a22) (T123-126) Reality can be neither one nor many, and all theses, like these, are likewise only true from the conventional standpoint.

172. DHARMAPĀLA, Commentary on Vasubandhu's *Triṁśikā* (560)

Dharmapāla is regularly credited with a work, famous in China, entitled *Cheng wei shi lun* and referred to often as *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, supposed to have been translated by Hsüan-tsang into Chinese and available as T. 1591. However, as Tillemans points out, this is not an Indian text at all, but "a work by Hsüan-tsang himself...as a compilation of various Indian Vijñānavāda masters' thought". It "relied especially heavily on Dharmapāla's commentary to the *Triṁśikā,* very possibly because Dharmapāla was himself the teacher of (Hsüan-tsang)'s guru, Śīlabhadra.".[213] Cf. Bibliography, Third Edition, p. 224 for some references.

PARAMĀRTHA (560)

Diana Y. Paul has made a life's work of studying this author. In her article "The life and times of Paramārtha (499-569)", Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 5.1, 1982, pp. 37-69, working with a number of Chinese sources, she has reconstructed a full account of Paramārtha's remarkable life. (The account provided in Paul's book *Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century Chinea*, Stanford, Cal. 1984, is even more complete.) He was born in Ujjain, at that time in a province of Malwa, into a Brahmin family of the Bharadwaja caste, he became a Buddhist monk, but little is known of his life in India except that he travelled a lot. His travels took him, we don't know when, to Funan province, an Indian colony in what is now Cambodia. He was not the first Indian Buddhist monk to go to China to translate texts--we know that several others were in fact sent to China from Funan in the first half

of the 6th century. Paramārtha apparently arrived in Canton in 546; he was in his early forties. Political unrest caused him to keep moving around the country, translating many of the most important Buddhist works such as the *Abhidharmakośa*, *Madhyāntavibhāga* and several of Vasubandhu's works, as well as *sūtra*s such as the *Saṁdhinirmocana*. He died in Canton in 569 at the age of 71.

It is not clear whether Paramārtha wrote any original works other than translations of works already extant. Diana Paul writes that of all the many works composed by Paramārtha only one, titled in Chinese *Chuan shih lun*, has any special claim to being an independent work of Paramārtha's. "Yūki Reimon, for example, makes the point that since Paramārtha in all his other translations preserved the corresponding literary form, he was not in this instance simply changing the form from verse to prose. Other Buddhologists, including Fukaura Shobun and Ui Hakuju, maintain that the *Chuan Shih Lun* is not just a translation of a line-by-line commentary on the *Triṁśikā* but Paramārtha's own exegesis."[214]

We will follow her lead and count this work as written by Paramārtha himself.

173. PARAMĀRTHA, Commentary on Vasubandhu's *Triṁśikā* (560)

This text exists in Chinese under the title *Chuan shih lun*, abbreviated here as "CSL". It "is a Chinese translation of the *Triṁśikākārikās* by Vasubandhu, along with a lengthy exegesis by Paramārtha."[215] Diana Paul provides a running summary account,[216] from which we draw.[217]

Summary by Diana Paul

1."The text opens with a striking statement, found in verse 1 of the *Triṁśikā*, paraphrased as follows: 'Consciousness evolves in two ways: (1) it evolves into selves (*ātman*); (2) it evolves into things (*dharma*).'...Everything is mentally conditioned, the exegesis adds, and not truly existent independent of consciousness and its own fabrications..."

2.The store-consciousness "originates in defilement and karma; it is the most fundamental of all functions, because it is a repository for all...'seeds'...bearing moral valuation."

3. Paramārtha "argues that by inference from its observable effects we know of its (the storehouse-consciousness') existence. One cannot directly apprehend the images and objects of this retributive faculty, but its effects such as ignorance are knowable."

4 "asserts that these mental states associated with the indeterminate moral quality of *ālayavijñāna* are constant and ever moving, momentary, like the current in a river."

5."'(A)ppropriating' (*ādāna*) is its the thinking consciousness' essence."

6 "presents the four types of delusion--ignorance (*ātma-moha*), views of self or ego (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*), conceit or self-pride (*ātma-māna*), and self-love (*ātma-sneha*)--these being the accompanying states associated with the *manas*, described as indeterminate, as was the *ālaya*, but hidden (*nivṛta*) (because of defilement), unlike the *ālaya* (which is *anivṛta*)."

7."'When the path of insight (*darśana-mārga*) destroys the defiled consciousness and its mental states and when there is the attainment of the transcendent path (*lokottara-mārga*) of the sixteen practices of meditation on the Four Noble Truths then it (the defiled consciousness) is ultimately eliminated.'"

8."The exegesis relates these sense-objects to the three natures (*trisvabhāva*)."

9-14. "The exegesis comments on the ten good actions together. These ten pervade the mind of the triple world of desire, matter, and spirit and the mind in the realm without outflows from defilement, namely *anāsravadhātu*, and are classified as the great mental elements. Their nature is intrinsically good."

15."Paramārtha's translation of verse XV reads as follows: 'The five sense-consciousnesses (subsumed) in the six consciousnesses--the intellect (*manovijñāna*), the fundamental consciousness, and the appropriating consciousness--these three groups of faculties ensue from causes and conditions. They occur either simultaneously or sequentially.' The exegesis elaborates on the conditioning process for sensation, taking attention as the (immediate) cause and the external sense data as the (secondary) condition for consciousness to occur...Each sense consciousness has a corresponding sense datum (vision to form, hearing to sound, and so on). Multiple sense consciousnesses must occur simultaneously with multiple sense data in order to register as a single, coherent image. All seven consciousnesses (in these subjective-objective dynamics of consciousness/sense data series) interact with each other in

the *ālayavijñāna*, and are 'reflected together as in a mirror'."

16."In Verse XVI conditions or situations are given for when the faculty of the intellect (*mano-vijñāna*) no longer occurs...The CSL adds to this list a sixth state, 'dreamless sleep.' All thought processes associated with the intellect (such as language, symbol making, integrating sense data, and concept formation) cease in these five or six situations."

17."The exegesis adds: "...the discriminator also does not exist. Without a sense object to be grasped, consciousness cannot occur.' Then the CSL cites the last part of the verse: "Therefore, the principle of Consciousness-Only can be upheld.' This passage...may be an indication that Paramārtha is here developing a new idea that departs from the tenets of Sthiramati's and Vasubandhu's school of thought. The CSL elaborates: 'What does it mean to establish the principle of Consciouness-Only? The meaning, fundamentally, is to dispense with sense objects and to dispense with the mind.' This passage, frequently cited in the literature, is evidence that this was a significant redefinition of *vijñaptimātratā* not common to other Buddhist treatises and perhaps unique to Paramārtha's own thought. It is a much more radical statement than either verse XVII or Sthiramati's exegesis."

18."(T)he CSL states: 'As for the consciousness containing the seeds of all phenomena (namely, the *ālaya-vijñāna*), it creates and evolves from one to another form, evolving from each other onward and onward into varieties of discriminations and discriminated objects through mutual interaction (of the *ālaya* with the other states of consciousness).""

19."There are two kinds of influences (*hsün-hsi*) from past karma and two kinds of influential forces (*hsi-ch'i*)...The CSL interprets *hsün-hsi* as *vāsanā* of karma and *hsi-ch'i* as defilement. These are then considered synonyms for the seeds (*bīja*) of karma. The CSL comments that the *vāsanā* of attachment from past karma is the discriminator, the *vāsanā* from past karma being the discriminated object. (T)he CSL elaborates on influential forces of habit (*hsi-ch'i*) that have a defiled character, a notion that has no analogue in the *Triṁśikā*...

These influential forces...are of two kinds: the influential habits of imputing features or characteristics on things, and primitive (or gross) latent defilements. The former is the subjective side of consciousness, dependent in nature; the latter is the objectified side of consciousness, the discriminated nature. By eliminating both types of influences and their defilement, one arrives at the absolutely real nature...(T)he CSL construes each seed as dual (*dvaya-vāsanayā*), including the *vāsanā* of karma and

not only what strictly corresponds to *grāhavāsanā* or the *vāsanā* of dualistic perception as Sthiramati and Vasubandhu construe the twofold nature of this latter category of *vāsanā*..."

21-22."'Arguing against the separability of these two natures, *parikalpita* and *paratantra*, the CSL opposes what constitutes the position of Sthiramati: 'If they were separable from each other, then the principle of Consciousness-Only would not be upheld, because sense objects would be different from consciousness. Because they are inseparable, there is Consciousness-Only without an objective world. Because there is no objective world, consciousness also does not exist. Because the sense object does not exist and neither does consciousness, the principle of Consciousness-Only is established.' The CSL does not affirm the existence of either a mental or a material world, both being contingent upon each other, suggesting a strong Mādhyamika line of reasoning."

24."The CSL expands at some length on each of these three naturelessnesses: 'The essence of an object in consciousness appears as the aspect of matter. Matter is the nature of discrimination. Since discrimination does not exist, the essence of an object does not exist. Since the causes do not exist either, the sense object, being derived from the nature of discrimination, can bring about effects on consciousness.'

27."'If one says 'there is only the existence of consciousness' based upon attachment to what is presented before him as an object, then since he has not yet eliminated this attachment (to dualistic perceptions), he does not enter Consciousness-Only.'"

30."The CSL ends with some of its most frequently quoted lines, on how both the sense object and consciousness doe not exist; and this is the definiiton of both Consciousness-Only and the *amala-vijñāna*."

174.VASUMITRA (560)

Vasumitra was a pupil of Guṇamati's and the author of a commentary on the *Abhidharmakośa* which now seems to be lost. Marek Mejor (op. cit.) has discovered a number of references in Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* to Vasumitra's views. Marek concludes: "Vasumitra often followed literally the explanations of his teacher and it can be surmised that he wrote a subcommentary on Guṇamati's commentary; Guṇamati and Vasumitra belonged to a school different from that of Vasubandhu, they contradicted the opinions of the Ābhidharmikas, and their opinions were criticized by Yaśomitra, a

Sautrāntika; they might have belonged to the school of Mahīśāsikas since one of their theses is found on the list of the tenets of that school."[218]

STHIRAMATI (560)

"It is said that Sthiramati originated from Lāṭa country (Gujarat Central and South). He was a disciple of Guṇamati but probably turned away from his teacher as he had established himself in Valabhī. It seems that Sthiramati was not always in perfect doctrinal agreement with the school in Nālandā for the Chinese comentators very often point out the differences, if not the open contradictions, with the opinions of Dharmapāla. He must have succeeded his master in Valabhī: we know from the inscription that the king Guhasena of Valabhī (ruled 558-566 A.D.) presented a monastery to Sthiramati."[219] Sthiramati's dates as given by e.g., Masaaki Hattori and Erich Frauwallner as 510-570 are accepted by scholars at present. Since both Sthiramati and Dharmapāla criticize Bhavya's views Sthiramati must postdate Bhavya. The tradition that Sthiramati was a direct disciple of Vasubandhu is unlikely.

175.STHIRAMATI, *Tattvārthaṭīkā* on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*

Summary by Robert E. Buswell Jr.

The Chinese title of this work is *Chü-she-lun shih-i shu*. The Chinese text appearing in the Taisho *Tripiṭaka* is a reprint of a Tun-huang manuscript (Pelliot no. 3196), belonging to the French collection of the Bibliotheque Nationale. No other Chinese recensions are known, but a fragment of a Uighur translation of portions of the Chinese text has been discovered.[220] A prefatory note to the extant Chinese text states that the commentary comprises a total of 28,000 *śloka*s, which corresponds closely to the size of the Tibetan recension of the commentary. Only fragments of the first five fascicles (*chuan*) of the Chinese text are extant, covering the first three fascicles of Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation of *Abhidharmakośa* (T.1558); this treats part of the first and second Kośasthānas. The commentary cites 15 full and two half-verses of the 48 *kārikā*s in the Sanskrit recension of the first Kośasthāna, Dhātunirdeśa, and eight of the 73 *kārikā*s in the Sanskrit of the second chapter,

Indriyanirdeśa.[221] Such important texts as *Mahāvibhāṣā* (T 1545) and Saṁghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra* (T 1562) are quoted by Sthiramati (though without citing his sources by name), and there is little in the extant fragments that can be considered particularly innovative.

Based on the existing evidence, it is impossible to determine the original size of the complete translation of the commentary. We are on equally unsure footing as to when and by whom the translation was made. There are, however, close affinities between the translation style and terminology of this text and that found in parallel Abhidharma works rendered by Hsüan-tsang and his associates; this could suggest that this translation also was done by Hsüan-tsang, probably sometime after the completion of the translation of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* in 659 A.D. The contents of the Chinese-Uighur and Tibetan recensions seem to have little in common, the former apparently being a much abridged rendition of the commentary.[222]

Fascicle One: Dhātunirdeśa (T1561.29.325a.5-326a.1). Sthiramati begins with an invocation, which he then explicates in the following manner: Because of one's reverence toward the *dharma*, one constantly enjoys hearing the *dharma*; this produces learned knowledge (*śrutamayiprajñā*), which gives rise successively to understanding generated through reflection (*cintamayiprajñā*), wisdom deriving from spiritual development (*bhāvanāmayiprajñā*), and finally wisdom which is free from any associations with the outflows (*anāsravajñāna*). Thanks to this last one is able to bring an end to all the proclivities and thus realize enlightenment. Sthiramati subsequently uses a similar chain of relationships to explain the dependence of Abhidharma on instinctive knowledge and learned knowledge.[223]

Based on Saṁghabhadra's explanation in *Nyāyānusāra* (T 1562.29.329a) the seven purposes of the text are next treated, which are explicated in terms of the invocatory verse of *Kośa* 1.1. These are the perfection of knowledge, forsaking, benefitting others, skill in means, acting as a spiritual guide, resolution, and the title.[224] "He who has dispelled all darkness entirely" (1.1a) refers to the perfection of knowledge. "Dispelled all of it" (1.1a) is the perfection of forsaking. "He has pulled all beings out of the mire of *saṁsāra*" (1.1b) refers to the perfection of benefitting others. "Having paid respects" (1.1c) is the perfection of skill. "The teacher who teaches things as they are" (1.1c) refers to the perfection of skill, i.e., the Buddha's ability to use

skill-in-means to explain the *dharma* in such a way that sentient beings will benefit. "I will explain the *śāstra*" (1.1d) is the perfection of resolution, because one has the resolute intention to write this *śāstra*. "Treasury of Abhidharma" (1.1d) refers to the perfection of the name.

Sthiramati then continues on to discuss the five classifications of factors (matter, consciousness, mental associates, dissociated and unconditioned), and explains why only a Buddha, not a seeker or a self-enlightened one, may fully understand their significance. This is illustrated with tales of the inability of Śāriputra and Mahāmaudgalyāyana to match the extensive knowledge of the Buddha. Śāriputra had refused ordain a certain postulant because the elder had been unable to find any affinities with monastic life in the man over the last two uncountable eons; the Buddha, however, was able to discover that still farther back in the past, that person had such affinities and allowed him to ordain. Maudgalyāyana, despite his reputation as an adept in spiritual powers, was unable to determine where his mother had been reborn; only the Buddha was able to discern her destiny outside the Trichiliocosm.

The third verse, on the value of the analytical investigation of factors in bringing an end to the defilements is also illustrated by Sthiramati with a story from Kāśyapa Buddha's time, about a monk whose constant criticisms of his fellows ordained and lay had led him to rebirth as a large fish. After being landed by a fisherman, the Buddha came to realize the being's previous state, and preached the *dharma* for him. Becoming repentant at his past conduct, the fish refused all food and drink, and starved himself to death. He was reborn in heaven, where he was able to hear the *dharma* and benefit from it. These treatments are typical of Sthiramati's nontechnical approach to most of the *kārikā*s.

Fascicle Two (T1561.29.326a.2-b.16). The major focus of the fragment remaining of this chapter is an examination of the meaning of unmanifested matter as given in 1.11. The *Kośa* had defined unmanifested matter as that stream which was the product of the material elements and which occurred even in the mind of a distracted or unconscious person. Sthiramati cites a verse, taken verbatim from Saṁghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra*, which instead describes unmanifested matter as a physical element which is unimpeded and which is found in either an active, concentrated or absent state of mind.[225] Sthiramati unfortunately gives no further explication of unmanifested matter such as is found in his commentary to Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandhaka*.[226] This

fascicle concludes with the verses in the *Kośa* summarizing the five aggregates (1.13, 14c-d, 15, 16), but without any further explication.

Fascicle Three (T1561.29.326b.17-c.21). The three classifications of factors as aggregates, organs, and elements are discussed, and their meanings of aggregation (*rāśi*), gate for coming into being (*ayadvāra*), and element (*gotra*) are given, following the explanation of *Kośa* I.20a-b. A simile for the meaning of element is related: just as a single mountain may contain many types of ore, such as copper, iron, gold, and silver, so too does a single body or a single continuum (*saṁtāna*) contain 18 elements--the 18 elements. Four verses (*Kośa* I.25, 28, 29, 33) are then given with no further explication, and the discussion on the three types of construction (*vikalpa*) (*Kośabhāṣya* I.33) is cited verbatim from Hsüan-tsang's translation (T1558.29.8b.2-4). Sthiramati adds that an eightfold division of construction is incorrect.

Fascicle Four (T1561.29.326c.22-327a.21) The following verses from the *Kośa* are cited without explication: AK I.37, 38, 41c-d, 42, 46, 47. The commentary continues by citing verbatim Hsüan-tsang's translation of the *Kośa*'s listing of the 22 senses (T. 1558.29.13a.20-23), Sthiramati adding only the relevant *sūtra* passage where this list appears.

Fascicle Five: Indriyanirdeśa (T1561.29.327a.220-328a.27) This fascicle begins the treatment of the second *Kośasthāna*. After citing *Abhidharmakośa* II.1 and three explanatory verses from *Nyāyānusāra* (T 1562.29.377b.18-23), Sthiramati then continues on to show how the mind predominates over the physical and verbal activities. He illustrates this with the example of a fetal libido: even in that unborn state, a male embryo will lust after the mother and hate the father, while a female fetus will have the opposite feelings.

Six more verses are then cited in succession (*Kośa* ii.2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9), after which Sthiramati continues with a discussion on the fact that only the last three senses in the list are free from the outflows--i.e., the faculties of "I shall come to understand the not yet understood" (*anājñātā ājñāsyāmīndriya*), understanding (*ājñendriya*) and having achieved full understanding (*ājñātāvīndriya*). He illustrates this point with a long excerpt from a scripture in which the Buddha's reticence to teach the *dharma* after his enlightenment is overcome through the intercession of the god, Brahmā Sahampati. The Buddha surveys the beings of the world

with his enlightened eye and discovers that there are sentient beings of all different capacities, some of whom would be capable of understanding his teaching. He thus consents to turn the wheel of the *dharma*.[227]

Sthiramati then turns to a consideration of the faculty of life-force (*jīvitendriya*), which AK II.10 had classified as the only sense which was always resultant (*vipāka*), i.e., the product of actions in previous rebirths.[228] Sthiramati cites a verse which shows the differences in the possible lifespans of various regions; our realm was of indeterminate lifespan, as was shown from the Buddha's statement that the lifespan of humans in Jambudvīpa had varied from 80,000 years during the time of the Buddha Vipaśyin to 20,000 years during the Buddha Kāśyapa's age, to only 100 years during Gautama's own era. Hence, lifespan was definitely dependent upon one's previous karma, and could be extended through meritorious deeds, such as building *stūpa*s and monasteries.

176. STHIRAMATI, *Bhāṣya* on Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (560)

Summary by Paul Griffiths

Author: The colophon of the only extant Sanskrit manuscript does not give the author's name. The Chinese tradition suggests that the work is by one Buddhasiṁha and was later revised by Sthiramati. The Tibetan tradition, in contrast, unanimously states that it is by Rgyal Ba'i Sras - probably best reconstructed as Jinaputra. There is now no external evidence to resolve this issue; extensive discussion was given to it by Prahlad Pradhan in 1950[229] and much of the relevant material may be found in his analysis. Internal evidence shows that there are substantial similarities--to the point of precise verbal parallels--between this work (=ASBh) and other works that are clearly attributed to Sthiramati. While the existence of such parallels is by no means clear evidence, it may suffice to adopt, as a provisional solution, Sthiramati's name as the author of the work. If in fact the ASBh was by either Buddhasiṁha or Jinaputra this is not terrible enlightening since we know little about either figure.

Editions: A single complete manuscript of the Sanskrit original of this text was discovered by Rahula Sankrtyayana in 1934 during his first major journey into Tibet in search of Buddhist Sanskrit texts.[230] An edition of this manusript was produced by Nathmal Tatia in 1976,[231] and

it is on this edition that the following summary is largely based. Tatia's edition appears reasonably accurate, though there is no doubt that it would have benefited from greater use of the Chinese and (especially) Tibetan translations.

Translations: (i) Tibetan: the entire work was translated into Tibetan by Jinamitra, Śilendrabodhi and Ye Shes Sde (Tohoku #4053, D Sems-Tsam LI 1b1-117a5; Peking #5554, P Sems-Tsam SHI 1b1-143b2). The translation is, as far as can be judged, faithful and accurate. It provides a useful check upon Tatia's Sanskrit edition and has been so used in the summary that follows. The Tibetan canonical collections also contain a work entitled *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (ASV), translated from a Sanskrit original also attributed to Rgyal Ba'i Sras (Jinaputra) by Jinamitra and Ye Shes Sde (Tohoku #4054, D Sems-Tsam LI 117a5-293a7; Peking #5555, Sems-Tsam SHI 143b2-362a8). This text is essentially a conflation of the AS and the ASBh, though there are some minor differences with the material found in those texts; also, the Tibetan translation found in ASV is often different from those found in the Tibetan versions of AS and ASBh, while undoubtedly reflecting an identical Sanskrit original. These differences will not be significant for the summary that follows.

(ii) Chinese: there is extant in Chinese only a complete translation of the ASV - that is to say, a Chinese version of a text that is substantially identical to the AS and ASBh taken together. This translation, like that of the AS, was made by Xuanzang (i.e., Hsüan-tsang) (Taisho #1606, Vol. 31, 695a-774a).

(iii) Other languages: there is no complete translation extant in any language other than those noted above. Various short sections have been translated and commented upon by contemporary Western, Indian and Japanese scholars.[232]

Form and Influence: The ASBh is a commentary to the AS, designed to elucidate many of the terse definitions found in that text. Many of its comments therefore simply gloss key terms in the AS with synonyms or near-synonyms and give grammatical analyses of Sanskrit compounds. But there are also occasional longer and more systematic philosophical discussions. Not every section of the AS receives discussion in the ASBh, but, like the text upon which it comments, the ASBh expounds the philosophical system of Indian Yogācāra. The text has close links with the other major texts of that tradition: there are parallels with, for example, the 182. *Triṁśikābhāṣya,* the

Mahāyānasaṁgrahabhāṣya of Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva's *Upanibandhana*; Vasubandhu's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkārabhāṣya* and Asvabhāva's *Ṭīkā*, Asaṅga's *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī*. Some of the more important of these parallel passages will be pointed out.

The structure of the ASBh follows that of the AS. The section numbers given here correspond to those in the summary of the AS. The absence of a section number in this summary may indicate either that the ASBh has no comment on that section or that I judge the comment given to be of only philological or historical interest. The abbreviation T refers to page and line of Tatia's edition of the Sanskrit text.

A. COMPENDIUM OF CHARACTERISTICS
(*Lakṣaṇasamucuccaya*) (E1.1-48.17)

The introductory section (T 1.1-9) describes the purpose with which the text was composed in terms of the twofold advantage which results from the attainment of intellectual skill in handling the categories programmatically defined by the AS. The advantages are those of attention and analysis of debate, relating respectively the development of concentration and insight and that of skill in logic and philosophical debate.

A5 Characteristics of the Aggregates, Elements and Spheres (E 2.10-3.2). Physical form is defined as being characterised by changeability; sensation is defined as experience resulting from good or bad actions committed in the past, and is connected to the functions of the store-consciousness as receptacle for the effects of both good and bad actions; conceptualization is defined as the expression in language of what is experienced through the senses; no comment is offered on either of the aggregates of traces or consciousness.

The store-consciousness is also given a key role in the operations of the sense-consciousnesses. It is the store-consciousness that accumulates the karmic seeds from previous operations of the sense-consciousnesses and, as a result of the ripening of these seeds, enables them to operate in the present and future.

A6 Arrangement of Aggregates, Elements and Spheres (E3.3-20.2)

A6.1 Arrangement of the aggregate of form: here the ASBh expounds the five types of cause which define the senses in which physical form is dependent upon the four great elements (earth, water, fire

and air). The first is the cause of arising, the second is the cause of existence, the third is the cause of similarity, the fourth the cause of endurance, and the fifth the cause of increase.

A6.2 Arrangement of the aggregate of feeling

A6.3 Arrangement of the aggregate of identification

A6.4 Arrangement of the aggregate of traces: a detailed exposition of the fifty-three Yogācāra mental concomitants. The ASBh discusses in detail the five errors contained in the view that there is an existent individual, errors which were simply mentioned in the AS. The first error (*doṣa*) is that of identifying any of the aggregates with the self; this is incorrect because the aggregates do not possess the defining characteristics (permanence and so forth) of a self. The second error is that of locating a self among the aggregates; this is incorrect because the aggregates are impermanent, and the idea of basing a (permanent) self upon non-(permanently) existent aggregates makes no sense. The third error is that of thinking that the self possesses (the qualities of) any of the aggregates, since this would mean that the self (which is by definition permanent, uncaused and existent) must not be self-dependent. The fourth error is that of thinking that the self is something quite separate from the aggregates: this would mean that the self must be bodiless (since the physical body comprises one of the aggregates, that of matter), and no such bodiless self is in fact apprehended. The fifth error has to do with spontaneous liberation: if a self entirely separate from the aggregates exists then it would automatically be liberated since liberation is defined as separation from bondage to the aggregates. And this is not seen to occur.

Substantial attention is also given to the six kinds of distraction as one of the mental concomitants.

The definitions of the twenty-three traces dissociated from mind amount to little more than grammatical and schematic glosses on the very brief definitions found in the AS.

A6.5 Arrangement of the aggregate of consciousness: the ASBh begins with a discussion of the nature of mind, identifying it with the store-consciousness and providing brief definitions of the key terms used in the AS.

The ASBh then gives an eightfold proof of the existence of the store-consciousness, quoting explicitly the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, another important Yogācāra text.[233] The proofs are framed as negative conditionals; if the store-consciousness does not exist, then certain absurd

consequences can be seen to follow: (i) If the store-consciousness does not exist then the operation of the effects of previous karma could have no locus (five subsidiary reasons are given for this); (ii) If the store-consciousness does not exist there could be no first functioning of the six sense-consciousnesses since there would be no basis from which they could arise. Also, as the ASBh points out, the fact that the different sense-consciousnesses (visual, auditory, etc.) sometimes function simultaneously - as when they are all directed to an identical object - indicates that they must have a common locus, which must be the store-consciousness. Denial of the store-consciousness leads to denial of the possibility of the simultaneous operation of different consciousnesses; (iii) If the store consciousness does not exist then there could be no clear mental images in the mind (*manas*, mental organ, in this case). This is so because, for one who denies the existence of the store-consciousness, the sense-consciousnesses can operate only serially and not simultaneously (see argument (ii) above), and this would mean that whenever the mental consciousness is operating only that consciousness can be operating. The result would be the abandonment of any distinction between memory - which, according to this system, possesses less clear mental images than does mental cognition of a present object - and mental awareness of a (metaphysically and epistemically) present object, which operates simultaneously with the apprehension of the given object by one of the other sense-consciousnesses; (iv) If the store-consciousness does not exist there is nothing of which the quality of seedness can be predicated. This is because the six sense-consciousnesses mutually condition one another from moment to moment and do not plant seeds - that is, perform actions the results of which need not occur for some time. Another locus is required for such seeds, and this can only be the store-consciousness. Also, it is only the store-consciousness which can account for the renewed operation of a given mental continuum after a period of quiescence since it is precisely the store-consciousness which holds the seeds that make such a renewal possible; (v) If the store-consciousness does not exist then action cannot occur. The argument here suggests that since action (karma) is apprehended as operating under a number of different aspects at once, and since this can only be the case if a number of different sense-consciousnesses can operate simultaneously (see arguments (ii) and (iii)), the store-consciousness is a necessary postulate; (vi) If the store-consciousness does not exist then physical experience

(*kāyikānubhava*) cannot occur. The argument here is that the physical experience of a person in a wide variety of mental states goes on, in its richness and variety, largely independently of those mental states. This can only be explained on the basis of store-consciousness; (vii) If the store-consciousness does not exist, emergence from the attainment of meditative states which are entirely without consciousness is inexplicable. This is because the only cause for the re-emergence of consciousness would be the body - a manifest absurdity for the Yogācāra; (viii) If the store-consciousness does not exist then there could be no transmission of consciousness from one body to another at the time of death. The only other possible candidate for such transmission is the mental consciousness - one more *reductio ad absurdum* for the Yogācāra.

The ASBh concludes section A6 with a long series of grammatical glosses on compounds from the AS. It also includes, as part of its discussion of the meaning of the term "aggregate" (*skandha*), a list of the eleven kinds of greedy desire to which the eleven modes of existence appropriate to physical form (already mentioned in outline in the AS) correspond.

A7 Division of the Aspects of Aggregates, Elements and Spheres (E 20.3-46.4) Here a series of categories is applied by means of question-and-answer (see the summary of section A7 of the AS) to the aggregates, elements and spheres. The ASBh states that the point of this method of analysis is the removal of false attribution and delusion pertaining to objects and their defining characteristics. Each of the categories is then briefly discussed. Most of these discussions take the form of the provision of synonyms and grammatical glosses for terms and compounds in the AS; there are few instances in this section of sustained philosophical prose. Perhaps the greatest space is devoted to a discussion of the scheme of dependent origination and the causal system which underlies it (sections A7.24-A7.25), though even here only detail is added to the outline AS account.

A8-A10 Analyses of Collection, Conjunction and Concomitance (E 46.5-48.17)

B. ANALYSIS OF THE TRUTHS (*satyaviniścaya*) (E 49.1-94.15)

B2 The Truth of Suffering (E 49.1-55.4)

B2.3 The ASBh analyses the third defining characteristic of suffering - that of emptiness - in the following terms: emptiness of

essential nature is equated with constructed nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) because it is without any defining characteristic of its own (*svalakṣaṇa*); emptiness which consists in nonexistence in any particular manner is equated with dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) because any mode of existence that is imagined to exist does not in fact do so; and natural emptiness is equated with perfected nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) because such existence is naturally empty.

B2.4 On momentariness. The momentariness of mental events is taken as established and is used as a framework for the demonstration of the momentariness of physical form. The ASBh therefore attempts to show that physical form is in all important senses dependent upon awareness (*citta*); this is done through a series of categories which explain from all angles the complete dependence of the physical upon the mental: the physical is grasped or appropriated by the mental; it is given continued existence by its association with consciousness; it is based upon mind and its modes of existence depend upon those of the mental continuum upon which it is based; since mind is momentary and physical form acts as the material support of mind, physical form too must be momentary since a material support cannot be different in kind from that which it supports.

B3 The Truth of Origin (E 55.5-74.9)

B3.3 The ASBh gives long analyses of the AS's brief outline of the types of action; the basic division, as in the AS, is that between volitional action (*cetanā*) and action that occurs subsequent to volition (*cetayitva*). The latter is in turn subdivided, as is standard in almost all Buddhist texts, into three: physical, vocal and mental. These three in turn can be either good or bad. There are ten kinds of bad action, ranging from murder through sexual misconduct to the holding of false philosophical views. Each of these actions in turn has five aspects: its object, its intention, its application, its defilements, and its final accomplishment. The ASBh gives examples of these aspects in the case of murderous action: here, the object of the action is the being to be killed; the intention is the intention to kill; the application is the murderous action proper; and the final accomplishment is the bringing about of the death of the being concerned. All these aspects are necessary in order for a karmically productive action to occur, and the same schema is applied to the other types of good and bad action. The remainder of this section of the ASBh consists of a multiplication of subcategories of action and its results - much of which can be directly

paralleled in the Abhidharma texts of other schools, for example the lengthy discussions of action in the fourth chapter of the *Abhidharmakośa* - and of comments upon the catena of *sūtra* quotations found in the AS.

B4 The Truth of Cessation (E 74.10-76.4)[234] The ASBh provides very sparse and incomplete commentary upon this section of the AS; of the twelvefold division of the truth of cessation offered in that text, only three (B4.2, B4.8 and B4.12) are commented on at all, and only the last - the extensive list of synonyms - in any detail. Even here we find only lists of synonyms and brief grammatical comments.

B5 The Truth of Path (E 76.5-94.15)

B5.4 The ASBh explains how it is that upon the path of vision the practitioner is enabled to perceive objects without using either of the two kinds of conventional designation - that which describes an object as a being or a thing. This occurs, according to the ASBh, because during the practise of this path the practitioner does not mentally construct images of selves or things, but instead perceives the world as it actually is, completely without subjects and objects. Extensive discussion is given to the standard division of the path of vision into patiences and knowledges.

B5.5 The path of cultivation is defined as the obtaining of the complete comprehension of the four truths on the part of noble seekers.

B5.5a The description of the mundane path of cultivation, upon which the meditations and immaterial states are practised, is largely given over to a detailed analysis of the psychological components of these meditative states and their functions in removing passions and depravities. An especially interesting feature of the ASBh's discussion of this issue - which in most respects is not significantly different from the corresponding discussions in Abhidharma texts of other schools - is the occurrence of a sevenfold list of acts of attention by means of which the meditative stages are obtained. The seven are, first, that which recognizes characteristics - which means that the practitioner recognizes the characteristics of the state in which he finds himself as a result of hearing the doctrine and considering its meaning; the second goes beyond such hearing and considering and zealously applies itself to the development of tranquility and insight; the third separates itself from the passions appropriate to the stage upon which the practitioner finds himself; the fourth cultivates pleasure in the idea of abandoning passions beyond those which have already been abandoned; the fifth investigates

closely the mechanisms by which passions occur in the mind of the practitioner; the sixth acts as an antidote to all the passions below the stage of the relevant meditative level; and the seventh and final act brings the practitioner to the attainment of the meditative stage under consideration. There are seven such acts belonging to each of the four meditations and the four formless states.[235]

B5.5b In its discussion of the relationship between the condition of being freed from the passions proper to the material level (as part of his analysis of the transcendent path of cultivation) and the condition of attaining the peaceful liberations of the immaterial levels, the ASBh provides a good example of the use of the tetralemma in order to unpack all the possible alternatives; there are conditions under which the practitioner can have become free from the passions proper to the material realm and yet not attain the immaterial states. Similarly, there are conditions under which he can attain the latter but not the former, both, and neither.

B5.5f The ASBh gives an interesting analysis of the four applications of mindfulness from a Yogācāra point of view, placing a great deal of stress upon the importance of manipulating mental images in one's contemplation of body, sensation, mind and mental objects. According to the ASBh four errors are abandoned by the practise of mindfulness: the error of thinking that there is something pure within the individual mental continuum; of thinking that there is something pleasant therein; of thinking that there is something permanent therein; and of thinking that there is a self therein. Also, as a result of these practices, the practitioner enters into a further understanding of the truths: the four objects of mindfulness are correlated with the four truths. Finally, as a result of these practises the practitioner realizes separation from attachment to body, sensations, mind or mental objects. Similarly detailed commentary is given to the other practises contained with the thirty-seven qualities which aid enlightenment.

B5.6 Analysis of the final path.

B5.6a The ASBh provides detailed definitions of each of the twenty-four types of depravity.

B5.6c A detailed discussion of the threefold division of the continuous revolution at the basis. The first division consists in the continuous revolution belonging to one who has attained the path of the adept, and is defined in typically Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha terms as the removal of those adventitious defilements which belong to the

naturally radiant mind. The other two divisions concern the transformation of the mundane path into the transcendent and the complete removal of all depravities. This section of the ASBh provides a useful insight into the Yogācāra psychology of enlightenment.

C. ANALYSIS OF DHARMA (E 95.1-116.12)

C1 Divisions of the Canonical Literature (T 95.1-98.7). Brief definitions of the major divisions of the Buddhist canon, together with some discussion of the functions and goals of each type of literature.

C2 *Dharma* considered as the Object of Mental Activity (E 98.8-99.6)

C3 Reasons, Methods and Results of Studying *Dharma* (E 99.7-102.4).

C3.1 The ASBh explains the four reasons for studying *dharma* in the following terms: (i) the reason of dependence, since *dharma* explains what depends upon what - for example, just as the arising of conditioned phenomena is dependent upon causes and conditions, so the arising of shoots is dependent upon seed-bearing fields; (ii) the reason of cause and effect, since *dharma* explains what causes what; (iii) the reason of establishing a conclusion, since *dharma* teaches proper conclusions with regard to things that need to be established; (iv) the reason of the true nature of things, since *dharma* establishes the truth about the way things really are.

C3.2 The four methods of studying *dharma*: (i) the method of studying words, which consists in the investigation that realises the true nature of language as being simply a designation; (ii) the method of studying things by means of language - the language of the doctrine - and the concomitant realization that things also have no independent existence; (iii) the method of studying the putative essential nature of things as consisting simply in the means used to designate them. This has to do with the relation between propositions and their referents, and the concomitant realization that there is an irreducible mutuality between that which designates and that which is designated. This necessarily means, from the Yogācāra point of view, that essential nature actually has no existence outside of the fact that it can be the object of an act of designation; (iv) a method similar to (iii) except one that is concerned with particulars (*viśeṣa*) rather than abstract essences. The same points about the referential relationship are made.

C3.4 The five stages of spiritual practice belonging to one

who studies *dharma* in a concentrated manner: all except the fourth - *dharma* considered as radiance (*āloka*) are given cursory exposition by the ASBh.

C3.4d *Dharma* considered as radiance: here the ASBh describes the practitioner's progress from a perception of sense-contents (*viṣaya*) to a realization that what appear to be sense-objects are actually nothing other than the practitioner's concentrated mind; on the basis of this realization the practitioner directly perceives the absence of both subject and object.

C3.4e The process culminates in revolution at the basis, the complete rejection of all mental depravities.

C4 On the Meaning of *Vaipulya* and the Nature of the Perfections (E 102.5-112.7) As the major part of the discussion here the ASBh includes an extensive outline of the nature of *pāramitā* practise - the practise of the six perfections (of charity, ethics, forbearance, meditation, zeal and wisdom. Most of the material here does not differ from that to be found in any of the major Mahāyāna expositions of the practise of the perfections. The ASBh expounds the *pāramitā*s under the headings of number, characteristics, order, etymology, meditative development, divisions, grouping, opposed qualities, advantages, and mutual analysis.

C5 Twenty-Eight Wrong Views of the Mahāyāna Doctrine (E 112.8-114.13) There is also a substantial analysis of the twenty-eight false views which result from a superficial and literalistic examination of the doctrines found in the Vaipulya (=Mahāyāna) scriptures: (i) the first has to do with excessive attachment to signs, which here means the verbal formulation of the doctrine. This happens to someone who reads in a *sūtra* that, say, "all *dharma*s are without essential nature" and becomes attached to that form of words without understanding the indirect intention behind the words. It may be possible to recognise a polemic against some excessively doctrinaire followers of Nāgārjuna here; (ii-iv) these wrong views have to do with casting aspersions upon the doctrines of designation and the three essential natures basic to Yogācāra ontology; (v-vi) these views have to do with incorrectly grasping the sense of the sacred literature and warping its meaning to suit one's own purposes, essentially by the application of an incorrect hermeneutic; (vii-viii) these views - concerning the irreproachability of one's views and actions and the certainty of one's attainment of *nirvāṇa* - are also the product of incorrect understanding and tend to lead to inappropriate practises; (ix-x) these views, which lead to despising those who have a different view

from one's own and to being angry with them - especially those who follow the way of the seekers - spring from excessive confidence in and attachment to one's own views; (xi-xii) these views consist in misapprehending key Mahāyāna doctrines - such as that of emptiness - and thinking to develop merit as a result of holding such misapprehended views; (xiii-xiv) these views have to do with ignoring arguments against one's own views and using incorrect argument-forms in support of one's own views; (xv) a view that considers only one's own position as doing honour to the Buddha and all others as inferior; (xvi) the view of profound illusion, which considers one's own view to be unassailable; (xvii) this has to do with the proclivities and depravities which accompany all the previous views. In turn, these proclivities and depravities influence the following views; the remaining eleven views in fact are essentially variants on some of those already mentioned.

C6 The Implications and Indirect Intentions of Doctrinal Formulae (E 114.15-115.25)

This section of the ASBh gives a reasonably detailed commentary on the hermeneutical categories outlined in the AS. The discussion centers upon two key terms--*abhiprāya*, here translated implication, and *abhisaṁdhi*, here translated 'indirect intention.'[236]

Four kinds of implication are distinguished: (i) the implication of sameness, which is illustrated by the Buddha's saying that he was at one time Vipaśin (a former Buddha) in virtue of the undifferentiated nature of the Dharma-body. (This is not entirely clear, but seems to stress the idea of identifying two separate things (in this case Buddha and Vipaśin) in order to bring out a feature that they share, in this case the undifferentiated Dharma-body); (ii) the implication of different times (*kalātara*), illustrated by the future effects of past religious vows, like those involving a wish to be reborn in Sukhāvatī. (The point here seems to be simply that a present event (the religious vow) needs to be understood not simply in terms of its present effects but also in terms of its future results); (iii) the implication of different meanings (*arthāntara*), which refers to the fact that statements such as "all *dharma*s are without essential existence" should not be understood *au pied de la lettre* but in accord with a more sophisticated hermeneutic (see the discussion of indirect intention, below); (iv) the implication of the inclinations of individuals, which is illustrated by the teaching of different doctrines to individuals of different temperaments.

Four kinds of indirect intention are distinguished: (i) indirect

intention which leads to entry, explained as the teaching of (false) doctrines such as the existence of physical form in order to encourage seekers to enter the Mahāyāna; (ii) indirect intention as regards defining characteristic, explained as the relation of the (apparently straightforward) teachings of the essencelessness of defining characteristic, the essencelessness of nonarising, and the ultimate essencelessness to the threefold-essence teaching of the Yogācāra. he point here seems to be simply that an apparently univocal teaching can often be, if not equivocal, then at least multi-levelled; (iii) indirect intention of antidote. This is the use of a specific (apparently univocal) doctrinal formula in an attempt to correct a specific fault in a hearer; (iv) indirect intention of transformation. The basic idea here is that some (apparently clearly false) doctrine may be used to alter the complacent ideas of some practitioners. But the meaning of this final category is not entirely clear.[237]

C7 Criteria for Recognizing Competence in Meditative Practice Related to Dharma (E 115.26-116.12)

D. ANALYSIS OF OBTAINING (E 117.1-140.5)

D1 Classification of Individuals (E 117.1-122.8). Section D1 consists almost entirely of brief grammatical and semantic glosses on the complex classificatory system set out in the AS. There is little or nothing here of philosophical interest.

D2 Classification of Realization (E 122.9-140.5)

D2.3 The ASBh gives detailed analyses of the nineteen special qualities. Many of these detailed discussions find precise or almost-precise parallels in other commentarial literature of the Yogācāra school, notably in Asvabhāva's commentaries on the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* and the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra*. Many of them also reproduce standard definitions from early Buddhist canonical literature.[238] Much of this material is relatively easily available elsewhere; a list of the qualities may be found in the relevant section of the AS summary.

D2.4c The explanations given by the ASBh of the ten kinds of conceptual construction or discrimination are thus:[239] (i) the basic discrimination is identified with the store-consciousness; (ii) discrimination of images relates to such things as physical form, which are characterised as being a content of cognition; (iii) discrimination of the appearance of an image refers to the six sense-consciousnesses, which are defined as performing this function; (iv) discrimination of the transformation of an image refers to cognition which has as its object

things - such as the human body - which by their nature undergo alteration; (v) discrimination of the transformation of an appearance of an image refers to those cognitions which are transformed by the addition of affective tones - pleasure, displeasure and so forth; (vi) discrimination caused by someone else refers to discriminative thought evoked by hearing the doctrine taught by someone else; (vii-viii) incorrect and correct discrimination resulting from hearing incorrect or correct expositions of the doctrine; (ix) discrimination consisting in attachment to the sixty-two species of false view; (x) distracted discrimination; this last category is itself given a detailed tenfold subdivision.

E. ANALYSIS OF DEBATE (E 141.1-156.29)

E1 Definition and Subdivisions (E 141.1-2)

E2 Analysis of Meaning (E 141.3-142.4) Brief glosses on the sixfold division outlined in the AS.

E3 Analysis of Explanation (E 142.5-147.26)

E3.1 The six types of explanation are explained thus: the object to be explained consists of such things as the aggregates; the meaning to be understood consists in such qualities as impermanence; the approach to what needs to be understood is the practise of morality and guarding the doors of the senses--preliminary meditative practices; the essential nature of understanding consists in those qualities which aid enlightenment; the result of understanding consists in liberation itself; and the experience of that liberation consists in the knowledge and vision of liberation.

E3.2 The fourteen methods for interpreting sacred texts - listed already in the AS - are here given brief definitions rather than extensive discussion. This material is of interest for the history of Buddhist hermeneutical theory, and operates within the framework laid out in section C6. The concern here, though, is more for the purely mechanical questions of exegesis and the proper arrangement of systematic texts than it is for purely theoretical interpretive questions.

E4 Analysis of Analytical Demonstration (E 148.1-149.16)

E5 Analysis of Questions (E 149.17-150.7)

E6 Analysis of Grouping (E 150.8-19)

E7 Analysis of Argument (E 150.20-155.5)

E7.3 On objects of proof and methods of proof:

E7.3a The object of proof, the thing to be proved, is divided into two. The first has to do with essential nature and is

concerned to demonstrate whether persons or things in general possess any such putative essence. The second has to do with specifics, and is concerned to ask whether specific persons and things possess such qualities as permanence/impermanence, form/formlessness and so forth.

E7.3b The method of proof (see AS summary) is divided into eight kinds. The definitions are quoted from the AS and commented on word-by-word; they add little to our understand-ing of Buddhist logic at this period,[240] with the exception of the ASBh's detailed presentation of a proof of the proposition "there is no self" as a demonstration of the methods outlined in the AS (compare section A6.4). The proposition mentioned is defined as the thesis (*pratijñā*).). The reason (*hetu*) for accepting that proposition is the apprehension of the fourfold error in asserting (the existence of) a self among the aggregates. Briefly outlined, the four errors consist in asserting that the self is the same as the aggregates, in which case it would possess all the standard characteristics of the aggregates - such as being caused, arising and passing away - and therefore would not be a self, which is by definition permanent and unchanging; that it occurs "among" (locative case) the aggregates, in which case it would also have to take on the characteristic of impermanence, since it makes no sense to postulate something permanent based on something impermanent; that it is located elsewhere than the aggregates, which would mean that the self would be bodiless, something that it apparently regarded as unlikely; and that it is something quite other than the aggregates, in which case all selves would be spontaneously liberated, since it is (according to many of those who hold to some form of the self-theory) inherent to the nature of selves to be liberated and it is clearly not the case that all selves are in fact liberated.[241] The example (*dṛṣṭānta*) is that of the relationship between past and present, where the past plays the part of the self and the present that of the aggregates. The same four errors are distinguished, and the discussion of each stresses that past and present are correlative concepts; to designate the one is to designate it in relation to the other and therefore to deny, ultimately, that there is any separate enduring principle which might be called the "self" of the past or the present. The application (*upanaya*) of the arguments here developed is said to be the demonstration of the nonapplicability of other concepts--such as permanence--to the aggregates. The final conclusion (*nigamana*) is that the five aggregates are appropriately qualified by a series of adjectives, beginning with "impermanent" and ending with "without a self."

In its brief discussion of the three instruments of knowledge the ASBh stresses that the third, authoritative tradition is valid only if it does not come into conflict with the first two--direct perception and inference. In the later (Dignāga and after) Buddhist epistemological tradition this category of authoritative tradition was dropped altogether as a separate reliable means of obtaining knowledge.

E8 Analysis of Indirect Intention (E 155.6-156.22)

E9 The Meaning of the Title *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (E 156.23-29)

177. STHIRAMATI, Commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakakārikās* (560)

It is said this is available in Chinese.

178. STHIRAMATI, *Ṭīkā* (*Āgamānusāriṇī*) on Vasubandhu's *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* (560)

Summary by Karl H. Potter

This text has been edited several times, and its first chapter has been translated twice. For the purpose of this summary by the Editor "E" references are to the edition by Ramchandra Pandeya, Delhi 1971, and our "T" is the translation in Th. Stcherbatsky, Soviet Indology Series No. 5, which originally appeared as Volume 30 of the *Bibliotheca Buddhica*, Moscow-Leningrad 1936. In summarizing the first Chapter David Friedman's translation (Utrecht 1937) has also been consulted. In numbering the *kārikā*s we follow the numbering used in the earlier summaries, so that the Introductory section does not constitute a numbered section. E's numbering, which counts the Introduction as the first verse, consequently numbers each section one higher than our numbering indicates. The summary tries to bring out only those points which mark fresh ground beyond what is found in the summaries of Asaṅga's and Vasubandhu's works in Volume Eight of this Encyclopedia. We have provided materials from the commentary on the first few verses to give an impression of its style and complexity.

CHAPTER ONE

(E3-9; T11-37) Sthiramati explains each word in the Introduction at length.

1 (E9-12; T38-54) Some (Madhyamakas) say that all factors are without essential natures like the horns of a hare. To repudiate this *kārikā* 1 says "Construction of what was not exists". This does not contradict (Buddhist) *śāstra* since he adds "There is no duality in it", i.e., the construction is not divided into object apprehended and subject apprehender.

Objection: Then why aren't we liberated?

Answer: That is why Asaṅga says "Emptiness does exist there". I.e., since emptiness exists in the construction of what was not, you are not liberated, you do not understand it.

Others (Ābhidharmists) claim that not only consciousness and mental concomitants exist but matter, etc. as well. To refute them it is said: "Construction of what was not exists", i.e. it really exists, and there are not such things as matter, etc., since "There is no duality in it", i.e., it is neither grasper nor grasped.

Objection: But if so there can be no liberation, since there is no supporting object (of the liberating awareness).

Answer: No, since "Emptiness does not exist there", i.e., emptiness itself is the pure supporting object itself.

Again, "Construction of what was not exists" and "emptiness does exist there" refute the extreme skeptic; "there is no duality in it" refutes the extreme realist.

Or yet again, this verse indicates that the nature of the construction of what was not is defilement but illusory because "there is no duality in it", but that because "emptiness does exist there" the path and the liberation that result are available, though this liberation is nothing different, involving a mistaken construction of grasper and grasped.

This construction of what was not, which includes past, present and future, causes and effects, is beginningless, issues in liberation and constitutes ordinary life, is divided into two, what is grasped, i.e., matter etc., and the grasper, i.e., visual consciousness, etc. Although these things, e.g., grasper and grasped, do not exist one shouldn't conclude that the construction of what was not doesn't exist, any more than one should suppose that because a rope is not a snake the rope doesn't exist. Rather, what is real (the construction of what was not) is empty (i.e., emptiness exists in it and it in emptiness). Thus two things are actual--the

construction of what was not and emptiness.

2 (E13-14; T56-60) "Because of existence", i.e., the construction of what was not exists. "Because of nonexistence", i.e., the grasper-grasped relation does not exist, "again because of existence" of the construction of what was not..

3 (E14-17; T60-76) "These do not exist" includes consciousness as well as the objects that appear among "these". The four comprise all experiences, and the passage says that there are no actual entities having the form of which these are the experiences. Others say that since objects appear to have a form (*ākāra*) the mistake is rather in our attributing external reality to these forms. But a "form" is only the chief qualifier (*prakāra*) by which a momentary supporting object is grasped, and since it is what is grasped (and not the grasping) it can have no form. And having no form it doesn't exist.

Nor is it that an awareness has two parts, the perceiving and the perceived. Since there are no objects there are not really ideas of objects. But it seems that there are.

4 (E17-18; T77-81) That is why it is as wrong to say that nothing exists as to say that everything does. If either were true there would be neither bondage nor liberation.

6 (E19-22; T88-102) Some (Mīmāṁsakas) say: At the moment when it is grasped the object takes on a new property of knownness. Answer: But if so a different entity is grasped than the one that was initially grasped, since it has a new characteristic.

Sautrāntika: The object--an atom of color, e.g.--that is disappearing causes our perception of it at the next moment by creating its image and projecting it into the external world.

Answer: But perception never is of a single atom, and a collection of atoms, being a nominal existent, cannot be a cause of awareness. Where does the image come from, then?

Sarvāstivāda: We don't accept that past and future entities cannot be objects of perception.

Answer: If so one can have perception without any object, since that occurs in dreams, etc., and it is unnecessary to postulate independent entities as the causes. Furthermore, at any moment the representation (*vijñapti*) is either already produced or not yet produced; if the latter it cannot grasp an object since it's not there to do it, and if the former it's too late to do anything!

Question: If both subject and object are unreal why don't you first

show the unreality of awareness (*prajñapti*) alone?

Answer: Because the reality of awareness depends on the actuality of the external objects it supposedly cognizes, so that when the object is disproved it easily follows that awareness is unreal. The reverse procedure would land us in nihilism.

8 (E14-16; T107-117) Objection: The construction of what was not is just thinking, i.e., initial and sustained thought constitute it, but not other mental activities.

Answer: No. He says "the three realms", meaning to include both mind and all accompanying mental factors. These three realms comprise the realm of sensual desire, the material and the immaterial realms; they are distinguished in various ways, but basically in order to enable one to recognize different types of beings inhabiting the universe with their differing requirements.

"Consciousness perceives things" alone, i.e., distinct particulars (*viśeṣa*). "Mental factors (perceive) their specific qualities", e.g., the feelings they produce, or the class to which we ascribe them. The distinctions between them is abstracted from reality.

Vaibhāṣika: No, each distinct consciousness and each distinct mental factor comprise a separate, particular awareness. Otherwise one thing could also be many.

Answer: That might be all right if factors were real entities. But we have shown that factors are illusory. So there is no problem for us.

9 (E16-18; T120-128) The only real thing is the construction of what was not. So there cannot really be distinctions between causes and effects. "Causality" is another word for the construction of what was not. Its mark is activity (*pravṛtti*). But this can be viewed in two ways, as a series of momentary occurrences or as the stages that one passes through during a lifetime. This is what is described in the chain of dependent origination.

The storehouse consciousness is the causal condition of all other consciousnesses. It is the projection of the appearance of beings and their world. Though itself karmically neutral, it contains all the seeds of experiences; our experiences are produced through maturation of karmic seeds, not by external objects. The storehouse consciousness is the dominant condition of all functioning consciousnesses, but not their immediate causes; the immediate cause is the functioning consciousness.

179. STHIRAMATI, *Bhāṣya* or *Ṭīkā* on Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra*[242] (560)

180. STHIRAMATI, *Vaibhāṣya* on Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandhaka* (560)

Summary by Ronald Davidson

In the following summary, numerical references are to the *sūtra* divisions adopted by Shanti Bhikshu Shastri,[243] wherein he has also translated the work both into English and back into Sanskrit. The folio numbers refer to the Derge edition (sDe-dge par-khang) To. 4066, *bsTan'gyur*, Sens-tsam, *Shi*, fols. 195b5-250a7. Unfortunately, the work was translated during the early period (*snga-'gyur*) by Jinamitra, Śīlendrabodhi, Dānaśīla and Zhu-chen Ye-shes sde. As a result it suffers some of the problems associated with obscurities in the earlier translations. Fortunately, though, the Sanskrit materials and Tibetan translations of the *Triṁśikābhāṣya* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* serve to render the difficulties intelligible.

The *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇavaibhāṣya* has been written by the Ācārya to bring about the comprehension of the specific and general characteristics of all factors. One may object that this is pointless since the examination of these factors has been done in detail in such extensive works as the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Such an objection, however, is invalid. Some people understand things very quickly, comprehending all the specific details merely by grasping a part, and for the sake of their conversion this summary has been written. Alternatively, it is impossible for householders to persevere in the study of works with many chapters since they have many duties, and even monks may become indolent in the study of a many-chaptered work, so this summary was written for their sake. Alternatively, understanding this summary of the characteristics of factors, one is able then to comprehend the extensive discussions without further effort. Therefore the Ācārya has written this examination as a cause for the future investigation of works with many chapters, such as the *Yogācārabhūmi*, etc. An investigation of this variety is the only source for the ability to delineate and answer questions, for one-pointedness of mind, and for fearlessness obtained through the highest insight.

2 (fol. 197a2-198a6) The question may arise whether there are only four great elements and why that should be the case. Sthiramati answers that if there were fewer, then a great element could not fulfill all the four necessary functions of holding together, combining, displacing and supporting. Because there are not any other basic functions which require a great element, there is no need for the addition of another. An objection is raised that there is the function of supplying room for movement that space governs, and therefore the element *ākāśa* should be considered one of the great elements. Sthiramati answers that the description "supplying room" merely indicates that there is the lack of some hindering matter/form and not the presence of another kind of element called *ākāśa*. If indeed there were some great element called *ākāśa*, then it too would hinder the presence of the other great elements, thus defeating its own definition. So in the interests of economy *ākāśa* need not be called a great element.

There are five causal relationships obtaining between the great elements and the derivative material elements. A productive cause (*jananahetu*) indicates that if the great elements are lacking there will not arise the dependent varieties of matter/form. A dependence cause (*saṁniśrayahetu*) indicates that if the great element arises the dependent matter/form will follow. A maintaining cause (*pratiṣṭhāhetu*) indicates that the dependent matter/form will survive for the duration of the element. The supporting cause (*upastambhahetu*) indicates that it is by the power of the element that the dependent matter/form remains. An embracing cause (*upabṛṁhahetu*) indicates that if the element increases, the dependent matter/form will also increase.

14 (fol. 199b6-201b4) Although Vasubandhu has included shape (*saṁsthāna*) in his description of the object of vision, there is no real shape separate from color. There are two reasons for this. First, the identification of any of the shapes--long, short, circular, etc.--is only a function of thought (*mati*) and involves the process of inference, not sensual cognition. It is similar to the case of inferring the color of a flower from its smell. Second, whereas an atom of the visual object is possessed of color, there are no atoms of shape, which is only perceived based on the aggregation of the atoms in question. Thus shape is only nominally existent and not really so. Manifest form (*vijñapti*), moreover, is the physical form arising from the mind directed on the object immediately in front of it. Thus the shape of lips in prayer are not manifest, since their form is derived from aspiration and a mind intent on

an object other than that directly in front of it. Because the physical action of manifest form is directed by a mind intent on good or ill, we attach the labels of good or ill to the action itself. Like shape, though, manifest form is nominally, not actually existent. Vasubandhu has merely included these two, shape and manifesting, in the definition of the material basis (*rūpāyatana*) to be in accordance with what is known in the world and what is found in the scriptures.

19 (fol. 203a7-205a7) With respect to the definition of unmanifest form/matter, manifest form may be either physical or vocal, and these may be good, ill, or neutral. Unmanifest form may operate in the sensual level, the material level, or be pure. Desire level unmanifest form arises from either good or bad manifest form. The other class of unmanifest form mentioned by Vasubandhu, that arisen from concentration, includes the unmanifest form pertaining to the material level and pure form, distinguished by the presence or absence of defilement. Vasubandhu also qualifies unmanifest form as invisible and unimpeded form. Properly speaking, this should include all the five members of the form included in the mental object: minute (*abhisaṁkṣepika*), representational (*abhyavakāśika*), contractual (*samādānika*), imaginary (*parikalpita*), and powerful (*vaibhūtvika*). Now since Vasubandhu wished to include eleven actually existing elements in the aggregate of matter/form, he has only mentioned contractual form, being the same as unmanifest form, in this list. Why not the others? Minute and representational form are the same as the atom. Imaginary form consists of images, such as skeletons, which are imaginary meditative objects. Likewise, powerful form is the object of one practising concentration for the purpose of liberation. Neither of these latter two exist apart from consciousness. Those wishing to understand Vasubandhu's intention should consult his discussions in the *Abhidharmakośa*. Now, in the same manner as the manifest form imagined by the Vaibhāṣikas, unmanifest form is not actual but conventional, since it has the content of any valid means of knowledge. This does not, of course, mean that the desire level unmanifest form, etc., does not exist. Rather those things are seeds planted in the storehouse consciousness at the time of undertaking the specific discipline and continue to ripen as memory when the restricted situation presents itself.

20 (fol. 205a7-206a3) Saṁghabhadra has objected to Vasubandhu's definition of feeling as "threefold experience" (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on II.24). Instead he wished to define it as "experiencing contact" (*sparśānubhava*), that is, based on pleasurable, etc., contact there is the

arising of pleasurable feeling. This is unacceptable, though, since we would have to set contact aside from all of the other factors associated with consciousness and classify it as causal and the others as resultant. We prefer to define the experience of happiness and unhappiness as arising with contact from the storehouse consciousness. Absolutely speaking we should say that there is the maturation of goodness and badness from the storehouse consciousness and its conjoint equanimity.

23 (fol. 206b2-207a4) Moreover, feelings can be further divided into physical and mental, attached to the body or not, and attached to the objects of desire or not.

24 (fol. 207a4-207b2) An objection to Vasubandhu's definition of conceptual identification is that it is unable to distinguish between identification and consciousness since both of them grasp the characteristic of the object. The difference between them, however, is that identification is weak and is not the complete comprehension of the object. While Vasubandhu classifies conceptual identification into three kinds, Sthiramati expands the list to the six varieties found in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*: (a) signful (*sanimitta*) is identification oriented towards all those objects not included in signless (*animitta*) identification; (b) signless consists of (i) the perception of a pure particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) unalloyed by linguistic cognition, (ii) the perception of liberation wherein all conditioned factors have passed away, and (iii) the perception of the *bhavaṅga* which is signless only due to its lack of clarity; (c) limited (*paritta*), consisting of perceptions of the sensual level; (d) *mahadgata*, perception of the material level; (e) boundless (*apramāṇa*), perception of the two entrances of endless space and consciousness; and (f) nothingness (*akiñcanya*), perception of nothing whatsoever.

38 (fol. 211b3-213b1) With respect to the three types of objects of faith--action and its fruit, the truths, and the triple gem--action is of three kinds: having merit, lacking merit, and immovable. The first two are concomitant with good or bad factors and have their maturation in the level of desire. Immovable (*aniñjya*) action has its fruition on the material and immaterial levels. Confidence (*abhisaṁpratyayaśraddhā*) in action and its fruit means that one has confidence in the existence of good and bad acts and that these acts generate certain kinds of desirable or undesirable fruits, rather than believing that the fruition is the manifestation of God and so forth. Faith in the truths refers to the four noble truths. When there is confidence that five aggregates of grasping and their concomitant factors exist as the truths of frustration and its

arising, this is clear faith. When there is confidence that cessation is to be obtained and the path is to be developed, this is called faith of aspiration. Faith in the triple gem refers to the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha. They are like gems, because they are rare, precious, give joy, are beneficial, and are antidotes to nonhumans, etc., who would cause harm. Without regard to himself, the Buddha has taken three immeasurable eons to obtain complete enlightenment. He has completed the two collections of knowledge and merit in completing the six perfections. The Dharma, being dependent on the Buddha and obtained by the abandonment of all the compounded elements, is rare and precious. Likewise, the gem of the Saṅgha is superior to the highest worldly accomplishment and to be obtained by the two accumulations. The Buddha is like a wish-granting gem by his spontaneous accomplishment of the welfare of beings through his gnosis and ability. The Dharma is of three varieties: the Dharma of the *Piṭaka*, which is to be explained; the Dharma of the eightfold noble path, which is to be accomplished; and the ultimate Dharma known as *nirvāṇa*. The Saṅgha refers either to those upholding the eight varieties of the *prātimokṣa* or those who have obtained one of the four fruits. Faith is also of three kinds. That which has the element of confidence is oriented towards an object either possessed or nonpossessed of beneficial qualities. That which has an element of clarity is oriented toward an object possessing beneficial qualities. That which has the element of aspiration is oriented toward the obtaining or generation of an object possessing beneficial qualities. It may be objected that, because this faith has the element of aspiration, is it not basically the same as thirst or interest? This is unacceptable since it is oriented toward a good object and therefore cannot be thirst. Moreover, because it operates as the basis for interest, it cannot be that factor itself. Furthermore, clarity of mind is based on faith, and this clarity is entirely dissimilar to the obscuration of the bad factors.

41 (fol. 213b7-214a4) Nongreed may have its negation considered in one of three ways: absence, being otherwise, or being the antidote. Here Vasubandhu has indicated that he intends the latter.

43 (fol. 214a6-214b4) Vasubandhu has equated understanding (*amoha*) with the thorough comprehension of reality (*yathābhūtasampratipatti*). This latter is of two varieties: knowledge and examination. Knowledge again is of four types: that which has its cause in fruition, in the scriptures, in volition, and in realization. Examination

(*pratyavekṣaṇa*) is insight and its explanation, this latter being directed toward its proper objects, insight, meditation and effort. Indeed, the definition of that which is directed towards examination is insight joined with meditation and effort. We may again define understanding thus: that which has the nature of knowledge of things just as they are and that specific knowledge having the nature of examination.

62 (fol. 218b6-221a3) The theory of the self may be imputed as "I" or "mine" in one of two ways: as consisting of an essential nature or through induction by examining results. An example of the former is the Sāṁkhya system which imagines that cognition exists as the self because the Sāṁkhyas are not knowledgeable about the distinction between awarenesses and mental factors. Therefore the four aggregates (excluding matter/form) are imagined as "I" and the fifth (matter/form) as "mine." Likewise the *nirgrantha* (Jain) tradition, whose analysis is similar to that of the Sāṁkhya. An example of the inductive method is that of the Vaiśeṣika system. Objects and organs of perception are existents. These two must occur in the proper relation to the subject of perception in order for the act of perception to occur. Therefore, the presence or absence of this subject is the ultimate unique cause for the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the perceptive act. Alternatively, they imagine that there is an actor because it can become the object of inspection.

This latter viewpoint imputes the existence of an operator based on the premise of action needing a subject separate from the act itself. In response we will examine the act of passing out of existence since all elements are momentary. If the action obtains as the agent then it has no time to remain acting since it must pass out of existence. If the agent is the cause of destruction then the elements will never pass out of existence, not being obtained before. If the cause of destruction is different from the agent, then the cause is neutral, since "destruction" is not an existent separate from the elements to be destroyed. Destruction could not have existed prior to the elements of destruction for then it would be meaningless. Now if the elements and the action are no different, it is incorrect to divide them into agent and action. On the other hand, it is irrational to assume that elements obtain "agentness" having already come into existence. This latter case assumes that the elements, the action, and the agent are all dissimilar items, despite their identification. Only if one assumes that all elements of existence contain automatically their own destruction can this dilemma be overcome. Thus is established the doctrine of momentariness, a construct entirely

antithetical to the maintenance of eternal wholes.

94 (fol. 226a2-4) With the phrase "these and other varieties" Vasubandhu indicates the list to be nonexhaustive, and we will include below between *sūtras* 110-111 the following: operation (*pravṛtti*), individual determination (*pratiniyama*), connection (*yoga*), speed (*java*), sequence (*anukrama*), time (*kāla*), place (*deśa*), number (*saṁkhyā*), and collection (*sāmagrī*).

95 (fol. 226a4-226b1) With the threefold division of seed, control, and manifestation Vasubandhu redefines the traditional categories of obtainment and endowment. Seed applies to both of these two while control and manifestation only apply to endowment. The state of being a seed lasts from the first moment of obtainment until the point of control. A seed is a specific ability to generate in the future within a certain stream of consciousness associated with factors good, bad, and neutral, the cause of yet another factor which is consistent with that stream. Control indicates the circumstances of the future accomplishment of the fruit in that stream, dependent on the conditions of the seed. Manifestation indicates the moment of the accomplishment of that seed.

96 (fol. 226b1-227a5) Nonidentifying absorption (*asaṁjñisamāpatti*) indicates certain functions occurring out of the third and fourth meditative levels. When Vasubandhu mentions that it is brought about by mental application preceded by an idea of "going forth", he means that one's concentration is initially focused on liberation or the path and this is what is indicated by "going forth." Finally, it is the cessation of all the unstable factors of mind and mental events, a definition excluding only the storehouse consciousness and the defiled mind together with the latter's permanently associated four defilements.

98 (fol. 228a4-228b1) Birth among the nonidentifying gods (*āsaṁjñika*) is the fruit of nonidentifying concentration. The process is that there is a restriction of the self-referential (*svasaṁvedya*) mind and mental events occurring in one born on that level. Thus these factors grow ever more subtle, their seeds being injured and restricted to their own locus, so that there is no further arising of the mental factors.

110-111 (fol. 230b6-231a6) (Sthiramati provides here definitions of the nine dissociated factors which he introduced under *sūtra* 94. His definitions are taken, with very slight elaboration, directly from the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, p. 11.17-25.)

114 (fol. 231b6-232b5) Vasubandhu has explained that mind is called *citta* because the seed of all traces are collected in every moment.

Collected (*saṁcita*) here means either that time and again there is the development of seeds or that there is the continuity of traces born of seeds. These are born from the four conditions: (1) The causal condition is the traces (*vāsanā*) present within the storehouse consciousness. (2) The dominant condition consists of the various organs of sensory consciousness, such as the visual organ and so forth. (3) The antecedent condition is the immediately preceding consciousness which has just passed away. (4) The supporting object condition is whichever object, color-form, etc., is associated with that particular sense organ. Following the arising of the sensual consciousness there arises the searching intellectual consciousness, the establishing intellectual consciousness, and then the cognitive intellectual consciousness. According to the object it becomes oriented either towards defilement or purification. At that time are formed the traces--good, bad, or neutral--whose nature is that of volition. From these is directly generated maturational traces and indirectly intoxicating traces, each of which operates in its own way to continue the generation of both the storehouse consciousness and new traces.

115 (fol. 232b5-233a6) The storehouse consciousness operates uninterrupted as a dual supporting object: internal grasping cognition and cognition of the external environment. The former consists of those traces intent on the constructed nature and the forms of the localized internal organs. The essential nature of a functioning consciousness may be good, bad or neutral, but the storehouse consciousness is of only one variety, neutral. This is because it only forms associations with the factors always present and is unilaterally uninterrupted, unlike the functioning consciousnesses. In this way various factors and states of being may arise without the undesirable implication that a defiled state or lower state of being issues directly from an undefiled state or a higher state of being. These lower states and defiled states issue from the traces present in the storehouse consciousness. The storehouse consciousness, though, is not a single substance, but a continuous stream of operations.

The proof of the storehouse consciousness rests on both scripture and reasoning, the former being the specific references found in the *Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra* and the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*. Reasoning consists of the arguments given by Vasubandhu that the arising of the functioning consciousnesses after the states of nonidentifying, cessation and unconsciousness meditations would be untenable if there were no storehouse consciousness.

The Sarvāstivādin objects that his theory of existence of three time periods would make this possible without the assumption of the storehouse consciousness since the existent past would carry its effects over into the present. The proper response to this is that this supposition entails the differentiation of the factor from its activity (*kriyā*). Factors would therefore be permanent and nonfrustrating, both of these in turn entailing perverse views and the nonabandonment of defilements. Furthermore, there would have to be postulated a sixth aggregate to contain the activity of the various factors, since these are now separate, and since this activity must be included as a psychophysical constituent.

The Sarvāstivādin responds that activity can be defined as that which brings about fruition. The factor is then existent as the causal element bringing about another factor. The answer is that if the factors are differentiated according to time, this still entails the differentiation of the factor and its activity. Furthermore, the Sarvāstivādin would still be defining cause and fruit as identical so that all factors would be permanent.

The Sarvāstivādin might then define the activity as neither the same nor different from the factor. But the response must be that whatever is neither the essential nature of the factor nor of anything else is nonexistent, and it therefore cannot be causal.

Others claim that a functioning consciousness, which arises after these three states of being, is generated by the body. This claim, however, would entail that there are for each person two streams of consciousness: one arising from the body, the other from the mind. Moreover, for cessation meditation, which occurs at the immaterial level, there is no body from which a functioning consciousness can arise. It must be acknowledged that functioning consciousness and storehouse consciousness are different, the former being interrupted and the latter noninterrupted, to account for these states of being.

Finally, there could be neither activity in existence nor cessation from it if there were no storehouse consciousness. The former is the case because there is a gap between the traces of the previous existence and the rebirth-linking consciousness obtained at the moment of obtaining a new body. Thus there is a problem of continuity between the second and third members of the chain of dependent origination, and the storehouse consciousness naturally supplies the process whereby this continuity may be maintained. It may be objected that the psychophysical complex, being present at birth, could supply this continuity and therefore

consciousness would not be always dependent on traces but also the psychophysical complex. But if this were the case then this would involve multiplication of the psychophysical complex into two species, one dependent on traces and the other dependent on consciousness, an implication which is unacceptable.

Furthermore, liberation is not merely accomplished by the elimination of outbursts (*samudācāra*) of the emotions and other negative mental events, but due to the elimination of their seed causes. Otherwise we would have to assume that one who is in a neutral mental state at a certain moment has obtained enlightenment, an entirely unwarranted conclusion. If there were no storehouse consciousness, then we could not assume any mechanism among the functioning consciousnesses which could sustain these seeds and in which locus they could be entirely eliminated.

181. STHIRAMATI, *Bhāṣya* on Vasubandhu's *Triṁśikā* (560)

"E" and "T" references are to the edition and translation by Krishna Nath Chatterjee as found published at Kishor Vidya Niketan, Bhadaini, Varanasi in 1980. The translation was earlier published in Anviksa 3.1, 1968. There are several editions and a German translation by Hermann Jacobi. Quoted references are to the summary of the 192. *Triṁśikā* by Stefan Anacker in Volume Eight of this Encyclopedia.[244]

Introduction (E27; T29-33) This work explains two kinds of selflessness, (1) of the person and (2) of the factors. Realization of (1) involves the elimination of the defilements and the obstructions to knowledge. One gets rid of these by understanding the selflessness of the person. By realization of (2) one gets rid of the obstructions to awareness that constitute ignorance; one attains omniscience.

1 (E27-30; T33-40) "Metaphors" (*upacāra*) means various sorts of constructions like aggregates, elements, sense-organs etc., which are superimposed on consciousness. "Develop", that is, evolve (*pariṇāma*), meaning to appear differently than they are through conceptual construction proceeding from the storehouse consciousness. Thus consciousness is the only real entity; there are no selves or factors in actuality. This provides the middle way between the extreme views that there is nothing at all and that everything really exists.

Question: If only consciousness exists and not external objects, how can our experiences of objects occur?

Answer: We suppose that an external object is the supporting-object condition of consciousness by producing consciousness which actually has its own form (*svābhāsa*) and does not cause it, for otherwise there would not be other kinds of conditions such as antecedent, etc. conditions.

The five sensory kinds of consciousness (*vijñānakāya*) have as contents the collective form (*sañcitālambana*), but there is no collective form of a thing other than the forms of its parts, since there can be no awareness of a collective form without there being those parts there. It is not that real atoms combine to form objects as contents, since atoms have no form. And so the collective form of atoms cannot function that way either.

Objection: The collective form is perceptible.

Answer: But since it is composed of atoms which have no shape, no front or back, etc., it too cannot produce an experience.

Objection: If there is no self, and no substantial entity, metaphor, i.e., conceptual construction is not possible. Metaphor requires association between three actual things: some thing, something like it, and a property that they share.

Answer: But things can be similar without sharing an actually existing property. And properties may be related without there being any actual thing constituting their relation. A substance is cognized only in terms of its qualities, not its essence, and language functions without there being any essential relation between a thing and its name. Thus all these things are evolutions of consciousness. And there are three kinds of such evolutions.

2 (E30; T40-41) There are three kinds of evolution of consciousness: maturation (*vipāka*), thinking (*manana*) and awarenesses of contents (*viṣayavijñapti*). The first is an evolution of the storehouse consciousness, which stores the seeds of experiences and ideas. It functions in two ways, internally and externally.

3 (E31-32; T41-47) "It is not fully conscious"--i.e., we are not clearly aware of the locus and nature of the ideas contained in the storehouse consciousness, and they have no specific supporting object, etc.

Objection: How can an awareness be unclear?

Answer: Just as in meditations such as the cessation-meditation, though consciousness is there it is not consciousness of any content.

5 (E41-49; T47-53) The store-consciousness is both single and a

stream.

Who is an *arhat*? One who has knowledge of the destruction (of his defilements) and of his nonarising.

Question: Now as to the second kind of evolution of consciousness, thinking. We know what the loci and objects of sensory experience are, viz., color/form, etc., but what is are the loci and objects of the defiled mind (*kliṣṭamanas*), the subject of ordinary thinking?

Answer: "Dependent on this store-consciousness", etc. And thinking always has the storehouse consciousness as its supporting object.

6 (ET53-55) Defilements are of six kinds, but the mind associates with four of them, ignorance, the belief in a self, pride and desire,

7 (ET56-59) as well as with others such as touch, attention, feelings, identifications and volitions. These defilements are unobstructed-neutral in the storehouse-consciousness but obstructed-neutral in the defiled mind. The *arhat* does not have a defiled mind when he has got rid of all defilements through the endless path attained by spiritual cultivation culminating in cesssation meditation, though he regains one when he comes out of that meditation.

8 (ET59-60) identifies the third kind of evolution of consciousness, viz, the six kinds of perception. It is good when involving absence of desire, of hatred or of ignorance; when associated with desire, hatred or ignorance it is bad, and when with neither it is neutral.

9-14 (ET60-95) Each of the defiled factors and the afflictions are explained at some length.

19 (ET107-116) "Proclivities", karmic traces (*vāsanā*), together with twofold grasping, "cause other maturations of seeds to occur, when the former maturation has been exhausted" in the storehouse-consciousness. Without a storehouse consciousness there could be neither bondage nor liberation, since the traces would be gone as soon as they have their result and couldn't do anything else.

182. STHIRAMATI, *Bhāṣya* on Vasubandhu's *Viṁśatikā* (560)

This commmentary has been edited several times; cf. Bibliography, Third Edition, p. 226.

183. STHIRAMATI, *Ṭīkā* on the *Kāśyapaparivartasūtra*[245] (560)

Summary by Jikido Takasaki

The *Kāśyapaparivartasūtra*, which forms the 43rd *pariṣat* of the (*Mahā-*)*Ratnakūṭasūtra*, is a collection of 49 *sūtra*s that appear in the Chinese and Tibetan *Tripiṭaka*s.[246] The Sanskrit original of Sthiramati's commentary is missing. Only Chinese and Tibetan translations are available at present.[247] Both translations are almost identical with each other and are no doubt translated from the same version. The Chinese translation does not mention the name of the author, nor is there any record concerning the author in Chinese tradition, while the Tibetan translation gives the name in the colophon as '*slob dpon blo brtan*,' i.e., Ācārya Sthiramati.[248]

The basic text on which this *Ṭīkā* comments seems different from the present Sanskrit version edited by Stael-Holstein[249] on the basis of a Central Asian manuscript, and judging from its construction of commented sections, it seems nearest to the Tsin version among the Chinese translations.[250] Namely, the following sections of the present Sanskrit edition are lacking in the *Ṭīkā*: #s 21, 22; 27, 28; 33; 50, 51; 55; 84, 89; 119, 120; 126; 150-156; 158; 164, 165.

This *Ṭīkā* utilizes a portion of the *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*,[251] which is, in its turn, a kind of summarized commentary upon the *Kāśyapaparivarta*. Namely, in the introductory section, the *Ṭīkā* mentions the sixteen topics given in the *Yogācārabhūmi* as the frame of the *sūtra*, and accordingly is divided into sixteen sections. In each section, sometimes in combinations of three or four sections, the *Ṭīkā* gives its own commentary first, then adds the *Yogācārabhūmi* passage together with quotations of the *sūtra* passage.

From this fact, we come to know that the *Kāśyapaparivarta* was highly esteemed among Yogācāras as showing the whole scope of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* and that the author of the *Ṭīkā* as a member of the Yogācāra school followed this tradition, but with addition of his own interpretation when necessary.[252]

4 Sixteen topics showing the frame of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* are as follows:[253]

I Form (*ākāra*) of wrong practice (**mithyāpratipatti*) of *a bodhisattva*.

II Form of right practice (*samyak-pratipatti*).

III Form of the merit of right practice (*samyakpratipatty-anuśaṁśā*).

IV Form of the method of abiding in the right practice (*samyak-pratipattisthitinaya*) ---

1. lawful activity (*dharmacaryā*),
2. equal activity (*samacaryā*),
3. good activity (*kuśalacaryā*)),
4. dwelling in the lawful activity (*dharmacaryāyām sthiti*)

V Form of similes (*upamā*) denoting the superiority of virtues of *bodhisattva*s, thus abiding in the right practice in order to let the people produce faith in them.

VI Form of the precept of *bodhisattva*s, abiding in the right practice (*śikṣā*).

VII Form of the superiority of *bodhisattva*'s precept to that of *śrāvaka*s (*śikṣā-viśeṣa*).

VIII Form of altruistic deed of *bodhisattva*s by means of worldly and superworldly wisdom (*laukika-lokottarajñānena parārthakriyā*).

IX Form of the precept of *śrāvaka* (*śrāvakaśikṣā*) kept in the precept of *bodhisattvapiṭaka*.

X Form of the ascetics not well-trained (*asuśikṣitaśramaṇa*).

XI Form of ascetics well-trained (**suśikṣitaśramaṇa*).

XII Form of those who are abiding on sham (or conventional) precept (**saṁketavratasthita*).

XIII Form of those abiding on the ultimate precept (**paramārthavratasthita*).

XIV Form of Tathāgata's means of discipline (*tathāgatavinayopāya*).

XV Form of the word of hidden meaning (*saṁdhyābhāṣya*).

XVI Form of the merit of believing in the precept of *Bodhisattvapiṭakabodhisattvapiṭaka-asvavāde adhimuktyanuśaṁśā*.

Commenting on the title of the basic *sūtra*, *Ratnakūṭa,* the hill of jewels, the *Ṭīkā* says that the *sūtra* is so-called because it has the entire forms of these sixteen, within which are enclosed all teachings of Mahāyāna.[254] This statement suggests that the original title of the *Ṭīkā* was *Mahāratnakūṭa-ṭīkā*.

5 In the following a summary of the contents will be given section by section. *Sūtra* passages are referred to by their section number.

I-II-III, 1-20 (-22)

The *Ṭīkā* treats these first three sections together under the title: Twenty (or twenty-two) sets of *catuṣpādika*, stanza consisting of four feet. Of these three, I (*mithyāpratipatti*) includes 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, and 15. They are respectively said to show (1) regress of wisdom, (2) forgetfulness of right memory, (3) causing to destroy pure qualities, (4) sham conduct of *bodhisattva* caused by wrong mind, (5) difficulty to be trained, (6) mischievous conduct of stealing, (7) impossibility to approach (good) and possibility to approach (bad) things, (8) causing (the people) not to help in *bodhisattva* practice, and to perform wrong practice.

Opposite to them are II (*samyakpratipatti*), which covers 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16.

III. *Samyakpratipattyanuśaṁśā* (the merit of right practice) involves 17-22 with (1) perfection of accumulation of moral conduct and wisdom, (2) purification of hindrances, (3) causing one to attain the gates to precepts, (4) practice of immeasurable merit, (5) causing one to overcome the fundamental ignorance, and (6) causing one to attain the unobscured state. (Of these six, the last two, corresponding to 21-22, are found only in the Chinese version.).

IV. *Samyakpratipattisthitinaya*, 23-26

The *Ṭīkā* otherwise calls this section the 32 forms of a Bodhisattva's right practice. The same counting of virtues (*dharma*) is given in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, too, but the way of their distribution to the four subdivisions, *dharmacaryā*, etc., differs between the *YBh* and the *Ṭīkā* proper. Namely, the YBh counts 5, 8, 7, 12 factors for (1) *dharmacaryā*, for (2) *samacaryā*, for (3) *kuśalacaryā* and for (4) *dharmacaryāsthiti*, respectively, while the *Ṭīkā*, 5, 10, 6, 11, respectively. (In the basic *sūtra*, 23 covers one to eight factors, 24, nine to eighteen, and 25, nine to thirty-two.)[255]

V. *Upamā* , 29-32, 34-49

There are 19 similes in total given in this section, and their order is said to be in accordance with the way in which the dissimilarity of a simile is overcome by the next simile, and thus the last simile shows the superior and unparable qualities of the *bodhisattva*.

VI. *Bodhisattvaśikṣā*, 52-71

Of this section, the *sūtra* says that in teaching the middle way the real intuition of the factors constitutes the core doctrine of the *Ratnakūṭa*.[256] Accordingly the *Ṭīkā* first defines the meaning of the middle way as being apart from both extremes of substantial view on ego of heretics and nihilistic views on nonego of Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha followers, and its true intuition is sought for in nondiscriminative wisdom (*avikalpajñāna*). The *Ṭīkā* introduces also the theory of consciousness-only, saying that through nonaffirmation of the nature of the falsely imagined on things causally conditioned and through the establishment of emptiness as the real nature (*dharmatā*) by perfection (of practice) (*pariniṣpatti*), there are avoided both extremes of over-affirmation (*samāropa*) and blasphemy (*apavāda*).

The whole passage is summarized, after the *YBh*, into the 13 forms of the middle way. They are, namely:

1 emptiness of personality (*pudgalaśūnyatā*) (52),

2 nonsubstantiality of personality (*pudgalanairātmya*) (52),

3 emptiness of factors (*dharmaśūnyatā*) (53),

4 nonsubstantiality of things (*dharmanairātmya*) (53-54),

5 extreme of over-affirmation (*samāropānta*),

6 extreme of blasphemy (*apavādānta*),

7 realization of the truth (*dharmābhisamaya*) (61-62),

8 transfer of merit of the realization of truth to the great enlightenment (**dharmābhisamayamahābodhipariṇamana*), (63)

9 nongrasping of mind by defilement and suffering (**kleśaduḥkhābhyām cittāgrahaṇatā*) (63),

10 superiority (*viśeṣa*) in (a) perception (64), (b) remoteness (64-65), (c) (overcoming of) perplexity on extinction, (d) (overcoming of) perplexity in mind (66-67).

11 cause (of superiority) (68-69),

12 pervasion of emptiness (*śūnyatāparyavasāna*) (70),

13 strength of emptiness (*śūnyatāprabhāva*) (71).

VII. *Śikāraviśeṣa*, 72-92 (excluding 85 & 89)

Of this section, the *YBh* counts 13 points of superiority of Bodhisattvas to Śrāvakas.[257] They are the superiority in:

1 intention (*āśaya*) (72-75),

2 perfection of pure *dharma* (*śukladharmasamadāgama*) (76-77),

3 perfection of wisdom (*jñānāgamasamudgama*) (78-79),
4 succession (*anvaya*) (80-81),
5 clan (*gotra*) (82),
6 retaining of lineage (*gotrāvadhāraṇa*) (83),
7 practice (*prayoga*) (86),
8 strength (*prabhāva*) (84)
9 establishment (*siddhi*) (87),
10 venerability (*dakṣinīya* (88),
11 the highest superiority (**viśiṣṭānāṁ prativiśiṣṭatā*) (90),
12 cause and result (*hetuphala*) (91),
13 birth (*jāti*) (92).

The *Ṭīkā* regards, on the contrary, the first point as showing the general statement and picks up twelve points of superiority.

Prior to explanation of superiority, the *YBh* refers to the four kinds of *Śrāvakas* namely: 1. incarnated (*nirmita*) seekers, 2. haughty (*abhimānika*) seekers, 3. seekers turning to enlightenment (*bodhi-pariṇamana*), 4. seekers striving only for quiescence (*śamaikāyana*), and says the last group is here referred to for comparison with Bodhisattvas. Generally speaking, we can observe here the lineage theory of the Yogācāra for explaining a Bodhisattva's superiority to seekers.

VIII. *Parārthakriyāviśeṣa*, 93-104

This section deals with Bodhisattva's cure of mental disease of living beings by means of the medicine of wisdom in four ways, namely, (a) to know causality, (b) to understand non-ego-ness of things, (c) to have no fear of emptiness, and (d) investigation into the mind. (97) Of them the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Ṭīkā* alike give a special importance to the investigation of the mind. The whole passage is subdivided in the following way:

1 Bodhisattva's altruistic deed by means of worldly wisdom (93-96),

2 the same by means of supraworldly wisdom (97-104),

a. general feature of the mind (97),
b. particular feature of a mind (98),
c. defiled feature of the mind (98-101),
d. purified feature of the mind (102-104).

Of these four features, the *Ṭīkā* explains again through the doctrine of the threefold nature that by the defiled character is meant the constructed nature, and by purified feature, the perfected nature, while the

other two refer to the dependent nature. This interpretation is not clearly observed in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. The purity of the mind which is referred to as *āryagotra*[258] or the lineage of the saints and, characterized as unconditioned, is explained from three standpoints: (1) nonattainment and attainment, (2) nine features of unconditioned in comparison with the conditioned, and (3) the essential nature of the unconditioned in five points.

IX. *Śrāvakaśikṣā* in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, 105-118

This section showing criticism of the morality of Śrāvakas, according to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, has three subdivisions:

1. the simile of a dog running after a thrown stone (105-107),
2. the threefold precepts of a Bodhisattva (108-110),
3. eightfold defects against a Bodhisattva's precept (111-118).

The eightfold defects, which are arranged in order so that the previous one stands as the cause of the next one, are respectively: (1) unpurified mind, (2) twofold bondage, (3) twofold obscurity, (4) twofold stains, (5) *dharma*-destroyer (simile of hail), (6) twofold tumors, (7) twofold fever, (8) twofold uncurable disease. By the last item is meant (a) haughtiness and (b) slander of a Mahāyānist.

X-XI-XII-XIII, 121-137 (excluding 126)

The *Ṭikā* treats these four sections in succession, probably because all relate to the states of ascetics. Namely, the *sūtra* classifies ascetics into the following four:

1. ascetics merely in outer features,
2. ascetics who delude others by keeping moral conduct,
3. ascetics seeking for honor and fame,
4. ascetics of real practice.

Of them, #1-3 belong to X, not well-trained ascetics, which are explained by 121-124, while #4 refers to XI, well-trained ascetics, explained by 125. The following sections 127-133 explain these four kinds of ascetics with similes.

The next two sections (134 & 135) are said to refer to XII, mendicants of sham morality and XIII, those of real morality. XI, well-trained ascetics, are naturally XIII, mendicants of real morality, and they are Bodhisattvas.

The following two sections in the *sūtra* (136-137), consisting of ten verses, refer to the Bodhisattva of right precepts.

XIV. *Tathāgatavinayopāya*, 138-144

This section comments on the story of 500 mendicants who retired from the assembly after hearing the teaching on the right precepts and the two incarnated mendicants seeking to convert to Mahāyāna. The means of conversion are (1) through appearance and (2) through instruction. The latter includes (1) the ground for producing fear toward purity and defilement, (2) annihilation of the ground of defilement, (3) annihilation of the ground for fear towards purity, and (4) the means for dwelling in the higest pleasure in this life.

XV. *Saṁdhyābhāṣya*, 145-148

This section is on the conversations between Subhūti and the 500 mendicants just converted to Mahāyāna. The *Ṭīkā* regards this passage as referring to the great merit of the true wisdom, and summarizes it in six points, namely: (1) *nirvāṇa*, (2) basis (*āśraya*), (3) sound (*śabda*), (4) rational thought (*yoniśo manasikāra*), (5) instruction (*avavāda*), (6) establishment of factors in accordance with truth (*dharmānudharmaniṣpatti*), and by dividing the last one again into ten, makes fifteen subjects of conversation.

XVI. *Adhimuktyanuśaṁśā*, 149, 157, 159-163, 166

This section, according to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, consists of the fivefold merit of faith and the fivefold cause of receiving pleasure.

At the end, there are added two verses expressing the altruistic turning of merit, composed by the author of the *Ṭīkā*.

184.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (565), "*Sūtra* on the original cause of raising the world"

Nanjio 549, another work translated for the first time by Dharmagupta around 615 or before.

185.VIMALAMITRA (?) (580), *Abhidharmadīpa* with *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* thereon

Summary by Padmanabh S. Jaini

The present edition of the *Abhidharmadīpa* is based upon

photographs of a single palm-leaf manuscript discovered in Tibet by Rahula Sankrtyayana in the year 1937. The work has not been translated into Tibetan or Chinese and is also not noted anywhere else. The edition contains two works, the metrical *Abhidharmadīpa* and a prose commentary on it known as the *Vibhāṣāprabhā-Vṛtti*. Both works are by the same author, who is merely called "Dīpakāra". The *kārikā* text, namely the *Abhidharmadīpa*, closely follows the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu, and the *vṛtti* contains several portions which are identical with the *Kośabhāṣya*. The work is divided into eight *adhyāya*s which deal with the following topics, arranged in the same order as in the *Kośa*: I-*Skandhāyatanadhātu*, II-*Indriya*, III-*Lokadhātu*, IV-*Karma*, V-*Anuśaya*, VI-*Mārga*, VII-*Jñāna*, VIII-*Samādhi*. The original work probably consisted of some 1200 verses in about 150 folios. Only 62 folios have survived; they contain 597 *kārikā*s together with their *vṛtti*. The importance of *Abhidharmadīpavṛtti* lies in the fact that it is the only surviving Sanskrit text which contains a criticism of the author of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Vasubandhu, the author of this latter text, is never mentioned by name but is simply called "Kośakāra", and is criticized for his upholding of the Sautrāntika positions on several occasions against those of the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas.

The name of the author of the *Abhidharmadīpa* has not survived, but two possibilities regarding his identity have been suggested on the basis of Hsüan-tsang's account of the Abhidharma authors who flourished in the area of Kāśmrīa-Gandhāra. The editor of the text (Jaini) has suggested the possibility that Vimalamitra, a Sarvāstivādin master of Kashmir whose legend is given in detail by Hsüan-tsang and who flourished within a hundred years after Vasubandhu (circa 550 A.D.), might have been the author of this work.

Professor J.W. de Jong has proposed as author of this work the name of another master called Īśvara, whose legend also appears in Hsüan-tsang's account. For details see his article "L'Auteur de l'Abhidharmadīpa" in T'oung-Pao, Volume 51, Parts 4-5 (1965); Kenyo Mitomo, "The date of the authorship of the Abhidharmadīpavibhāṣā-prabhāvṛtti" in *Studies in Buddhology (in Honour of Professor Zuiryu Nakamura)*, Tokyo 1985, pp. 676-688. In this article, Professor Mitomo assigns the date of 490-570 for this work. See also Funio Enomoto, "A fragment from the Sanskrit manuscript of the Abhidharmadīpa found in Turfan" in Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 36.1, 1988, pp. 414-420. See also Samuel Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, Vol.

I, London 1884.

Abbreviations used in this summary:

ADV: Abhidharmadīpa-Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti (ed. P.S. Jaini), K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1959

AKB: Abhidharmakośa-Bhāṣya of Vasubandhu (ed. P. Pradhan), K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1967

LVPAK = La Vallée Poussin (tr.), Abhidharmakośa

SAKV: Sphuṭārtha-Abhidharma-Kośa-Vyākhyā of Yaśomitra (ed. U. Woghihara), Tokyo, 1932-1936

Introduction

Unlike AKB which is divided into *kośasthāna*s (chapters), ADV is instead apportioned into eight *adhyāya*s, each of which is in turn subdivided into four *pāda*s. The text of ADV follows closely the scheme of AKB and, in a great many cases, offers little that could be considered new to the latter's discussion; we will note here only those things which distinguish ADV from its model. There are three categories of such features:

(1) ADV adds something to the discussion of specific problems which is not directly relevant to Abhidharma *per se* or is not explicitly covered in AKB.

(2) ADV includes materials directly connected with Abhidharma which go back probably to the *Vibhāṣā*s, but which, for some reason, are neglected by the Kośakāra. Occasionally, the Dīpakāra points out these omissions in AKB and remedies them in some detail.

(3) Perhaps most importantly, the Dīpakāra takes the Kośakāra to task for espousing Sautrāntika views, and defends the orthodox Vaibhāṣika standpoint.

Because of the fragmentary state of the ADV manuscript, a great many sections detailing the Vaibhāṣika positions have been lost. In addition, in a number of cases, the Dīpakāra simply has nothing new to relate concerning these controversies, limiting the overall value of his text to Abhidharma studies. Nevertheless, the distinctive views appearing in ADV will be briefly summarized to indicate wherever possible the traditional Vaibhāṣika interpretation.

Chapter I, Section 1

Only the first folio has survived, which includes the salutation to

the Buddha, the name of the text, and a grammatical analysis of the formation of the word "*buddha*."

Chapter I, Section 2

The next available folio is no. 31, which contains a portion of an interesting discussion on the unconditioned factors of the Vaibhāṣikas--calculated cessation, uncalculated cessation, and space--which are claimed by the Vaibhāṣika to be eternal, i.e., uncaused. In this connection, the Dīpakāra refutes the Vaiśeṣika and Sāṁkhya categories of the eternal. Only a single line of the refutation of the category of self as "constructed" by the Vaiśeṣikas has survived: the Dīpakāra says that, being a nonexistent, the Vaiśeṣika category of the soul is neither eternal nor noneternal. The discussion on why the soul does not exist appeared earlier in the chapter, in the folios which are no longer extant.

A brief refutation of the Sāṁkhya doctrine of the eternal *pradhāna*, i.e., *prakṛti*, has survived. *Pradhāna* is also not eternal, for two reasons. First, if the three *guṇa*s (*sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*) were identical with *pradhāna*, then there would be no increase or decrease of those *guṇa*s, and without that evolution, there would be no "manifestation" (*vyakta*), i.e., creation, at all. Second, if the *guṇa*s were different from *prakṛti*, then they would be impermanent anyway, thus proving the Vaibhāṣika view.

The Sāṁkhya may suggest here that the *guṇa*s will indeed undergo change according to the action (*karman*) of individual beings and thus there is no fault arising. That explanation too is inappropriate, since if the actions, whether volitionally undertaken or not, belong to *prakṛti* itself, then the assertion that there is a single *pradhāna* common to all individual souls is futile. But if it is maintained that the actions do not belong to *prakṛti* but to the souls, then surely there would never be liberation for those *puruṣa*s; this is because since the *puruṣa*s are eternal, i.e., free from any change, their karma also would have to be eternal and unchanging, which is impossible. If, in order to escape this untenable position, the Sāṁkhya were to maintain that karma belongs to *pradhāna*, then one could show many other faults; for example, since there is a single *prakṛti*, there would be no way to determine which karma belonged to which individual (i.e., the fault of *akṛtābhyāgama*), and in the absence of such a determining factor, there would be no possibility of any individual ever escaping from the bonds of karma. These two refutations

are not found in AKB.

Chapter I, Section 3

This section describes the factors, i.e., the eighteen elements, in terms of matrices. In discussing the dyad contaminated/pure, the Dīpakāra quotes the Kośakāra's etymological derivation of the word for "proclivity" (*anuśaya*) at AKB I.4c-d. Here, Kośakāra does not explain the word according to the more common root *anu* + *śru* (to flow), but instead derives it from *anu* + *śri* (to lie dormant or latent). The Dīpakāra calls this interpretation sacrilegious (*abrahma*), since it misrepresents the true etymological meaning of the word "*anuśaya*". The Dīpakāra is certainly aware that, in making this unusual derivation, the Kośakāra intended to interpret *anuśaya* as "to gain nourishment" or "to gain a firm foundation". By recourse to such an interpretation, the Kośakāra sought to avoid the possibility of including the Noble Truths of the path and of liberation (which, by definition, were free from the contaminants) among the contaminating factors, since a person entertaining wrong view could turn these salutary factors into sources of attachment and thence of contaminants, much as he might do with sensory objects or other contaminating factors. It should be noted here that the definitions of the words *sāsrava* and *anāsrava* are of primary importance for the factor-classification scheme of the Ābhidharmikas, since this dyad epitomized the entire Abhidharma (see AKB I.4a). Yaśomitra devotes several long paragraphs of his commentary on AKB to a discussion of this problem of precisely what renders a factor contaminated, and quotes the viewpoints of various Vaibhāṣika masters, including Guṇamati, whose perspective he rejects. Although the Dīpakāra does not add anything new to our knowledge on this topic, it seems reasonable to assume that he had no access to such controversial views as are found in Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthā*.

The next dyad pertains to whether a factor involves initial or sustained thought. It is agreed by all schools that the five sensory consciousnesses involve both initial and sustained thought, while the ten material elements are without either initial or sustained thought. In this regard, a question is raised in both AKB and ADV: If the five sensory consciousnesses involve both initial and sustained thought, then how is it that they are also called constructionfree? The word "construction" (*vikalpa*) has never been precisely defined in the Abhidharma, but probably referred to some sort of ratiocination. The Kośakāra first gives

the standard Vaibhāṣika view that *vikalpa* is of three types: natural (*svabhāva*), consisting of examination (*abhinirūpaṇa*), and consisting of recollection (*anusmaraṇa*). According to Yaśomitra, however, Vasubandhu does not agree with the threefold division, since the Kośakāra believed that natural construction was nothing but initial thought itself. Here, too, the Dīpakāra does not show any awareness of Vasubandhu's disagreement with the Vaibhāṣika view; he does state, however, that the latter two types of construction are its principal constituents. His statement is thus in agreement with that of the Kośakāra: memory and examination are the properties of mental consciousness and not of the five sensory consciousnesses; these latter consciousnesses are constructionfree, and, in the Dīpakāra's words, act like a person born blind or deaf.

This discussion on construction serves as a springboard for the Dīpakāra to elaborate three topics relevant to the discussion on the elements, all of which are missing in AKB. The first topic is to identify which of the three constructions is present at any given moment in the six consciousnesses. The second topic deals with the further categorization of these consciousnesses into good and bad varieties.

The third topic deals with memory, a form of construction, and with how a previously-experienced object is remembered. In this connection, the Dīpakāra examines how memory remains possible, even in the absence of an eternal soul, when the series of momentary consciousnesses perishes without having established a connection between one consciousness and another, and in the absence of the soul's eternal quality, called *saṁskāra* (faculty of memory, or trace), which serves as the primary cause of such memory by providing the connection between the soul and the object. This is undoubtedly an extremely important topic which the Kośakāra should have examined; he apparently reserved it for treatment in the eighth *kośasthāna*, entitled Pudgalanirdeśa. The Dīpakāra shows no acquaintance with that chapter at all, however. In verse 27, Dīpakāra gives three conditions for memory to occur: (1) repeated activity (*prayoga*), (2) close proximity, i.e., the presence of the suitable conditions (*aṅgasānnidhya*), (3) a homogeneous stream of consciousness (*sabhāgasantati*).

Having stated the Buddhist case, the Dīpakāra seeks to refute a heretical view, possibly that of the Vaiśeṣikas. It is suggested by the opponent that memory occurs in dependence on a particular kind of trace, which itself arises due to the conjunction of the internal organ with the

soul. The Dīpakāra's refutation of this view is quite simple. An eternal self can never be in conjunction with an internal organ nor play any role in the production of traces. Moreover, how would the opponent explain the conjunction of the traces with such an eternal and omnipresent self? If a single trace were to occupy the entire self, there would be no room left over for a second trace. But if it occupied only a portion of the self, then this implies that the self, which according to the opponent is indivisible, can be divided. Therefore, concludes the Dīpakāra, the Buddhist explanation of memory is the correct one.

The loss of memory of previously-experienced objects also happens when the three conditions leading to memory are missing, or when one is overcome by weakness or disease. It appears from the earlier statement of the Dīpakāra that this problem was covered in the nonextant portions of the first chapter.

Chapter I, Section 4

This section begins with a much-discussed problem concerning the respective functions of the sense-faculties and of consciousness: namely, whether there is a distinction between seeing and knowing. This is discussed in great detail in AKB 141-142. The Dīpakāra's treatment of this topic does not differ much from that of the Kośakāra, but there are certain important statements pointing to a proto-Sautrāntika view, which denies the perception of external objects. The traditional Vaibhāṣika view is that the eye sees the matter/form and consciousness knows it. It is its nature to perceive, but its efficacy (*śakti*) is aroused only by the coming together of the appropriate conditions, such as light, etc.; only then does that power of seeing manifest. Perception itself, however, takes place only when it is accompanied by the corresponding visual consciousness. The two act simultaneously and thus give rise to the function called perception. The simultaneous operation of these three--i.e., sense-object, sense-organ, and sense-consciousness--is therefore prerequisite to the activity known as sense-perception.

Contrary to this Vaibhāṣika view, the Sautrāntikas seem to have developed a view which established a sequence in regards to the process of sensory perception. This sequence was between the object and the sense-organ on the one hand, and consciousness on the other. This view is apparently based on the *sūtra* passage, "conditioned by the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises". Here, eye and matter/form appear to be presented as the initial cause, depending upon which arises the effect

called consciousness. Based on this *sūtra* passage and the self-evident, momentary nature of all these factors, the Sautrāntikas made a bold extrapolation and rejected the Vaibhāṣika doctrine of the simultaneity of these three factors. The Sautrāntikas probably arrived at their view by interpreting the gerund form, *pratītya*, appearing in the *sūtra* too literally, by taking it as indicating a real sequence of events. The Dīpakāra frames their perspective as follows: The consciousness, being an effect, does not coexist in the same moment as does the eye and forms which, being the causes, came into existence previously.

The Dīpakāra does not name the Sautrāntikas as the advocates of this view, but in a different context, he later (v. 77) mentions by name a school called the Dārṣṭāntika to which was attributed a virtually identical view. He describes the Dārṣṭāntika position as "all is nonperception" (*sarvam apratyakṣam*). Since the five sensory consciousnesses have past things as their objects, when eye and matter/form exist, consciousness has not yet come into existence; by the same token, once consciousness comes into existence, the eye and matter/form are then no longer existing. Both the previous view and that attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas seem to belong to the same school; this seems certain because, as Yaśomitra pointed out, the Dārṣṭāntikas were a subsect of the Sautrāntikas. This Sautrāntika view that external objects are not directly perceived becomes a distinguishing feature of this school in later times and differentiates it from the Vaibhāṣikas, who uphold the doctrine of *sārūpya* or the simultaneity of object, sense-organ, and consciousness. This distinction was considered to be quite significant by non-Buddhists, as can be gleaned from the brief description of these two schools in *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*: "The Vaibhāṣikas consider the object to be joined with consciousness. The Sautrāntikas consider that the object is not directly perceived and, therefore, is external to consciousness." To the best of our knowledge, ADV is the only Sanskrit Abhidharma text which attests to this *bāhyānumānavāda* of the Sautrāntikas.

The Dīpakāra's criticism of this position is very terse. In the absence of the direct perception of the object, he says, both inference as well as scriptural testimony cannot be considered valid. This is because both of these means of knowledge cannot proceed without the initial perception of the objects thus inferred or acknowledged.

The next point of importance appears in a discussion concerning the problem of whether the senses perceive objects only when they come into direct contact with those objects, or even at a distance also. The

Dīpakāra's treatment of this topic is almost identical to the Kośakāra's, except for the following point of interest. In this passage, the Dīpakāra refutes the view of a person called Vindhyavāsī, who holds the doctrine that the sense-organs are omnipresent (*sarvagata*). Nothing more is known about this Vindhyavāsī, and there are no references in other Abhidharma texts to the view attributed to him. He is probably identical to the Sāṁkhya teacher Vindhyavāsa, who is said to have been a contemporary of Vasubandhu. The precise meaning of *sarvagata* is unknown, and the refutation too is very terse. The Dīpakāra says that to call the sense-organs *sarvagata* is like claiming that oil is found all over the sesame seed rather than just inside it. Similarly, he says, who but a fool would imagine that the sense-organs exist outside their supports of eye, ear, etc.

Finally, toward the end of the first chapter, we may note a topic which is characterized by the Dīpakāra as being the quintessence of Abhidharma, which was forgotten by the Kośakāra. This concerns which of the eighteen elements is overcome by recourse to which stage and to which transcendent path. The correlations are given in verses 58-70, where the elements are said to be overcome through the removal of specific proclivities as one progresses on the pure path.

Chapter II, Section 1

In this Section, which treats the sense-organs, the following topic which is not discussed in *AKB* is alluded to by the Dīpakāra. If "*indriya*" means sovereignty (*adhipati*; mastery, lordship), then why is it that certain factors such as interest, contact, attention, identification, and volition, certain dissociated traces like birth, and even such unconditioned factors as liberation are not included in the list of senses? Appropriate answers are given in vv. 81-85, and the Dīpakāra concludes that the orthodox number of senses, twenty-two, is correct, and need not be supplemented or reduced.

Chapter II, Section 2

This Section contains only one statement worth noting. It pertains to the Kośakāra's definition of "atom" (*paramāṇu*), which is defined there as the most subtle aggregation of matter. The Dīpakāra seems to take objection to the word "*rūpasaṁghāta*" in Kośakāra's definition, for he says that the Kośakāra should have stated if there is any

matter/color which is other than aggregated form. He then offers his own alternate definition: "The material atom is the most subtle one". Dīpakāra does not elaborate whether the Vaibhāṣikas believed that there were two kinds of atoms--namely, aggregated and nonaggregated.

Yaśomitra's comments (*AKB* ch. 2, 22a-b) on atoms are worth noting here. He says that by "*paramāṇu*" the *ācārya* meant the aggregated atom, not the substantial atom (*dravyaparamāṇu*). Explaining the latter term, Yaśomitra says that a *dravyaparamāṇu* is that factor which has no forms that may enter into aggregation, and he divides it into former and latter. It is that essential thing which is devoid of all other matter/form and which enters into aggregation. While the Dīpakāra's statement lacks this detail, the problem was seriously taken up in other texts, such as *Nyāyānusāra* (*LVPAK* 2, p. 144, n.3) and *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (pp. 41-42).

Chapter II, Section 3

This Section deals with the various types of traces, including the mental associates and the traces dissociated from awareness. In the former category, *ADV* contributes something new only in his treatment of initial and sustained thought. These two factors are generally described as consisting of a searching and fixing state of mind respectively, but no adequate definition of their specific characteristics appears in any Abhidharma text. *AKB* itself does not define the terms, and distinguishes the two purely in terms of their comparative subtlety, initial thought being the grosser of the two.

Kośakāra then proceeds to debate the problem of the simultaneous operation of these two factors in one moment of consciousness. The Vaibhāṣikas maintained that grossness and subtlety themselves were the characteristics of initial and sustained thought. Kośakāra, however, rejects this view, saying that unless a specific distinguishing feature of each of these two factors were noted, they would have to be considered as different states of a single factor. If that were so, then it would be impossible to claim, as the Vaibhāṣikas had, that both initial and sustained thought could exist in the same thought-moment. Diverging somewhat from *AKB*'s treatment, *ADV* does attempt to define the specific characteristics of initial and sustained thought. Dīpakāra professes that initial thought produces the manifestations of the five sensory consciousnesses, while sustained thought conduces only to the manifestation of the mental consciousness. Hence, Dīpakāra attempts to show that the

gross/subtle distinction between initial thought and sustained thought is not simply a qualitative difference, but a functional one.

Such a functional difference is not corroborated in Saṁghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra*, the relevant passages of which have been quoted by Yaśomitra. Saṁghabhadra is purported to have claimed that initial thought and sustained thought can subsist in one moment of thought, but cannot function simultaneously. He therefore defended the Vaibhāṣika view that these two factors could coexist.

Dīpakāra seems to agree with that assessment, since he says that the Vaibhāṣikas acknowledge only the coexistence of these two factors in the same moment of thought, not their simultaneous operation. However, the examples provided by Saṁghabhadra and Dīpakāra to illustrate this point differ in an important aspect. Saṁghabhadra gives the example of attachment and delusion as two distinct factors which are, nevertheless, complementary and capable of operating symbiotically. Dīpakāra offers instead the examples of knowledge and ignorance, and doubt and decision (*nirṇaya*), none of which are complementary factors. By "knowledge" (*vidyā*), the Dīpakāra apparently means wisdom (*prajñā*), which the Vaibhāṣikas advocated could coexist with ignorance.[259] But Dīpakāra's claim that doubt and decision could coexist is uncorroborated and demands further examination. Dīpakāra apparently believes that he has handily defeated Kośakāra with his remarks, for at the end of these two examples, he chides the Kośakāra to remain silent and not allow himself to become the butt of ridicule of the "learned."

Initial thought and sustained thought fall into the category called "connected conditions" (*samprayuktasaṁskāra*). The next topic discussed in *ADV* is that of "dissociated conditions" (*viprayuktasaṁskāra*), also known as "forces dissociated from both matter and mind" (*rūpacittaviprayuktasaṁskāra*), a category of real factors (*dravya*) unique to the Vaibhāṣika school. *AKB* contains a lengthy debate between the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas on the admissibility of these factors. The Vaibhāṣikas seek to defend the reality of these factors through quoting a large number of *sūtra* passages. The Sautrāntikas, however, while also admitting these same passages, still consider those factors to be purely nominal (*prajñapti*). Kośakāra himself sides with the Sautrāntikas on this point, and he characterizes the Vaibhāṣikas as being overly literal in their interpretation of these scriptural passages.

Some of these forces were probably introduced to explain meditational states associated with the immaterial level. In the cessation

meditation, for example, the mind and all the mental factors are rendered totally inoperative. But because this state takes place in the immaterial level, there is also no physical body present and the meditation renders the mind and mental factors totally inoperative. Such a state cannot even be said to exist unless one were to assume that there are forces outside the psychophysical complex which would automatically--that is, as a maturation of some previous karma--sustain the life-force of the individual and maintain his meditation. The Vaibhāṣikas consider that these two functions are fulfilled by the life-force and cessation meditation respectively, which thus come to be classified as separate dissociated conditions.

Certain of these dissociated conditions, called the conditioned marks (*saṁskṛtalakṣaṇa*), are also employed by the Vaibhāṣikas to explain the alleged distinction between the intrinsic nature of a factor and its function (*kāritra*). The dispute between the Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāṣikas on the reality of these factors sheds a great deal of light on the understanding of factor-theory, as well as on the precise meaning of momentariness, continuity, and causation, as they were understood by these two schools. A very rich discussion on the merit of this Abhidharma category and on the correct interpretation of the *sūtra* passages which allegedly support their reality is found in *AKB*. Dīpakāra certainly intended to make a long rejoinder to Kośakāra's prominent bias toward the Sautrāntika school and, at the beginning of this chapter, he articulates the following questions, allegedly raised by the Sautrāntika interlocutor: "Now, what are these *viprayuktasaṁskāra*s and how many are there? We do not apprehend any own-nature of these *dharma*s, nor any function. These *dharma*s are not well known in the world, or in the words of the Buddha, or in the Vedic treatises either." Dīpakāra then proclaims that he will indeed describe both the nature and function of these factors and would also quote the appropriate words of the omniscient Buddha in support of his statements.

One wonders why the Dīpakāra would have the Sautrāntikas say that these factors are not found in the Vedic scriptures, since one would not expect a Buddhist to justify the existence of a factor by reference to a non-Buddhist school. It is well known that during the course of their dispute with the Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrāntikas accused their opponents on many occasions of borrowing these factors from the Vaiśeṣikas as, for example, when they alleged that homogeneity was modelled upon universals (*AKB* I, 41a). The Dīpakāra's statement that these factors are

not found in heterodox scriptures thus seems to be an attempt to preempt any such suggestion of borrowing. The Dīpakāra says that one should not look for these factors in the Vedas, since they can be comprehended only by the omniscient Buddhas or by those Bodhisattvas like Ārya-Maitreya, Sthavira-Vasumitra, and Ācārya-Aśvaghoṣa, who have attained to the special knowledges (*pratisaṁvid*) by virtue of their clarity of mind. How could it be possible that these factors would come within the range of childish beings with inferior intelligence, or by those dullards whose minds have turned away from the Abhidharma? We may note in passing that the mention of Ārya-Maitreya as one who knows the Abhidharma is quite significant and confirms even the Mahāyāna tradition as preserved in *Śālistambasūtra* that Maitreya was an exponent of dependent origination. It is also significant that no other Bodhisattva recognized in the Mahāyāna school has been mentioned, indicating that the Vaibhāṣikas accepted only one Bodhisattva, Maitreya, as a future Buddha. It is also notable that scholars like Vasumitra and Aśvaghoṣa should also receive the title of Bodhisattva, but this must be used here as a term of respect, since they are properly designated as Sthavira and Ācārya, respectively.

With such a prolix introduction, Dīpakāra obviously intended a detailed rejoinder to the Sautrāntika biases of Kośakāra. Unfortunately, two important folios pertaining to this controversy have been lost, leaving only a few places where Dīpakāra makes some original contributions. The first of these concerns life-force, that factor which is held responsible for sustaining life on the sensory, material and immaterial levels. It is agreed by all Buddhist schools that the life-force is sustained for a fixed duration of time as a result of one's past karma. This renders life-force a karmic maturation, which cannot be altered at will. The Sautrāntikas take it as being a cumulative effect of karma and, consequently, not an independent factor at all. The Vaibhāṣikas, however, advocate that it is a separate factor operating independently of both mind and body, but still as a result of past karma. The issue of life-force's being a maturation of past karma is not relevant to the question of whether it is in fact a dissociated factor and, therefore, it was not discussed by the Kośakāra in his examination of it. He had, however, dealt with this topic at *Abhidharmakośa* II,10a, under the rubric of which of the twenty-two senses were maturations and which were not.

Having explained that the life-force is a maturation, Kośakāra raised a further question as to whether the Buddha's alleged prolongation

of life (for three months in order to initiate Subhadraparivrājaka into the Saṅgha) could also be considered a result of past karma or the result of his exercising miraculous yogic powers. Kośakāra maintained that the extension of life was not a maturation but a projection of a force generated by meditation. The Dīpakāra takes the opportunity to examine this view of Kośakāra in his discussion of its being a dissociated condition. He first has an opponent pose the following question: "The Kośakāra says that the extension of life takes place through the force of meditation, upon the termination of the life which is born of karma. What should be the answer to such a statement?" The Dīpakāra's position makes it clear that he is emphatically opposed to Kośakāra's view. He says that there is no need for a rejoinder here since the Kośakāra's position is not attested in the *sūtra*s or *vinaya*, and is contrary to the *dharmatā*. Therefore, it should be ignored as the words of a fool, for the *sūtra*s say clearly, "It is impossible merely by one's own strenuous exertions or by violent means that one might be able to bring to maturity something that is not yet mature, or, once it has matured, to lead it to yield a result not originally expected." In the *Vinaya* too it is stated, "The threefold karmas which fall into the category called 'destined to be experienced' cannot be averted by anybody, including the gods." And in the Abhidharma too, the possibility of a life which is infinite in length has been rejected. Having said this, the Dīpakāra accuses Kośakāra of entering the portals of Mahāyāna Buddhism. "For surely, if the Lord, by the powers of meditation, could at will produce a new living personality or could cast a new life-span independent of karma, then indeed, the Buddha would be turned into a Nārāyaṇa. Moreover, he would never attain *parinirvāṇa*, such is his compassion for worldly beings. Therefore, this view deserves no consideration, as the Kośakāra here is following the Vaitulikaśāstra."

As we have noted, the first ten of the dissociated factors discussed by the Vaibhāṣikas have some bearing on the Buddhist theories of causation, unconscious meditations, or life-duration, and thus are directly or indirectly related to the working of the traditional five aggregates. The last three of these conditioning factors, however, *nāmakāya*, *padakāya*, and *vyañjanakāya*, have a bearing only on the nature of words and meanings, as they are "forces" that impart significance to words, sentences and letters, respectively. An influence of the theory of *sphoṭa* and also of the Mīmāṁsaka theory of eternal words in the formulation of these three Vaibhāṣika conditioning factors

was long ago noted by Stcherbatsky. Little material on these *saṁskāra*s appears in *AKB*. The Sautrāntikas themselves were certainly acquainted with certain aspects of these controversies as can be seen from the Kośakāra's arguments against the revelation of the name (*nāman*) by series of vocal sounds--arguments which are not different from those of the Mīmāṁsakas and others against the theory of the revelation of *sphoṭa* by *dhvani*. But neither the Kośakāra nor his commentator Yaśomitra makes any reference to the Mīmāṁsaka or the Sphoṭavādins, remaining content with giving only a brief refutation of the Vaibhāṣika position. The treatment of this topic in *ADV* is much more comprehensive and is one of the Dīpakāra's most important contributions to the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma. *ADV* refutes the Sautrāntika position, makes pointed reference to the theories of sound held by the Mīmāṁsaka and Vaiśeṣika, and briefly examines the *sphoṭa* theory of the Grammarians.

After briefly stating the Sautrāntika argument that the *nāmakāya*, etc., are not different from verbal sounds and, therefore, are unreal, the Dīpakāra sets forth the Vaibhāṣika theory of these conditioning factors. A verbal sound (*vākśabda*), he says, is synonymous with speech or utterance, and is therefore included in the matter aggregate. The *nāmakāya*s, etc. are dissociated factors, and hence included in the aggregate of traces. The *nāmakāya*s, etc. are dependent for their origin on verbal sound and manifest the meaning which is dependent on the utterance (or the individual word-shape); thus they are representatives of the thing meant, as in the case of the content of a knowledge. Just as the five sense conditions are dependent on their corresponding five objects, so too are the *nāmakāya*s, etc. dependent for their origin on verbal sound. For this reason, it is said, "A verbal sound operates on the *nāman*, the *nāman* expresses the object."

Here the Sautrāntika raises the following objection: you say that, along with speech, letters (like *ka*, *ca*, etc.) are produced, and by speech the *nāmakāya*s are brought into operation. But if this were the case, speech would be subject to divisibility, since it would follow each letter in turn. Therefore, there can be no such thing as a *nāmakāya* functioning as meaning-conveyor (*abhidhāna*), since for this purpose a unitary entity would be required. The Dīpakāra rejects this argument, saying that when the aggregate of the sound-parts is perceived, there is a possibility of its *nāmakāya* having the capacity of being a meaning-bearer. Moreover, its existence is evident from its activity, which is to convey its meaning. And it conveys its own meaning, since the relation between *nāman* and

meaning is not created by any person.

The Sautrāntika here brings forward the theory of *saṅketa*. He says that the *nāman*, etc., are not different from verbal speech. Verbal sound alone, acting itself as the factor which gives rise to the cognition of the object, conveys the meaning to the listener when its constituent parts are grasped as a unity by memory. Why, therefore, postulate these separate *nāman*, etc.? The Dīpakāra points out that verbal sounds, being atomic, are not capable of revealing the thing meant. As a collection of atoms, a verbal sound can reveal only those objects with which it has come into contact, like a lamp. Things which are not born or which are destroyed or are inaccessible to the senses, like heaven, are not reached by sound. Naturally, therefore, a sound cannot convey these objects.

Moreover, sounds cannot convey a meaning either serially or simultaneously. The stems of *balvaja* grass, for instance, which are individually incapable of being used in the action of dragging a piece of wood, become so capable when they are put together in the form of a rope. But the words of a sentence which consist of atoms of sound, and which come into existence in series, are merely conceptual unities of the constituent parts which are received by the mind. They are, therefore, incapable of conveying the meaning either individually or if taken together, since they cannot stand in unity like the *balvaja* grass. Thus it is proved that the sounds do not convey the meaning either serially or simultaneously.

Moreover, as in the case of a lamp, there is no relationship of revealed-revealer between sounds and meanings. Thus people who wish to see a pot use a lamp which has the capacity of revealing a pot and other things as well; and there are no spoken sounds which have the predetermined activity of revealing or acting on any meaning taken at random by some particular relationship.

Nor is this particular relationship of revealed-revealer appropriate in the case of the thing meant and a sound. This is because sounds do not convey that which is not agreed upon by convention to mean a particular thing.

Even if we accept the theory of *saṅketa* obtaining between a sound and its meaning, such a sound is still subject to the argument of seriality. If it is said that the memory of each sound conveys the meaning, then also it is subject to the same fault. And if it is maintained that the trace left by the sounds in the mind conveys the meaning, then also we deny it as it is not proved.

The Dīpakāra further elaborates the atomic nature of sounds. He says that sound (*ghoṣa*) cannot be a unity as it consists of several atoms. It is accepted that the diphthongs *e* and *ai* are produced in the throat and palate. But it is not correct to say that a sound consisting of only one atom operates in two different places. But this is possible in the case of aggregates of atoms. Even then the atoms cannot convey a meaning individually, for their individual existence cannot be proved. Nor can they do so in a collection (*saṁghāta*), for a collection does not exist in reality apart from its constituent parts.

After thus showing that verbal sounds alone cannot convey a meaning, the Dīpakāra sums up his position. "The correct form of exposition," he says, "is that the letters which are past with reference to the last letter are grasped by a (single) mental effort and then cause to arise the mental concept as directed towards the relevant meaning and thus only in this fashion convey the meaning."

As regards the common belief that a verbal sound conveys a meaning, the Dīpakāra says that this belief does not correspond to the facts. "In fact speech operates on the *nāman*, i.e., it expresses or speaks the name, i.e., it gives voice to it. The name brings to light the object. Thus the speech passing over each letter in order, speaking or giving voice to the name and at the same time giving rise to the perception of its own form, but existing only in the form of series, is said to reveal the *artha* only by a process of metaphorical transfer. The meaning is not expressed or brought to light by the sound."

This exposition of the *nāmakāya* offers several points of comparison with the *sphoṭa*-theory of early Grammarians. *Sphoṭa* is defined as "the abiding word, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which is the conveyor of the meaning" (Mādhava, *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* (ed. Abhyankar), p. 300). The *nāmakāya* is also distinct from letters (i.e., sound), is revealed by them, and is claimed to be the conveyor of meanings. The Vaibhāṣika argument that sounds, on account of their seriality, cannot convey a meaning, is identical with the argument of the Sphoṭavādins against the Naiyāyikas who, like the Sautrāntikas, maintained that verbal sounds (with the help of *saṁketa*) convey the meaning. But whereas the *sphoṭa* is called a *śabda* and described as one and eternal, the *nāmakāya*s are nowhere designated as *śabda* and are declared to be many and noneternal.

The Dīpakāra does not appear to be unaware of this similarity. As if anticipating an attack from the Sautrāntikas on this account, he

raises a question as to whether the *nāmakāya*, etc., are eternal or not. Such a question is indeed unnecessary, for the *nāmakāya* is a trace and consequently noneternal. The question raised, therefore, suggests that a similarity between the *sphoṭa* and *nāmakāya* was present in the mind of the Dīpakāra. He is, therefore, unduly emphatic when he says that the *nāmakāyas* are noneternal, as they depend for their function on such causes as sound, etc.

The Dīpakāra does not accept the theory of *sphoṭa*. He examines a statement of Patañjali that *sphoṭa* (the unchanging substratum) is the word, the sound being merely an attribute of the word. (*Mahābhāṣyā*, I. 1, 70, Kielhorn's edition, vol. I, p. 181, lines 19-20) The Dīpakāra does not admit any difference between a substratum and an attribute, and therefore says that since these two are identical, even sound (*dhvani*) would become eternal. For him, "*dhvani*", "*śabda*", and "*sphoṭa*" are synonymous. *Sphoṭa*, being thus identical with verbal sound, was subject to the same fault of seriality and therefore incapable of conveying the meaning.

Dīpakāra further confirms his rejection of the theory of *sphoṭa* by openly favoring a view, which Patañjali calls naive, that *śabda* is *dhvani*. Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* gives two views on the nature of a word (*śabda*): (i) a word is that by means of which, when uttered, there arises an understanding of the thing meant; (ii) a word is a sound capable of conveying a meaning. The Dīpakāra does not refer to the first view, but quotes the second view, showing his preference for it. But this second view equally goes against his theory of *nāmakāya*. He, therefore, says that name, etc., are different from sound (*dhvani*) (i.e., from *śabda*), because they are *sarvārthanirṇaya*. The significance of this statement seems to be that whereas a sound refers to a particular thing, the *nāmakāya* as a trace is capable of conveying all meanings.

The *sphoṭa* theory referred to by the Dīpakāra shows his acquaintance only with the Pātañjala school of grammar. He does not refer to the later developments of this theory as contained in the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari. While dealing with the nature of sounds, he says that the Vaiyākaraṇas (together with the Mīmāṁsakas) do not recognize the atomic nature of sounds, and proceeds to show that sounds are atomic, because they possess resistance. The *Vākyapadīya* refers to a view that some consider words (*śabda*) as consisting of atoms. It is possible that the Dīpakāra was not aware of this view, or did not consider it an authoritative view of the Grammarians.

As seen above, the Sphoṭavādins understand the term "*śabda*" in the sense of *sphoṭa* and not in the ordinary sense of a sound. This *śabda*, therefore, is not perceived by the ears but only by the mind. The Dīpakāra plays with the ambiguity of this term and ridicules the Grammarians for maintaining a view that sound is perceived by the mind. The Dīpakāra further gives some more details about the *nāmakāya*s, etc. The *nāmakāya*s are twofold: those which have a determinate meaning, and those which do not in themselves mean any particular thing. The former is again divided into two kinds: *apauruṣeya* (not created by any person) and *laukika* (mundane). The *nāmakāya*s which convey the elements, organs, and aggregates are *apauruṣeya*. They are primarily perceived only by the Buddha. It is therefore said, "The *nāmapadavyañjanakāya*s appear only when the Tathāgatas appear in the world".

The *laukika* (worldly) *nāmakāya*s are twofold: those which convey a particular thing (*niyata*), and those which are conventional (*yādṛcchika*). Of these, the *apauruṣeya* as well as the *niyatalaukika nāmakāya*s convey only those meanings for which there exists a convention (*saṅketa*).

The use of the term "*apauruṣeya*" for the *nāmakāya*s which convey the Buddhist categories of factors is significant. It reminds us of the *opapatikanāma* of the Theravādins and shows the direct influence of the Mīmāṁsakas. For the latter, the Vedas are *apauruṣeya* and eternal. For the Vaibhāṣika, the Buddha-*vacana*s (i.e., *nāmakāya*s) are *apauruṣeya*, but not eternal.

It appears from the above discussion that the Vaibhāṣika theory of the *nāmakāya*s was a continuation and a development of an earlier tradition represented in the form of *nāma-paññatti* in the Pāli Abhidharma and *Aṭṭhakathā*s. As in the case of many other *prajñaptidharma*s, the *nāmakāya*s, etc. also came to be recognized by the Vaibhāṣikas as *dravyadharma*s, and thus found a place in the dissociated factors category. The lack of speculation on the nature of the Buddha-*vacana* in the Pāli tradition and its presence in the Vaibhāṣika school suggests that this was a later development brought about by a certain influence of other schools, particularly the Mīmāṁsakas and the Vaiyākaraṇas, who, although for different reasons, had a primary interest in the problems of words and their meanings. The Vaibhāṣikas seem to have benefitted from the arguments of the early Sphoṭavādin Grammarians. But the Mīmāṁsakas seem to have exercised a far greater influence on them, as

is evident from the use of such expressions as *apauruṣeya* for denoting the Buddha-*vacana*.

Chapter III

A large portion of the third *adhyāya*, corresponding to the third *kośasthāna,* is lost. Only a small portion of the text, dealing with the seven types of destruction of the world, has survived.

Chapter IV, First Section

The fourth chapter deals with karma. Dīpakāra opens the discussion with a refutation of the doctrine that a creator God is the cause either of the universe itself or of its diversity. Dīpakāra remarks that he had already referred to this issue earlier, but now intends to expound upon it in detail. The earlier reference probably appeared in the second chapter, which has a corresponding passage in *AKB* II.64d. It should be noted however that, unlike Dīpakāra, Kośakāra does not repeat the discussion in his fourth chapter.

Dīpakāra's refutation of Īśvarakāraṇavāda is of some significance and contains material not found in *AKB.* Dīpakāra points out that if indeed a unitary, eternal God were to be the cause of the production, continuation, and destruction of the universe, then, since effect must accord with cause, all these three effects would have to occur simultaneously--a logical impossibility. This is neither observed to be so, nor is it advocated even by those who accept God as the creator. In addition, if this were so, the world would also be without any diversity, since its creation would take place just as the Lord Śiva (the symbol of destruction) wanders onto the scene, naked and carrying his begging-bowl skull. This also is not the case, and therefore God is not the cause of the diversity of the world either--it is the karma of each individual that is the cause.

It might be maintained by the opponent that the overlordship of God in the matter of creation is proved because his existence is necessary to maintain the order of the world, just as a village headman is not a creator, but maintains order in his village. This is rejected, because of the following faults: dependence upon others, noneternality (i.e., impermanence), and the ability of others to hinder one's power.

Moreover, the idea that anything at all could exist eternally, as is alleged in the case of God, has been rejected by the Buddha in his utterance in the *Gomayapiṇḍopamāsūtra* (the Dīpakāra no doubt is

referring to the *Gomayapiṇḍasutta, Saṁyuttanikāya* iii.142), where the Lord states there has never been a being even as small as a lump of cowdung who was eternal.

Moreover, God cannot be the creator of the universe, since even those who believe in him still censure him. It is well known that the Bhāgavatas (i.e., Vaiṣṇavas) censure Śiva (whom the Śaivites claim to be God), while the Māheśvaras (i.e., Śaivites) censure Viṣṇu (whom the Vaiṣṇavas consider to be God). Therefore, God cannot be considered the overlord of the world.

It might be maintained that God relies upon causes for the production of the universe but creates the universe nonetheless through the majesty of his own austerities. Just as a potter produces his wares through his own creativity but still makes use of clay and the wheel, so too does God create the world by his own majesty while still making use of the efficient causes (*sahakārikāraṇa*). This is rejected, however, because this would make God--who is claimed to be unitary, eternal and independent--actually dependent on factors other than himself. Such a being surely could not be considered self-sustained--the meaning of the word "*Īśvara*". By this same argument is refuted such theories as that the cause of the universe is either time or the *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* of the Sāṁkhyas.

The opponent might reply that if the cause of the diversity of the world is karma and not God, then why would it be that the world commonly acknowledges God, time, and so forth as being the creator? To this the Dīpakāra responds (verse 157): "It is the power of karman that is expressed by such notions as fate (*vidhi*), time, and the planets (i.e., astrology). Therefore, that word "*karman*" can be applied to those notions in a secondary manner." As it was also said elsewhere: "Fate, destiny, rule, nature, time, astrology, God, action, chance, merit, fortune, and inevitable result and chance: all these are synonyms of deeds done previously."

Moreover, it has also been said, "The conjunction of the planets, the quivering of the shoulders, dreams, a full pitcher, etc.--all these merely foretell to men the maturation of their own actions." Thus, the term "*karman*" may be employed in all these cases as well.

Returning to the problem of karma itself, we may note an important statement found in the *ADV* but not in the *AKB* concerning the attribution of a certain doctrine to the Dārṣṭāntikas. It has been generally maintained that the results of meritorious and demeritorious actions are

experienced as happy and unhappy feelings respectively at the level of desire. A question therefore is raised as to whether feeling, namely *vedanā* alone, is the result of actions. In answer to this, the Dīpakāra says that the word "*vedanā*" here is used only to denote the most important element of karmas and should not be considered as their sole result. Instead, the words "happy feeling" or "unhappy feeling" should be taken as referring to the totality of the four mental aggregates. The Dīpakāra here mentions the Dārṣṭāntikas by name and says that according to them, *vedanā* alone is maturation. Moreover they also maintain that volition alone is karma. By contrast the Dīpakāra says that for the Ābhidharmikas all five aggregates are causes of karma, as well as the effects thereof. The statement that the Dārṣṭāntikas, who are considered a variety of the Sautrāntika, believed that a single aggregate, namely the volition and the feeling respectively, was the cause and effect of karma, is not attested elsewhere.

The next important discussion pertains to one of the three mental actions called wrong view (*mithyādṛṣṭi*). It is maintained by the Ābhidharmikas that when this wrong view attains to its highest grade it is capable of destroying even the most subtle of the good roots. In this connection, Dīpakāra examines Kośakāra's view, which apparently was identical to that of the Sautrāntikas. The Kośakāra, in the second *kośasthāna*, had debated this point in connection with the dissociated factor called "possession" (*prāpti*), and had maintained therein that whereas all defilements or bad factors are totally eradicated by the transcendent path, the good roots were never entirely destroyed by any defilement. In this connection he had stated that the subtle seeds of the good factors may be injured by wrong view, but they persist and will grow strong again should appropriate conditions present themselves. This is patently the Sautrāntika view.[260] The Dīpakāra finds this view unacceptable and declares that wrong view is the root of all bad factors and is capable of destroying all forms of good roots, even those which are considered "innate". Having stated this "Saugata" view and having mentioned Kośakāra by name, Dīpakāra rejects it on the grounds that it is contrary to both reasoning and scripture: "It is opposed to reasoning because it violates the law of homogeneousness: to maintain that good roots will grow in the presence of wrong views is to admit that one can get rice grains from barley seeds, or that wrong views can result even when an aspirant has listened with careful attention to true teachings. Moreover, two things which are opposed to each other, as for example,

light and darkness or happiness and unhappiness, are never seen arising together. This view is also contrary to scripture, wherein it is stated unequivocably that wrong view totally destroys the good roots, and hence a person holding a wrong view comes to be called *samucchinnakuśala-mūla*."

Although Dīpakāra does not put forth any new arguments in defense of the Ābhidharmika view, he certainly draws attention to a most glaring contradiction which the Sautrāntika, in maintaining his *bīja* theory, cannot easily resolve.

The last section (*pāda*) of the fourth chapter, which is completely preserved, is of great importance, as it deals with the Bodhisattva doctrine. This topic is conspicuously absent from the Pāli Abhidharma literature, and even in the AKB it receives only scant attention. The Kośakāra introduces the Bodhisattva topic in the course of a discussion on the *ānantaryakarma*, deeds which result in immediate rebirth in hell. It is the Vaibhāṣika view that killing a predestined Bodhisattva is such an act. In this context a question is raised as to the point at which a person comes to be designated as a Bodhisattva. This problem is then discussed in the *Kośa* in verses 108-111ab. In contrast, the Dīpakāra devotes almost the entire fourth *pāda* to this question, and fills in a great many details not found in other Abhidharma texts. Having declared that an aspirant earns the designation Bodhisattva only after having reached the *anivartya* stage, i.e., the stage of nonreturn, the text then enumerates the 32 marks of a great person (*mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇa*), as well as the 80 *anuvyañjanas*, the physical characteristics which distinguish a Buddha from other beings. The Dīpakāra then takes up a very important polemic against those heretics whom he describes as "those whose minds have been banished from the words of the Buddha," and who consequently maintain that the Lord did not teach the Bodhisattva path in the *Tripiṭakas*, thereby suggesting that this path was outside the purview of the Abhidharma. He confronts these heretics and labels their view erroneous, because "The Lord has from his own mouth declared the following factors which constitute the causes leading to the attainment of enlightenment, namely the three meritorious actions, the four *adhiṣṭhānas*, the seven *saddharmas*, the seven *yogas*, the three aggregates, the three trainings, the four perfections (as enumerated in the *Vinayapiṭaka*), as well as the 37 *bodhipakṣyadharmas*. (For details on these items, see *ADV* p. 196, notes 1-8.) These lead to the attainment of enlightenment which is of three grades, the lowest, the middle and the highest (corresponding

respectively to the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha and the Buddha)." Therefore, the Dīpakāra declares: "The Bodhisattva path is not outside of the *Sūtra*, *Vinaya* and the *Abhidharmapiṭaka*. Anyone who should assert that the Bodhisattva doctrine is outside these *piṭaka*s must surely be considered as one speaking the words of Māra." The Dīpakāra further supports his statement by quoting the scriptural passage which states that one should declare those words which are not to be found in the Sūtra or the Vinaya, and which go against the established law (*dharmatā*), to be spurious, and the reverse (that those words which appear therein are truly the words of the Teacher). He further qualifies this statement by claiming authenticity only for those scriptures, namely the four Āgamas, which were compiled by such Elders as Mahākāśyapa and Ānanda, and the contents of which were entered into the Udānagāthās.

The statement that the Bodhisattva doctrine is part of the Piṭaka teaching and that the highest form of that Bodhisattva path leads to the attainment of the enlightenment of the Buddha is highly significant. Such a claim was undoubtedly meant to repudiate the Mahāyāna assertion that one cannot attain Buddhahood through the teachings of the Piṭakas. While discussing the nature of *bodhi* in the sixth Chapter, the Dīpakāra returns once more to this topic and makes the bold assertion that the entire Buddha teachings consisting of the 37 *bodhipakṣyadharma*s is Mahāyāna, but is divided into three parts, namely the Buddhayāna, the Pratyekabuddhayāna and the Śrāvakayāna, merely because there are such qualitative grades among those who practise the path. To the best of our knowledge, the term "Mahāyāna" is not attested anywhere else in the non-Mahāyāna texts other than the *ADV*. The Dīpakāra's attempt to equate the Vaibhāṣika school of Buddhism with Mahāyāna as he understood it is certainly novel and noteworthy. It may be noted that there is no reference to the word "Hīnayāna" made by the Dīpakāra. We will never know if he was indeed unaware of the term "Hīnayāna", or merely chose to ignore it while he appropriated the word "Mahāyāna" for the Piṭaka teachings.

The remaining three Chapters of the *ADV* cover more or less the same topics that are dealt with in the *AKB*. The only noteworthy section where the Dīpakāra's treatment differs considerably from that of the Kośakāra is to be found in the fifth Chapter devoted to a debate over the reality of past and future aggregates, the central doctrine of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. Here too the Dīpakāra stays close to the Vaibhāṣika arguments as put forth by the Kośakāra in the *AKB* but

introduces a few new points not found in other Abhidharma texts. His description of the four schools within the fold of Buddhism is certainly novel: (1) the Sarvāstivādins declare that factors exist in all three times; (2) the Vibhajyavādins (meaning probably the Theravādins) and the Dārṣṭāntikas (i.e., the Sautrāntikas) declare that the present and only a portion of the past and future exist; (3) the Vaitulikas, characterized as *ayogatāśūnyavādins* (the Mādhyamika?) maintain that no factor exists in any of the three times; (4) the Paudgalikas (i.e., the Sammitīyas) are characterized as *avyākṛtavastuvādins*, who hold the view that the *pudgala* exists as a reality. Of these four (Buddhist) schools, says the Dīpakāra, only the first one, the Sarvāstivādin, is the speaker of the truth, as his words are consistent with reasoning and scripture. As for the other three, the Dārṣṭāntika, Vaitulika and the Paudgalika, the Dīpakāra declares that these should be relegated to the respective company of the Lokāyatika (Materialist), the Vaināśika (Nihilist), and the Nagnāṭa (Naked Wanderer). Dīpakāra's identification of the three non-Sarvāstivāda schools with the three non-Buddhistic schools is significant. It is especially remarkable when we consider that this is probably the first Buddhist text which has identified the Paudgalikas with the Nagnāṭas, a term which in the context of the doctrine being discussed must refer to the Digambara Jainas, whose doctrines of *syādvāda* and changing soul offer many points of similarity with that of the *avyākṛtapudgala* of the Sammitīya.

The Dīpakāra discussion proper on the validity of the doctrine of three times does not vary significantly from that of the Vaibhāṣika position appearing in the AKB. Dīpakāra is vehement in his opposition to the Sautrāntika position, and now and then makes a few observations which appear to be unique to this text. For example, in his examination of the Sautrāntika position that even a nonexistent entity can become the object of consciousness, and that hence past and future factors can become objects without necessarily being real, the Dīpakāra quotes certain *sūtra*s in rejection of this theory and states: "The *sūtra*s uphold a middle path: compounded things (*saṁskāra*) are in some respects empty, i.e., devoid of such false imputations as *puruṣa*, *ālayavijñāna* and *abhūtaparikalpa*, etc. They are also nonempty in some respects, i.e., with reference to their own characteristics, or their universal characteristics."

Although it would be reasonable to assume that the Ābhidharmikas were well acquainted with the doctrines of *ālayavijñāna* and *abhūtaparikalpa*, the twin doctrines of the Vijñānavāda school, the Dīpakāra seems to be the only Ābhidharmika to have recognized these

two terms and denounced them as false doctrines comparable to the Sāṁkhya doctrine of an eternal self (*puruṣa*). Moreover he also shows a good deal of acquaintance with the Mādhyamika *śūnyavāda* school, whose members he labels as Vaitulikas. According to him, the Vaitulika imagines the following: "That which is produced by the coming together of causes does not exist by its own nature." Elaborating on this statement the Dīpakāra says: "That which is devoid of its own nature and is devoid of a self, and is brought into existence by depending upon causes, that truly does not exist by its own nature. For it could not be considered to be abiding severally within the various causes which produced it, nor within the totality of the causes, nor anywhere else. And that which does not abide anywhere--how could such a thing be said to emerge with its own nature. And that which is devoid of its own nature--how could such a thing even be described as existent? Therefore all factors are devoid of self, that is, of their own nature, and are comparable to the wheel of a firebrand."

The Dīpakāra condemns this as an absurd statement, and proceeds to reassert the Vaibhāṣika view that factors exist in all three times endowed with their own nature, but that they depend upon the chain of causes for the manifestation of their activity and the changing of their mode, namely their passage from the state of future to present, and then to past.

In this connection he even quotes Bhadanta Kumāralāta, a renowned Dārṣṭāntika, according to whom the three times doctrine is described by the following example: "Particles of dust are to be found on both sides of a beam of light entering through a window. But, whereas the dust in the beam is visible, the dust on either side of the beam is not seen but can only be inferred. Thus is explained the existence of factors in the past and future. (That is, these two aspects of the factors are inferred, whereas their present aspect is visible.) However, the sages, having attained to supernatural knowledge, perceive all three aspects (and hence the factors exist in all three times)."

It should be noted that this view of the Dārṣṭāntika Kumāralāta is certainly not in keeping with the acknowledged view of the Sautrāntika, as known to us through both the *AKB* and *ADV*. Nor is this view ascribed to Kumāralāta attested elsewhere. One would have expected the Dīpakāra to examine the significance of this example, but unfortunately the quotation stands without any comment.

The Dīpakāra's treatment of the Vaibhāṣika doctrine of three

times does take into account the Sautrāntika objections as fully laid out by Vasubandhu in the fifth Chapter. Barring a few minor points such as the distinction between the nominal and the real or the definition of function (*kāritra*), Dīpakāra's contribution to this discussion cannot be considered as having broken any new ground. The conclusion of the discussion is however of some interest, as the Dīpakāra uses this occasion to condemn the Kośakāra once more for his alleged inability to understand the Vaibhāṣika viewpoint. The Dīpakāra undoubtedly has the Kośakāra in mind when he says: "Here the Vaitulika, an apostate from the Sarvāstivāda, asserts, 'We too imagine the existence of three characteristics similar to the Vaibhāṣika doctrine of three times.'"

The Dīpakāra's rejoinder to what appears to be the Vaitulika, that is the Mahāyāna, doctrine as put forth by Vasubandhu in his *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa* does not provide any meaningful discussion but merely expresses his hostility to the Kośakāra. For he says: "The world is pervaded by such imaginings which can delight only foolish minds, but that theory which can capture the minds of the learned is a rare one indeed. The three-nature theory entertained by you has already been refuted. False doctrines similar to this should also be rejected. This is one more occasion where the Kośakāra has demonstrated his confusion regarding the doctrine of times." (ADV p. 282)

186.ŚĪLABHADRA (580), *Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna*

"Śīlabhadra, according to Hsüan-tsang, belonged to the family of the king of Saṁtata and was of Brāhmaṇa caste. Having travelled widely in India, improving his store of learning, he came at last to Nālandā where he met Dharmapāla and expressed to him a wish to be his disciple. About that time Dharmapāla had received a challenge to a disputation with a heretic of South India and the king had asked him to accept it. He proceeded to the venue along with his disciples, Śīlabhadra being among them. Śīlabhadra asked his master to allow him to hold the disputation himself and his request was granted. At the time he was only thirty years of age. The heretic was defeated and the king pressed on him a substantial reward for his scholarhips which the latter at first refused, but finally accepted on the king's insistence. With the money awarded, he built a monastery near Nālandā."[261]

John P. Keenan's doctoral dissertastion titled "A Study of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa: the Doctrinal Development of the Notion of

Wisdom in Yogācāra Thought" (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1980), contains a translation of a Chinese work attributed to a Bandhuprabhā, the Sanskrit title of which is *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa*. In Tibetan there is a parallel text, titled *Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna*, attributed to Śīlabhadra. Keenan has determined that about one-half of Bandhuprabhā's text is identical with Śīlabhadra's, with the other half being taken almost entirely from Dharmapāla's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* and inserted in appropriate places in the original Sanskrit test of Śīlabhadra's work. Keenan translates Bandhuprabhā's text in his unpublished dissertation, indicating those sections which were originally writtten by Śīlabhadra. The summary by the Editor provided below is based on Keenan's translation from the Chinese of those portions he indicates correspond to the passage contained in the Tibetan.

Introduction

The *Buddhabhūmisūtra* deals with five factors: the pure *dharmadhātu*, the knowledge of the mirror (*ādarśanajñāna*), the knowledge of evenness (*samatā*), reflective (*pratyavekṣa*) knowledge, and the knowledge that *dharma* has been fulfilled.

Part One: Why This Teaching is Given

1.1 There are four kinds of meaningful language: (1) analogical, as in "monks are like treasures", (2) exhortations as to how one should conduct oneself, (3) answers to questions, (4) temporizing. How many of these are involved when a *sūtra* is spoken? Some say only one, others two; others still say that all are.

Explanation of the introductory words of the *Buddhabhūmisūtra*.

1.2 This passage of the *sūtra*, which is found in several texts including the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* and the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*, describes the perfection of the land of the Buddha, comprised of eigheen kinds of plenitude: of his form of appearance, his beauty, his extent, his locations, his causes, his effects, his supremacy, his entourage, his retinue, his sustenance, the effects of his actions, the benefits he provides, his fearlessness, his abode, the paths of his lords, his vehicles, his doors and his support.

1.3 The Buddha's complete enlightenment is extolled as involvng 21 aspects.

1.4 The merits of the Buddha's disciples described.

1.5 Objection: Those seekers who have achieved the state of

adepts will automatically escape from bondage--so why does the Buddha teach them the *dharma* all over again?

Answer: So that they will turn toward enlightenment.

Objector: But what is it they lack that leads them to seek enlightenment?

Answer: Seekers lack the happiness of full wisdom (*sambodhi*). But in this state of enlightenment short of full wisdom, though they have attained uncalculated cessation, they can still, through the power of their vows, remain embodied and gradually turn toward full realization.

1.6 The merits of Bodhisattvas.

Part Two: The Content of the Teaching

2.1 The five factors that comprise enlighenment explained. Does an enlightened one see images? There are different opinions: (1) No, an enlightened person sees things directly unmediated by images (i.e., without marks (*animitta* or *nirākāra*). (2) Yes, they see images with marks, but they are not attached to them, which is what is meant by calling them *animitta*. (3) Consciousness that is constructionfree has no images, but the subsequent awarenesses (*pṛṣṭalalabha*) do have contents. The *Ālambanaparīkṣā* does not say that just because there are no images of atoms there no objects at all. Rather, the enlightened one's pure mind has pure seeds that appear as if they were contaminated objects but are actually not. This (3) is the correct view. But remember we are still speaking from the conventional standoint, not the highest, which is beyond discursive thought and lacks both images and insights.

2.2 The pure *darmadhātu* is like empty space in reflecting all sorts of forms. Though it has no form both it and space are pure, inactive, unconditioned by birth or death or increase or descrease, without movement, eternal, unfrustrating, etc.

2.3 The mirror wisdom, like a mirror reflecting all sorts of images, is itself unreflected, free from obstacles as a clean mirror is free from dust, reflecting images that move and act but not itself moving or acting, omniscient, omnipresent.

2.4 Evenness knowledge has ten kinds of marks corresponding to ten stages.

2.5 Reflective knowledge has kinds of causal activity: to support spells and concentration, causing ideas to arise, causing delight, discernment, experiencing, the five destinies, the desire, material and immaterial levels, *dharma*, suppression of Māra, and the ending of doubt.

2.6 *Dharma*-fulfilment knowledge realizes the magical body (*nirmāṇakāya*) of the Tathāgata, his spiritual powers, powers of rebirth, manifesting karmic results, the joy of speech providing assistance and explanation, etc.

Part Three: The Practice Based on the Teaching

3.1 Bodhisattvas as well as a Buddha can experience wisdom.

3.2 Four verses from the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra* are recited by the Buddha to explain the pure *dharmadhātu*. They provoke extended discussion.

GUṆAPRABHĀ (580)

This author apparently specialized in Vinaya given the works preserved in Chinese that are attributed to him. Bu-ston refers to him as an authority on Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, while Hsüan-tsang makes him originally a Mahāyānist who later converted to Hīnayāna.

187.GUṆAPRABHĀ, *Vṛtti* on Asaṅga's *Bodhisattvabhūmi*

In the Encyclopedia of Buddhism 3.2, 1972, pp. 236-237 we find a description of this work from which we quote below, omitting the Tibetan references. The work exists in Tibetan as No. 4044 of the Tengyur and No. 5545 of the Peking edition. The translators are named as Jayaśīla and Dīpaṅkaraśrījñāna. "The text is very long, containing nine chapters. They are as follows:--

(1) The method of the earliest step of meditation of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.
(2) The arising of the *bodhicitta*.
(3) The advantages (thereof) for oneself and for others.
(4) The method of meditation of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.
(5) The power of meditation of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.
(6) The complete perfection of the meditation of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.
(7) The method of meditation of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.
(8) The eightfold ways of meditation.
(9) The method of giving."

188. GUṆAPRABHĀ, *Vivaraṇa* on Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandha*ka

The Tibetan translation is found at Peking/Tokyo Tibetan Tripiṭaka volume 114, pp. 29-42. References in the summary below are to this translation. Some passages are translated and discussed in Brian Galloway, "A Yogācāra analysis of the mind, based on the *Vijñāna* section of Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* with Guṇaprabhā's commentary", Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 3.2, 1980, pp. 7-20

Summary by Stefan Anacker

(p. 29, 2.5). Guṇaprabhā states that an exact determination (*vibhakti*, *vibhāga*) of momentary phenomena is the main aim of Abhidharma, particularly as regards the question as to which are good, bad, and neutral Both their particular characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa*) and their general characteristics (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) are to be discussed.

(p. 29, 4.2). Why are the aggregates always enumerated in the order they are? Materiality is enumerated first because it is the most manifest, because it is the support of the five sensory consciousnesses, and an object of consciousness also for the sixth, or mental consciousness. Feelings, after materialities, are most manifest, and are important for the entire sentient world. Cognitions inform the consciousnesses, and present them with the "signs" for determining events, thus they are the next manifest. The motivating dispositions are already less manifest, though they color all of experience. Consciousness, being the most subtle, is numbered last.

(p. 29, 5.1 ff.) There is also a causal reason for this enumeration. Feelings are linked to the materiality of an aggregate-series, and these feelings in turn condition cognitions. But once cognitions are fixed, motivating dispositions arise (since motivating dispositions arise only in regard to phenomena distinguished by signs). Motivating dispositions in turn are the chief impellers of consciousness.

(p. 30, 2.3). States that Vasubandhu gets his definition of materiality from the *sūtra*s.

(p.30, 4.5). The reason why space is never listed as a material element in any Buddhist work (in contrast to Vaiśeṣika, for instance) is that the material elements must be causally produced in a causal sequence. This is not the case with space, which is eternal.

(p. 30, 5.1 ff). All four material elements take part in the genesis of a sentient being.

(p. 31, 1.2) Though Guṇaprabhā does not explain the nature of sentient materiality, he states in the case of the eye that it is the brightness covering the pupil of the eye, and that it is absolutely necessary for the arising of a visual consciousness. Whereas the sentient materialities connected with the other sense-organs cover only a portion of these organs, the sentient materiality related to body and touch pervades the whole body.

(p. 32, 1.2) Quotes an ancient Tripiṭaka *sūtra* to show that the idea of manifest and unmanifest action are already in the *Sūtrapiṭaka*.

(p. 32, 2.6 ff.) Guṇaprabhā makes subdivisions of feelings:

(1) basic: pleasure, suffering, or indifference felt by the eye, etc., with contact,

(2) by essential nature: satisfaction, frustration, indifference,

(3) compounded: when experienced together with material and immaterial aggregates,

(4) defiled when connected with thirst,

(5) conducive to alleviation: all those involved in a path conducive to the elimination of frustration.

(p. 32. 3) Gives as reason for the category "immeasurable cognition" the fact that cognitions of "immeasurability," or of "ocean," "space," etc., can arise.

(p. 32. 5) Beginning of discussion of why, among motivating dispositions dissociated from consciousness, only feelings and cognitions are counted as separate aggregates. Feelings and cognitions are the root of disputes and the motivating cause for the world. For the root of any dispute may be connected either with desires, or with views. The reason why cognitions may be given as a causal motivator for the world, is that false views, such as the view of self in a body, are causes for the continuation of *saṁsāra*.

(p. 33) Sometimes adds phrases (which seem akin to Asaṅga, *Abhidharmasamuccaya*) to Vasubandhu's definitions,, but in general, has little new to say on these.

(p. 34) Long discussions of which motivating dispositions are predominant in a Buddha.

(p. 39, 4.1) States that the characteristic of consciousness is the knowledge of an object of consciousness.

(p. 39, 5.1) But finally reduces objects of consciousness to seeds

of consciousness, as does Vasubandhu in *Viṁśatikā* 9, and regards the internal processes of traces being more important than any inferentially deduced object-stimulus.

(p. 40, 1.1). The storehouse-consciousness is regarded as the cause of all motivating dispositions entering into affliction.

(p. 40, 1.2) There are two aspects to the store-consciousness: causal and resultant. The "causal" aspect is the equivalent to impression. The "resultant" aspect is the equivalent to karmic maturation. These karmic retributions arise because of the impressions left by former volitions.

(p. 40, 2.1 ff.) Develops the inferential arguments for the existence of the store-consciousness in a manner quite akin to the *Karmasiddhi*'s: the six consciousnesses are suspended in the attainment of cessation: there must be some other consciousness to account for the continuity of consciousness, and this consciousness must exist even in the attainment of cessation.

(p. 40, 2.7) The author equates the store-consciousness to a support of the seeds, in contrast to Vasubandhu who often (*Karmasiddhi* 39, *Triṁśikā* 18) equates the storehouse-consciousness to the seeds.

(p. 42) Spells out in detail the categorizations Vasubandhu makes for the sense-fields.

(p. 42, 4.4-6) According to Guṇaprabhā, the last two sentences of the *Pañcaskandha* refer to the terms *sabhāga* and *tatsabhāga* A material organ such as the eye may exist without its corresponding consciousness--in that case, the eye is called *tatsabhāga*.

189.UPASENA (580), *Saddhammappajotikā* on the *Niddesa*

The author "himself states that he wrote the work at Anurādhapura in the 26th year of the reign of king Siri-Saṅghabodhi, whose dates are disputed. He probably lived about the middle of the sixth century A.D..Buddhadatta concludes that Siri-Saṅghabodhi is Aggabodhi I, who came to the throne c. A.D.554. This would give a date around A.D. 580 for the completion of" this work.[262]

YAŚOMITRA (580)

A discussion of the date of this author, about whose life etc. we have no information, is contained in Marek Mejor, *Vasubandhu's*

Abhidharmakośa and the Commentaries Preserved in the Tanjur (Stuttgart 1991), pp. 38-42. Mejor cites a number of opinions, concluding for a date a bit later than ours, but noting that André Bareau and Étienne Lamotte in private communications expressed their agreement with the dating decision made here.

190. YAŚOMITRA, (*Sphuṭārtha*) *Vyākhyā* on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* (580)

Summary by Stefan Anacker

This work of profound elegance is the only favorable commentary on the *Kośabhāṣya* to survive in Sanskrit. Yaśomitra explains difficult passages of the *Kośabhāṣya*, but also defends it against attacks by Saṁghabhadra and others, and often adds his own discussions and solutions. In these, he is very "Sautrāntika," not alluding to later Yogācāra solutions of Vasubandhu *re*: psychic continuity, and sometimes even defending definitions of the *Kośa* (cf. summary at I, 11) which Vasubandhu rejected in works such as the *Pañcaskandhaka*, though Yaśomitra is quite familiar with this latter work, and quotes it frequently. Yaśomitra has quite independent opinions on a number of subjects. Aside from such passages of philosophic interest, Yaśomitra has also much information of interest to the history of Indian philosophy. There are summaries below of passages of both types.

I, 3: As proof that the Abhidharma is not the word of the Buddha, he cites the authors of the books of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma: Kātyāyanīputra for the *Jñānaprasthāna*, Vasumitra for the *Prakaraṇapāda*, Devaśarman for the *Vijñānakāya*, Śāriputra for the *Dharmaskandhaka*, Maudgalyāyana for the *Prajñaptiśāstra*, Pūrṇa for the *Dhātukāya*, and Mahākausṭhila for the *Saṅgītiparyāya*.

He defines the Sautrāntikas as those who follow the *sūtra*s and not the *śāstra*s.

I, 4: He defines "*saṁskṛta*" as "engendered by causes and conditions."

On the question why all conditioned events except those taking part in the Noble Path are contaminated he quotes Guṇamati, who asks how this can validly be said, since all factors are supporting objects of consciousness for contaminants. Yaśomitra replies that Guṇamati's

opinion is not an interpretation conformable to the Abhidharma because space and calculated cessation are never in the state of being supporting objects of contaminants. He quotes *Kośa* V, 14 as support of his claim. According to some, Yaśomitra says, the supporting objects of the cessation path can arise as contaminants. All it takes is for there to be view of self and craving: as soon as these appear, their proclivities, which entail the possibility of the arising of yet other contaminants, also arise just as there is the possibility of dust adhering rapidly to a wet cloth. Thus, in this sense, a state may be "not pure" until the higher states of the Path. When antidotes are made to arise, and in the Path leading to liberation, there is finally a state where there is no more support for contaminants, just as a foot can find no support on a heated rock. Accordingly, there are two kinds of cessation path: worldly (where there are still contaminants developing) and transcendent.

Others again claim that as soon as satisfaction, frustration, and feeling which is neither one nor the other arise, contaminants, noncontaminants, and a combination of both arise, so everything is both contaminating or pure, or putting this another way, neither contaminating nor pure.

But in that case, Yaśomitra says, why would there be a category "pure" at all? Or a category for those that are both contaminating and pure? Yaśomitra says that the Vaibhāṣikas make the distinction clear, when they say that there are two kinds of residues of defilements: defiled and undefiled (cf. *Kośa* V, 32). According to this interpretation the eye, etc. and visibles, etc. are undefiled, but contaminated by contaminants.

According to the Dārṣṭāntikas, the eye, etc. and visibles, etc. of an *arhat*'s series are pure, because of their state of being not being a support to contaminants.

The contaminated states are those where there is no antidote to the contaminants: thus in this way the eye, etc., must be reckoned as both contaminated and pure, the Dārṣṭāntikas claim.

Yaśomitra replies: There is a passage which says that the pure factors are the Truth of the Path and the unconditioned. Thus the eye taking part in the Truth of the Path is pure (i.e. noncontaminating). The Vaibhāṣikas however claim that the eye, etc., is contaminating. But why should factors with such a low level of contaminants be called contaminating?

Reply: Because contaminants may still adhere to them. Yaśomitra is rather of the opinion that "contaminating" means the ability

of contaminants to arise in a series.

I, 5: On the question as to what the three unconditioned factors are, Yaśomitra cites the Vātsīputrīyas, who say that only *nirvāṇa* is an unconditioned factor

He cites the Sautrāntika opinion that space has only one characteristic, "the lack of impinging materiality". He cites the Vaibhāṣikas as quoting a *sūtra* proving that space exists as a factor (which the Sautrāntika definition actually denies, since space for them is a mere absence), for when the Brāhmaṇas ask the Buddha about the support of the Earth, the Buddha says it rests on the water-sphere, that in turn on wind-sphere, and that in turn on space, which is unbased on anything and thus needs no support.

I, 6: He makes a clear distinction between calculated cessation and uncalculated cessation, which relate to a series, and cessation by noneternality (*anityatānirodha*), which is the cessation of a moment-factor.

I, 7: States that this *Kośa* verse is now making a new kind of distinction (no longer the distinction contaminant and pure), namely, the distinction unconditioned/conditioned.

I, 11: Yaśomitra introduces here an elaborate defense of the *Kośabhāṣya*'s definition of unmanifest action against the criticisms of Saṁghabhadra, which are cited *in toto*, thus giving us the Sanskrit for these *Nyāyānusāra* passages. These are objections which prompted Vasubandhu himself to alter his definition in the *Pañcaskandhaka*, but Yaśomitra endeavors to prove that the *Kośabhāṣya* definition is at least as good as Saṁghabhadra's own. To Saṁghabhadra's objection that Vasubandhu's definition defines a series only, and thus cannot refer to a real moment-event, Yaśomitra replies that a stream of moment-events (*pravāha*) is nothing but many moments. Since Vasubandhu says that unmanifest action arises in one whose awareness is distracted (*vikṣipta*), Saṁghabhadra objects that the series of unmanifest action exists in meditationally concentrated (*samāhita*) states, too. Yaśomitra replies that this is taken care of by Vasubandhu's "clear and unclear" (*śubhāśubha*), and further makes an elaborate and sometimes humorous explanation of Vasubandhu's term "*api*" as meaning "too" ("It arises in one of distracted awareness, too"), and not implying exclusivity, as Saṁghabhadra wants to interpret the Vasubandhu passage. Saṁghabhadra also states that Vasubandhu's definition does not sufficiently differentiate a clear unmanifest action. Yaśomitra says this

objection is worthless because one of the characteristics of an undistracted awareness, namely its clarity, is covered by the term "clear." Furthermore, Saṁghabhadra's own definition of unmanifest action, that it is materiality exercising no resistance, which occurs even when the originator-series is not functioning or in states beyond awareness, does not sufficiently distinguish the clear unmanifest actions either.

I, 17: He cites YogācārAs as saying that there is a mental element (*manodhātu*) beyond the six consciousnesses, and Tāmraparṇīyas (the Theravādins of Ceylon) as upholding a material basis for psychic continuity, the heart (*hṛdayavastu*).

He states that there are some awarenesses which do not become "mental" since they don't give rise to a mental consciousness.

I, 19: He cites Saṁghabhadra as arguing that the limitation of 18 sensory domains (*dhātu*) is to show the minimum necessary for the consciousness to arise: thus one eye is counted, not two, etc.

I, 20: He states that there are five kinds of cessation: momentary cessation; cessation brought about by a meditational attainment; spontaneous cessation, which exists in the unconscious states such as certain god-states; calculated cessation; and uncalculated cessation.

He makes a distinction between "the Bhadanta" quoted by Vasubandhu and the Bhadanta Dharmatrāta (some commentators were of the opinion that "Bhadanta" meant Bhadanta Dharmatrāta), says the latter was a Sarvāstivādin, as the *Vibhāṣā* tells us, but that the former WAs a Sautrāntika, and is always quoted by the *Vibhāṣā* as "Bhadanta."

Yaśomitra includes a highly interesting discussion of which of the sensory domains, sense-fields and aggregates are considered as real by various philosophers:

Sautrāntika: Sensory domains (eye, visibles, visual consciousness, etc.) are real, the sense-fields (eye and visibles) by themselves are nominal, and the aggregates by themselves are nominal.

Vasubandhu: Sensory domains and sense-fields are real, aggregates by themselves are nominal.

Saṁghabhadra: Sensory domains, sense-fields, and aggregates are all real.

Vibhāṣā itself: Aggregates are nominal. Yaśomitra quotes Vasubandhu to this effect.

Does the arising of an awareness depend on the atoms of the sense-faculties or on the atoms of the sense-objects? Primarily, says Yaśomitra, it depends on the atoms of the sense-faculties, because all of

the atoms of an eye, etc., become common causes for the arising of a consciousness, but not all atoms of the sense-object do. Futhermore, the atoms of the sense-object "blue" take part only in the arising of a visual consciousness of blue, and not for a visual consciousness of yellow. And even though atoms of "blue" take part in the arising of a visual consciousness of blue, they are reckoned in a different kind of position, because their manner of operating is unequal. For all these reasons, it would also be illogical that eye and visibles be considered a single sense-field.

Vasubandhu has said that the "*rūci*" of the faculties is of three kinds. Yaśomitra explains: Those who are centered on peace have compressed *rūci*, those who are centered on peace and insight have middle *rūci*, and those centered on insight alone have extended *rūci*.

I, 33: The sensory consciousnesses (one through five) do not contain "defining discrimination" (*abhinirūpanavikalpa*), e.g., "This is materiality, this is feeling," etc. All such distinctions are made by the mental consciousness.

Vaibhāṣika discussions of memory[263] assume that memory has as its object only things previously experienced, but this, Yaśomitra says, does not take into account the definition of memory as a "discourse of awareness". He quotes Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandhaka* without naming it, giving its definitions of initial and sustained thought, of which Yaśomitra approves, thus giving us the Sanskrit for these passages. Thus initial thought is for Yaśomitra, as for Vasubandhu in *Pañcaskandhaka*, identical to either wisdom or volition. It is discernment if it involves a deduction from the sense-impression; volition if it doesn't. Thus even the sensory-consciousnesses have basic construction, which is initial thought. Thus it is proper to call the sensory consciousnesses constructionfilled (*savikalpaka*). The only reason they are called constructionfree (*nirvikalpaka*) is because other kinds of construction do not exist in them.

II, 1: He explains "*paṇḍaka*" in a different manner than La Vallée Poussin, as including all those whose powers of sexuality are lost, whether temporarily or permanently, mentions as subdivisions "*paṇḍaka*" by nature, through jealousy, where functioning is physically deficient, where use of organs is simply not known, or where organs are lacking.

II, 12: In commenting on Vasubandhu's statement that depression doesn't exist in the realm of images starting with the simpler meditational states, because all causes of interpersonal worry are absent in these states, Yaśomitra brings up the nine chief causes of interpersonal worry:

"someone has done me a wrong," "someone is doing me a wrong," "someone will be doing me a wrong," "someone has done a wrong to someone I like," "someone is doing a wrong to someone I like," "someone will be doing a wrong to someone I like," "someone I don't like has done me a favor," "someone I don't like is doing me a favor," "someone I don't like will be doing me a favor." With these nine grounds of interpersonal worry not existing in these meditational states, there can be no object for interpersonal worry.

II, 15: He lists gradual understanding (*abhisamayakrama*), which are the twelve moments of the path of vision:

1 forbearance (patience) necessary for the knowledge of *dharma*, or a factor, in frustration;

2 knowledge of a factor in frustration;

3 forbearance necessary for the subsequent knowledge in frustration;

4 subsequent knowledge in frustration;

5 forbearance for the knowledge of a factor in the origination of frustration;

6 knowledge of a factor in the origination of frustration;

7 forbearance necessary for subsequent knowledge in the origination of frustration;

8 subsequent knowledge in the origination of frustration;

9 forbearance necessary for the knowledge of a factor in the cessation of frustration;

10 knowledge of a factor in the cessation of frustration;

11 forbearance for subsequent knowledge in the cessation of frustration;

12 subsequent knowledge for the cessation of frustration;

13 forbearance for the knowledge of an event in the path that leads to the cessation of frustration;

14 knowledge of a factor in a path leading to the cessation of frustration;

15 forbearance through a subsequent knowledge of a path leading to the cessation of frustration;

16 subsequent knowledge in the path.

These sixteen moments are equivalent to the faculty of coming to know. But the sixteenth moment is itself sixteenfold, and is the path of cultivation and is the faculty of knowing, too. This differs a little from the interpretation of the *Abhisamayālaṁkāra*, where the last moment of

the path of vision is immediately followed by the path of cultivation,[264] and Haribhadra's comments on it. The fruit of a stream-enterer is gained in moment sixteen. In this stage, five faculties of faith, energy, mindfulness, meditational concentration and insight arise necessarily, because this stage is always beneficial. The stage of forbearance for a subsequent knowledge of the path is marked by equanimity, whereas the stage of subsequent knowledge of the path is where the five previously named faculties, as well as the knowledge of what was unknown, the knowledge that one knows, the mental organ, and equanimity, are all present.

II, 25: Follows Ghoṣaka in admitting motivating dispositions present in every moment of awareness (*sarvatrAga*).

Sleepiness (*styāna*) is not listed among the motivating dispositions invariably giving rise to defilements, because it may be favorable to meditational concentration. This is the opinion of some Ābhidharmikas, Yaśomitra says, but the *Vibhāṣā* itself lists sleepiness among the motivating dispositions invariably giving rise to bad factors. Yaśomitra himself is against the idea that one kind of factor can be classified in contradictory ethical categories in different circumstances."

II, 33: Yaśomitra backs up Vasubandhu's statement that initial thought and sustained thought cannot be situated in the same awareness-moment, since they are different stages in the same series. He also emphasizes further Vasubandhu's statement that initial thought is a less subtle state, sustained thought a more subtle one, and that these descriptions are relative, by stating that grossness and subtlety are always a matter of degree, e.g., feelings are subtle in relation to materiality, but gross in relation to identifications.

Yaśomitra quotes Saṁghabhadra as objecting: In one awareness, there may be both grossness and subtlety. There is no contradiction in this, because of the difference between the times of their predominance. E.g., there may be a series in which greed and confusion both exist, but in one moment, greed is predominant; in the next, confusion.

Yaśomitra replies: But there is no special characteristic to distinguish initial and sustained thought other than their grossness and subtlety. They are series of the same kinds of factors, volition and discernment.

The "*pūrvācārya*s" (who in this case are both the *Vibhāṣā* writers and Asaṅga--cf. *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, Pradhan ed., p. 10)-- deny that initial and sustained thought are the same kind of factor, and say that

these two are based on volition and discernment, rather than being strictly identifiable with them.

II, 36: Yaśomitra quotes a later Vaibhāṣika, probably Saṁghabhadra, who attempts to refute Vasubandhu's characterization of a "seed" as a special force in the awareness-series, and who asks whether this special force is something different from the awareness itself, or the same. If it is something different, this Vaibhāṣika claims, then you are accepting our notion of possession (*prāpti*), and your dispute over it is only a matter of words. If it is not something different from awareness, then a bad seed would be coexistent with a good one, so the absurdity ensues of the commingling of all three ethical categories.

Yaśomitra replies: It's if one assumes that the seed *is* something different that there will be a commingling of the ethical categories. The seed is not to be spoken of as something either different or nondifferent from the awareness itself, because of its being only a designation for something appropriated. And even if one does assume that it is something nondifferent from the awareness itself, the flaw adduced by the Vaibhāṣika doesn't exist, since as soon as a good awareness arises, a good seed does, too. This special awareness gets its power in the efficacy effected by a good seed. Thus, though a good seed may arise from an awareness of any kind, its result will always be good. The "special" in the definition "special force" means that its efficacy is always differentiated. In fact, Yaśomitra says, there is no difference between the meanings of the words "*śakti*," "*bīja*," and "*vāsanā*".

The Vaibhāṣika (and here we obviously have to do with Saṁghabhadra's opinions (cf. *Nyāyānusāra* chapter 51)) continues his objections: If immediately after a contaminated awareness a pure awareness may arise, does it arise endowed with force (*śaktimān*) or unendowed with force? If it is endowed with force, then is this force in the contaminated awareness itself contaminated or pure? Talk about the commingling of the efficacies for forces--it would be rampant in this case! If the awareness is not endowed with force, how can it be a directly antecedent condition for the succeeding awareness? There must be yet another efficacy to the awareness different from this force. Also, Vasubandhu does not seem to know the real characteristics of seeds, where seeds of such and such a sort always give results of such and such a sort. And if a good awareness is stopped, a bad one (with a different seed) would necessarily arise.

It is not clear that Yaśomitra completely answers these objections

of Saṁghabhadra's, which prompted Vasubandhu to speak of a separate seed-series in the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*. Yaśomitra merely retorts that the definition of "seed" as "a special force" shows that a "seed" is really only a metaphoric designation. The difference between Vasubandhu's "seed" and Saṁghabhadra's "possession" lies in this, says Yaśomitra: Vasubandhu knows his "seed" to be a metaphor, whereas the Vaibhāṣikas want to speak of actual entities (*dravyasat*), not conventional ones (*prajñaptisat*), and to introduce possession and nonpossession as actual entities .

II, 44: Note on the Bhadanta Vasumitra, stating that he wrote not only the *Paripṛcchā*, but also the *Pañcavastuka* and other treatises.

II, 46: On the discussion of whether birth can be considered something apart, the Sautrāntika has objected that the birth of a factor is always dependent on causes, and that arising has no efficacy, and is not a factor at all. Yaśomitra cites a certain Bhadanta Anantavarman, who objects: "Even though the eye doesn't produce a visual consciousness without light being present, yet the eye is still a cause for the visual consciousness." Yaśomitra replies: An injury to the eye can result in blindness--thus the efficacy of the eye towards a visual consciousness is clearly demonstrated. However, it is not clear that "birth" does anything which cannot be explained by other causes, i.e., the causes for arising!

II, 54: Vasubandhu states that there is a kind of act whose retribution is included in a single sense-field, the sense-field of mentally cognizables (*dharmāyatana*). This kind of act is any act which has as its retribution a life-force with its concomitants, which all belong to the *dharmāyatana*. Yaśomitra cites the Bhadanta Vasumitra as objecting to this opinion. Bhadanta Vasumitra says: A life-force is the result of an act which projects a new existence. If the retribution which brings about a life-force matures at the level of desire one necessarily has a tactual-organ element (*karmendriya*) and life-force in the first stages of embryonic life already: after the evolving of the six sense-fields in the embryo, five other sense-organs and five other mental organs (referring to the sensory consciousnesses) also evolve. If the life-force matures in the material level of images there are seven organs from the beginning. In the immaterial level), there is only the sense-field of mind and mentally cognizables. But at certain times in the imageless realm, there is no sense-field of mind, and thus also no sense-field of mind which is retributory. Now a life-force which arises as a result of an act which projects a new existence is made known only through the sense-field of

mind. But can one really call a life-force itself the retribution which ripens, when this life-force is in turn known only through feelings becoming manifest? Here someone may say: The life-force is not itself retribution unless the awareness born of retribution isn't functioning in that moment, however, where this retributory awareness isn't functioning, it is the life-force itself which is responsible for the continuation of retribution in the series.

Yaśomitra replies: It is true that it is the life-force which constitutes retribution. But at the same time the life-force retributionally matures, the sense-fields of mind, etc., also retributionally mature. This is consistent with the idea that retributional maturation takes place within the sense-fields.

Yet it has been said that there are acts whose retribution is included in a single sense-field. If all the other sense-fields are included in the process of retribution, how can one say this?

Yaśomitra replies: What is the problem with having other sense-fields also enter into the process of retribution? For there is a coexistence of all kinds of elements for one retributional maturation: the first is actually taking part in an organism, then the life-force, then the sense-fields of mind, etc.

Here it may be objected: Just because of the necessity of sense-fields arising when there is retribution, can one say that these sense-fields are themselves retribution? No, for one kind of effect should come from one kind of factor. In fact, then the sense-fields of whatever type that arise may just as well be retribution also.

Reply: No, because the sense-field of the eye can arise, for instance, only when there is already the sense-field of the body. So it is dissimilar to factors which could be called responsible for retribution in every moment.

Saṁghabhadra says that all sense-fields take part in retribution. For the life-force, homogeneity-force, etc., take place with a mutual invariable concomitance. Thus they may all be considered a part of retribution.

Both opinions (i.e., that only life-force is retribution, or that other sense-fields are retribution, too) are upheld by the writers of the *Vibhāṣā*. Thus one can follow whichever opinion one wants, Yaśomitra concludes.

II, 64: If *prakṛti (pradhāna)* were the cause of creation, then all things in the world would arise simultaneously. If one assumes other causes for a gradual arising, then an infinite regress results. Also, in that

case *prakṛti* becomes actually without efficacy. To assume a *prakṛti* among other causes which can take care of arising of phenomena by themselves is pure devotionalism. If *prakṛti* takes care of everything, the other acknowledged causes have no efficacy. But if *prakṛti* can exercise its efficacy only when there are auxiliary causes (*sahakārakaraṇa*), then the "*pradhāna*" (chief) becomes an "*apradhāna*" (subsidiary). If one says that primary creation is the efficacy of *prakṛti*, then since *prakṛti* has no beginning, creation also can have had no beginning. If it is the character of *prakṛti* to produce effects then it has to exercise this efficacy constantly, since it has no need of other causes. These other causes must themselves be the result of *prakṛti*. Thus they are analogous to that which is manifested, and not to the manifestation. To accept other causes at all would be for the theist to admit that the manifested has itself the power to further manifest something, which isn't so according to his system!

IV, 2b-3b: He cites "Sthavira Vasubandhu" and others as saying that a flame ceases due to an absence of a cause of duration. It is the Vaiśeṣika who objects that an absence cannot be a cause.[1]

IV, 4a: He again makes the point that matter may be either contaminated or pure. In an *arhat* matter is pure because it gives no basis for afflictions.

IV, 23: There are manifest actions with the characteristic of restraint of religious discipline until there is an abandonment of these manifest actions through the casting away of religious discipline, etc. Thus the aggregate-series is endowed with past manifest actions or their traces as long as they haven't been abandoned in this way. The manifest actions involving lack of restraint are abandoned by the unmanifest actions of restraint and resolution (e.g., the resolution of the *prātimokṣa*), and until they are abandoned in this way, the aggregate-series is endowed with them. The manifest actions which are neither restraint nor lack of restraint, such as revering a *stūpa*, etc., are abandoned when the force of tranquility and the cutting of the force of the afflictions are abandoned,

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1. This passage has encouraged many in the belief that there was an earlier Vasubandhu. However, the point made here by "Sthavira Vasubandhu" is precisely the point the *Kośa* wishes to make. Could the term "Sthavira Vasubandhu" be interpreted to mean "Vasubandhu when he was still a Hīnayānist"?

and until they are abandoned in this way the aggregate-series is endowed with them. In other words, in the next moment the aggregate-series is necessarily endowed with an unmanifest action which corresponds to the fundamental ethical or unethical manifest or unmanifest act preceding.

IV, 46: Yaśomitra explains the feelings accompanying the three meditational states belonging to the realm of desires (i.e., the first three meditational states may belong there): From the first and intermediate level to the second, there is bodily pleasure and mental contentment. In the second meditational state, mental contentment alone predominates, whereas in the third, bodily pleasure has totally ceased and the pleasure experienced is mental.

The only retributional actions (that is, actions which have an ethical retribution) which exist without the initial factor for ratiocination (initial thought: fundamental discrimination--"mental application") occur in meditation. All other retributional actions must be accompanied at least by initial thought.

V, 1: In commenting on Vasubandhu's statement that the source of rebirth is properly the proclivities or defilements, Yaśomitra says that even in an *arhat*, it's not that the actions which he committed while he was still an ordinary person do not have an effect which is lasting in him also, but rather that there are no residues that become capable of producing a new rebirth. Thus the residues can be demonstrated to be nonlasting.[1]

The effects of actions previously committed become nonefficacious towards the development of a new existence in the *arhat*. It is only the nonexistence of residues which makes release from rebirth possible.

Yaśomitra explains how a residue of a defilement may make other afflictions arise: greed will engender lack of shame, excitedness, selfishness, etc.; hostility will engender anger, envy, etc.

He explains "*bhava*" in the dependent origination formula as meaning karma which can engender a new existence.

The residues intensify their own preparatory cause, which is improper mental attention.

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[1]The significance of this statement rests on the fact that the Sarvāstivādins wish to make the residues of actions eternal, which theory, according to Yaśomitra, would make the state of an *arhat* impossible.

Yaśomitra explains the efficacies of various defilements: Greed engenders a fundamental malaise of susceptibility to harm, because it gives rise to a lack of skill in dealing with adversity; hostility opposes good qualities; pride gives rise to disputes, because the wise are no longer respected; views make for a falling away from the good path, because reversed opinions become predominant; doubts as to the truths, jewels, etc., increase the seeds for various untrue opinions which in turn produce all the injustices of *saṁsāra*.

Yaśomitra sees greed as a sort of root-proclivity, and says that when it exists, other adverse factors immediately spring up.

V, 2: To the Vaibhāṣikas, with their doctrine of the existence of past and future factors, the residues and the defilements are equivalent, thus the residues *are* afflictions; to the Vātsīputrīyas, residues are possessions; to the Sautrāntikas they are "seeds" or the potentialities for new defilements arising, which are left behind by past defilements. Once these residues of defilements are eradicated, there is no more possibility for any afflictions of whatever kind to arise in the series. The Vātsīputrīyas, in affirming that the residues are possessions, must also admit that they are motivating dispositions (traces) dissociated from awareness since possession belongs to this category. But in that case, Yaśomitra says, how could they be associated with satisfaction, frustration and neutrality, as a *sūtra* states they are? For them to be linked to these factors, and yet be dissociated factors, would be illogical. But the Vaibhāṣika opinion also has its problems, since the same *sūtra* states that greed for desires (or for the level of desires) is eradicated together with its residues. If the Vaibhāṣika view is correct, this would be redundant. Yaśomitra will of course in the final analysis accept Vasubandhu's opinion, which is that the residues are not the same as the defilements, that they are traces connected with awareness, and that they are fundamentally "seeds".

V, 5: If one says that the supporting object of consciousness associated with a residue of a defilement can be abandoned by the path of vision, does this also include an object of consciousness focused on the four noble truths? No, Yaśomitra says, what is abandoned are the defilements which serve as objects of consciousness which can be abandoned by the path of vision.

Now if one says that a trace to be abandoned by the seeing of the truth of the origination of frustration is always a trace associated with ignorance, an object of consciousness which can be abandoned by the

other truths must also be included there, so does not the absurdity ensue that such a trace can be abandoned by the other truths as well since all of them have actually as their object of consciousness the five aggregates? No, Yaśomitra says: If it is in their aspect as origination of frustration that the trace takes as its object of consciousness the aggregates, then it can be abandoned only by seeing the origination of frustration.

Because of the nonexistence of frustration on the material and the immaterial levels there is the nonexistence of unpleasantness in these states because the unpleasant exists only in the feeling of frustration. But sentient beings in these states are aggregate-series which adhere to complete calm, and there is an absence of retributional maturation (which would account for certain other kinds of frustration still existing) for these states are devoid of unpleasant retributions.

V, 6: In quoting *Brahmajalasutta* (*Dīghanikāya* I, 1) he shows humorously how the idea of eternality of Brahmā, or of one's being Brahmā oneself, may come from meditation where right views have not been assimilated. Such a meditator may wish others to worship him, and at the same time consider himself to be the only true entity! Thus he is actually still stuck in the level of desires since such false views are operative only in this realm.

V, 8: Yaśomitra states that the Yogācāras claim that there are 128 defilements or traces of defilements. There are ten abandoned by seeing the truth of frustration: the view of a self in the body, views regarding the impermanence or the permanence of the elements constituting "personality", false views, adherence to views, adherence to mere rule and ritual, doubts, greed, aversion, pride, and ignorance. The same ten are to be abandoned by seeing the origination of frustration, and the same ten by the truth of the cessation of frustration, and the same ten by the truth of the path--thus there are 40 to be abandoned by seeing the truths. Six are abandoned by meditation: the unconstructed view of a self in the body (which is a spontaneous sense of self which has nothing to do with any intellectually formed opinion), the view that there is a discontinuity, greed which is innate, aversion, pride, and ignorance--thus there are 46 residues on the level of desires. Forty-one of the same ones exist at the material level --all of the preceding except the aversions (i.e., the four kinds of aversions to be abandoned by each of the four truths, and the kind of aversion to be abandoned in meditation). The same 41 exist at the immaterial level, too, thus 46 + 41 + 41 = 128.

He cites an unidentified Ābhidharmika who objects to the idea that all defilements which have a contaminated object are related to frustration. For some contaminated objects are unconnected to the truth of frustration, but others are connected with it. Only those which are connected with the truth of frustration can be abandoned by this truth. For instance, attachment to rules and rituals can be abandoned only by a knowledge of the truth of frustration, thus it is connected with frustration. But a view such as "There is no path of deliverance proclaimed by the Buddhas," gives rise to false views of other sorts, and all these can be abandoned only by seeing the truth of the path, thus are connected with the truth of the path.

Objector: But how can any object be connected with the truths of the origination and cessation of frustration?

Saṁghabhadra affirms that attachment to rules and rituals can be abandoned by these two truths because of their establishing an absence of ground for its "body" or "essence". The essence of attachment to rules and rituals is to cling to the idea that that which is not a cause is a cause, and to cling to the idea that that which is not the path is the path. For instance, a denial of the truth of origination may come about when one assumes a causeless origination simply because one doesn't know any cause. But in reality there is in this case also no exclusion from the truths of frustration and the origination of frustration. The idea of God rests on the idea that there is no cessation, but with the knowledge of the truth of cessation this idea becomes meaningless: thus there is no occasion for the first of the items enumerated under the "essence" of attachment to rules and rituals. The other item cannot be abandoned by seeing the truth of the path, because a Buddhist path is precisely what is being denied in this error. Thus this type of attachment to rule and ritual has to be abandoned by the truths of origination and cessation of frustration, and not by the truth of the path.

Yaśomitra replies: The truths of origination and cessation are inadequate to remove attachment to rules and rituals. For the idea of rules and rituals is to obtain liberation, thus it is the truth of the path which serves as the best antidote for such confusion. Yaśomitra concedes that some kinds of attachment to rule and ritual may be abandoned by seeing the truth of frustration. For instance, an object of consciousness relating to the suffering caused by ascetic practises can be abandoned in this way: for instance, the idea that the suffering of ascetic practises is itself praiseworthy. But as soon as there is an attachment to rules and

rituals which considers that which isn't the path to be the path, such an attachment can be abandoned only by the Truth of the Path.

V, 13: He states that not all judgments which have a reversed object of consciousness belong to the category of views. For instance, a judgment which considers that what is not the self is the self belongs to the category of "the view of self in a body". Only if the view becomes the basis for a sense of self is it "the view of self in a body," thus this category does not include views such as considering that Brahman is a being because this does not involve the view of a self.

V, 24-27: Though Yaśomitra completes Vasubandhu's *sūtra* quotations and fills in certain other details, he adds little which is new to these important discussions.

V, 28: He states that that which is abandoned by seeing the truths is the essential nature of four aggregates, and that that which is abandoned by meditation is the essential nature of five aggregates. Those that are abandoned by seeing the truths are the essential natures of feelings, identifications, traces and consciousness, and what this means precisely is: feelings associated with residues of afflictions, etc. For "traces" this means dissociated factors of both consciousness and associated mental factors such as birth, decrepitude, etc. The additional kind of aggregate which is abandoned by meditation is of course matter, both internal and external, which is susceptible to contaminants.

V, 29-38: He goes into great detail on which residues are abandoned by which part of the path.

V, 42: He cites Saṁghabhadra as stating that envy and selfishness must be considered fetters apart because of the intensity of their functioning. Saṁghabhadra says they exist even in divine realms.

V, 56: He completes the information given by him at IV, 46 by stating that there are four consciousnesses operating in the first meditational state of the immaterial level, i.e., the visual, audial, tactile, and mental consciousnesses. Joy is associated with the first three of these, satisfaction with the fourth. All four are associated with equanimity. But after the first meditation of the immaterial level, there is only the mental consciousness. In the second meditation of the immaterial level, there is satisfaction and equanimity; in the third, joy and equanimity; and in the fourth, only equanimity. Some residues of contaminants may still exist in the beginning, but there will be neither elation nor dejection because series in these states adhere to complete peace. There will not be any regret or any other factors which would

give rise to dejection since they cannot be associated with satisfaction. Nor in fact is there any faculty for frustration in these states.

V, 61: A difficulty arises from the Vaibhāṣika thesis that a contaminant cannot be separated from its traces associated with awareness, but that it can be separated from its object in such a way that it can't arise again in relation to this object. Vasubandhu has objected that he can see how a future contaminant can be separated from its object, but how can a past contaminant, according to the Vaibhāṣikas an existent entity, be so separated, because the object which it takes stays in the state of being the object of the contaminant, following all the implications of Vaibhāṣika theory. If the Vaibhāṣika replies that the expression "to be separated from its object" means "to be separated through the complete knowledge of its object", this won't do because, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, not all contaminants are abandoned by a knowledge of their objects.

Yaśomitra cites Saṁghabhadra's attempt to resolve this difficulty: Contaminants "have to be abandoned by separation from their objects" because it is through the power of knowing the object that the contaminant is abandoned. There are two kinds of traces of contaminants: those of association and those of nonassociation. The possessions of the traces which have as their object an associated thing, and also those traces which don't have one but which are produced by the first kind of trace, exist in a series even when the series consists of uncontaminated awarenesses. For the possession continues, which is the effect of the past contaminant and the cause of the future contaminant. In the case of traces which do not have an actual associate or which have an actual nonassociate it is also the present possession which is the cause of future contaminants. But the possessions of these traces is counteracted by the possession-series which enters into function with a path countering these traces. That is to say, the traces actually remain in relation to their objects, but they are no longer associated with the possession which is the cause and effect of the past and future traces: thus one says that they are abandoned. When their object is not completely known, however, the possession of these traces continues.

Yaśomitra objects: In that case, why is it said that the contaminants are abandoned by the abandonment of their objects? To state that this refers really to their being abandoned by complete knowledge of their objects is an unwarranted extension of what the Abhidharma says. They are in fact not abandoned by a complete

knowledge of their objects, but by a complete knowledge of the truths. It's also said that contaminants are abandoned directly by their antidotes, for instance, those which can be abandoned by meditation.

V, 63: He objects to Saṁghabhadra's opinion that "acquisition" (*siddhi*) is a synonym for the attainment of (spiritual) fruitions. He states that the attainment of fruition is really an increase of the sense-faculties and has reference to both the beginning as well as the concluding stages of this process, whereas "*siddhi*" is actually a synonym for the fulfillment of the antidotes.

He explains Vasubandhu's statement that disconnection from the contaminants takes place in six different moments by stating that one type of disconnection takes place after the immaterial meditational attainments are practised, but this does not mean that it may not be attained again in another moment. This is the disconnection from contaminants in those of sharp sense-faculties. For them there is disconnection at these six times: at the time when there is the fulfillment of antidotes towards the contaminants to be abandoned by the truths, at the time when the fruit of the stream-enterer has been attained, at the time when the fruit of the once-returner has been attained, at the time when the fruit of the non-returner is attained, at the time when *arhat*ship is attained, and at the time when the sense-faculties are made totally perfect. Yaśomitra further elaborates these correspondences to show that when a certain acuteness of sense-faculties has been attained, disconnections from contaminants may take place only at five, four, three, or two moments, i.e., at the minimum, it takes place either at the time of the fulfillment of antidotes, at the time of attaining *arhat*ship, or at the time when the sense-faculties are perfected.

VI, 3: He agrees with Vasubandhu that satisfaction truly exists, and in fact defines the state of frustration as a transformation of conditioned events experienced as satisfying. Furthermore, frustration is not a constant because it arises and ceases. It it is claimed that there is no satisfaction because there is no occasion for the causes of satisfaction, then there will also be no frustration either because there is also no occasion for the causes of frustration. In other words, there is a sense to the term "frustration" only if there is its opposite, satisfaction. He quotes a *sūtra* where the Buddha states that there are nine quintessences which are unbroken, nondefective, pure, unaffected by disorders, which serve as sources of satisfaction, and which arise from the seeds of the five sensory consciousnesses. (N.B. The figure 9 is arrived at by adding the 5

consciousnesses to the 4 material elements.) He quotes another *sūtra* which states that the cause of the sensory organs is karma, that the cause of karma is craving, that the cause of craving is ignorance, and that the cause of ignorance is improper mental attention. The truth of the origination of frustration is understood only when this is realized. In other words, it is not sensory pleasures themselves that give rise to frustration, but craving towards them, which in turn is due only to ignorance, which in turn is due only to improper mental attention.

VI, 4: On commenting on Vasubandhu's statement that that which is susceptible to decomposition is only conventionally existent, he states that there are two kinds of decomposition: a pot breaks into pieces through a forceful impinging; water, etc., is "broken into pieces" by mental analysis of its different constituents: its taste, etc. One can also say that that which is conventionally existent can be divided into two categories: the conventionally existent which is based on another conventionally existent (e.g., a pot, which is itself composed of earth-elements, etc., which themselves are only conventionally existent), and the conventionally existent which is based on something existent as an entity (e.g., water, which is based on atoms). The first kind may undergo either kind of decomposition; the second kind only "decomposition by mental analysis," otherwise known as "*anyāpoha*" (separating that which is different). It is true, Yaśomitra says, that even that which is conventionally existent in the second sense could still give rise to further analyses, thus the atom on which water is based consists itself of eight elements (cf. *Kośa* II, 22), but these elements cannot be separated out from the atom. On the two truths, conventional and ultimate, he quotes Nāgārjuna, *Madhyamakakārikā* XXIV, 8. He quotes the Yogācāras as being the "ancient masters" (*pūrvācārya*) cited by Vasubandhu.[1]

VI, 8: He explains craving towards existence and nonexistence as follows: The wish "Would I were Indra!" is craving for a certain kind of existence; the wish "Would that I no longer exist after this life!" is craving for a certain kind of nonexistence.

VI, 19: Includes an elaborate description of which aids to

1.This term ("ancient masters") could, of course, mean simply masters previous to Vasubandhu.

penetration belong to which level of existence and which kinds of contaminants or afflictions may be removed by each part of the path.

VI, 21: Vasubandhu has said that noble persons lose aids to penetration only by a change of level and never by dying (in other words, when a noble person dies, the aids to penetration carry over into the new existence) and that the non-noble loses them only by death. Yaśomitra quotes Vasumitra as stating that non-nobles may lose them by either death or a change of level. Yaśomitra says this view is incorrect, since there is no arising of the aids to penetration, for instance, in the Brahmakāyika world. He quotes Saṁghabhadra as being of the opinion that non-nobles lose them only by death, and seems to agree with this opinion.

VI, 28: If one considers that the sixteenth moment which follows on the path of vision, i.e., the subsequent knowledge of the path (cf. summary of II, 15--according to the interpretation now brought up, there would be only 15 moments to the path of vision) must itself be part of the path of vision on the basis that it serves as a support for the abandonment of contaminants abandoned in the path of vision, there is a flaw of overextension of principles because the entire path of cultivation serves as a support for the abandonment of contaminants abandoned by the path of vision. Thus it would have to be part of the path of vision, too. But the opponent wishes to have 16 moments in the path of vision, not 17, 18, etc. And since these moments of reflection continue in a series, even the reflections of the second and third day after the practise of the 15 moments would still be a part of the path of vision. Thus there would never be an end to the abandonment effected by the path of vision!

VI, 33: Vasubandhu has said that the practitioner who is not practising the third meditative level, and who enters into the path of vision based on the first and second levels, realizes a path superior to what one might expect as the result of this level. For as he passes on to the fourth level he is endowed with pleasure only. Yaśomitra cites the *Vibhāṣā* as stating that it is certain that the practitioner is endowed with such a pure pleasure because he still has it on entering the fourth level, but if he enters the path of vision from the third level being still endowed with an impure pleasure, he will lose the faculty for this pleasure on entering the fourth level. Now, if he enters the path of vision, and he is endowed with a pure pleasure, then he realizes a path superior to the fruition one might expect, i.e., the fruits of the nonreturner. Yaśomitra states that though this opinion is in the *Vibhāṣā*, it is by no means one

which must be followed because the *Vibhāṣā* itself continues with another option: that a practitioner who enters into the path of vision in basing himself on the first and second meditative levels obtains the fruition of a nonreturner, with all the levels which this implies, in the sixteenth moment, but that he is also endowed with the fruitions of these inferior levels.

VI, 44: Further extremely elaborate correspondences of meditative levels, their functioning, and mainly how many may arise at one time. Similar elaborations of the path are found also on VI, 54, 57, and 63.

VII, 1-8: Several quotations by Yaśomitra from *Prakaraṇapāda* regarding the exact nature of the moments on the path of vision.

VII, 9: The truths of the cessation of frustration and of the path are not to be considered as belonging to any of the three levels of experience. When a realization of a moment-event in the cessation of frustration occurs, though this relates to the level of desire, it also relates to the other two levels since the defilements of the higher states are also countered in this moment.

VII, 11: On the question of whether an awareness accompanied by sleepiness can be considered nondistracted (*saṁkṣipta*) because it does not allow for the conditions necessary for distraction, he cites the Vaibhāṣikas, who claim that such an awareness, if defiled, must be considered both distracted and undistracted. Vasubandhu thinks rather that sleepiness and distraction are contradictory, since a certain intensity of reaction in awareness is necessary for there to be distraction, thus an awareness accompanied by sleepiness must be considered nondistracted. The Vaibhāṣikas object that this contradicts the *Jñānaprasthāna* itself, because according to it a nondistracted awareness must be accompanied by knowledge, which knowledge is contradictory to torpor. Vasubandhu admits that his view contradicts the *Jñānaprasthāna*, but says that it's better to contradict treatises than to contradict the *sūtra*s. Yaśomitra elaborates this retort even further, repeating again (as at I, 3) that the Abhidharma is not the word of the Buddha.

VII, 14-15: He cites Saṁghabhadra as stating that the knowledge of a factor in the path of vision must be directed at the level of desires only because of the absence of a cognitional support which would transform it into an awareness on a different level. In fact, the cognitional supports for such knowledges are in the material elements which belong to the level of desires. Only at the level of desires do the awarenesses which emerge from meditation exist (whereas the

awarenesses of the meditations themselves may belong to the other two levels), and it is only with the awarenesses which emerge from meditation that knowledge of factors is realized. Yaśomitra quotes this opinion of Saṁghabhadra's without objection, probably because it is itself in conformance with what Vasubandhu thinks but has not completely elucidated.

VII, 21: In contrast to the truth of the path, which is realized fully actually only in the path of cultivation, every human being can understand frustration, the origin of frustration, and the cessation of frustration, even in a mundane path.

VII, 26: If one becomes an *arhat* after having been born at the level of desires, one has cultivated the meditations belonging to all three levels. If one becomes an *arhat* after having been born in the material level, one has cultivated the meditations belonging to two levels: the material level and the immaterial level. If one becomes an *arhat* after having been born in the immaterial level, one has cultivated the meditations belonging to the immaterial level only. If one becomes an *arhat* in the stage which is neither cognitional nor noncognitional, one has had to practise this meditation only.

There are inferior qualities, usual in *saṁsāra*, which are not to be included in cultivation because they are not retained in the future. But qualities which are unusal in *saṁsāra*, such as the meditations, are retained in the future also. Yaśomitra cites Saṁghabhadra: If dharmic features previously acquired are lost for a time and then re-emerge, they are not "cultivated" if they arise again without effort. A dharmic feature not previously acquired, which is acquired by effort, is cultivated also for the future because of its state of having a power of penetration. If this opinion of Saṁghabhadra is correct, Yaśomitra says, then everything which is true for conventional knowledge should also be true for the conventional knowledge of *arhat*s, and this is in fact what Ācārya Vasumitra has written. But certain Vaibhāṣikas object that whatever dharmic feature is obtained again after having been left, it arises again because of cultivation, i.e., because of an effort. If it has been obtained before, how can it be something which has not existed before? Others again explain this as follows: "That which has been obtained" means "that which has been obtained in this life, but not for the next." That is, it is not obtained again if it is not cultivated anew, because the former cultivation has been forgotten.

VII, 28: The Vaibhāṣikas claim that the eighteen special

Buddha-factors are the ten powers (1) one knows with insight, as it is, what can be as what can be, and what can't be as what can't be; (2) one knows with insight, as they are, the karmic results of past, future, and present actions; (3) one knows with insight, as they are, the various elements in the world; (4) one knows with insight, as they are, the various dispositions of beings; (5) one knows with insight, as they are, the practises and the processes of defilement and alleviation; (6) one knows with insight, as they are, the faculties of sentient beings; (7) one knows with insight, as it is, the path that leads everywhere; (8) one recollects one's previous lives; (9) one sees the death and rebirth of beings as it is; (10) one realizes the end of all defilement; the four grounds of confidence: confidence in knowing all events as they happen, in knowing the destruction of all defilements, in having correctly described the impediments to liberation, and in having shown how one must enter on the path that leads to liberation; the three higher applications of mindfulness--the mindfulness focused on feelings, awarenesses and accompanying mental factors, and the great compassion. But others, says Yaśomitra, claim the eighteen are something quite different, namely: There is, in a Tathāgata: (1) no failing; (2) no violent speech (explained by some as "no violent action whatsoever"; (3) no action of play or pure amusement; (4) no cognition of diversity, meaning that there is no cognition connected with greed, hostility, or confusion, regarding sense-objects of satisfaction, frustration, and that which is neither satisfying nor frustrating; (5) no unconcentrated awareness, (6) the Tathāgata's equanimity is not due to a lack of consideration; (7) there is no obstruction to knowledge as regards past events; (8) there is no obstruction to knowledge as regards future events; (9) there is no obstruction to knowledge as regards present events; (10) all one's bodily actions revolve around knowledge; (11) likewise for verbal actions and (12) mental actions; (13) one's zest (for good action) never fails; (14) one's vigor never fails; (15) one's mindfulness never fails; (16) one's meditational concentration never fails; (17) one's insight never fails; (18) the seeing of the knowledge necessary for liberation never fails. Yaśomitra's list here differs a little from the standard one given in *Mahāvyutpatti* 135 ff.

VII, 30: When the Buddha recognized the innate potentialities for sainthood in "individuals," this rested on his being able to recognize their "seeds" or traces of the past.

VII, 36: Yaśomitra explains the qualities of a Buddha which are

also qualities of *arhat*s as including *araṇa*, the power of prohibiting the arising of defilements in another. Yet the degree of this nonconflicting is different in a Buddha and an *arhat*, Yaśomitra says. A Buddha can eradicate defilements in another; an *arhat* can only effectuate an absence of defilements in others directed towards himself. I.e., an *arhat* can bring it about that another has no hostility in regard to himself, but he cannot eradicate the view of a self in the body which another has towards him, because once the view of a self in the body exists, it exists in that "series" in regard to all so-called individuals.

VII, 45: As regards the higher faculties, he quotes Bhagavadviśeṣa, who claims that they are thus enumerated because this is the order of their genesis. I.e., one removes errors relating to the past by the memory of one's former lives, one removes errors relating to the present by the knowledge of deaths and rebirths, one removes errors relating to the future by the knowledge of the removal of contaminants. But Saṁghabhadra, Yaśomitra notes, explains the matter differently: one removes errors relating to the past by the memory of one's former lives, one removes errors relating to the future by the knowledge of deaths and rebirths, and one removes errors relating to the present by the knowledge of the removal of contaminants. Yaśomitra approves of this interpretation of Saṁghabhadra.

VII, 53: As regards magically created beings, nine sense-fields can be so created: eyes, visibles, ears (but not sounds), nose, smells, tongue, tastes, body, and tactile sensations. But the sense-field of mind and of mentally cognizables cannot be so created in a magically created being because the latter has no mental activity. A magically created being moves because of the mental activity of the one who has produced it, and he quotes *Karaṇaprajñapti* to this effect.

VIII, 1: He describes "*adhicitta*" as being the concentrations of the four meditative levels.

VIII, 2: It is not necessary to state that initial thought exists in the first level, since if one says it is endowed with sustained thought it necessarily has initial thought also. This is just like smoke necessarily existing with fire. One can define this, as Vasubandhu says, as the regular coexistence of smoke with fire.[1]

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[1]It is interesting that Yaśomitra retains "regular coexistence" (*sahacarya*) as the relation of that which is directly perceived to that

VIII, 3: If it is stated that the psychophysical complex has as its condition consciousness (which is one of the links of the dependent origination formula), this means that consciousness is the condition for *every* psychophysical complex. But not every consciousness is the condition for the arising of a psychophysical complex. Some consciousnesses, such as those in the immaterial level, are conditions only for psychological aggregates. It may be claimed that if every consciousness were not a condition for the psychophysical complex, that it wouldn't have been so designated in the formula. But to this it can be replied that in spontaneously generated beings consciousness is a condition for the six sense-fields and not for the psychophysical complex. The designation "psychophysical complex" in the dependent origination formula refers to the five aggregates before the six sense-fields have been completely developed.

VIII, 9: The equanimity of meditational concentration is defined as a lack of elation or depression, attraction or repulsion. Elaboration of the elements existing in various meditative levels states that all the elements (initial thought, sustained thought, satisfaction, pleasure) exist in the first level; in the second, where initial and sustained thought are lacking, there is, however, strictly speaking, the addition of equanimity, mindfulness, and insight; the third is truly concentration; and the fourth has only elements which cannot be described by speech.

He describes initial thought as a mental discourse of inquiry, and sustained thought as a mental discourse of examination--these definitions derive from Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandhaka*.

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which can be inferred from it, even though Vasubandhu's logical works (later than the *Kośa*) had already raised the more exact definition of "invariable concomitance" (cf. *Vādavidhi* 4). Yaśomitra describes this regular coexistence as "where there is smoke, there is fire", but not "where there is fire, there is smoke." In addition, there is a problem with Yaśomitra's statement, since initial and sustained thought are *successive* according to Vasubandhu (*Kośa* II, 33), and thus cannot exhibit a regular coexistence! For instance, the intermediate state between the first and second meditative levels is endowed with sustained thought, but not with initial thought! In effect, it should be said that the intermediate state is without initial and thought, and that the second level is without sustained thought!

VIII, 25-28: On the very interesting discussion of emptiness in Hīnayāna, which occurs in meditations having as their focus emptiness and selflessness, he elucidates the meditational concentration of the emptiness of emptiness by stating that it relates to emptiness only, and not to selflessness, for this meditation comes after the aspect of emptiness (as emptiness?) has already been determined. But why can't selflessness play the same role as a preliminary to the emptiness of emptiness? Because it is the realization of emptiness, and not selflessness, which allows for the realization of the emptiness of emptiness. Interestingly enough, emptiness is here linked, quite unlike in Mahāyāna, with abhorring *saṁsāra*.

Calculated cessation through contemplation of the four noble truths is disconnection from everything contrary to a saintly state.

A second level free from afflictions, as Vasubandhu says, has as its result the acquisition of *jñānadarśana*. Yaśomitra explains: *Jñāna* is a discernment (*prajñā*) linked to a mental consciousness, thus contains constructions which can even be verbally expressed. *Darśana*, on the other hand, is a vision which is associated with the visual consciousness and is exempt from discrimination.

In commenting on Vasubandhu's statement that it is in the fourth unafflicted level that thunderbolt concentration is reached, where all defilements are totally and forever eradicated, he states that the future Buddha, directly before his enlightenment, practised the first level to master meditational skills, then acquired the divine eye by which he could see the deaths and rebirths of sentient beings, then realized the meditations on emptiness, the signless, and the wishless, then, basing himself on the fourth level, accomplished the eradication of all fetters through the thunderbolt concentration.

VIII, 29: On the four boundless states, he says that loving kindness is an antidote to ill-will, compassion is an antidote to desire to harm, rejoicing at the joy of others is an antidote to dissatisfaction, and equanimity is an antidote to both greed for desires and ill-will.

VIII, 39: The scriptures (*āgama*) will last longer than the *adhigama* or path without afflictions.

VIII, 40: In commenting on Vasubandhu's statement that he has followed the interpretation of the Vaibhāṣikas of Kashmir (in the *kārikā*s), Yaśomitra defines the Vaibhāṣikas as those who rejoice in the *Vibhāṣā*, and specifies that there were Kashmirian masters who were not Vaibhāṣikas, such as the Vinaya scholars and Sautrāntikas such as the

Bhadanta (cf. comment on I, 20), and that by the same token there were Vaibhāṣikas who were not Kashmirians!

IX: Yaśomitra considers IX an annex to VIII.

IX, p. 1190 (Dwarikadas Shastri edition): The object of consciousness of the mental consciousness is defined by Yaśomitra as being both the sense-field of the factor-organ (*dharmāyatana*) and those extra objects which yogis only perceive, such as the awarenesses and mental concomitants of others. But since a mental consciousness arises in regard to an object only after the original consciousness which has perceived the object has ceased, apprehension by a mental consciousness can't be a direct perception. Some Sautrāntikas claim however that a mental consciousness may immediately apprehend its object, e.g., when a mental concomitant of desire or aversion arises, or a feeling of satisfaction or frustration.

IX, p. 1191: He identifies Vātsīputrīyas with Ārya-Sammitīyas.

IX, p. 1197: The Vātsīputrīya has said that all six consciousnesses may recognize the "person" (*pudgala).* But, Yaśomitra retorts, what sense does it make to say that a person is recognized when a sound has been perceived? Does the sound become the cause of the apprehension of the "person," or does one apprehend the person when the sound is being apprehended? If the sound is itself the cause of the apprehension of a person, then there's no difference between the sound and the person, just as one cannot really claim that there is a difference between the sound and the mental consciousness of hearing which perceives it. If the second alternative is true, is it apprehended by the same apprehension as the sound is, or by another? If by the same, then there is no difference of intrinsic nature between the so-called "person" and the sound. Or alternatively, the sound itself is only a designation for the person. In that case, how could a difference be made between the judgments "This is a sound!" and "This is a person!"? If there is no difference to be made, then it should be asked how one can even say that a sound exists and a person exists, too.

IX, p. 1203: He quotes a *sūtra* to the effect that Buddhists are to take as their refuge the *dharma*, but never the idea of a person, that they are to take as their refuge the *sūtra*s which are to be taken literally (*nītārtha*), and not those which need further interpretation (*neyārtha*), that they are to take their refuge in knowledge, and not in the six consciousnesses.

IX, p. 1205: He says that the view of a person constitutes a kind

of "view of self in the body" which is so frequently condemned by the Buddha. He says further that the idea of a person arises only as a result of many factors viewed in a heap.

IX, p. 1206: In reply to the Vātsīputrīya's statement that there is a *sūtra* which speaks of the person as "that which takes the weight" (*bhārahara*), he says that this is only an illustration, and that the *sūtra* goes on to say that neither the "weight" nor "that which takes the weight" really exist.

IX, p. 1215: He says that the Vātsīputrīyas hold to the idea that a person exists, and that the Madhyamakas, by contrast, hold to the idea that nothing exists. Both these points of view are extremes.

IX, p. 1216: In explaining memory, he again strictly follows the *Kośa*, not alluding to later Yogācāra explanations of Vasubandhu's made in part necessary by objections of Saṁghabhadra.

IX, p. 1218: He states that the idea that an action needs an agent is an idea of the Grammarians, and that it has no place in Buddhism.

IX, p. 1220: There is in fact no difference between a consciousness and a perceiver, because no differentiation between them can be apprehended. If one makes the differentiation, one is falling into the category-splitting typical of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*s.

IX, p. 1222: He identifies the opponents of Vasubandhu in the latter half of *Kośa* IX as being the Vaiśeṣikas.

IX, p. 1223: The contact of internal organ with the self which the Vaiśeṣikas claim leads to several absurdities: the self would have to move when the internal organ moves; the self would have to perish when the internal organ perishes.

IX, p. 1224: As a matter of fact, when it is said "mine", "yours", these are only awarenesses with seeds making for such conceptions coloring them.

IX, p. 1228: Yaśomitra states that Vasubandhu is making a reference to his own *Pañcaskandhaka* when he talks about frustration and satisfaction being experienced by the sense-fields themselves, and not by a self.[265]

IX, p. 1233: He makes reference to both "Tīrthikas" and Vātsīputrīyas as being fundamentally mistaken in their view of a self. Are the "Tīrthikas" the Jains, or are the Vaiśeṣikas also included there?

He resumes the early theories of Vasubandhu in speaking of dispositional traces and seeds as factors for retribution and memory, without alluding to the problems in these theories, or to Vasubandhu's

later solutions in the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa.*

191.ĪŚVARASENA (580)

Īśvarasena was a teacher of Dharmakīrti, so we may estimate his sixtieth year at around 580. Dharmakīrti cites his teacher at several points, and Ārcaṭa in his *Hetubinduṭīkā* also refers to this teacher. He seems to have been "the proponent of the *ṣaḍlakṣaṇahetu* doctrine against which Dharmakīrti repeatedly argued."[266]

Ernst Steinkellner[267] remarks: "According to Īśvarasena the absence of the probans in the heterologue is proved by a third kind of valid cognition (*pramāṇāntaram*) called non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), which is nothing but mere absence of perception. In consequence of this new concept Īśarasena seems to have re-thought the whole theory of the infallibility (*avyabhicāra*) of the probans and of the conditions the probans has to fulfil to be considered infalliable to the probandum. As a result of his concept of non-perception he taught the infallibility of the probans no longer as with Dignāga to be due to the three marks only, but to at least four marks, the fourth being that its object, the probandum, must not have been cancelled by perception."

192.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (590?), *Buddhabālādhānapratihāryakūrvanirdeśasūtra*

Originally summarized by Nalinaksha Dutt in *Gilgit Manuscripts* Volume 4, pp. xxv-xxvii, five leaves of this text have been edited by Gregory Schopen from both Dutt's Sanskrit fragment and the Tibetan translation (Tohoku 186) in Journal of Indian Philosophy 5, 1978, pp. 319-336.. It apparently does not exist in Chinese. Schopen promises a critical edition and translation of the Tibetan.

193.BHADANTA VIMUKTISENA (590?), *Abhisamayālaṁkāravārttika*

David Seyfort Ruegg reports that this work was translated into Tibetan "at the time of King Byan chub 'od by Śāntibhadra and Sakya 'od with the Sanskrit title *Ārya-Pañcaviṁśatīsāhasrikāprajñāpāraṃitopadeśa-śāstrābhisamayālaṁkārakārikāvārttikam.*"[268] As to the date, Rueggg tells

us that Bu ston identifies him as a pupil of Ārya Vimuktisena, Tāranātha makes him a contemporary of Candrakīrti.[269] That does not seem out of keeping with the other relevant dates we have proffered in this Volume.

The work is available in Tibetan as Tohoku 3788.

194.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (ca. 598?), *Devatāsūtra*

This work seems to have been first translated by the famous Hsüan-tsang, a Chinese who traveled to India in 629 and returned in 645, having visited many interesting places; he has left an array of uniquely important information about India in this period. He also translated some 75 works, almost all of which had been translated by others earlier. Born in 602, he died in 664. We happen to know of the precise dates of many of his translations. Of the few previously untranslated works this one, which we are told contains nine questions and their answers, was translated in 648. It is catalogued as T.592 and Nj 753.

ENDNOTES

1. Heinz Bechert, "Mahāyāna literature in Sri Lanka: the early phase:, in L. Lancaster (ed.), *Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems* (Berkeley, Calif. 1977), pp. 362-364.
2. H. D. Sankalia, *The University of Nālandā* (Delhi 1972).
3. Ibid., p. 40.
4. Ibid.
5.Ibid., p. 71.
6. Ibid., p. 72.
7. Ibid., p. 77.
8. For a much more developed account of *bhavaṅga* see Rupert Gethin, "*Bhavaṅga* and rebirth according to the Abhidharma", *The Buddhist Forum. Volume III* (ed., Tadeusz Skorpuski and Ulrich Pagel) (London 1994), pp. 11-35. Gethin emphasizes that it is the *bhavaṅga* that explains "not merely the logic of continuity but also why a particular being continues to be that particular being throughout his or her life, rather than becoming some other being" (p. 29).
9. The account just given is based on Henepola Gunaratna, *The Path of Serenity and Insight* (Delhi 1985), pp. 72-74. A similar account is to be found in Someshwar Prasad, "The Abhidhamma view of momentariness", *V. V. Mirashi Felicitation Volume* (Nagpur 1965), pp. 264-269, who provides some helpful information about each of the momentary steps in the series.
10. See Paul J. Griffiths, *On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem* (La Salle, Illinois 1986). See also H. S. Cooray, "*Abhiññānirodha*", Encyclopedia of Buddhism 1.1, 1963, pp. 122-125.
11. See Edwina Pio, "Mutations in the *arahant* ideal", Indica 23.1-2, 1986, pp. 21-30.
12. Pio, ibid., p. 27.
13. Pio, ibid., p. 29.
14. Nathan Katz, *Buddhist Images of Human Perfection* (Delhi 1982).
15. Katz, ibid., p. xviii.
16. Shanta Ratnayaka, "The Bodhisattva ideal of Theravāda", Journal of

the International Association of Buddhist Studies 8.2, 1985, p. 106.

17. See Roy W. Perrett, "The bodhisattva paradox", Philosophy East and West 36, 1986, pp. 55-59, in which he cites relevant passages from Danto.

18. Georges B. J. Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality* (Albany, N. Y. 1997), p. 101.

19. Richard Hayes, "The question of doctrinalism in the Buddhist epistemology", Journal of the American Association of Religion 52, 1984, p. 648, note 4, with references to sources and authors cited.

20. Dreyfus, op. cit.

21. Dreyfus, op. cit.., p. 49. He goes on to suggest an analogous attitude toward ontological commitment in Willard Van Orman Quine's views.

22. See Dreyfus, op. cit., pp. 336-337.

23. Dignāga himself outlines the double aspect theory at the end of his Chapter on perception in *kārikā*s 11-12, though he does not use the term *ākāra* (for "aspect") there, but rather merely say that "an awareness has two forms".

24. Eli Franco, "Valid reason, true sign", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 24, 1990, p. 202.

25. Franco, ibid., p. 204.

26. Franco, ibid., pp. 206-207.

27. Franco, ibid., p. 207.

28. Franco, ibid., p. 208.

29. Shoryu Katsura, "Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on *adarśanamātra* and *anupalabdhi*", Asiatische Studien 46.1, 1992, pp. 222-231.

30. Katsura, ibid., pp. 227-228.

31. Bimal Krishna Matilal, *The Character of Logic in India* (ed. Jonardon Ganeri and Heeraman Tiwari) (Albany, N.Y. 1998), pp. 91-98. Quotations that follow are from this section. The latter parts of the passage(s) quoted can also be found in B. K. Matilal and R. D. Evans (ed.), *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology. Studies in the Buddhist Analysis of Inference and Language*. Studies of Classical India, Vol. 7 (Dordrecht 1986), pp. 9-10.

32. Richard Hayes, "An interpretation of *anyāpoha* in Diṅnāga's general system of inference" in Matilal and Evans, ibid., p. 36.

33. Katsura, op. cit., pp. 262-263. There has been a good deal of discussion of the use(s) of *eva* in Dharmakīrti; what Katsura claims is that Dharmakīrti is actually picking up Dignāga's language and perhaps expanding it to apply to all three marks.

34. See Masahiro Inami, "On *pakṣābhāsa*", *Studies in the Buddhist*

Epistemological Tradition (ed. Ernst Steinkellner) (Wien 1991), pp. 69-84.

35. Ole Pind, "Dignāga on *śabadasāmānya* and *śabdaviśeṣa*", *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition*, op. cit., p. 273.

36. Mark Siderits, "Apohavāda', nominalism and resemblance theories", in *Dharmakīrti's Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy* (ed. Shoryu Katsura) (Wien 1999), pp. 344-346.

37. Christian Lindtner, "Bhavya, the logician", Adyar Library Bulletin 50, 1986, pp. 61-62. The translation of technical Sanskrit terms left untranslated by Lindtner have been supplied in parentheses.

38. Yuichi Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka and the Prāsaṅgika school", *The Nava-Mālandā-Mahāvihāra Research Publication* Volume 1 (ed. Satkari Mookerjee) (Patna 1957), pp. 303-305.

39. Malcolm David Eckerl, "Bhāvaviveka and the early Mādhyamika theories of language", Philosophy East and West 28, 1978, p. 329.

40. Kajiyama, op. cit., pp. 310-311.

41. Kajiyama, op. cit., p. 314.

42. Christian Lindtner, "A treatise on Buddhist idealism: Kambala's Ālokamālā", in *Miscellanea Buddhica*. Indiske Studier 5 (ed. Chr. Lindtner) (Copenhagen 1985), pp. 117-118.

43. Christian Lindtner, "*Cittamātra* in Indian Mahāyāna until Kamalaśīla", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 41, 1997, p. 184.

44. Lindtner, ibid., p. 186.

45. Lindtner, ibid., p. 185. Sanskrit terms found in Lindtner's text are preceded by the translations of those terms standard in this Volume, with the Sanskrit terms given in parentheses.

46. Tom J. F. Tillemans, *Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti*. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Heft 24.1 (Wien 1990), pp. 54-55.

47. Tillemans, ibid., pp. 56-58.

48. Tillemans, ibid., p. 60.

49. Tillemans, ibid., pp. 41-46.

50. Tillemans, ibid., p. 68.

51. Lindtner, "*Cittamātra* in Indian Mahāyāna...", op. cit., p. 178.

52. Lindtner, "*Cittamātra*...", ibid., p. 179.

53. Lewis Lancaster's review of K. Venkata Ramanan, *Nāgārjuna's Philosophy as Presented in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra* (Tokyo 1966) in Philosophy East and West 18, 1968, pp. 97-99. Lancaster cites R. Hikata, *Suvikrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā-prajñāpāramitāsūtra* (Fukuoka,

1958), pp. LII ff. as pointing out the following inconsistencies with Ur-Nāgārjuna's works: "These are: (1) the arrangement of the Vinaya code of the (work) does not agree with the code in the other writings; (2) place names are unaccountable with regard to what we know about the life and travels of Nāgārjuna; (3) certain sections are directed to a Chinese audience, not an Indian one." Lancaster also points out that "the *dharma* list presented by the Sarvāstivādin layer of the *Ta Chih Tu Lun* does not agree with the *dharma* list in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*", commenting that this "distorts his doctrine into a polemic against this one school only."

54. Étienne Lamotte, *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra)*. Pp. 1-1118 = Volume I and II, Chapters 1-30; Bibliotheque du Museon Volume 18, Louvain 1949. Pp. 1119-1734 = Volume III, Chapters 31-41. Pp. 1735-2162 = Volume IV, Chapters 42-48 = Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain 12 (Louvain 1976). Pp. 2163-2451 = Volume V, Chapters 49-52 with Chapter 20 of the second section = Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain 24 (Louvain-la-Neuve 1980).

55. Translated anonymously some time between 334 and 431 (cf. K. 85 = T. 302 = N. 85). A brief work (1 fascicule). Its Chinese title is *Ta chang kuang ju ju lai chih te pu ssu i ching.*

56. Paul Demiéville, "Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha", Bulletin de l'Ecole Francais d'Extreme Orient 24, 1924, 220-230.

57. Lamotte, op. cit., Volume Three (1990), p. xxxvii.

58. For an account of this text's use in Japan see M. W. de Visser, *Ancient Buddhism in Japan. Sūtras and Ceremonies in Use in the Seventh and Eighth Centuries A.D. and Their History in Later Times.* Two volumes. Leiden 1935.

59. Although Lindtner considers this probable, without any reasons being given we prefer to locate the work among later works ascribed to a "Nāgārjuna". In this case there seems little to go on in assigning any particular date to the author. It may noted as well that George Chemparathy, "Two early Buddhist refutations of the existence of *īśvara* as the creator of the universe", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 12-13, 1968-69, pp. 89-92, suggests that this work may perhaps be ascribed to a seventh century Nāgārjuna since there is a reference at the outset to Vajrasattva, which Chemparathy says is a development in Tantric Buddhism of a period no earlier than the seventh century. Chemparathy cites André Bareau and Edward Conze as of a similar opinion.

60. Jikyo Masuda, "Origin and doctrines of early Indian Buddhist schools, a translation of Hsüan-Chwang's version of Vasumitra's treatise", Asia Major 2, 1925, p. 6.
61. K. 627 = T. 632 = N. 1257, translated by Kekaya in 472 at Pei-t'ai (cf. Lancaster, p. 206).
62. Taken from S. C. Vidyabhusana, *A History of Indian Logic* (reprinted Delhi 1978), pp. 259-261.
63. Bimala Churn Law, *Buddhaghosa*.. Bombay Branch Royal Asiatic Society Monograph No. 1 (Bombay 1946), p. 1. Law's work is a revised edition of his *Life and Works of Buddhaghosa* published in 1923.
64. Law, pp. 24 ff. These surmises are supported by the more recent discussion in K. R. Norman, *Pāli Literature* (Wiesbaden 1983), pp. 120-130.
65. Law, p. 29.
66. Law, p. 33.
67. Law, p. 36.
68. Cf. Norman, op. cit., pp. 127-129 for a critical summation. Norman is himself rather inclined to accept that most of these works are indeed by Buddhaghosa. See the published dissertation by Friedgard Lottermöser, *Quoted Verse Passages in the Works of Buddhaghosa: Contributions Towards the Study of the Lost Sīhalaṭṭhakathā Literature* (Gottingen 1982), pp. 5-9 for a summary of various published views on Buddhaghosa's works.
69. We adopt Nanamoli's translation; see T423.
70. These are probably names of works among the Singhalese commentaries, no longer extant.
71. In the Introduction to his edition of *Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa-Aṭṭhakathā* comprising Pali Text Society Text Series 169 (London 1979), pp. ix-xi.
72. Cf. Bapat's introduction to his edition of our work in E. For an argument to the contrary on Buddhaghosa's authorship of this and other commentaries ascribed to him cf. K. R. Norman, op. cit., pp. 123-125.
73. The translations of these three terms are those of B. C. Law, *The Debates Commentary* (London 1969), p. 11 *et passim*.
74. Taken from B. C. Law, *Buddhaghosa*, op. cit., pp. 90-91.
75. Law, ibid., p. 89.
76. Law, ibid. p. 89.
77. "...a town near Trichinopoly", says C. V. Udaya Sankara in *Contribution of Buddhism to World Thought and Culture*. Proceedings of the 6th International Buddhist Conference (Bodhgaya 1980), pp. 134-135.

78. Norman, op. cit., pp. 130-132.
79. The contents of this and the next Chapter correspond quite closely to the *Vipākuddharakathā* of Asl 267-288. Buddhadatta, however, presents the views of Tipiṭaka-Cūlanāga only whereas Asl gives the views of two other Theras. Buddhadatta is not following Asl directly, since in places his account is more complete. No doubt both are following the same source.
80. The *Ṭīkā* attributes this view to the *Mahā-Aṭhakathā* which apparently held that only awareness and not the other three mental aggregates are the object of this knowledge. It goes on to argue that it is in fact a path object literally speaking and declares this to be the decision of the Saṁghakāras. Buddhadatta appears to differ from Buddhaghoṣa here, cf. Vism 431; Asl 416 where the same discussion occurs; *Vibhaṅgaṭṭhakathā* 373-374.
81. It is interesting to note that the order here differs both from that found at Pati II 100 = Vism 693 and also from the different order in the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha.*
82. Boris Vassilieff, "'Ju-shih Lun'--a logical treatise ascribed to Vasubandhu", Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 8, 1935-37, 1013-1038.
83. (a) Yuanshenglun (*Yüan sheng lun*) by Dharmagupta of 607 A.D. (=Nanjio 1227; Taisho 1652, vol. 32; *Foreword*, p. 482a, 30 stanzas, p. 482b-483a, stanzas with commentary, p. 483a-486a); (b) Dachengyuanshenglun (*Ta ch'eng yüan sheng lun*) by Amoghavajra of 746-771 A.D. (Nanjio 1314; Taisho 1653: 30 stanzas, pp. 486b-487a, stanzas with commentary, pp. 487a-490a); (c) Tibetan version of the whole text, translated from the Chinese by Chos grub (Dharmasiddha/-i, Chin. Facheng, born in Dunhuang, active from 822, died c. 865), has been preserved among the Dunhuang manuscripts under the title *Rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba tshig le'ur byas pa sum cu pacing 'brel part 'byung ba tshig le'ur byas pa sum cu pa'i rnam par bshad pa (Pratītyasamutpāda-triṁśikā-kārikāvyākhyāna)* (La Vallée Poussin, *Catalogue of the Tibetan Manuscripts from Tun-huang in the India Office Library* (London 1962), No. 588.3 (with one folio missing), foll. Nga 30a-32b) and *Rten* 33a1-53a6; No. 619, foll. Ka 94, 99-100; kha 1; No. 620, fol Kha), respectively.
84. See Carmen Dragonetti in Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 22, 1978, 87-93 and 30, 1986, 109-122, and Christian Lindtner in the same Journal 26, 1982, 167-172 for a controversy about the number of

original stanzas and the ascription of the work to Nāgārjuna or to Śuddhamati.

85. See J. G. de Casparis, "Selected inscriptions from the 7th to the 9th century A.D.", Prasati Indonesia II (Bandung 1956), pp. 47-167; "A Buddhist text engraved on gold plates", pp. 338-341: Addenda.

86. See de Casparis, ibid., p. 339.

87. See de Casparis, idib., p. 339 (a).

88, See de Casparis, ibid., p. 339 (b).

89. See de Casparis, ibid., p. 340 (e).

90. See de Casparis, ibid., p. 340 9f) for the Sanskrit equivalents of the fivefold division: *kāraka, garbha, viṣayapravṛtti, prabhava, pravāha.*

91. See de Casparis, ibid., p. 340 (g).

92. Gokhale has *acetana*, "ohne Regung".

93. Edited by E. H. Johnston with T. Chowdhury, Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 36, 1950, 128 pp. This is our "E".

94. *Chu ching i ch'eng pao sing lun*, translated by Ratnamati around 510. Available as T. 1611.

95. *Theg pa chen po rgyud bla mai bstan bcos* and *Theg pa chen po rgyud bla mai bstan bcos rnam par bsad pa*, translated by Ratnavajra Sajjana and Blo ldan ses rab at Srinagar in later 11th century A. D. *Sde dge Ed., Tohoku Catalogue,* Nos. 4024 and 4025 respectively; *Peking Edition* No. 5525, 5526 respectively; *Reprint Edition*, Vol. 108, pp. 24.1.7-31 and pp. 31.1.6-56.3.7 (Textual Studies).

96. E. Obermiller, "The sublime science of the great vehicle to salvation, being a manual of Buddhist Monism. The work of Ārya Maitreya with a commentary by Āryāsaṅga. Translated from the Tibetan with introduction and notes", Acta Orientalia 9.2-3, 1931, 81-306, and separately printed.

97. Jikido Takasaki, *A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra)*. Serie Orientale Roma XXXIII (Roma 1966).

98. There is a sizable secondary literature on this text. In addition to the works cited on pp. 202-202 of the Third Edition of the Bibliography (Third Edition of Volume One of this Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies) the following items should be noted: Masatoshi Nagatomi has an extensive review of D. S. Ruegg's book in Journal of Indian Philosophy 2, 1972, 53-64; Z. Nakamura, *A Study of Ratna-Gotra-Vibhāga-Mahāyānottaratantra-Śāstra based on a Comparison and Contrast Between the Sanskrit Original and the Chinese Translations* (Tokyo 1960). See also G. M. Nagao, "'What remains' in *śūnyatā*: a

Yogācāra interpretation of emptiness" in Minoru Kiyota (ed.), *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice* (Honolulu 1978), pp. 66-82; Jikido Takasaki, "Description of the ultimate reality by means of the six categories in Mahāyāna Buddhism", Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 9.2, 1961, 24-33; Zahiruddin Ahmad, "The womb of the Tathāgata or Buddhist monism", Journal of the Oriental Society of Australia 15-16, 1983-84, 27-44.

99. Hakuju Ui, *Hoshoronkenkhu* (Tokyo 1959), attributes the whole text to Sāramati for the reason that the first person is used in the salutation to the three jewels in the basic verses and in the prose commentary as well. Jikido Takasaki on the contrary attributed the second part to Sāramati and the basic verses to Maitreya. At present, however, he is inclined to negate the participation of Maitreya in this text because of the later origin of the legend of his five treatises.

100. For this selection, see the Introduction to E, pp. 32-45.

101. On this subject see T, Introduction, pp. 32-45. A detailed study was done by J. Takasaki in his work in Japanese *Nyoraizo shiso no keisei.*

102. Apparently not the same text as #116 of Volume Eight of this Encyclopedia.

103. Brian Edward Brown, *The Buddha Nature: A Study of Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna* (Delhi 1991).

104. Cf. D. S. Ruegg, *La Théorie des Tathāgatagarbha* (Paris 1969), summarized by Nagatomi at Journal of Indian Philosophy 2, 1972, 53-64), and Ruegg's article in Journal of Indian Philosophy 5, 1977, 32-34. Z. Ahmad, op. cit., follows Ruegg's analysis, but in English, and Masaaki Hattori (Journal of Indian Philosophy 2, 1972, 56-64) reviews Ruegg's book and prefers an earlier date for Sāramati. Summaries of portions of the text are found by E. H. Johnston in Journal of the Bihar Research Society 36, 1950 (reprinted Patna 1950, 1960); S. C. Goswami, *Philosophy, Grammar and Indology* (ed. Hari Shankar Prasad), Delhi 1992, pp. 275-282; and Richard King, *Early Advaita and Buddhism*, Ithaca, N.Y. 1995. Papers by Jikido Takasaki (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 7.1, 1958, 48-53; 9.1, 1961, 24-33; and 10.2, 1962, 26-33) are helpful but hard to understand. Ruben L. F. Habito, "On *dharmakāya* as ultimate reality: prolegomena for a Buddhist-Christian dialogue", Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 12, 1985, 233-252, as well as in Journal of Dharma 11, 1981, 368-378, studies the use of the term *dharmakāya* and the three-body theory in RGB.

William Grosnick (Journal of the International Association of

Buddhist Studies 4.2, 1981, 33-43) studies the Tathāgatagarbha idea that *nirvāṇa* means nonorigination (*anutpāda*) of *prapañca*, not extinction. "Suffering is not a *dharma* one should extinguish, but an illusion one should not produce" (p. 37). So the third noble truth of the extinction of suffering is regarded as the practice of nondiscrimination (*avikalpajñāna*), "a practice that is already deliverance, for ignorance and its attendant passions and sufferings are simply not originated" (37). He contrasts *ekayāna* texts such as the RGV with *triyāna* texts such as the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*.

Z. Nakamura, op. cit., has an English introduction. Nakamura finds that the Chinese translation has eleven chapters, while the Sanskrit and Tibetan only have 7 (or 5?) chapters by collapsing the first seven chapters into one.

105. D. S. Ruegg edits and translates 1.9ab at Journal of Indian Philosophy 5, 1977, p. 33. Lobsang Dargyay (same Journal 18, 1990, pp. 86-87) translates Chapter One, verses 154-155.

106. Brian E. Brown, op. cit., pp. 44-45, reviews the various translations chosen by scholars to translate the term *garbha* in this context, and gives reasons why "embryo" seems the most appropriate choice.

107. On this set of categories see T, Appendix III, pp. 400-408.

108. This summary is provided by Prof. Takasaki on pp. 45-46 of his translation of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* cited previously.

109. However, Marek Mejor, *Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa and the Commentaries Preserved in the Tanjur* (Stuttgart 1991), p. 83, cites M. Van Velthem as identifying Skandhila as "a teacher of Saṅghabhadra and a contemporary of Vasubandhu" on the basis of Chinese sources, and says Skandhila is "frequently cited" by Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra. Mejor translates a few passages on pp. 84-87.

110. Publications de l'Institute Orientaliste de Louvain 16, Louvain-la-Neuve 1977.

111. Mejor, op. cit., pp. 63-74.

112. Mejor, ibid., p. 64.

113. L. Schmithausen, "Beiträge zur Schulzgehörigkeit und Textgeschichte Kanonischer und 'postkanonischer buddhistischer Materialen", in Heinz Bechert (ed.), *Zur Schülzugehörikeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literature* (Gottingen 1985), pp. 338 ff. He edits Chapter Three, verses 1828 of the Tibetan text.

114. Hajime Nakamura, *Indian Buddhism* (Delhi 1987), p. 230.

115. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 22, 1978, pp. 87-93

makes the case; Lindtner in the same Journal 26, 1982, pp. 167-172 criticizes Ms. Dragonetti's claims on some points but does not question her conclusion on the identification of the commentator, except to note that the reconstruction of the name as Śuddhamati is doubtful as had been some time ago noted by de la Vallée Poussin.

116. Marek Mejor, op. cit., p. 83. Passages are studied on pp. 87-88.

117. This summary was prepared by Professor Ames for our Encyclopedia. Most of it has been published in Ames' article "Buddhapālita's exposition of the Madhyamaka", Journal of Indian Philosophy 14, 1986, pp. 313-349.

118. See C. W. Huntington, Jr., The Akutobhayā and Early Indian Madhyamaka. Unpublished dissertation, University of Michigan 1986.

119. See D. S. Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India*. Vol. VII, Fascicule 1 of *A History of Indian Literature* (Gen. Ed. Jan Gonda), Wiesbaden 1981, p. 49 and John P. Keenan, "Asaṅga's understanding of Mādhyamika notes on the *Shung-chung-lun*", Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 12.1, 1989, pp. 93-107.

120. See D. S. Ruegg, ibid., p. 60 and Ruegg, "Toward a chronology of the Madhyamaka school" in L. A. Hercus, F. B. J. Kuiper, T. Rajapatirana and E. R. Skrzypcsak (eds.), *Indological and Buddhist Studies: Volume in Honour of Prof. J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday* (Canberra 1982), p. 512.

121. Tāranātha, *Tāranāthae Doctrinae Buddhicae in India Propagatione* (ed. Anton Schiefner), St. Petersburg 1868, pp. 105-106.

122. According to Christian Lindtner in Indo-Iranian Journal 23, 1981, pp. 176-217, Buddhapālita was born in *Haṁsakrīḍa in the south. *Saṁgharakṣita, a disciple of a certain *Nāgamitra, became his teacher and his residence was the *vihāra* of Dantapuri. *Saṁgharakṣita is supposed to have also taught Bhavya.

123. *Bstan 'gyur Dbu ma Tsa*, Peking (Vol. 95 of Japanese reprint) 317a-8; Derge (Vol. 1 of Japanese reprint) 281a-3.

124. See M. Walleser, *Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, Bibliotheca Buddhica vol. XVI (St. Petersburg 1913-1914).

125. See Judit Fehér, "Buddhapālita's *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti:* arrival and spread of Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika literature in Tibet", in Louis Ligeti (ed.), *Tibetan and Buddhist Studies Commemorating the 200th Anniversary of the Birth of Alexander Csoma de Kőrös*. Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica, Vol. XXIX, part 1 (Budapest 1984).

126. See Musashi Tachikawa, "A study of Buddhapālita's *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti* (I)," Journal of the Faculty of Literature, Nagoya University 63, 19074, pp. 1-19.
127. Christian Lindtner, "Buddhapālita on emptiness", Indo-Iranian Journal 23, 1981, 187-217.
128. Akira Saito, A Study of the Buddhapālita-mūlamadhyamakavṛtti. Ph. D. Dissertation, Australian National University 1984.
129. See, for example, Ruegg, *Literature of the Mādhyamika School...*, op. cit., pp. 36, 60, 64-65, 76-78.
130. George Chemparathy, op. cit., p. 86, note 9.
131. David S. Ruegg, *Buddha-Nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective* (London 1989), p. 151.
132. This summary is found in Jikido Takasaki, *A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga*, op. cit., pp. 47-49.
133. This summary is excerpted from Prabhas Chandra Majumdar's article "The Kāraṇḍa Vyūha: its metrical version", Indian Historical Quarterly 24, 1948, pp. 293-299.
134. The prose text has been published by Satyavrata Samasrami with its Bengali translation, Calcutta 1873.
135. P. S. Sastri, "Some Buddhist thinkers of Andhra", Indian Historical Quarterly 32, 1956, p. 165.
136. See the discussion by Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga on Perception*. Harvard Oriental Series 47, Cambridge, Mass. 1968, pp. 68-69.
137. Ibid., p. 2.
138. Alex Wayman, "Yogācāra and the Buddhist logicians", Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 2.1, 1979, pp. 68-69.
139. David J. Kalupahana, "Dignāga's theory of immaterialism", Philosophy East and West 20, 1970, pp. 123-125.
140. Richard Hayes, *Dignāga's Interpretation of Signs* (Dordrecht 1988), pp. 175-177, gives us a summary of this work, as do Georges Dreyfuss, *Recognizing Reality* (Albany, N.Y. 1997), pp. 101-102 and David Kalupahana, ibid., pp. 121-128. Amar Singh, *The Heart of Buddhist Philosophy: Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti* (Delhi 1984), pp. 61-63, 122) argues that the position of this view is not idealism, as it has sometimes been assumed to be.
141. N. A. Sastri's text gives *śakti*, which Tola and Dragonetti translate as "virtuality". We replace that with the term "trace" which is standard throughout this Encyclopedia as one of the preferred translations of the term.

142. The proper interpretation of this brief text has been the subject of an extended interchange between Richard Hayes (in *Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs*, op. cit.), B. K. Matilal (in Matilal, ed. *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, Dordrecht 1984, pp. 31-49), and Hans Herzberger (pp. 59 ff. of the same collection. Bimal Matilal summarizes with a chart on pp. 7-8 of his *The Character of Logic in India* (Albany, N.Y. 1998). Lambert Schmithausen translates verses 8-9 at Journal of Indian Philosophy 27, 1999, 79-82.

143. This salutation becomes of great importance in the view of later authors, especially in the Tibetan tradition. Cf. Roger R. Jackson, "The Buddha as *pramāṇabhūta*: epithets and arguments in the Buddhist 'logical' tradition", Journal of Indian Philosophy 16, 1988, 335-365.

144. We quote this important section of the *Svavṛtti* from Shoryu Katsura's translation in "Dignāga on *trairūpya* reconsidered: a reply to Prof. Oetke", *Tosaki Hiromasa Hakase Koki Kinen Ronbunshū (Festschrift for Dr. Hiromasa Tosaki, Culture and Logic in India)*, Kyushu University Press 200, pp. 244-245. Katsura remarks (p. 245) that "throughout Dignāga's works this is the only place where he discusses the theory of *trairūpya* at length."

145. An analysis of this section is found in Bimal Krishna Matilal, "Diṅnāga's remark on the concept of *anumeya*", Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute 24, 1968, p. 159.

146. In the *Nyāyamukha nyūnatā* is defined as "lack of any member of a proof" as in the Nyāya tradition.

147. Exactly the same types of fourteen *jāti*s are discussed in the *Nyāyamukha* in a different order, namely, in the order of 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 14 and 3. In the *Vādavidhi* of Vasubandhu the same fourteen *jāti*s are classified into three categories, namely (1) "wrong" = 7, 8, 9, 10, 2, 1, 11, 12, 4 and 6; (2) "unreal" = 14 and 13; and (3) "contradictory" = 5 and 3.

In the *Tarkaśāstra* attributed to Vasubandhu we find a similar list of sixteen refutations (**khaṇḍana*), namely (1) "wrong" (**viparītakhaṇḍana*) = *sādharmyakhaṇḍana, vaidharmya-, vikalpa-, aviśeṣa-, prāpti-, aprāpti-, ahetu-, upalabdhi-, saṁśaya-, kāryabhedakhaṇḍana* (cf. *Pramāṇasaṁgrahavṛtti* nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 1, 2, 11, 12, 4, 6); (2) "unreal" (**asatkhaṇḍana*) - *avaryavyañjakakhaṇḍana, arthāpattivyañjaka-, pratidṛṣṭānta-* (cf. *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* nos. 14 and 13 and *Nyāyasūtra* V.1.9) and (3) "contradictory" (**viruddhakhaṇḍana*) = *anutpattikhaṇḍana, nityatā-, svārthaviruddha-* (cf.

Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti nos. 5 and 3, and no parallel). The list contains the types of refutations which are parallel to all of the fourteen *jāti*s of Dignāga.

The *Nyāyasūtra*s contain a similar list of twenty-four *jāti*s in the following order: 7, 8, *utkarṣa-, sama-, upakarṣa-, varya-, avarya-*, 9. *sādhya-*, 1a. (*prāpti-*), 1b (*aprāpti-*), 14. *pratidṛṣṭānta-*, 5, 12, *prakaraṇa-*, 2, 13, 10, *upapatti-*, 11. *anupalabdhi-*, 3. *anityā-* and 6. This list contains all but one of the fourteen *jāti*s of Dignāga.

The *Upāyahṛdaya* or *Prayogasāra* attributed to Nāgārjuna lists the following twenty types of objections (**dūṣaṇa*), namely, *utkarṣasama, apakarṣa-, bhedābheda-, praśnabāhulyam, uttarālpatā-, praśnālpottarabāhulya-, hetu-, kārya-, vyāpti-, avyāpti-, kāla-, prāpti-, aprāpti-, viruddha-, aviruddha-, saṁśaya-, asaṁśaya-, pratidṛṣṭānta-, śruti-, śrutibhinna-, anupapatti-sama.* It is to be noted that the author of the text does not regard these objections as futile rejoinders but as legitimate ones.

148. This summary is taken from Prof. Kitagawa's article "A study of a short philosohical treatise ascribed to Dignāga", in H. Kitagawa, *Dignāga no Taikei* (Kyoto 1965), pp. 430-439.

149. T. 1656 = N. 1253, translated by Paramārtha between 557 and 569.

150. See Thomas, "The works of Āryadeva, Triratnadāsa, and Dharmādhikarabhūti", *Album Kern* (Leiden 1903).

151.Quoted from Giuseppe Tucci, "Minor Sanskrit texts on the Prajñāpāramitā", Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1947, pp. 53-75. Essentially the same information is provided in Edward Conze, *The Prajñāpāramitā Literature* (Second edition, Tokyo 1978), p. 52.

152. Oskar von Hinüber, *A Handbook of Pāli Literature* (Berlin 1996), pp. 143-144. Hinüber concludes "Thus Paṭis-a appears to have been completed between AD 459 or 499"--which date depending on the correct dating of Moggallāna, which is not certain. So we split the difference!

153. K. R. Norma, *Pāli Literature*, op. cit., pp. 132-133.

154. Noriaki Hakamaya, "Asvabhāva's commentary on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra IX. 56-76", Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 20.1, 1971, pp. 473-465, and "Asvabhāva's and Sthiramati's commentarties on the MSA, XIV, 34-35", Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 27.1, 1978, pp. 491-487.

155. It seems more likely that this commentary is by an Asvabhāva other than the author of #s 134-135 above. It will be summarized in a later Volume.

156. See NCat III, p. 169.
157. See NCat III, p. 169.
158. See NCat III, p. 169.
159. See NCat III, p. 168.
160. Mejor, op. cit., p. 50.
161. Quoted, with stylistic emendations, from N. A. Sastri's summary in Visva-Bharati Annals 2, 1949, pp. 28-29.
162. Christian Lindtner, "Adversaria Buddhica II. On the authenticity of Madhyamakaratnapradīpa", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 26, 1982, pp. 172-184.
163. A portion is translated and studied in Donald S. Lopez, Jr., "Do *śrāvaka*s understand emptiness?", Journal of Indian Philosophy 16, 1988, pp. 71-81.
164. Shikafumi Watanabe, "A translation of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* with the *Tarkajvālā* III. 137-146", Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 21.1, 1998, p. 127.
165. Passages from this Chapter are translated and studied in Donald S. Lopez, Jr.'s article cited in footnote 111.
166. Jens Braarvig has provided the Tibetan text and a summary of a small section of Chapter Four in his paper "Bhavya on *mantra*s: apologetic endeavours on behalf of the Mahāyāna" in Studia Indologiczne Volume 4, 1997, from the Oriental Institute, Warsaw University, pp. 31-39.
167. The summary provided here is taken from Christian Lindtner's article "Bhavya on Mīmāṁsā" in Studia Indologiczne Volume 4, ibid., pp. 91-123. Also verses 133-140, which concern meat-eating (allowable) and the question whether plants have feelings (he thinks not) are provided and analyzed in Shinjo Kawasaki, "Principle of life according to Bhavya" in R. K. Sharma (ed.), *Researches in Indian and Buddhist Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Professor Alex Wayman* (Delhi 1993), pp. 69-83. Prof. Kawasaki has published the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts in several issues of *Studies* from the University of Tsukuba Institute of Philosophy: 1976 (Sept. 1977), pp. 1-15; 12 (March 1987), pp. 1-23; 13 (March 1988), pp. 1-42.
168. This Chapter has been translated by William L. Ames in Journal of Indian Philosophy 21-22, 1993-1994 (our "T"). The summary provided here is based on Ames' translation. Numbering of verses of this Chapter follows the "E" of the summary of Nāgārjuna's work in Volume Eight of this Encyclopedia.

169. This Chapter is translated (our "T") by William L. Ames in Journal of Indian Philosophy 23, 1995, pp. 295-365. Our summary is based on Ames' translation alone.
170. Translated by William L. Ames in his Ph. D. dissertation at the University of Washington, 1986. The summary is made on the basis of this translation alone.
171. This Chapter has been translated by William L. Ames in his dissertation at the University of Washington in 1986, pp. 162-207. The summary here is made on the basis of that translation alone.
172. This Chapter is translated by William L. Ames in his dissertation, ibid. The summary is made on the basis of the translation alone.
173. This Chapter of Bhavya's commentary is translated (our "T") by Paul Nietupski in Journal of Indian Philosophy 24, 1996, 103-143. This summary is based solely on that translation.
174. Translated by William L. Ames in his dissertation, op. cit.
175. A portion of this section is translated and studied in D.S.Lopez, Jr., op. cit.
176. Shotaro Iida, "The nature of *saṁvṛti* and the relationship of *paramārtha* to it in Svātantrika-Mādhyamika", in Mervyn Sprung (ed.), *The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta* (Dordrecht 1973), pp. 68-69.
177. This is *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.16, 21 and 22 in the numbering used in the summary of that work in our Volume Eight, p. 376.
178. Cf. *Nyāyamukha* 1; *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III. 12.
179. Christian Lindtner, "Bhavya, the logician", Adyar Library Bulletin 50, 1986, pp. 69-76.
180. For a typical discussion with references see footnote 1 in Christian Lindtner's "Bhavya's critique of Yogācāra in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*" in Bimal Krishna Matilal and Robert D. Evans (eds.), *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology* (Dordrecht 1986), p. 255.
181. A portion of this first section (Peking edition N. 5254, Tsha fol. 326a6-330a2 is translated and discussed by Christian Lindtner in "Atīśa's introduction to the two truths", Journal of Indian Philosophy 9, 1981, pp. 169-177.
182. Christian Lindtner has translated this Chapter in his article from the collection edited by Matilal and Evans cited earlier, pp. 246-254. This is "T". He has also kindly provided an independent summary for this Volume. What follows is a combination of the summary (sections 1-2 and 12) with his translation of sections 3-11. Lindtner's translations of

technical terms has been replaced by ours in the usual fashion.

183. Lindtner points out that the passage quoted is found in *Tarkajvālā* on *Madhyamakahṛdaya* 5.41-42 minus the reference to *trikāya*.

184. The passage is Vasubandhu's *Triṁśikā* 28-30.

185. For an analysis of *Maṇimekhalai*'s main narrative and sixteen branch stories, with discussion of Cāttanār's use of Tamil literary conventions, Hindu myths, and a Buddhist cosmology, see Paula Richman, *Women, Branch Stories and Rhetoric in a Tamil Buddhist Text* (Syracuse 1987).

186. Scholarly dating of *Maṇimekhalai* varies from the second to the early ninth century. Some Tamil scholars have dated *Maṇimekhalai* as early as the second century A.D. For example, Varatarāja Ayyar provides a second century date. See his Tamil *Ilakkiya Varalāru* (Madras 1957), p. 148. S. Kandaswami Aiyangar claims that *Cilapattikāram* and *Maṇimekhalai* were both written at the same time and both belong to the Caṅkam period. See his *Maṇimekhalai in its Historical Setting* (London 1928), p. 11-12. This very early dating of the text seems to be popular among Tamil scholars of a more traditional bent. At the other extreme, Vaiyāpuri Pillai has assigned *Maṇimekhalai* to the eighth or early ninth century and considers the two epics to be roughly contemporary. He bases his case on the allusions made to purāṇic and epic literature. His orientation is more Sanskritic than that of writers mentioned earlier. See S. Vaiyāpuri Pillai, *Kāriyakālam* (Madras 1962), pp. 33, 141, and his *History of Tamil Language and Literature* (Madras 1956), p. 153.

Some scholars have also made claims about *Maṇimekhalai*'s date based on the philosophical materials contained in the chapters at the end of the epic. Suryanarayana deals with the dating issue on the basis of the description of Sāṁkhya philosophy contained in Chapter 27 of *Maṇimekhalai*. See S. S. Suryanarayana, "The Maṇimekhalai account of the Sāṁkhya", Journal of Indian History 8, 1929, pp. 322-327. Others try to date it on the basis of its chapter dealing with Buddhist logic. Some claim that *Maṇimekhalai* is a seventh century text and, therefore, it was written after Dignāga, the sixth century Buddhist logician. Because they feel that the material on Buddhist logic in Chapter 29 is based on Dignāga's syste, they assume *Maṇimekhalai* must be later. See S. Kuppuswami Sastri, "Problems of identity in the cultural history of ancient India", Journal of Oriental Research (Madras) 1.2, 1927, p. 192 and K. A. Nilakantha Sastri, *The Colas* (Madras 1955), pp. 55-56, 62 n. 117. The issue is discussed further in K. G. Sesha Aiyar, "The date of Maṇimekhalai", Journal of Oriental Research (Madras) 1.4, 1927, pp.

321-329. Others dispute that dating, claiming that both Ċāttanār and Dignāga shared a common source. See SKA,pp. 34-107. S. Suryanarayana Sastri claims that Chapter 29 is a later interpolation; see his "Buddhist logic in the Maṇimekhalai", Journal of Indian History 9.3, 1930, p. 356. If one were to accep this view, it would not make sense to date the material in the rest of the text by evidence provided in that Chapter. S. N. Kandaswamy argues that Cāttanār incorporated Dignāga's system into the epic, but made a few small changes in the process of translation. See his *Buddhism as Expounded in Maṇimekhalai* (Annamalinagar 1978), p. 236.

Both Kandaswamy and Kamil Zvelebil make convincing cases for dating *Maṇimekhalai* in the sixth century. Zvelebil uses internal evidence as the basis for his discussion and assigns approximate dates of 550 A.D. for *Maṇimekhalai* and 450 for *Cilapattikāram*. See Kamil Zvelebil, *Tamil Literature*, Volume 2, Fascicule 1 of *Handbuch der Orientalistik* (General Editor Jan Gonda) (Leiden 1975), pp. 114-116. Kandaswamy does a comprehensive survey of the issue, concluding on pp. 5-74 of *Buddhism as Expounded in the Maṇimekhalai* that Cāttanār "lived in the latter half of the fifth century A.D. and the early part of the sixth century A.D." Many of his conclusions about the dating issue are especially convincing because he also places *Maṇimekhalai* in the context of events occurring outside of Tamilnadu. While the earliest dating of the text seems intended to vest *Maṇimekhalai* with a hoary Caṅkam venerability and the datings according to Buddhist logic attempt to date the entire epic by a single chapter, the date agreed upon by Kandaswamy and Zvelebil seems to account for the nature of the epic as a whole.

187. See Appendix A of Paula Richman, *Women, Branch Stories...*, op. cit., for a discussion of the issue of *Maṇimekhalai*'s authorship.

188. For a discussion of other Tamil Buddhist texts which have not survived, see Kamil Zvelebil, *Tamil Literature*, op. cit., p. 142.

189. For a discussion of the relationshp between *Maṇimekhalai* and *Cilapattikāram*, see Richman, op. cit., pp. 2-5.

190. U Ve. Cāminātaiyar, ed., *Maṇimekhalai* (Madras 1898).

191. Na. Mu Veṅkaṭacāmi Nāṭṭār and Auvai Cu. Turaicāmi Pillai, *Maṇimekhalai* (Tinnevelly 1946).

192. S. K. Kandaswamy in *Buddhism as Expounded in the Maṇimekhalai,* op. cit. provides a nearly complete translation, along with an extensive introduction to the text. Especially interesting to philosophers will be pp. 54-107, which discusses the philosophical systems described. In addition,

Kandaswamy Aiyangar includes, on pp. xxxi-xxxv, a short supplement by the German Indologist H. Jacobi concerning the relationship between Dignāga and Chapter 29. Also helpful is a short supplement by Tubianski entitled "The authorship of the Nyāyapraveśa (sic)", found on pp. 108-110 of the book.

193. Hisselle Dharmatara Mahathera, "Buddhism in South India", *The Wheel Publication* volumes 124-125, 1968.

194. S. S. Suryanarayana, "The Maṇimekhalai accont of the Sāṁkhya", op. cit.

195. A. L. Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas: A Vanished Indian Religion* (London 1951; Delhi 1981).

196. Refers to Makkali Gosāla. See Basham, ibid., p. 215 and Kandaswamy, op. cit., p. 194.

197. Note that in line 289 of this Chapter it is said that five systems of thought have been expounded. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar interprets these five as being (1) the Vedic schools, (2) the Jaina schools (in which category he includes both the Ājīvikan and Nirgranthan speaker), (3) the Sāṁkhya school, (4) the Vaiśeṣika school, and (5) the Lokāyata school. See Kandaswamy, op. cit., p. 199.

198. Kandaswamy. op. cit., p. 313.

199. For a discussion of this section and a chart comparing Sanskrit, Pāli and Tamil terminology for each link see Kandaswamy, op. cit., pp. 320-322.

200. See Musashi Tachikawa, "A Sixth-Century Manual of Indian Logic (A Translation of the Nyāyapraveśa)", Journal of Indian Philosophy 1.2, 1971, p. 119, note 3 for a list of articles devoted to this discussion.

201. Gaekwad's Oriental Series 38, Baroda 1968.

202. N. D. Mironov, *Nyāyapraveśa.* 1. Sanskrit Text, edited and reconstructed. T'oung Pao 28, 1931, pp. 1-24.

203. Tachikawa, op. cit., pp. 111-145.

204. David Seyfort Ruegg, "*Ārya* and Bhadanta Vimuktisena on the *gotra*-theory of the Prajñāpāramitā", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 12-13, 1968-69, pp. 303-318.

205. Also see John J. Makransky, "Controversy over *dharmakāya* in India and Tibet: a reappraisal of its basis, *Abhisamayālaṁkāra* Chapter 9", Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 12.2, 1989, pp. 45-78.

206. Conze, *The Prajñāpāramitā Literature*, op. cit., p. 112.

207. Tom J. F. Tillemans, *Materials for the Study of Āryadeva...*, op. cit.

p. 8. For a full discussion see N. Aiyaswami Sastri, "On Dharmapāla", Journal of the Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Institute 2.2, 1941, pp. 347 ff.
208. Tillemans, ibid., p. 11. Tillemans, p. 12, discusses the possibility that this work may have been a commentary on Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*.
209. Tillemans, ibid.
210. Giuseppe Tucci's *Le versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva, confrontata col testo sanscrit e la traduzione tibetana.* Rivista Degli Studi Orientali X, 1925, pp. 521-567.
211. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, "Le *nirvāṇa* après Āryadeva", Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques 1, 1932, pp. 127-135.
212. Listed at NCat IX, p. 253, but not known to Hsüang-tsang or found in the Taisho collection of translations. This reference should be checked against the the commentary on the *Śataśāstra* attributed to "Vasu" translated in Gisueppe Tucci's *Pre-Dignāga Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources* (Gaekwad's Oriental Series 49) (Baroda 1929).
213. Tillemans, op. cit., p. 8
214, Diana Y. Paul, *Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century China* (Stanford, Cal. 1984), p. 120
215. Paul, ibid., p. 7
216. Paul, ibid., pp. 121-130
217. For analysis of the beginning of this work see Robert K. C. Forman, "Paramārtha and modern constructivists on mysticism: epistemological monomorphism versus duomorphism", Philosophy East and West 39, 1989, esp. pp. 398 ff.
218, Marek Mejor, op. cit., pp. 51-57
219. Mejor, op. cit., p. 90
220. See Haneda Toru, "Kaikotsuyaki Anne no *Kusharon Itsugiso"* (The Uighur translation of Sthiramati's *Chi-she lun shih-i shu*) in *Shiratori hakushi kanreki kinen Tayoshi ronso* (Tokyo 1925), pp. 745-793.
221. The numbering of the *kārikā*s in Hsüang-tsang's Chinese translation differs slightly; I will follow the order of the extant Sanskrit recension for ease of comparison.
222. Marek Mejor, op. cit., pp. 90-110 has provided an extended discussion reviewing the opinions of various scholars on the date and works of Sthiramati and in particular the "serious problem connected with the history of (the) transmission" of this work. For one thing, Mejor concludes that the Tibetan translation "is one of the latest ever made in Tibet". Mejor concludes that "it is by no means an easy task to determine what precisely Sthiramati wrote himself. A comprehensive

study of Sthiramati's *Tattvārtha*, with the help of all existing materials--its Chinese, Uigur, Tibetan versions as well as the commentaries of Pūrṇavardhana and Yaśomitra--is a desideratum."

Masahiro Shogaito (*Turfan, Hotan and Dunhuang* (Berlin, 1996), pp. 293-306) says that both Chinese and Tibetan translations exist. The Tibetan version was translated by Dharmabālabhadra (1441-1528). Shogaito's article concerns a Uighur version in the British Library that contains the complete first volume and more of the fourth volume of the Chinese text from which it was translated.

223. Cf. also *Nyāyānusāra* T.1562.29.329b.

224. The first listing mistakenly repeats *upāya* as the last member.

225. *A-pi-ta-mo shun cheng-li lun* 2, T.1562-29.355c7-8; quoted in Yaśomitra, *Sphuṭārtha Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, ed. Dwarikadas Sastri (Varanasi 1981), vol. 1, p. 41. See also V. V. Gokhale, "What is *avijñaptirūpa* (concealed form of activity)?" in New Indian Antiquary 1, 1938, pp. 70-71.

226. See the outline of Sthiramati's position in Gokhale, ibid., p. 72.

227. Cf. *Saṁyuttanikāya* vi.1.1 (*Brahmayacana*); *Tseng-i A-han ching (Ekottarāgama)*, T.125.2.593a-b.

228. See the discussion of the controversy over the true character of *jīvitendriya* in P. S. Jaini, "Buddha's prolongation of life", Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 21, 1958, pp. 550-551.

229. Prahlad Pradhan, "A note on Abhidharmasamuccaya Bhāṣya and its author Sthiramati (?)", Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 35.1-2, 1950, pp. 34 ff.

230. The original (largely erroneous) description of the ms. given by Sankrtyayana may be found in Rahula Sankrtyayana, "Sanskrit palm-leaf mss. in Tibet", Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 21, and 1935, p. 35.

231. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 17, 1976.

232. Some of this material is listed and annotated by Noriaki Hakamaya in his bibliographical introductions to these texts found in Volumes 12 and 13 of *Tibetan Tripiṭaka Sde Dge Edition Bstan Hgyur Sems Tsam*, compiled and edited by K. Hayashima, J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi and N. Hakamaya (Tokyo 1980).

233. This eightfold proof has been studied by Noriaki Hakamaya, "Alayashiki sonzai no hachi ronsho ni kansuru shobunken" ("Materials concerning the eightfold proof of the existence of the *ālayavijñāna*"),

Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyogakubu Kenkyu Kiyo/Journal of the Faculty of Buddhism of Komazawa University 36, 1978, pp. 1-26. This article discusses in detail the parallels between this section of the ASBh and the *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī*. A. Charlene S. McDermott's briefer study of the same issue (A. C. S. McDermott, "Asaṅga's defense of *ālayavijñāna*. Of catless grins and sundry related matters", Journal of Indian Philosophy 2, 1973, pp. 167-174) contains some perceptive philosophical discussion. Other illuminating materials may be found in the first chapter of Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*, conveniently available in Étienne Lamotte's French translation.

234. Some discussion of the philosophical issues raised here has been provided by Noriaki Hakamaya, "*Nirodhasamāpatti*--its historical meaning in the Vijñaptimātratā system", Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 23.2, 1975, pp. 33-43, and more recently by Paul Griffiths, "On being mindless: the debate on the reemergence of consciousness from the attainment of cessation in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam and its commentaries", Philosophy East and West 33, 1983, pp. 379-394.

235. This section of the ASBh reads very like a summary of Asaṅga's *Śrāvakabhūmi* (ed. Karunesha Shukla, 439.9-443.11) and provides some evidence that the author of the ASBh was acquainted with that work. The discussion in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* is the only other analysis of this sevenfold category that I have been able to locate; it appears to have been a specifically Yogācāra creation.

236. For a recent excellent discussion of the problems involved in translating these terms see Michael M. Broido, "*Abhipraya* and implication in Tibetan linguistics", Journal of Indian Philosophy 12, 1984, pp. 1-34.

237. A largely parallel discussion of these categories may be found in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra* 12.19-23.

238. For the standard definitions see the materials gathered, discussed and translated into French by Étienne Lamotte in the third volume of his translation of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*. See also Asvabhāva's *Mahāyānasaṁgrahopanibandhana* D /sense-)-tsan /ri 2803ff/P Sems-Tsam LI 338b3ff and the same author's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāraṭīkā* (Komazawa Daigaku Bukyogakubu Kenkyu Kiyo/Journal of the Faculty of Buddhism of Komazawa University 41, 1983, pp. 2-36.

239. A close parallel to these definitions may be found in the second chapter of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*. See Étienne Lamotte's translation, Chapter 2, #20.

240. For an introductory discussion of Indian inferential schemata see the chapter on "Good Reasons in Philosophical Discussions" in Karl H. Potter, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1963; Delhi 1991, 1999), pp. 56-92. More detailed discussions--also of more relevance to specifically Buddhist ideas--may be found in some of Douglas Dunsmore Daye's works. See Bibliography (3rd edition) for references.

241. This outline of the errors involved in postulating a self is of common occurrence in Indian philosophical literature. The fullest and most standard form of this analysis occurs in Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* (T. 120 ff.; see Louis de la Vallée Poussin's edition and translation) where a sevenfold analysis rather than this fourfold one is employed.

242, Available in Tibetan as P. 5531. The only information about this work in Western languages, to my knowledge, is contained in an article by Noriaki Hakamaya, "Asvabhāva's and Sthiramati's commentaries on the MSA, XIV, 34-35", Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 27.1, 1978, pp. 491-487.

243. Shanti Bhiksu Shastri, "Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa of Vasubandhu", Indian Historical Quarterly 32, 1956, pp. 368-385.

244. Passages are studied in D. S. Ruegg, Journal of Indian Philosophy 5, 1977, pp. 30-32; Y. Kajiyama, Asiatische Studien 43.1, 1992, pp. 212-221; J. Takasaki and P. Griffiths in N. K. Wagle and F. Watanabe (eds.), *Studies in Buddhism in Honour of Professor A. K. Warder* (Toronto 1993), pp. 149-159; G. M. Nagao in *Indianisme et Bouddhisme offerts à Msgr. Étienne Lamotte* (Louvain-la-Neuve 1980), pp. 245-258; P. S. Jaini in *In the Mirror of Memory* (ed. J. Gyatso) (Albany, N.Y. 1992), pp. 47-60.

245. Yuichi Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 12-13, 1968-69, p. 197, expresses doubt that this work is actually by Sthiramati.

246. Chinese: *Ta-pao-tsi-ching*, compiled and translated by Bodhiruci between 693-713, 120 fascicules. Taisho No. 310 (1-49). Tibetan: *Hphags padkon mchog brtsegs pa chen poāi chos kyi rnam graṁs leāu ston phrag brgya pa,* Cases, Dkon brtsegs 1-6, Peking Ed. No. 760 (1-49). Arrangement of the *sūtra*s in the Tibetan version seems to have followed after the Chinese version.

247.*Kāśyapaparivarta-Ṭīkā*: Chinese translation: *Ta-pao-tsing-lun*, translated by Bodhiruci (between 508-537). Taisho No. 1523 (Vol. 26, pp.

204a-230c). Tibetan translation: *Hphags pa dkon mchog brtsegs pa chen po chos kyi rnam grans leāu ston_phrag brgya pa las āod sruris kyi leāyāi rgya cher āgrel pa (Ārya-mahāratnakūṭa-dharmaparyāya-śatasāhasrikāparivartakāśyapaparivarta-Ṭīkā)*. Peking Edition No. 5510 (Reprint Ed. Vol. 105, pp. 153.5.1 - 196.2.7.7.

248. Tib. Peking Repr. p. 196.2.6.

249. *The Kāśyapaparivarta, a Mahāyānasūtra of the Ratnakūṭa Class, edited in the Original Sanskrit, in Tibetan and in Chinese,* by Baron A. von Stael-Holstein, Shanghai 1926. The editor divides the whole *sūtra* into 167 sections (pp. 1-166) and in each section the Sanskrit text and parallel passages in Tibetan and four Chinese translations are provided. Hereafter, in referring to the *sūtra*, this section numbering is used.

On this *sūtra* see Friedrich Weller, *Index to the Tibetan translation of the Kāśyapaparivarta* (Harvard Sino-Indian Series, Vol. 1, pt. 1) 1935; *Zum Kāśyapaparivarta*, Heft 1: Mongolischer Text, Berlin 1962; ibid., Heft 2; Verdeutschung des sanskrit-tibetischen Texts, Berlin 1965. Also see Gadjin M. Nagao's Japanese translation in the *Daijo Butten,* vol. 9, Tokyo 1974.

250. There are four Chinese translations: 1. Han version, tr. by Lokakṣema, T. 350; 2. Tsin version, tr. anonymous, T. 351; 3. Ts'in version, tr. anonymous, T. 310 (43); T. 351; 4. Sung version, tr. by Che hou (Dānapāla), T. 352. Of them, 4. Sung version is identical with the Sanskrit edition and Tibetan translation, while 3. Ts'in version includes sections on Samantāloka's questions (secs. 150-156) but lacks secs. 157-165, 2. Tsin version lacks Samantāloka's questions and others, and 1. Han version lacks all after section 150 with additions of secs. 35, 53, 62, 91, and 107.

251. Chinese tr.: *Yü-chia-shih-ti-lun*, tr. by Hsüan tsang, Tisho No. 1579, fasc. 79-89, Vol. 30, pp. 738c - 747b. Tib. tr.: *rNal ābyor syod paāi sa rnam par gtan la dbab pa bsdu ba*, Bam pos. 41-43, Peking Ed. No. 5539, Repr. Vol. 111, pp. 110.2.1 - 118.5.8. It consists of the *Viniścaya* on the term "*bodhisattvapiṭaka*" in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.

252. Parallelism between *Ṭīkā* and *YBh* was early noticed by Tun-lun in his commentary on *YBh* (Taisho No. 1828, Vol. 42, p. 793c - 794a). Also see Tsukinowa, Kenryu: *Kohon Daihoshakukyo ni tsuite (On the Old Ratnakūṭasūtra)* (in Japanese), *Butten no Hihanteki Kenkyu* (Kyoto 1971), pp. 393-407.

As for the priority between the two texts, some scholars are of the opinion that *YBh* utilized the present work, but this is quite unlikely.

It is difficult to fix the date of *YBh* but it is probably some time in the early fifth century at the latest. This is inferred from the date of the Chinese translation of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (before 433, by Dharmakṣema), in which is suggested the existence of all five parts of the *YBh*. The date of Sthiramati, on the other hand, is usually held to be 510-570 A.D., but this date is too late to be that of the author of the *Ṭīkā*, since its Chinese translation was made between 508-537. We should, therefore, consider a wrong attribution of the Tib. version or the existence of another Sthiramati.

253. *Ṭīkā*, Taisho Vol. 24, 204a; Peking, Repr. Vol. 105, pp. 153.5.6 - 154.1.6.

254. *Ṭīkā*, ibid. 204a; Peking, p. 153.5.3-6.

255. A different kind of interpretation is given in the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*, T.31, 141c-142a.

256. On this section see Takeuchi, Shoko: "Kāśyapaparivarta no Chudo Setsu o megutte (On the doctrine of the Middle Way in the Kāśyapaparivartā" (in Japanese), Ryukoku Daigaku Ronshu 38, 1967, pp. 55-78.

257. On this section see Jikido Takasaki, *Nyoraizo Shiso no keisei (Formation of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory)* (in Japanese) (Tokyo 1974), pp. 453-465.

258. See Takasaki, ibid., pp. 465-474.

259. See P. S. Jaini, "*Prajñā* and *dṛṣṭi* in the Vaibhāṣika system", in Lewis Lancaster (ed.), *Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems. Studies in Honor of Edward Conze*, Berkeley Buddhist Series No. 1 (Berkeley, Calif. 1977), pp. 403-417.

260. P. S. Jaini, "The Sautrāntika theory of *bīja*", Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 22, 1959, pp. 236-249.

261. Sukumar Dutt, op. cit., p. 291.

262. K. R. Norman, *Pāli Literature*, op. cit., p. 133. but cf. von Hinüber, op. cit., pp. 142-143, who is inclined to date this work into the ninth century. Furthermore, he contends that Upasena "borrows material from Dhammapāla" (p. 143) which if correct would place this Upasena's date after Dhammapāla's, which seems to be around 970 (although von Hinüber dates Dhammapāla much earlier).

263. Notably also by Saṁghabhadra in *Nyāyānusāra*, Chapter 50, cf. La Valée Poussin, Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques 5.

264. *Abhisamayālaṁkāra* II. 10b.

265. This attribution of Yaśomitra's seems rather unlikely, as *Kośa* IX is certainly anterior to the *Pañcaskandhaka*, and the self-reference is rather to K*ośa* I, as Vasubandhu himself indicates.
266. Tom J. F. Tillemans, "Dharmakīrti and Tibetans on *adṛśyānupalabdhihetu*", Journal of Indian Philosophy 23, 1995, p. 129. See also Tillemans, "Pre-Dharmakīrti commentators on Dignāga's definition of a thesis (*pakṣalakṣaṇa*)", *The Buddhist Forum Volume III* London 1994), pp. 295-305, and Shoryu Katsura, "Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on *adarśanamātra* and *anupalabdhi*", Asiatische Studien 46.1, 1992, pp. 222-231.
267. The following paragraph is quoted from Ernst Steinkellner, "Bemerkungen zu Īśvarasena's Lehre vom Grund", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 10, 1966, p. 84.
268. D.S. Ruegg,"Ārya and Bhadanta Vimuktisena on the gotra-theory", in Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 12-13, 1968-69, p. 305, note 6.
269. ibid., p. 307

GLOSSARY-INDEX

1.Heinz Bechert, "Mahāyāna literature in Sri Lanka: the early phase", in L. Lancaster (ed.), *Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems* (Berkeley, Calif. 1977), pp.·362-364.

2.H.D.Sankalia, *The University of Nālandā* (Delhi 1972).

3.Ibid., p. 40.

4.Ibid.